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2Abstract
This thesis analyses how Italy succeeded in fulfilling the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria agreed upon at the Maastricht conference in late 1991. It is 
argued that economic policy reform in Italy between 1992 and 1998 has to be 
understood primarily as the result of two sets of factors: international financial and 
political pressure; and domestic political and socio-economic institutions. The 
institutionally grounded concept of ‘executive strength’ is regarded as particularly 
important, as ‘weak’ Italian governments had been the main reason for unsustainable 
economic policies in the past.
Methodologically, the study uses an historical-institutionalist approach to explain 
institutional and policy reform. From both an empirical and theoretical perspective, 
successful macroeconomic convergence during the 1992-98 period represents an 
anomaly. Hence the study of successful policy reform can be regarded as a ‘deviant 
case study’ which is implicitly comparative in nature.
The thesis analyses in a historically-detailed manner institutional and policy reforms 
in the four most relevant policy areas, that is, budgetary policy, pension reform, 
private and public sector wage policies, and monetary and exchange rate policy. It is 
argued that policy reforms in these four areas made an important contribution to 
monetary and fiscal convergence.
The study finds that the obstructive character of domestic institutions -  and 
especially executive weakness - was overcome thanks to international pressure. 
Nonetheless, domestic institutions continued to affect policy outcomes. By 
comparing the French and Italian macroeconomic policy regimes, the concluding 
chapter provides a second-line defence in favour of the domestic-institutional and 
‘executive strength’ accounts.
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71 INTRODUCTION: ITALY, EMU AND THE POLITICS 
OF MONETARY AND FISCAL CONVERGENCE
This thesis analyses how Italy succeeded in fulfilling the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria agreed upon at the Maastricht conference in December 1991. It 
is argued that economic policy reform between 1992 and 1998 has to be understood 
primarily as the result of the interaction of two sets of factors: international financial 
and political pressure; and domestic political and socio-economic institutions.
The study of macroeconomic convergence and domestic institutions is of great 
importance for several reasons. First, an examination of the factors that influenced 
macroeconomic convergence will shed light on the sustainability of Italian economic 
policies. A conceptual framework for understanding convergence will thus provide 
an analytical tool for evaluating whether Italian membership of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) will be viable in the long run. Second, a study of 
macroeconomic convergence in the context of increasing internationalisation will 
add to the current theoretical debate on how the ‘international’ and the ‘domestic’ 
interact and what role domestic institutions play in the context of increasing 
economic interdependence (Keohane and Milner 1996; Milner 1997). The case study 
of Italian macroeconomic reform will also evaluate the theoretical and empirical 
relevance of convergence theories that posit that economic internationalisation ieads 
to an increasing homogenisation of both macroeconomic policies and 
macroeconomic policy-making institutions. Third, a study of Italian macroeconomic 
policy reform will provide clues as to how a traditional ‘macroeconomic under­
performer’ managed to overcome domestic obstacles and achieve major 
macroeconomic reform. This will provide more general insights into the conditions 
that affect the initiation and content of economic policy reform.
On 1 January 1999, eleven European Union (EU) member countries formally 
created EMU. The creation of a single currency marked the end of a process of 
intergovernmental monetary co-operation that had begun in the late 1960s. Attempts 
to create intra-European exchange rate stability such as the Werner plan, the ‘snake 
in the dollar tunnel’ and the ‘snake’ were followed by the creation of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The EMS turned out to be more successful than 
previous attempts to stabilise intra-European exchange rates (Gros and Thygesen 
1998; Ungerer 1997). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EMS even evolved
8into a quasi-fixed exchange rate system and member countries increasingly aligned 
their monetary policies on German monetary policy. As inflation rates converged to 
German levels, realignments became less necessary. However, the degree of 
convergence differed among member countries.
Despite overall increasing convergence, persisting dissatisfaction with the 
asymmetric nature of the system, which placed the burden of adjustment on the 
‘weak currency’ countries, became increasingly vocal and led to several reforms of 
the international institutional framework, such as the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of 
1987 and the Franco-German Council of 1988. Partly as a response to the failure of 
these reforms to eliminate the asymmetry, the idea of closer monetary co-operation 
emerged in the late 1980s. This eventually led to negotiations to create an Economic 
and Monetary Union and finally to an agreement on the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) in December 1991. The TEU provided for - among other things - the creation 
of EMU in three stages by 1997 or, at the latest, 1999 (Gros and Thygesen 1998; 
Moravcsik 1998).
In order to qualify for stage 3 (that is, EMU membership), countries were 
required to fulfil so-called convergence criteria. Article 109j obliged prospective 
members to observe the following criteria:
(1) the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be apparent from a rate 
of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best performing member states in 
terms of price stability;
(2) the sustainability of the government financial position; this will be apparent from 
having achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive as 
determined in accordance with Article 104c(6);
(3) the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing 
against the currency of any other member state;
(4) the durability of convergence achieved by the member state and of its participation 
in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System being reflected in 
the long-term interest rate levels.
A separate protocol clarified that the inflation rate must not exceed - over a 
period of one year before the examination of the fulfilment of the criteria - the 
average of the three best-performing countries by more than 1.5 percentage points. 
Long-term interest-rates were allowed a larger margin of two percentage points 
(Gros and Thygesen 1998: 432).
\
9On 3 May 1998, the Council of the European Union took the decision to create 
EMU. All the fifteen EU member countries, except for Greece, Sweden, the UK and 
Denmark, became founding members of EMU. These four countries did not join 
EMU for various reasons: Greece did not meet the convergence criteria; Sweden 
chose an informal opt-out by not adhering to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
in the two-year run-up to EMU; and Denmark and the UK had negotiated an opt-out 
clause in the Maastricht Treaty, which did not commit them to joining EMU.
To the surprise of many observers, Italy became a founding member of EMU. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Italy was facing major fiscal problems.1 At the 
same time, it had been unable to achieve the same degree of monetary convergence 
within the ERM as most other member countries. Notwithstanding current 
macroeconomic problems, the Italian government under Prime Minister Giulio 
Andreotti signed the TEU in December 1991, thus committing Italy to respect the 
convergence criteria. Given that public debt as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) stood at more than 100 per cent and that a budget deficit of 9.3 per cent of 
GDP was expected for the year (which was in fact over-shot), it was not quite clear 
how the Italian government would be able to honour this commitment (Daniels 1993; 
Istituto Affari Intemazionali 1993: 128).
The TEU negotiations were concluded in December 1991, the Treaty was 
signed by the heads of state in February 1992 and came into force on 1 November 
1993. It was approved by the Italian cabinet in April 1992 and ratified by the Senate 
in September and the Chamber of Deputies in October 1992. Naturally the Treaty did 
not oblige member countries to meet the Maastricht criteria. However, as there was 
never any doubt that Italy would ratify the TEU and seek EMU membership, the 
convergence period effectively began with the signing of the TEU. At that time, there 
was little doubt about the practical implications that the meeting of the convergence 
criteria would have for macroeconomic policy (cf Verdun in Pochet 1998).
It was only due to a major macroeconomic effort starting in the early 1990s 
that Italy was able to meet the deficit criteria and make considerable progress in 
terms of stabilising and then reducing public debt by 1997-98. Although Italy’s 
government debt exceeded the limit set by TEU, Italy benefited from the ‘dynamic
1 Italy was not the only country that did not respect the monetary and fiscal criteria in the early 1990s. 
However, Italian macroeconomic indicators exceeded the reference values so considerably that it
10
interpretation’ that stipulated a reference value equal or less than 60 per cent of GDP 
“unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace” (TEU, Art. 109j). Italy also met the monetary criteria: Italy had re­
entered the ERM in November 1996 and it met the inflation and long-term interest 
rate targets (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1998). Thus Italian 
macroeconomic policies during the 1990s not only defied the predictions of 
observers at the time but - as will be demonstrated below - also represented a puzzle 
in light of political-institutional theories of economic policy.
In order to demonstrate that Italian convergence policies do indeed require an 
in-depth explanation, I first review the academic literature regarding the various 
aspects of European monetary co-operation and integration. Then I briefly discuss 
the possible relevance of domestic-institutional approaches to macroeconomic 
policy. I argue that Italy’s macroeconomic achievement in the 1990s represents a 
puzzle with respect to these theories. The research design and methodology of this 
study are outlined in the last section.
1.1 Economic and System-Centred Explanations o f Monetary Co­
operation and Integration
International-political and economic approaches are the natural starting point for 
explaining policies of monetary co-operation and integration. Traditionally the 
International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) literature has 
focused on the political or economic characteristics of the international system or has 
relied on the notion of national interest to explain a country’s (foreign) economic 
policies (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]; Waltz 1979). However, in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s approaches that focused on the benefits and costs of co-operation rather 
than on political power alone became more prominent (Keohane and Nye 1977; 
Keohane 1984; Krasner 1983). Finally, economic theory accounts of monetary co­
operation were developed from the 1960s onwards (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; 
Kenen 1969). All of these approaches stress the overriding importance of systemic- 
level variables for international monetary co-operation and integration. The most
seemed virtually impossible to meet the criteria by 1998 -  let alone by 1996 (that is, the earliest 
possible EMU starting date).
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representative accounts of monetary co-operation are briefly discussed here: 
hegemonic stability theory, neo-liberal institutionalism and the various approaches 
related to the capital mobility hypothesis.
One influential strand of the EPE literature, the so-called hegemonic stability 
theory, argues that the stability (or instability) of an international economic order is 
the result of the presence (or absence) of a hegemonic country willing and able to 
uphold the rules consistent with this order. Hegemonic stability theory comes in three 
varieties with respect to international monetary co-operation. Kindleberger (1973) 
stresses the benign function of a hegemonic country in the international economic 
system: the hegemon acts as a stabiliser and provides public goods, such as for 
example monetary stability. Gilpin (1981) emphasises the military-coercive nature of 
hegemony: the hegemonic country resorts to the use of force, or at least the threat of 
the use of force, and enforces the ‘rules of the game’. A third variant highlights the 
ideological aspect of hegemonic power (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Hegemonic 
countries use ideology to create consensus and thus exercise a socialising influence.
Considerable doubt has been cast on the relevance of these theories in the case 
of European monetary co-operation and integration. It has been argued that Germany 
-  as a potential hegemon - failed the test for the first two accounts of hegemonic 
stability theory: it more often than not pursued domestic objectives instead of acting 
as a system-stabiliser; moreover, it did not possess a sufficient degree of military and 
economic dominance to fulfil a hegemonic-coercive function on the European level 
(cf McNamara 1998: 23-29). As I will show in more detail in Section 1.2, the third, 
ideology-centred variant cannot provide a sufficient explanation of monetary 
integration either -  at least as far as monetary and fiscal convergence is concerned.
Neo-liberal institutionalism, the capital mobility hypothesis and economic 
theory approaches are equally insufficient to explain satisfactorily monetary co­
operation and integration (in the context of EMU) -  as will be shown below. Neo­
liberal institutionalism emphasises the possibility of co-operation in the context of 
international anarchy and increasing economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye 
1977; Keohane 1984). It argues that the possibility of co-operation exists despite 
anarchy and the absence of a hegemonic country. Monetary co-operation is possible
2 With respect to monetary policy, ‘co-operation’ is defined as a situation where states retain ultimate 
authority over monetary policy. ‘Integration’ describes a situation or process where this authority is 
partially or totally transferred to the supra-national level.
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because, by reducing transaction costs and uncertainty, it guards against opportunism 
in the form of beggar-thy-neighbour policies (that is, competitive devaluations) and 
thus makes the game of co-operation a positive-sum-game. On that account, the 
institutionalisation of European monetary co-operation provides EU member 
countries with a framework that prevents them from ‘cheating’. Moving from the 
EMS regime to EMU could hence be interpreted as a permanent ‘locking in’ of 
commitments.
Finally, the so-called capital mobility hypothesis stresses the importance of 
systemic variables for an understanding of monetary co-operation. Partly overlapping 
with neo-liberal institutionalism, this approach focuses on the benefits countries can 
derive from monetary co-operation. The structural power of financial markets and 
increasing trade interdependence are regarded as primary sources of exchange rate 
co-operation (Dyson 1994: 260-97). In short, the argument goes as follows: in a 
system of free trade and free movement of capital (for example, Common Market), a 
country (with the exception of the hegemonic country) cannot pursue an independent 
monetary policy and a policy of fixed exchange rates at the same time. In the interest 
of preserving open capital markets, countries have an incentive to sacrifice an 
independent monetary policy in favour of fixed exchange rates. This situation is also 
known as the ‘inconsistent quartet’ (cf. Padoa-Schioppa 1996). On this account, full­
blown monetary union as compared to a system of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates may provide further economic benefits than the ones already achieved through 
exchange rate pegging (c f Gros and Thygesen 1998: chapter 7).
Related to the capital mobility hypothesis are various economic theory 
approaches such as the theory of optimal currency areas. These approaches focus 
exclusively on the economic costs and benefits of monetary co-operation in terms of 
its distributional consequences. Economic theory suggests that a country’s economic 
characteristics should have an effect on its exchange rate policy. With increasing 
openness an economy tends to become more sensitive to changes in the external 
value of the currency. This suggests that with increasing openness a country should 
have an increasing interest in a competitively valued as well as a relatively stable 
currency (Frieden 1991). More generally, theories of optimum currency areas have 
stressed the relevance of a high degree of factor mobility (Mundell 1961), the size 
and openness of the economy (McKinnon 1963) and the degree of commodity 
diversification (Kenen 1969) -  which are all important because they can function as
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insulation mechanisms against a variety of economic shocks. Empirical research 
based on the theory of optimal currency areas has shown that openness and size do 
indeed increase the likelihood that a country pegs its currency (cf. Edison and Melvin 
1990).
In sum, all of these systemic approaches are to a certain extent plausible. 
However, although there is considerable empirical evidence that confirms the link 
between increasing levels of trade and financial integration on the one hand, and 
lower degrees of currency fluctuation in Europe (Frieden 1996a) on the other, neither 
the capital mobility hypothesis nor neo-liberal institutionalism can satisfactorily 
explain the successful pursuit of macroeconomic convergence.
Regardless of whether they stress economic or political conditions, the problem 
with systemic theories is that they do not directly address the issue of agency and 
individual interest. Benefits and costs of monetary co-operation are derived from the 
political and economic characteristics of the international system. However, first, 
these incentives tend to be ambiguous and indeterminate as a result of the 
functionalist reasoning that underpins their derivation (De Grauwe 1997). For 
example, increasing openness increases the incentives for both increasing stability 
and a competitive exchange rate, without suggesting which one is of greater interest 
to a given country. Second, the analysis of costs and benefits is primarily ‘country- 
centred’ and disregards the differentiated effect monetary co-operation has on 
domestic groups and domestic conflict over exchange rate policy (Frieden 1991, 
1994). Third, these approaches are generally unable to explain divergence in policy 
on monetary co-operation, especially when countries occupy similar systemic 
positions. For example, why was Italy ‘uninterested’ in achieving the same degree of 
macroeconomic convergence in the 1980s as France, even though both countries 
occupied very similar structural positions in the international economic system?
The same critique applies, generally speaking, to all other system-centred 
(political or economic) accounts of monetary co-operation (Henning 1998; Dyson 
1994: 304-306) as well as to state-as-unitary-actor approaches to monetary 
integration (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988; Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz 1993; 
Mazzucelli 1997). (The two approaches are of course the two sides of the same coin.) 
Seeking to explain a state’s policy on monetary co-operation, the former approach 
analyses the incentives and constraints created by the international political and 
economic system, while the latter approach focuses on a state’s attempt to maximise
14
(political or economic) benefits. All these accounts can potentially ratiovlise why 
countries were willing to co-operate on monetary matters, give up monetary 
sovereignty and pursue policies of macroeconomic convergence. But they fall 
equally short of explaining different policies on monetary co-operation.
Moreover, these system-centred approaches are to a certain degree premised on 
the assumption that the state is a rational actor with a fixed preference hierarchy and 
the ability to pursue policies consistent with its national interests. By dismissing the 
domestic level in favour of international constraints, systemic as well as state-centric 
approaches fail to explain how states were able to implement successfully 
convergence policies. Naturally the state-as-unitary-actor assumption is an analytical 
tool rather than an ontological fact. But it is precisely when an analytical tool cannot 
explain real world phenomena that it needs to be substituted - or at least 
supplemented - with other tools.
In order to understand macroeconomic convergence adequately, it is necessary 
to take a Weberian approach to the state, according to which “[t]he state is neither 
unified nor does it have an ability to act. The state is nothing but a collection of 
institutions and rules” (Smith 1993: 49). This definition of the state allows for the 
analysis of how preferences are formulated, policy decisions taken and policies 
implemented. This seems a particularly plausible approach to adopt when it comes to 
economic policy (low politics) as opposed to security policy (high politics). As 
Krasner (1978) put it:
There is, however, no reason to assume that foreign economic policy-making is 
identical with foreign political policy-making. Any economic decision is likely to affect 
groups within the society differentially, creating the potential for societal conflict. For 
this reason it is questionable to assume that policy can be understood solely by 
examining the motivations and perceptions of central decision-makers. In a political 
system where state power is weak and fragmented, foreign as well as domestic 
economic policy can be influenced or even determined by societal groups (pp. 70-71).
Thus on descriptive as well as conceptual grounds, there are reasons to reject 
systemic reductionism. As Gourevitch (1986) argued in a seminal study of 
international economic crises:
The issue, then, is not whether the international system shapes domestic politics but 
how and through what mechanisms. Unless the international situation is completely 
coercive, as may be the case with foreign occupation, countries do have choices. The 
selection they make from among those choices depends on domestic politics, on the
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distribution of power within countries and the various factors that influence it - societal 
forces, intermediate institutions, state structure, ideology. The international economy 
affects national policies by acting upon domestic actors (p. 65; similarly Zysman 1983:
56).
In other words, the opening of the black box of the state allows for an analysis 
of both preference formation and domestic conflict over policy. It also allows for an 
analysis of how and why states were able to implement appropriate policies 
independent of their willingness to do so. This study avoids the shortcomings of 
systemic approaches and emphasises domestic preference formation and the 
government’s ability to implement policies in accordance with international 
commitments. These issues will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
More generally, this study also argues that the source of diverging policies can 
be found in diverging preferences and differing abilities to implement convergence 
policies. Two examples will have to suffice here to indicate the importance of 
domestic institutions and the corresponding inadequacy of purely systemic 
approaches to international monetary co-operation and macroeconomic convergence. 
Firstly, the example of Greece illustrates the relevance of a state’s ability to 
implement adequate convergence policies. The Greek government credibly professed 
its wish to become a founding member of EMU but failed to do so in 1999 because it 
was unable to achieve a sufficient degree of convergence. Secondly, the inability of a 
systemic-functional approach to account for diverging preferences is reflected in the 
empirical fact that some EU member countries did exhibit diverging preferences. 
Sweden, Denmark and the UK were unwilling to join EMU. Systemic approaches 
would have to resort to various, arbitrary ad hoc assumptions in order to explain 
these anomalies (see Grieco 1995).
In short, the inclusion of domestic politics and, more specifically, preference 
formation and implementation of macroeconomic policies into an analysis of 
monetary integration and macroeconomic convergence is necessary. But an 
unstructured analysis of domestic politics would be no less arbitrary than adding ad 
hoc assumptions to system-centred explanations of country preference formation. I 
thus argue below that a specific focus on domestic institutions is central for an 
adequate understanding of macroeconomic convergence.
4
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1.2 Domestic-Level Accounts o f  Monetary Integration
Haggard and Simmons (1987) state that:
[CJurrent theories of international regimes have ignored domestic political processes, in 
part because of the lure of parsimonious systemic theory. This neglect has extended to the 
issue of how regimes actually influence national policy choices [...]. There are both 
methodological and theoretical reasons to open the black box of domestic politics (p.
513).
However it is not entirely fair to say that TR theory has been solely concerned 
with systemic theory. The separation between the ‘international’ and the ‘domestic’ 
has never been that stark in IPE (Gourevitch 1978, 1996). In addition to systemic 
factors, IPE has traditionally emphasised three types of domestic accounts (Hall 
1986, 1997): society-centred, institution-centred and idea-centred explanations. I will 
argue that neither society-centred nor idea-centred accounts are sufficient to explain 
macroeconomic convergence unless they include a thorough analysis of the 
independent effect of institutions on macroeconomic policy.
Society-centred explanations of (foreign) economic policy generally regard 
government policy as the product of interest group influence. The interests of societal 
groups in turn are usually derived from the position of these groups relative to the 
international economic environment and hence closely related to the (expected) 
distributional consequences of economic policy decisions (Frieden 1991, 1994; 
Hefeker 1997). With regard to monetary co-operation and integration, this poses 
several problems. McNamara (1998: 32-42) has argued that the preferences with 
regard to European monetary co-operation are unstable and that moreover there is no 
empirical evidence that interest groups were the driving force behind EMU. Indeed, 
there is considerable evidence that the creation of both the EMS and EMU were 
driven by political rather than economic factors (Ludlow 1982; Story 1988; 
Mazzucelli 1997). Clearly, with respect to both EMS and EMU there were economic 
incentives for domestic interest groups to influence policy. But historical research 
has shown that interest groups only had an impact at critical junctures (such as 
regime reform) and that even then their impact differed across countries depending 
on national domestic-institutional characteristics (Kaltenthaler 1997).
More generally, there are two main problems with respect to pure interest- 
group approaches: domestic distributional consequences of exchange-rate co­
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operation are difficult to determine, and society-centred approaches neglect the 
importance institutions play in the domestic policy process.
First, the exact distributional consequences of exchange rate policy are difficult 
to determine (see Giovannini 1995; cf Frieden 1994a). Exchange rate policy not only 
affects domestic interest rates and inflation but also international competitiveness. It 
also tends to affect fiscal and wage policy. Put differently, as policy choices with 
respect to exchange rate policy have complex distributional consequences, the costs 
and benefits for domestic sectors or groups is highly situationally dependent. This is 
all the more true with regard to macroeconomic convergence, which is a much more 
complex process than simple exchange rate co-operation, as it directly affects fiscal 
policy and related areas.
A second major shortcoming of a pure society-centred approach is its neglect 
of the role of domestic institutions. As Kaltenthaler (1997, 1998) asserts, societal 
influence on the policy-making process depends on how influential interest groups 
are domestically; and their relative influence is largely a function of how the state 
and society are organised since the institutional characteristics of the state-society 
relationship largely determine the influence and access to the policy-making process 
of societal groups (Katzenstein 1976, 1977a, 1977b). Even though institutions are not 
the only factor determining societal influence, they tend to be a crucial, intervening 
vaiiable in the interest mediation process (cf Gowa 1988).
In short, analysing the benefits and costs of monetary integration for domestic 
interest groups and subsequently concluding that the groups -  notwithstanding the 
uncertainty regarding the distributional effects -  that stand to benefit were the 
driving factor behind integration is too simplistic. Since the influence of interest 
groups is at least partly determined by the institutional characteristics of the political 
system, one needs to take into account the effect of domestic institutions -  at least as 
a working hypothesis - and see how domestic institutions have played an empirically 
verifiable role in domestic policy formation.
Another major IPE approach is the idea-centred approach (Hall 1993; cf 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993). With regard to European monetary integration 
McNamara (1998) argues that the success of the ERM in terms of achieving 
exchange rate stability can be explained by the changing policy beliefs of decision­
makers. The change from what Ruggie (1982) called ‘embedded liberalism’ to 
‘competitive liberalism’, that is, broadly speaking, a shift from Keynesianism to
18
monetarism and German-style monetary policies, was a response to the increasing 
systemic constraints (especially increasing capital mobility) that national policy­
makers faced. However, various responses were theoretically (and practically) 
possible so that ultimately this shift has to be understood in terms of the policy­
makers’ economic ideas that evolved in response to policy failure - and thus in terms 
of a change in the dominant policy paradigm. As a result, other European countries 
sought to emulate German monetary policy.
While this may or may not explain the stability of the EMS relative to the 
‘snake’, as an explanation of integration and convergence, it is insufficient. First of 
all, even if one grants that all countries have come round to the idea of ‘competitive 
liberalism’, then this approach cannot explain why some countries decided to stay 
outside EMU, even though they have (or could have) fulfilled the convergence 
criteria. Secondly, and more importantly, at best this approach accounts for the 
willingness of policy-makers to create a monetary union. It does, however, disregard 
the capability aspect. That is, even if policy-makers have a preference for 
‘competitive liberalism’ (and hence for EMU), it still does not explain how EMU 
membership was achieved. The capacity of governments to implement convergence 
policies and qualify for EMU membership critically depends on a country’s ability to 
implement convergence policies (Walsh 1994). This is why an analysis of political 
institutions is indispensable.
For very much the same reason, Marxist-informed approaches fall short of 
providing an adequate explanation of EMU and especially convergence (Hueglin 
1992). In fact, a Structuralist Marxist approach takes into account domestic 
institutions to the extent that it regards the autonomy of the state as the bearer of the 
long-term interest of the capitalist class. However, this view is too deterministic and 
does not allow for institutional variation. Structuralist Marxism would regard the 
state under capitalist conditions of production as autonomous without, however, 
demonstrating how this autonomy is anchored in specific rules and institutions. By 
positing autonomy as a premise and by not allowing for a historically detailed 
analysis of how this autonomy is underpinned by a certain set of rules and 
institutions, Structuralist Marxism would have difficulties explaining the differences 
in attitudes of advanced capitalist Western European states towards monetary co­
operation. The diverging policies of France and the UK are only the most striking 
example of how attitudes differed.
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Similarly, Instrumental Marxism, which regards the state as the instrument of 
the capitalist class, disregards institutions altogether and would thus fall under the 
distributional-societal approaches discussed above. Similarly, bureaucratic models or 
individual leadership seem to be more useful for explaining negotiation processes 
(Dyson 1998; Kaltenthaler 1997, 1998) rather than the success and failure of co­
operation and convergence. Bureaucratic struggles or personal leadership may be 
important at certain stages of the integration process. However, fiscal policy, for 
example, is not the exclusive domain of a bureaucratic elite, let alone an individual 
leader. In democratic regimes, parliaments usually have the last word with regard to 
budgetary decisions. Whether the bureaucratic elite dominates monetary policy­
making depends at least as much on elite cohesion as on the wider political- 
institutional structure of the monetary policy-making regime (and especially the 
existence of an independent central bank). Hence, if anything, whether or not a 
bureaucracy or clearly defined elite determines monetary co-operation and 
convergence will depend on the wider institutional framework within which policies 
are formulated, fought over and implemented.
This suggests the need for a sector-specific analysis of domestic institutions. 
This is not to say that ‘domestic institutions’ can fully explain Italy’s successful 
convergence. Rather, discounting them as a crucial intervening variable makes any 
account inadequate. This claim is tentatively supported by institutionalist theories of 
macroeconomic policy.
1.3 Institutional Influences on Macroeconomic Policy Outcomes
The institution-centred approach to political economy posits that institutions can 
explain or, at least, strongly influence policy outcomes. This approach has provided 
important insights with regard to how and why institutions affect economic policy 
{cf. Katzenstein 1976, 1977a, 1997b; Hall 1986; Zysman 1983; Henning 1994; 
Walsh 1994). The recent interest in how domestic institutions affect (foreign) 
economic policy has more explicitly drawn on comparative methodology (Keohane 
and Milner 1996; Milner 1997), thus offering the possibility of a synthesis of 
comparative politics and IR theory (Milner 1998; Caporaso 1998). The two best- 
known approaches that are relevant with regard to macroeconomic convergence are 
briefly sketched here (see Chapter 2 for more detailed discussion).
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First, certain domestic-institutional arrangements are more conducive to fiscal 
discipline, as measured in terms of the size of budget deficits and the size of public 
debt, than others. Grilli et al. (1991) find that ‘representational’ (as opposed to 
majoritarian and presidential) democracies, and fractionalised party systems, are 
associated with high public debt. Similarly Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) 
conclude that there is a correlation between the size of budget deficits and public 
debt on the one hand, and the political characteristics of governments on the other 
hand. More specifically, “[wjeak and divided governments (as evidenced by the 
expected tenure in office, and by the number of political parties that share power in 
the governing coalition) have been less effective in reducing the budget deficit than 
have stable and majority-party governments” (Roubini and Sachs 1989a: 102). Both 
results are consistent with the basic insight that ‘strong’, single-party governments 
are much more successful at controlling fiscal policy than ‘weak’, multi-party 
coalition governments.
Although the Sachs-Roubini results have been challenged {cf Edin and 
Ohlsson 1991), the majority of studies arrive at largely similar conclusions (Borrelli 
and Royed 1995; for survey c f  Milesi-Ferretti 1996; Alesina and Perotti 1999). That 
is, broadly speaking, strong and stable governments (characterised by a low number 
of coalition parties, a ‘reductive’ electoral regime, and a high degree of cabinet 
cohesion) are capable of decisive action on the fiscal front and thus are able to pursue 
responsible fiscal policies over the long term. In contrast, weak, unstable 
governments do not possess this capacity. Hence they delay decisive action, which 
leads to persistent budget deficits and the accumulation of public debt. These results 
suggest that domestic political institutions matter, for whether a government is strong 
or weak and whether a party system is characterised by a high or low degree of 
centralisation, will be strongly influenced by domestic-institutional arrangements, 
such as the nature of the electoral system or a parliamentary or presidential 
constitution.
While some studies have focused on formal political institutions, others 
focused in more detail on the rules and procedures that govern the budgetary policy­
making process. The expectation that ‘strong’ budgetary rules (such as formal laws 
limiting the influence of parliament on budgetary legislation, voting procedures that 
enhance the position of the executive, and provisions that attribute a dominant role to 
the prime and finance minister in the budgetary process) are associated with smaller
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deficits and lower debt has been confirmed by empirical tests (Von Hagen 1992; De 
Haan et a l 1999). Von Hagen (1992), for instance, creates a complex indicator3 to 
measure the impact of different budgetary rules and finds support for the so-called 
‘structural hypothesis’, according to which “[bjudgeting procedures lead to greater 
fiscal discipline if they give a strong prerogative to the prime minister or the finance 
minister, if they limit universalism, reciprocity, and parliamentary amendments, and 
facilitate strict execution of the budget law” (Von Hagen 1992: 37). This 
‘hierarchical-transparent’ type of budgetary rules contrasts with the ‘collegial- 
intransparent’ type, which is characterised by a weak position of the prime minister 
and finance minister in the budget process, ample opportunities for parliament to 
introduce amendments and so on.
In short, there is strong evidence that both formal-political and budgetary- 
institutional characteristics affect budgetary policy outcomes (also Hahm et al. 1996; 
Von Hagen 1992; Von Hagen and Harden 1994 for European countries; Kontopoulos 
and Perotti 1999 for OECD countries). Hence the claim that institutions ‘matter’ with 
regard to budgetary policy outcomes is well supported.
Another very influential domestic-institutional approach to macroeconomic 
policy that is concerned with the influence of central bank independence on 
monetary performance also found strong empirical support.4 For a number of reasons 
it is plausible to assume that central bank independence is positively correlated with 
price stability, the most important being central bankers’ preference for price 
stability as opposed to politicians’ interest in economic expansion. Statistical studies 
have confirmed that (in developed countries) greater central bank independence is 
conducive to lower inflation (Cuckierman et al. 1994; Grilli et al. 1991; for a survey 
of the literature see Eijffinger and De Haan 1996). Qualitative studies also tend to 
confirm the relationship between central bank independence and low inflation 
(Goodman 1992; Scharpf 1991). However, these studies also suggest that other 
political-institutional factors can affect policy outcomes. This is, for example,
3 The indicator takes into account: (1) the strength of the position of the prime minister'(or finance 
minister) in intra-government budgetary negotiations; (2) the limits (or lack thereof) to parliamentary 
amendments; (3) the type of parliamentary votes (item by item or global); (4) the timing of 
parliamentary votes; (5) the degree of transparency of the budget; and (6) the amount of flexibility in 
the implementation process.
4 Other factors such as labour market institutions and in particular the organisation of collective 
bargaining are of considerable importance with regard to wage policy, and thus indirectly, price 
stability (for detailed discussion see Section 2.4).
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reflected in the criticism that the exclusive focus on central bank independence as an 
‘institutional fix’ has received (Hall 1994; Posen 1993, 1998). Notwithstanding this 
critique, cross-national evidence strongly suggests that on average central bank 
independence has a tangible and predictable impact on price stability.
To summarise, there is a considerable amount of evidence that macroeconomic 
policy outcomes are affected by domestic-institutional characteristics of a country’s 
policy-making regime. However, a weakness of policy area-specific analyses is that 
they do not take into account possible ‘interaction effects’ {cf. Henning 1994; Iversen 
and Pontusson 2000). Such interaction effects can potentially be very important {cf. 
Parkin 1987; Burdekin and Laney 1988). For example, expansionary fiscal policies 
tend to put upwards pressure on prices. The interaction effect on the policy level in 
turn largely reflects interaction at the institutional level, which complicates an 
institutionalist interpretation of macroeconomic policy. For example, a strong, 
cohesive and insulated executive is capable of pursuing a low inflation monetary 
policy in spite of the fact that the central bank is not independent. Nonetheless, 
central bank independence is ‘on average’ associated with lower inflation. In other 
words, it is possible that a strong, cohesive government ‘neutralises’ the effect of 
‘central bank independence’. Similar interaction effects exist between wage 
bargaining institutions and monetary policy regimes with respect to monetary 
performance. Institutional and policy interaction make it more difficult to arrive at an 
institutionalist explanation of macroeconomic policy outcomes (especially in the 
context of a case study), as the economic policy outcomes are the result of not only 
one policy and one institution but of a combination of interaction effects on both the 
institutional and the policy level.
The intricate and complex ways in which institutions can affect policy 
outcomes may seem to cast doubt on the usefulness of the institutionalist approach. 
However, only because global policy outcomes, and at times outcomes in specific 
policy areas, can depend on complex interaction between institutions and policies 
does not mean that institutions do not matter. If anything, it means that the linking of 
policy outcomes to domestic institutions requires an historically detailed study of 
interaction effects on both the institutional and policy level. This calls for a 
methodological approach that is able to analyse historically complex phenomena and 
causal complexity (Ragin 1987). In what follows, I briefly discuss such a 
methodological approach and outline what it does and does not claim.
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1.4 Historical Institutionalism and (State Strength’
A historical-institutionalist approach can account for the interaction between various 
institutions as well as between institutional and non-institutional factors (Ikenberry 
1988; Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Moreover, historical 
institutionalism is central to an understanding of the role governments play with 
regard to domestic economic policy. This makes it the ideal framework for an 
analysis of Italian macroeconomic policy.
Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism stresses the importance of institutions for an understanding 
of social and political life (March and Olson 1984, 1989; North 1990). Historical 
institutionalism is quite distinct from other institutionalisms such as rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Thelen and 
Steinmo (1992) have provided the most concise account of historical institutionalism.
Historical institutionalism puts “the emphasis on intermediate institutions that 
shape political strategies, the ways institutions structure relations of power among 
contending groups in society, and especially the focus on the process of politics and 
policy-making within given institutional parameters” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 7). 
In this sense, historical institutionalism helps to open the black box of the state and 
remove the state-as-rational-and-unitary actor assumption as implicitly posited by 
systemic-functional approaches.
In its most extensive form historical institutionalism defines institutions as “the 
formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure 
the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” 
(Hall 1986: 19). In this study ‘institutions’ will be defined in a more narrow and less 
controversial sense, namely as “such features of the institutional context as the rules 
of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various 
branches of government, and the structure and organization of economic actors like 
trade unions” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). As I will discuss in Section 2.3 and 
demonstrate in Chapter 4, previous policy choices can -  under certain circumstances 
- also be regarded as ‘institutions’ from a historical-institutionalist point of view 
(also Pierson 1993).
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Contrary to many other approaches, historical institutionalism does not reify 
institutions. This has two implications. Firstly, institutions are never the immediate 
cause of policy outcomes. Under certain circumstances institutions will make 
outcomes more or less likely but they never predetermine outcomes (Weaver and 
Rockman 1993). Hence there is no presumption that the presence of institution A 
will necessarily bring about outcome B. Rather, institutions are regarded as shaping 
both the objectives of political actors and the distribution of power among them 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 6). In other words, institutions are intervening variables 
and, to the extent that they shape power relations and affect the costs and benefits of 
political action, they influence outcomes. Thus, taking into account the relationship 
between various relevant actors, historical institutionalism retains the ability to 
analyse agency. As Zysman has pointed out, “[a]ny useful structural [that is, 
institutionalist] approach must retain a capacity to analyze the interests of actors, 
their capacity to act and their influence on structure [that is, institutions]” (Zysman 
1983: 349). Historical institutionalism does exactly that by allowing for the 
incorporation of interest groups, public officials, international pressure and so on into 
an historically bounded analysis.
Secondly, historical institutionalism is explicitly concerned with institutional 
change (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Institutions not only influence policy outcomes 
but are themselves subject to change. This change may come about in response to a 
variety of factors such as - among others - international or domestic pressure 
(Krasner 1988). However, historical institutionalism holds that institutions are still 
characterised by a certain degree of inertia and that this inertia has an independent 
effect on policy outcomes. Otherwise they would be a mere epiphenomenon, that is, 
a reflection of international pressures or of the balance of power between domestic 
actors. Moreover, historical institutionalism claims that if institutional change takes 
place, it tends to be ‘path-dependent’ in that institutions can rarely be built from 
scratch. They always reflect to some extent prior institutional conditions (cf. notion 
of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ in Krasner 1988).
Taken together, this allows for the possibility of a dynamic analysis of the 
relationship between institutions, politics and policy outcomes. Precisely this ‘double 
aspect’ of institutions in terms of being both a dependent and independent variable - 
and hence in terms of being reproduced through individual or collective action as
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well as influencing individual and collective action (cf. Giddens 1984) - makes a 
detailed historical analysis of institutions and institutional change necessary.
In short, historical institutionalism provides a framework for analysing and 
explaining both “variation in political behavior and outcomes over time as well as 
across countries, and a framework for understanding the sources and consequences 
of institutional change” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 13). At the same time historical 
institutionalism focuses on how different variables are linked and this allows us to 
analyse causal complexity and historical contingency. By assigning an independent 
effect to domestic institutions, historical institutionalism stands in clear contrast to 
both systemic-functional and domestic interest-group accounts which tend to 
disregard the importance of domestic institutions.
The Political System, the State, and Executive Strength
Historical institutionalism is particularly well suited to understand the central role 
played by the executive with respect to macroeconomic policy. This is so because the 
relative influence of the executive on policy outcomes is strongly determined by the 
institutional characteristics of the political system as a whole. More specifically, the 
‘state strength’ literature argues that the autonomy and power of national 
governments relative to other domestic political actors is central for an understanding 
of policy outcomes (Katzenstein 1977a, 1977b; Krasner 1977). This literature is not 
always quite clear about what is meant by the term state. Confusingly, ‘state 
strength’ is generally defined as the “capacity of the executive to get its own way” 
(Zysman 1983: 296) in the face of pressures from other political and societal actors, 
such as political parties, parliament, unions, employer associations and so on. While 
I accept this definition of ‘state strength’ (meaning ‘executive strength’), I take the 
term state (without inverted commas) to refer more specifically to the entirety of the 
institutions of the state (executive, bureaucracy, legislature, judiciary). When a 
reference to the ‘state strength’ literature is made, ‘state’ {with inverted commas) will 
be used to indicate that the term actually denotes ‘executive’. ‘Government’ and 
‘executive’ are used interchangeably. ‘Executive strength’ refers then to the 
autonomy, power and capabilities of the executive in the policy process. Finally, the 
term ‘political system’ refers to state (as defined above) and all other political actors 
such as interest groups, political parties, media and so on.
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Thus, ‘state’ (or executive strength) captures the ability of the executive to 
formulate policies and assert control over outcomes in a relatively autonomous 
manner. This ability is to a large extent a function of “[t]he number and range of 
policy instruments [that] emerge from the differentiation of state and society and the 
centralization of each” (Katzenstein 1977b: 892) -  and hence of the institutional 
features of the state and the political system.
This means that the ‘state’ is strong if it is able to formulate and implement 
policies consistent with its own preferences. A weak ‘state’ is one where policies are 
the result of societal influence and thus do not represent the preferences of the 
executive. This analytical distinction between weak and strong ‘states’ needs to be 
qualified in several respects. First, ‘state strength’ is a question of degree.
The ability of leaders to mobilize domestic resources is a function of (a) the structure of 
the domestic political system and (b) the convergence between public and private 
interests [...]. The defining characteristic of a political system is the power of the state in 
relation to its own society. This power can be envisioned along a continuum ranging 
from weak to strong. The weakest kind of state is one which is completely permeated by 
pressure groups [...]. At the other extreme [is a state] which is able to remake the society 
and culture in which it exists; that is, to change economic institutions’ values and 
patterns of interactions among private groups. Such extraordinarily powerful states only 
exist immediately after major revolutions [when] the society is weak because existing 
patterns of behavior have been shattered (Krasner 1978: 296).
In other words there is no such thing as an all-powerful ‘state’ nor is there a 
totally weak ‘state’. ‘States’ are more or less powerful.
The Krasner quote introduces a second caveat, namely that variation in ‘state’ 
strength is not exclusively determined by the institutional insulation of the 
government and its bureaucracy; nor is it entirely defined in terms of its 
centralisation relative to societal groups as suggested by Katzenstein (1976, 1977a, 
1977b). To a certain extent strength and autonomy also depend on a number of other 
factors such as the incentives for groups to mobilise on a certain issues (cf. theory of 
collective action [Olson 1965]), the presence or absence of international regimes, or 
even the so-called ‘intellectual barriers to entry’, that is, the inability of individuals 
and groups to relate potential policy decisions to their own tangible interests (Gowa 
1988; Odell 1982: 347). Institutional insulation is important, however, to the extent 
that it raises the costs of interest groups to mobilise successfully for or against certain
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policies that have been decided within these institutions. Hence the question is not so 
much ‘do institutions matter’ but rather ‘when and how do institutions matter’ 
(Weaver and Rockman 1993; Kent 1993). This is consistent with the claims of 
historical institutionalism, as discussed above and as defended throughout this study, 
namely that institutions are important intervening variables but that they do not 
determine outcomes. The same is true for ‘state’ strength.
Third, executive strength is not a generalised capacity. It is possible that a 
‘state’ is strong in one policy area and weak in another. As Krasner (1977) has 
argued, for example, the American ‘state’ is weak in the realm of trade policy but 
relatively strong with regard to (international) monetary policy. The claim that ‘state’ 
strength seems to vary between issue areas is certainly theoretically and empirically 
uncontroversial. By implication this means that in order to determine the degree of 
‘state’ strength, each policy area has to be analysed in detail.
Fourth, it is not only possible that there is variation between policy areas, but 
that there is also variation between the various stages of the policy process within the 
same policy area. A ‘state’ could enjoy a very high degree of autonomy at the 
formulation stage but have considerable difficulties in enacting and implementing its 
decisions. In practice, however, it is more likely that strength at one stage is reflected 
in strength at another stage within a given policy area. This is plausible because, for 
example, a government that is weak at the legislative or implementation stage will 
presumably have to take into account other actors’ interests at the formulation stage.
Hence, in order to determine the importance of executive strength in relation to 
policy outcomes, it is important to analyse each stage of the policy process, that is, 
the degree of autonomy at the formulation stage, the capacity to have its preferences 
enacted (where necessary) at the legislative stage, and the strength to implement or 
enforce policies against the opposition of political and societal actors at the 
implementation stage. Respectively, executive insulation from outside influences, the 
relative power of the executive in relation to parliament and the government’s 
dependence on domestic groups in the implementation of policies will be important..
Overall, the degree to which an executive is able to contribute to shaping 
policy outcomes depends to a high degree on the institutional characteristics of the 
political system and, in particular, on the characteristics of the state as well as of the 
wider political system. In general it is reasonable to expect that the stronger the 
executive, the more it will affect policy outcomes relative to other actors. This
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influence varies across different areas and, even though it is not exclusively 
determined by institutional features, it is certainly strongly affected by it.
How can the ‘state’ or executive strength argument be tested empirically? The 
ultimate test consists in demonstrating that a government has the ability to choose 
between different alternatives, turn them into law and implement policies against the 
opposition of other powerfully placed actors (Nordlinger 1981). In other words it 
needs to be demonstrated that public policy is more than the sum of societal interests 
or international pressure. Alternatively, if it can be shown that policy outcomes 
differed from government preferences, that the government had to compromise or 
even give up its original plans in response to opposition and demands of other 
powerfully placed actors, then the government can be regarded as ‘weak’. Naturally, 
strength is a matter of degree.
To sum up, the ‘state’ (or government or executive) strength argument holds 
that the executive has preferences of its own and that a strong executive is able to 
realise these preferences, if need be, against the opposition of other actors. However, 
whether this ‘state’ strength argument applies in a given case is primarily dependent 
on the institutional characteristics of a given policy area. The institutional 
characteristics of the state (and indeed of the political system) are important in that 
insulation, centralisation and - more generally - the power of the executive relative to 
other actors will increase a government’s ability and willingness to pursue coherent, 
long-term policies, while political systems where the executive is weak will make 
this much more difficult. This is so because the government will be forced to 
compromise with the conflicting interests of other actors.5
In Chapter 2, the concept of executive strength and the importance of domestic 
institutions will be applied, first, to the Italian political system in general and then to 
the various policy areas relevant with respect to macroeconomic convergence. It will 
also be shown that a low degree of executive strength is the single most important 
factor (albeit not the only one) determining past Italian macroeconomic performance.
5 If the input in the policy process is dependent on the domestic institutional structure, then the debate 
between different theories of the state misses the point (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987). Whether a 
pluralist, a statist or an elitist state model applies will largely be dependent on the institutional 
characteristics of a given policy area. For example, the decentralised U.S. policy process makes the 
pluralist model look more adequate to explain policy formation. By contrast, in political systems 
where there exists a unified, legislature-dominating executive, policy-making is better described by 
statist or elite theories.
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1.5 Methodological Remarks, Research Question and Plan o f  Study
This case study of Italian macroeconomic convergence makes use of the results of 
both comparative and quantitative-statistical studies. It thus allows for a theory- 
driven but historically detailed examination of policy reform in the various policy 
areas relevant with respect to macroeconomic convergence.
Methodological Remarks
Quantitative-statistical studies tend to reason in terms of average effects but have 
difficulties in capturing possible interaction effects with other variables, let alone 
phenomena like conjunctural causation. Qualitative approaches examine a small 
number of cases and this allows for analysis of the complex and sometimes 
historically contingent interaction between different factors. They tend to be 
historical-inductive and case-oriented (Ragin 1987) and thus tend to overemphasise 
historical contingencies.
According to Lijphart (1975), there are three types of non-experimental 
scientific methods: the case study method, the comparative method and the statistical 
method. Essentially, case studies “are intensive but uncontrolled examinations of 
single cases that cannot directly result in empirical generalizations” (Lijphart 1975: 
160). By contrast, the comparative and the statistical methods allow for the 
generation of empirical generalisations (Ragin 1987). Again, according to Lijphart 
(1971), there are six types of case studies: a-theoretical, interpretative, hypothesis- 
generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming and deviant case studies (similarly 
Eckstein 1975).
In terms of method, this study seeks to square a case-study approach with a 
comparative approach. From the point of view of institutionalist theory, the study of 
Italian macroeconomic convergence can be regarded as a ‘deviant case study’. This 
is so because, as will be shown in Chapter 2, institutionalist theories of 
macroeconomic policy would have predicted that Italy would fail in its attempts to 
meet the Maastricht criteria. Thus, although this study consciously adopts a case- 
study approach with an emphasis on historical detail, descriptive accuracy and causal 
complexity, its ‘deviant case’ character makes this study implicitly comparative 
(Lijphart 1975). In other words, the study examines a single case (that is, 
macroeconomic convergence in Italy) in a comparative perspective (based on results
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of quantitative-statistical and qualitative-comparative studies) “in order to probe the 
mechanisms of change, the details of the processes, and the presence or absence of 
specific factors” (Little 1990: 32) -  and thus to explain successful macroeconomic 
convergence.
The implicitly comparative character of a deviant case analysis allows for a 
more satisfying -  because theory-driven -  exploration of the conditions, factors and 
processes that led to convergence. It thus allows for an examination of causal 
complexity and historical contingency that are difficult to capture in statistical 
studies. This method is also consistent with the historical-institutionalist approach 
that holds that institutions do not determine outcomes and that their effect will tend 
to depend on the presence or absence of other (contingent) factors.
Research Question: Italy and Successful Macroeconomic Convergence in the 
1990s
If domestic institutions have been shown to have an independent impact on 
macroeconomic policy, then it is legitimate to incorporate the study of domestic 
institutions into an analysis of macroeconomic convergence. This study then 
examines the politics of macroeconomic convergence in Italy with a special focus on 
domestic institutions.
Why focus on Italy? First, Italian domestic institutions in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s were not conducive to sustainable macroeconomic policies. From a 
cross-national and institutional point of view, Italy’s successful convergence policies 
are particularly puzzling. As will be demonstrated in more detail in Chapter 2, Italy 
was characterised by a set of institutions that was conducive to short-termist 
macroeconomic policies that ultimately were unsustainable. From an institutional 
point of view, it was puzzling that Italy was able to achieve sufficient 
macroeconomic reform in the 1990s to enable it to meet the convergence criteria.
Second, from an historical perspective, Italy’s economic achievement is 
surprising. Italy has been confronted with high deficits and high government debt for 
more than two decades. Until its exit from the ERM in 1992, Italy had not been able 
to achieve monetary convergence with the best-performing countries such as France 
and Germany in that Italian inflation had been constantly and considerably above the 
European average. Similarly, fiscal policy was way out of line with respect to other 
European countries. In other words, the comparison of Italian macroeconomic
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performance of the 1980s with the performance after the early 1990s begs the 
question of why and how this major policy reform that eventually resulted in 
successful convergence occurred.
The question of why Italy realised such a major effort is without doubt to be 
found in the need for macroeconomic convergence as stipulated by the TEU. At 
least, this is true with respect to the second half of the 1990s. But this does not 
answer the question of how Italy was able to achieve policy reform. In short, from an 
historical perspective, Italian macroeconomic achievements in the 1990s represent a 
puzzle that requires an explanation.
That Italy would exhibit a generally positive attitude towards the EMU process 
would have been expected on the basis of Italy’s traditional pro-European policies. In 
addition to the attitudes of the economic and political elite, public opinion showed 
considerable enthusiasm -  indeed the greatest support among all European countries 
for most of the period - for European integration as well as EC and EU membership 
(Commission of the European Communities 1998; Istituto Ajfari Intemazionali 
1993: 44-46). Moreover, Italian public opinion in favour of EMU was strongest by 
far among all European countries - even in the face of fiscal adjustment and 
economic problems (Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1 Net Support for Single Currency, 1996 
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In 1996, for example, after four years of restrictive macroeconomic policies, 78 
per cent of Italians were in favour of EMU, while only 9 per cent were opposed to it. 
Ireland came second with 66 per cent for and 16 per cent against. Thus the 
interesting aspect of Italian policy toward EMU is not to explain Italy’s general 
interest in joining EMU. Rather, the interesting question is how Italy was able to 
implement policies that allowed it to satisfy the Maastricht criteria.
Several objections can be raised against the formulation of this research 
question. One might argue that the threat of exclusion from EMU or the political 
motivation behind EMU explains the success of Italian macroeconomic efforts (Baun 
1996; for contrary view see Moravcsik 1998). However, if domestic institutions 
affect macroeconomic policy, then, even if one accepts the ‘threat-of-exclusion’ 
argument, the question remains of how Italy was able to overcome domestic- 
institutional obstacles and potential societal opposition to macroeconomic reform, 
and thus fulfil its international commitments. Alternatively the ‘threat-of-exclusion’ 
argument leaves unanswered how the ‘logic of domestic institutions’ that tended to 
bias macroeconomic policies towards short-termism and unsustainability was 
overcome. If the predictions of a well-established body of theory and empirical 
research are not borne out, an explanation of this ‘anomaly’ is required. In the case of 
domestic-institutional theories of macroeconomic policy-making, this means that an 
explanation of how institutional obstacles were overcome - and how macroeconomic 
convergence was implemented - is needed. At a minimum, alternative explanations 
would have to show that domestic institutions did not matter.
Another criticism that might be directed against the potential relevance of 
domestic-institutional factors for the explanation of Italian macroeconomic policies 
in the 1990s comes from those who suggest that change was due to changing 
economic conditions rather than to political(-institutional) factors. As Schmidt 
(1982) asserts, economic policy outcomes can be seen as the result of two broad sets 
of variables. On the one hand, there are ‘socio-economic’ explanations drawing on 
factors such as the level of technological development, demographic changes, labour 
supply, world market integration, business cycle, international interest rates and so 
on. Broadly speaking, these factors are regarded as exogenous and as determining 
policy outcomes. On the other hand, there are ‘political’ explanations that stress the 
political determinants of economic policy. The political complexion of party
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systems, electoral cycles and the nature of political institutions more generally are 
examples of political factors that can account for policy outcomes.
Naturally these two types of explanations are far from being mutually 
exclusive. Far from denying the importance of socio-economic conditions, the 
institutionalist studies reviewed in Section 1.3 also suggest that socio-economic 
factors matter with regard to policy outcomes (Hahm et al. 1996; Bernhard and 
Leblang 1999). Nonetheless, socio-economic conditions should be regarded as the 
underlying conditions that provide constraints and opportunities within which policy 
choices have to be made and implemented. Conditions such as demographic 
developments or economic shocks do affect policy outcomes. But these conditions 
are largely exogenous (at least once they have occurred) and there is room for the 
exercise of political discretion, especially in the medium- to long-term.
As will be shown in the following chapter, the post-war Italian macroeconomic 
policy regime was characterised by institutional deficiencies -  the most of important 
of which was limited executive strength. The weakness of the policy-making regime 
in various areas contributed to Italy’s poor monetary and fiscal performance. From 
both an historical and an institutional perspective, the following questions arise then: 
How was Italy able to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria? If domestic 
institutions biased macroeconomic policy towards short-termism, how was the 
successful pursuit and implementation of medium-term adjustment and convergence 
policies possible? If the Italian government was institutionally weak, why was it 
willing and, more importantly, how was it able to pursue policies that imposed 
considerable costs on relatively powerful domestic actors?
I will argue that pure systemic, societal-distributional and ideas-centred 
approaches are insufficient to understand Italian macroeconomic convergence. 
Instead, any satisfactory account of how and why Italy managed to meet the 
convergence criteria has to take into account the central role played by domestic 
institutions in general and executive strength in particular.
Plan o f  Study
This study analyses the politics of Italian monetary and fiscal convergence. It 
analyses Italian macroeconomic policy between February 1992 and April 1998, that 
is, from the signing of the TEU to Italy’s entry into EMU. By explicitly drawing 
upon theoretically plausible and empirically corroborated results concerning the
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influence of domestic institutions on macroeconomic policy, this study seeks to 
explain how Italy was able to achieve macroeconomic convergence during the 1990s.
In this study I challenge the reasoning and conclusions that underpin the 
majority of studies of European monetary integration. I argue that the politics of 
macroeconomic convergence in the 1990s cannot be understood solely as a 
functional response by a rational, self-interested country to increasing international 
economic constraints. I do not wish to argue that scholars were wrong in suggesting 
that international constraints and domestic interest group politics were important. But 
I argue that existing studies have significantly underestimated the effects of domestic 
institutions and in particular the implications domestic institutions have with regard 
to the capability of a government to implement economic policies (c f Milner 1997).
More specifically, I suggest that ‘executive weakness’ and other institutional 
features of various relevant policy areas affect the nature of distributive conflicts and 
thus help explain historical patterns of inflation, crisis, reform and stabilisation in 
Italy. While the primary purpose of this study is to understand how Italy was able to 
achieve policy reform and meet the convergence criteria, the secondary purpose is to 
analyse institutions (as both dependent and independent variables) and their 
importance with regard to macroeconomic policy reform in the 1990s.
The study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses in more detail the 
institutional framework and history of Italian budgetary, pension, wage and monetary 
policies. Chapters 3-6 analyse the domestic politics of macroeconomic convergence 
between 1992 and 1998 with respect to various relevant policy areas and argue that 
domestic institutions and institutional change are central for a proper understanding 
of Italy’s economic convergence. The final chapter places the Italian experience into 
a comparative perspective and thus provides further support for the ‘institutions 
matter’ hypothesis.
Italian macroeconomic convergence of the 1990s was the result of policy and 
institutional reform in a number of analytically distinct policy areas. More 
specifically: the Italian economy had entered the 1990s with relatively high inflation, 
substantial external and domestic deficits, excessive public debt, and an institutional 
framework characterised by executive weakness, an unsustainable pension regime, 
wage indexation and uncoordinated private sector wage bargaining, and limited 
central bank independence. In order to explain macroeconomic convergence it is 
therefore necessary to examine if and how political conflict and institutional change
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in the budgetary, pension, wage and monetary policy areas contributed to 
macroeconomic convergence.
This selection of policy areas is justified in terms of their effects on 
macroeconomic performance which are generally acknowledged by the economic 
and political economy literature - and not least of all by the Bank of Italy itself:
In accordance with a long-standing tradition, based on theoretical analysis and empirical 
experience, the Bank of Italy firmly believes that, in addition to an appropriate monetary 
policy, the defence of the value of money requires the contribution of other policies [...].
The defence of the monetary criterion depends decisively on controlling public 
expenditure and budget policy [...]. In modern industrial economies an appropriate 
incomes policy is [also] essential if price stability is to be maintained without incurring 
excessive costs in terms of economic activity (Fazio quoted in Bini 1998: 660; also Bank 
of Italy, Abridged Report, 1982: 180-186).
Similarly, fiscal stability depends not only on the direct effects of budgetary 
policy but also on policies pursued in other expenditure related areas - the most 
important with respect to fiscal sustainability being, as will be argued below, pension 
policy. Although monetary and wage policy on the one hand, and pension reform and 
fiscal policy on the other hand, are intimately related, they deserve to be analysed 
separately since the institutional characteristics of the respective policy-making 
regimes differ quite considerably in terms of relevant rules and actors.
More specifically, I will argue that the following institutional characteristics 
are of importance with respect to policy outcomes in the various policy-making 
areas: executive weakness and budgetary institutions with respect to fiscal policy; 
executive weakness and an eamings-related pay-as-you go pension system (plus the 
presence of relatively strong trade unions) with respect to pension policy; executive 
weakness, trade union fragmentation, insufficient confederal control of wage 
bargaining, and a wage indexation mechanism with respect to wage policy; and 
executive weakness and central bank independence with respect to monetary policy. 
Why and how these institutional features affect policy outcomes is discussed in the 
next chapter.
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2 THE INSTITUTIONS AND HISTORY OF ITALIAN 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Italy was facing major economic problems 
such as decreasing international competitiveness, persistently higher inflation than its 
European partners, increasing unemployment and above all high public deficits and 
exploding public debt. Although economic growth throughout the 1980s was higher 
than the European average, it was clear that the continued deterioration of the other 
economic indicators would eventually be unsustainable. In 1991, public debt 
increased above the 100 per cent mark, the year-on-year inflation rate was 6.3 per 
cent (which was about one percentage point above the EU average and between two 
and three points higher than in the benchmark-setting German and French 
economies) and the deficit stood at around 10 per cent of GDP.
This chapter will show that Italy’s difficult economic situation in the early 
1990s has to a large extent to be seen as the consequence of the Italian government’s 
propensity to accommodate societal demands and its inability to exercise decisive 
leadership during the period up until 1992 when a major economic (and political) 
crisis rocked Italy (McCarthy 1995; Bufacchi and Burgess 1998). This propensity 
was above all the result of a low degree of autonomy and executive strength in 
various relevant policy areas. In addition, various other area-specific institutional 
characteristics contributed to Italy’s comparatively worse macroeconomic 
performance.
It is necessary to describe in more detail the institutional features as well as the 
history of Italian economic policy-making. This will provide the basis for the study 
of Italian convergence policies in Chapters 3 to 6. First, I discuss the institutional 
characteristics of the Italian political system, which will demonstrate that 
institutionally speaking the Italian government is indeed characterised by a low 
degree of autonomy and strength. Then I analyse the institutional features of the four 
most important policy areas, which will demonstrate that executive strength provides 
a central concept for an understanding of macroeconomic policy outcomes. If the 
institutionalist argument has any validity, then the institutional structure of a policy 
area should have had an impact on policy outcomes in the past. Therefore, I finally 
provide a stylised presentation of post-war Italian macroeconomic history up to the
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early 1990s and argue that it is broadly consistent with the institutionalist argument 
defended in this study.
2.1 The Structure o f the Italian Political System: Actors and 
Institutions
The Italian state has been called the ‘available state’ (Di Palma 1980). Historically 
the Italian state that emerged after the Second World War accommodated societal 
demands made upon it to the detriment of policy coherence. This has led students of 
Italian politics to characterise this system as a ‘republic without a government’ 
(Allum 1973) and its politics as a ‘politics of bargained pluralism’ (Hine 1993), thus 
implying a low degree of government autonomy and strength and a relatively strong 
influence of other actors such as interest groups and political parties. The Italian state 
has also been referred to as an ‘archipelago’ state (Ginsborg 1990: 154), reflecting 
the lack of centralisation of policy-making. These views are well summarised in the 
following passage:
Overall, the policy-making process [in Italy] can be characterized as of the reactive 
type and accomplished in conditions of emergency. More precisely, policy-making of 
some importance is rarely initiated in the political sphere. It is usually the product of 
demands coming from some socio-economic sectors, from international pressures, from 
outside actors such as collective movements or interest groups (Pasquino 1996b: 155).
This kind of reactive policy-making, incapable of producing cohesive, long­
term policies, is primarily the consequence of the institutional characteristics of the 
Italian polity. The Italian government is weak or, to be more precise, it historically 
lacked a strong executive capable of imposing short-term costs on societal actors and 
groups that are necessary to successfully pursue long-term, sustainable policies. 
Broadly speaking, the post-war Italian political system has been characterised by a 
weak executive, a fragmented party and parliamentary system and - partly as a 
consequence of the former - relatively influential societal interest groups.
The executive is made up of the prime minister and ministers. Formally the 
prime minister is the head of the executive and, according to the Italian constitution, 
“conducts, and is responsible for, the general policy of the government” (Art. 95). In 
reality, however, the prime minister’s power is heavily circumscribed (Cassese 1980; 
Hine and Finocchi 1991). First of all, even though the president of the republic
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appoints the prime minister, the choice of the president is constrained by negotiations 
between the parties of the government coalition. Moreover, because the government 
comes into being through a coalition agreement, the prime minister’s choice of 
government ministers is restricted - and usually party secretaries impose them upon 
him. As a result, post-war Italian governments have been characterised by a low 
degree of cohesion and collective responsibility. This tendency is reinforced by the 
relatively high number of parties forming the government coalition, by the high 
degree of factionalism within coalition parties as well as by a bureaucracy that is 
controlled by a ‘party’ rather than by collegial and loyal ministers.
All these features contribute to the weakness and fragmentation of the 
executive. They also contributed to the emergence of parentela and clientela 
relationships (the latter not being a feature that particularly distinguishes Italy from 
other countries) that make party-political and private interests relatively influential 
within the Italian bureaucracy (La Palombara 1964). This further weakened the 
executive. La Palombara (1964) defines clientela as follows: “[T]he clientela 
relationship exists when an interest group, for whatever reasons, succeeds in 
becoming, in the eyes of a given administrative agency, the natural expression and 
representative of a given social sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or 
reference point for the activity of the administrative agency” (La Palombara 1964: 
262). By contrast, “parentela involves a relatively close and integral relationship 
between certain associational interest groups, on the one hand, and the politically 
dominant Christian Democratic Party [...], on the other” (La Palombara 1964: 306).
The relative lack of cohesion of the majority and the lack of prime-ministerial 
authority within the government primarily reflect the government’s dependence on a 
highly fragmented parliament and government majority. Although all governments in 
parliamentary systems depend on the support of parliamentary majorities, the 
fragmentation of the Italian party system and hence the need for multi-party 
government coalitions makes the task of the Italian prime minister and the Italian 
executive to pursue autonomous and coherent policies more difficult. This contrasts 
with parliamentary systems where the number of government parties is low and 
where parliamentary factions are well controlled by the party leadership. Prime- 
ministerial and executive leadership is impeded because prime ministers are forced 
(for fear of losing support of coalition partners) to take into account the interests of
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the various coalition parties. Hence the prime minister’s as well as the government’s 
capacity to exercise leadership is very limited:
Normally, he [the PM] represents at most a political formula, and his main task is to 
negotiate agreement on the detailed legislative implementation of that formula between 
the factions and parties of which it [the government] is composed. Even relatively 
‘strong’ prime ministers are strong only in so far as they can assemble an effective 
alliance and then hold it together. Their skill is one of negotiation not policy 
enforcement: reconciling differences, distributing concessions, balancing one group 
against another, and sometimes just playing for time (Hine 1993: 200).
In other words, the prime minister is primarily concerned with the resolution of 
short-term conflict and intra-coalition trouble-shooting. Hence government policies 
tend to reflect short-term pre-occupations rather than long-term objectives (Hine and 
Finocchi 1991). The executive is further weakened by the fact that powerful party 
secretaries tend to remain outside the government, which -  as the government 
depends on the support of parliamentary parties -  reduces the importance of the 
cabinet as the body of effective decision-making. This further reduces the strength 
and autonomy of the executive vis-a-vis other actors.
If the weakness of the executive is largely the result of parliamentary 
fragmentation and poor party discipline, this weakness is further reinforced by the 
existence of a relatively powerful parliament. Three characteristics of the Italian 
parliamentary system have been conducive to executive weakness and political 
instability: bicameralism, parliamentary rules, and a proportional electoral system for 
the election of both houses of parliament (Hine 1993: chapter 6).
The existence of a bicameral system means that both houses of parliament, the 
Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) and the Senate (Senato), have to 
approve a bill before it becomes law. This requirement weakens the position of the 
executive in that it needs to deal with two legislative bodies over which it has 
relatively little control to begin with; and either house can block government 
initiatives. (This contrasts with the degree of control that governments in the UK and 
Germany, for example, exercise over parliament.)
The existence of parliamentary rules that make the legislative process slow and 
unreliable further reduces the government’s control over the timing and content of 
legislation (Koff and Koff 2000: chapter 6). The importance of these rules gains 
weight in the face of the existence of powerful parliamentary committees as well as
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the divisions within the parliamentary majority and within the majority parties 
themselves. This combination of rules, parliamentary prerogatives, and 
fragmentation of parliament is also conducive to the servicing of party-political 
constituencies and clienteles. The fact that the bulk of legislation deals with minor 
distributional issues rather than properly addressing broad policy issues may be 
interpreted as evidence (Hine 1993: 172).
Hence the executive and the legislative institutional features seem to bias 
policies towards short-term and micro-level rather than the long-term and macro­
level policies and legislation. Incoherence is then the result of give-and-take 
practices between various actors in the legislative process, such as between the 
executive and parliament, between the two houses of parliament, between parties, 
between party factions and so on. In this sense, Italian parliamentarism resembles 
more the U.S. presidential system than other more rationalised European 
parliamentary systems such as the British or German ones. The relative weakness of 
the U.S. president and of the Italian prime minister with respect to the legislative 
process contrasts with the powerful position of the British prime minister and the 
German chancellor.
A final, and arguably the most important, feature of the Italian polity is a 
proportional electoral system. This is highly conducive to the proliferation of
parliamentary parties. It may well be that the underlying structural cause of
parliamentary fragmentation is the existence of various social, economic and cultural 
cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). It may also well be that majoritarian electoral 
systems do not necessarily lead to a pure two-party system (Duverger 1986; Riker 
1986; Sartori 1986). However, a proportional electoral regime is undoubtedly 
conducive to the proliferation of parties and hence potentially to a weakening of
parliamentary government. As Pasquino (1996b) cogently put it: “At best, it [a
proportional electoral system] reflects the existing political pluralism. At worst, it 
encourages fragmentation” (p. 142). In the Italian case, the electoral regime goes a 
long way towards explaining political division between the parliamentary majority 
and the opposition, between the government and the parliamentary majority and 
within the parliamentary majority itself. During the post-war period, coalition and
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hence government instability1 have been high and are reflected in the number of 
post-war governments between June 1945 and June 1992 of fifty (Hine 1993: chapter 
3).
As in all parliamentary systems, however, the Italian executive has instruments 
to discipline parliament or at least to soften the parliamentary constraint temporarily, 
the most important of which are its ability to issue decree laws and to request a vote 
of confidence on legislative proposals. According to Art. 77 of the Constitution, the 
government can issue decree laws, that is, emergency executive decrees that have the 
force of law ‘in cases of emergency and necessity’. The decree laws have to be 
converted into legislation within 60 days or else they are nullified. The parliament’s 
power to convert or refuse to convert a decree into law places it in a powerful 
bargaining position, which not infrequently leads to a negotiation over the content of 
the decree before it is even issued. The increasing use of these laws can be seen to 
reflect the weakness of the executive in relation to the legislature (Hine 1993: 149- 
150).
The government can also ask parliament for a vote of confidence in order to 
push through a legislative proposal (Art. 94). In practice, this was of rather limited 
usefulness. If the government is divided because of diverging intra-majority interests, 
then it is very difficult for a prime minister to force coalition members on a particular 
proposal. This is probably the reason why governments have never been defeated on 
a formal vote of confidence (Pasquino 1996b: 149-50). Instead, intra-majority 
disputes and disagreements between party leaders usually bring about the fall of a 
government. Hence coalitions are likely to break up before the prime minister can 
ask for a vote of confidence.
Moreover, votes of confidence are of limited importance since the fall of a 
government rarely results in new elections. This is partly due to the absence of a 
German-style ‘constructive vote of confidence’ that would force new elections in 
case where a confidence vote is not followed by a positive parliamentary majority in 
favour of another prime minister. Hence the prime minister is unable to threaten the 
parties of the majority with new elections. The possibility of forming a new 
government by way of agreement between party secretaries after the fall of the
1 The fact that government instability stands in stark contrast with ministerial stability makes no 
difference, as empirical evidence indicates that it is primarily ‘government fragmentation’ that is 
responsible for ‘executive weakness’ (Roubini and Sachs 1989a, 1989b; Alesina and Perotti 1995).
42
government is not conducive to either party or majority discipline and therefore 
represents another element that weakens the executive relative to political parties and 
parliament.
The parliament is also powerful enough to prevent strong executive action but 
is at the same time not powerful enough to assume leadership itself (Furlong 1990). 
Ironically the Italian parliament itself is weak with regard to societal influence. This 
‘problem of permeability’ (Hine 1993: 182), that is parliament’s low degree of 
autonomy with respect to the influence of societal actors and interest groups, is partly 
due to the above-mentioned wide range of procedural opportunities for parliament to 
amend, add to or strike out important parts of draft legislation, a strong-committee 
system, the fragmentation of parliament as well as strong intra-party factionalism 
(especially within Christian Democratic Party [DCI]). This offers organised societal 
groups various points of access and hence increases parliamentary sensitivity to local 
and sectional pressures.
As a result, “the Italian Parliament, with its fragmented party system and its 
independent-minded members, appears to be a far more formidable obstacle to the 
concerted will of the political executive than in any other West European 
democracy” (Hine 1993: 166). Hence the description of Italy as a partitocrazia 
(‘party-cracy’) is misleading: “The term is generally associated with over-mighty 
party rule, but even if Italian parties are strong vis-a-vis Parliament and government, 
they are extremely weak as bearers of coherent programmes” (Hine 1993: 306).
In sum, the Italian political system is characterised by a weak executive and a 
legislature that is relatively powerful vis-a-vis the executive but weak in relation to 
societal interest groups. Executive weakness is primarily the result of a fragmented 
parliament. This ultimately translates into executive and bureaucratic fragmentation. 
Thus the inability to centralise decision-making, exercise leadership and co-ordinate 
various policies makes the Italian government ‘weak’. Due to the dispersion and 
diffusion of power, power in Italian politics is largely negative in nature, that is, 
various actors have enough power to block policies and force compromises but none 
is strong enough to dominate the policy process in order to produce more coherent 
policies. Hence the executive’s weakness, being the result of its limited power 
relative to other actors, forces it to accommodate a wide array of interests. The 
institutional characteristics of the Italian political system thus explain why Italian 
public policy has frequently been described as ‘muddling through’ or re-active. In
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short, “[accommodation has become the way of Italian political life” (Goodman 
1992: 142). The institutional bias towards short-term accommodation and, at best, 
incrementalism is especially relevant with respect to economic policy reform (cf 
Dente 1990).
The distribution of the sacrifices over time and across groups is at the heart of the 
politics of economic reform. It is not just that the costs are short-term while the benefits 
are long-term, thus running into political constraints from politicians with a short time 
horizon. It is also that the costs o f reform are often concentrated and readily evident 
while the benefits are diffuse and the beneficiaries are unknown ex ante (Williamson 
and Haggard 1994: 531).
In other words, a combination of a weak executive and influential societal and 
other political actors should make radical or at least decisive policy reform difficult if 
not impossible to achieve.
Italy’s parliamentary regime has been described as an assembly government 
(Sartori 1997: chapter 6), characterised by (1) an executive that does not lead the 
legislature; (2) political power that is not unified and concentrated but scattered and 
atomised; (3) a lack of collective responsibility; (4) a lack of party discipline; (5) 
obstacles faced by the prime minister and other ministers to act quickly and 
decisively; (6) obstructive intra-coalition disagreements and hence uncertain 
parliamentary support for the executive; and (7) a fragmented executive.
Assembly government contrasts with the more hierarchical and rationalised 
(British) Westminster, (German) Kanzlerdemokratie and (Dutch) working 
government systems. Even though various characteristics are important with regard 
to executive strength, it seems that the relatively stronger position of the head of 
government, greater cabinet cohesion and greater control of parliament is primarily 
the result of a more ‘reductive’ electoral system. It is the underlying thesis of this 
study that (in the Italian case) executive weakness is to a high degree the result of the 
government’s dependence on multi-party majorities {cf. Rose 1980; Mayntz 1980; 
Cassese 1980).
In short, as a consequence of the institutional characteristics of the Italian 
polity the Italian government enjoys a low degree of autonomy and strength. 
However, as pointed out, executive strength is not a generalised feature. Rather an 
executive’s capabilities can vary across various issue-areas (Katzenstein 1976;
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Krasner 1977, 1978; Gowa 1988). It is therefore necessary to analyse in detail the 
institutional features of the various relevant policy areas.
2,2 The Fiscal Policy-Making Regime
As already sketched out in Chapter 1, there is a great deal of evidence that 
institutional factors affect budgetary outcomes. Although there always is a certain 
degree of inconclusiveness with regard to cross-country studies of this kind (cf Edin 
and Ohlsson 1991; Borelli and Royed 1995), there is a clear sense that political and 
budgetary institutions influence budgetary policy outcomes (Von Hagen 1992; 
Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1999). This is so because institutions represent ‘rules of the 
game’ that have an impact on the strategic interaction between the different actors in 
the budgetary process.
Institutionalist approaches to budgetary policy can roughly be divided in two: 
political-institutional and budgetary-institutional approaches. Political-institutional 
approaches focus on the characteristics of the political system and emphasise the 
importance of such factors as cabinet fragmentation (Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999; 
similar Alesina and Perotti 1995), the fractionalisation of party systems (Grilli et al. 
1991), the number of coalition parties, the longevity of governments, and the nature 
of the electoral system (Roubini and Sachs 1989a, 1989b).
The argument that these institutional variables affect policy outcomes is 
roughly speaking the following. Proportional electoral systems tend to produce 
fractionalised party systems and hence multi-party majorities and governments. The 
greater the number of parties in a coalition, the more difficult it will be to implement 
budgetary adjustment as none of the coalition parties will accept a solution that 
imposes the costs on their constituency. By contrast, one-party governments2 can 
simply impose the costs on the constituency of the opposition parties.
2 There exists a trade-off for a strong government with regard to accountability and ability to impose 
costs. The stronger a government is in terms of executive control o f parliament (and the lower the 
number of coalition parties), the more it will be held accountable for the costs imposed through a 
restrictive fiscal policy. By the same token, the parties of a multi-party government could soften the 
negative feedback by spreading it among them and might therefore be more willing to implement 
budgetary reform (Schlick 1993; Pierson 1993). This seems particularly relevant in the context of 
corresponding plurality and proportional electoral systems that magnify or soften the negative 
feedback effect (also Chapter 4). Cross-national studies suggest however that the capability aspect 
prevails over the accountability aspect (Alesina and Perotti 1996b). Past Italian budgetary policy 
confirms this too (c f  Section 2.6).
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Section 2.1 demonstrated that the Italian political system is characterised by all 
those political-institutional features that have been shown to be associated with high 
public deficits and debt, most notably cabinet fragmentation, multi-party majorities, 
proportional electoral system and fractionalised party system. Italy has the worst 
record in terms of government longevity among Western democracies and its 
proportional electoral system leads to parliamentary and government fragmentation 
which in turn decreases longevity and stability. Indeed cross-national studies assign a 
composite indicator that would lead one to expect Italy to be the fiscally least 
responsible country in terms of budget deficits and public debt (Sachs and Roubini 
1989a, 1989b; Grilli etal. 1991; Alesina and Perotti 1996a).
Another institutionalist approach has focused on more narrowly defined 
budgetary institutions (or fiscal rules) that govern the budgetary policy-making 
process rather than the broader political-institutional features described above. 
Budgetary institutions can be defined as “all political rules and regulations according 
to which budgets are prepared, approved, and carried out” (Alesina and Perotti 1999: 
14). Von Hagen (1992), for instance, creates a complex indicator to measure the 
impact of different budgetary rules (cf. Annex A). Empirical tests confirm the so- 
called ‘structural hypothesis’, according to which (strong) ‘hierarchical-transparent’ 
budgetary institutions are more conducive to fiscal responsibility than (weak) 
‘collegial-intransparent’ ones3 (Hahm et a l 1996; Von Hagen and Harden 1994 for 
European countries).
A detailed discussion of these rules would be highly technical. A sketch of 
Italian budgetary rules will have to suffice here to make the point that the Italian 
budgetary process is collegial and non-transparent.4 The government is responsible 
for the preparation and formulation of the budget. The finance minister, though, has 
no special status and cannot rely on the support of the prime minister as the latter 
does not command sufficient authority to exercise influence over his ministers, 
especially those that are not members of his own party. Thus, “[i]n addition to the 
tensions between the ministries charged primarily with expenditures and those that 
try to limit spending, this stage in the budgetary process must contend with divisions
3 ‘Hierarchical-transparent’ budgetary procedures coincide with executive strength as discussed in 
Section 1.4 (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999).
4 For a detailed description of institutions and rules governing the formulation, legislation and 
implementation of budgetary policy see Onofiri (1979); Della Salla (1988); Chiorazzo etal. (1994); Da 
Empoli et al. (1995); Verzichelli (1999a: chapter 4); Alesina et al. (1998).
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within the governing coalition (not to mention within the parties themselves)” (Della 
Salla 1988: 119). Neither the prime minister nor the finance minister has any special 
prerogatives with regard to budgetary policy (OECD 1995a). In fact, the 1980s 
amply demonstrated this weakness at the formulation stage, as on various occasions 
spending ministers were able to prevail in conflicts over budgetary policy by simply 
disrespecting the limits set by the finance minister by way of threatening to resign 
(Verzichelli 1999b: chapter 4). Finally, the high degree of cabinet factionalism and 
parentela and clientela relationships, especially between the bureaucracy and interest 
groups (such as public-sector employees and beneficiaries of various types of income 
and welfare transfer), limited the autonomy of the executive at the formulation stage.
At the parliamentary stage both houses of parliament have to approve the 
budget. Both houses of parliament exercise full legislative powers concerning 
expenditure and revenue matters. Hence what is true for the Italian legislative 
process in general holds also for the budgetary process in particular (Della Sala 1988: 
110). Even though there are rules as to what parliament is allowed to amend (see 
below), in practice, parliament and government are ‘co-participants in the budgetary 
process’ (Della Salla 1988: 110). This means that the budgetary process at this stage 
is the result of a series of negotiations and compromises - between the government 
and parliament, and between government and opposition parties - to achieve what is 
politically acceptable to all actors involved.
Moreover, the Italian budgetary process at the parliamentary stage is also 
characterised by a high degree of complexity and lack of transparency (Alesina et al. 
1998; Verzichelli 1999a). These characteristics provide incentives for, and facilitate, 
creative budgeting. They also reinforce the ‘collegial’ - as opposed to an ‘executive- 
dominated’ - nature of the Italian budgetary process.
At this stage, the problems discussed above, such as the ‘problem of 
permeability’, the lack of cohesion of the majority, the inability of the government to 
determine the legislative agenda and so on, open the executive, and hence the 
budgetary programme, to short-term political pressures. This tends to result in the 
accommodation of societal demands channelled through parliament and forces the 
government to compromise on its proposals (Hine 1993: 182). On an institutional 
level, the existence of strong committees represent ideal channels of access for 
societal interests thanks to the informal bargaining that takes place in them. 
Similarly, these committees provide plenty of opportunities for exchange between
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parliamentary majority and opposition as well as between the majority parties 
themselves. This enhances the influence of non-executive actors in the process. Thus, 
the Italian parliamentary process allows U.S. style bargaining and logrolling, that is, 
exchange in committees (Visco 1990).
As for the implementation stage,5 bureaucratic fragmentation and the rules 
governing the implementation process are not conducive to strong, central control 
over this stage of the budgetary process either. For example, forecasts by the 
government (and parliament) seem to be persistently wrong, that is overestimating 
revenues and underestimating expenditures.6 Generally, it matters, among other 
things, how much power the finance minister has to restrain spending (in the case of 
a foreseeable budget overshoot) and how much flexibility there exists at the 
implementation stage. The idea behind this is that, on the one hand, a weak finance 
minister will be unable to enforce expenditure ceilings on recalcitrant spending 
ministers and that, on the other hand, the less binding and more flexible these rules 
are, the less commitment is necessary at earlier stages. The Italian budgetary system 
fares badly in both respects. In addition to a weak finance minister,
Italy’s Budget Law is only weakly binding and the budget implementation system is 
inordinately flexible. There are no cash limits on spending ministries, the budget 
minister lacks the power to block expenditures, budget changes and transfers of 
expenditures between chapters are routinely adopted, and carry-over procedures are 
extremely flexible (Milesi-Ferretti 1997: 20).
5 The problems related to implementation are complex and would require an exhaustive and detailed 
analysis o f the organisation and the recent reform of the fiscal bureaucracy, something which lies 
beyond the scope and purpose of this study, except to say that the overly formalistic approach and ex­
post control as well as the non-binding character of Corte dei Conti (Court of Accounts) decisions are 
certainly not conducive to financial discipline at this stage (cf Alesina et al. 1998).
6 The OECD (Economic Surveys Italy 1997: part III) found four main reasons for wrong forecasts: (1) 
future rates of economic growth were over- and future inflation understated; (2) planned deficit 
reductions hinged upon one-off measures (whose effects are difficult to predict); (3) intended 
measures of fiscal restraint were either not fully adhered to, or parliament, overriding government 
initiatives, approved expenditure-augmenting laws in the course of the fiscal year; and (4) deficit 
forecasts were extremely sensitive to interest rate developments as a consequence of the high level of 
debt. Very probably, the limited independence and underdevelopment of the budget service of the two 
houses (total of 6 civil servants compared to about 200 at the Congressional Budget Office in the 
United States), whose task it is to evaluate the admissibility of amendments (II Sole 24 Ore, 19 
October 2000: 8; Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris in hearing of Budget Commission of Chamber and Senate 
quoted II Sole 24 Ore, 17 October 2000), also contributes to poor forecasting. Moreover, the lack of 
transparency of the budget process and of the budget documents makes forecasting difficult. However, 
the fact that forecasts were characterised by a consistent one-sided bias (that is, underestimation of the 
deficit) suggests the importance of ‘political’ rather than ‘technical’ factors.
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Overall, Italian budgetary policy-making institutions are characterised by 
features that have been found to be empirically associated with above-average fiscal 
deficits and public debt.
What is the relation between political-institutional and budgetary-procedural 
variables? I would like to suggest that - even though the two sets tend to coincide in 
practice (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999) - political-institutional strength is more 
important than ‘strong’ budgetary procedures. There is plenty of empirical evidence 
for this claim with respect to the Italian case (see Chapter 3). A brief discussion of 
the formally most important budgetary rules with respect to budgetary discipline will 
illustrate this.
In theory, parliamentary amendment power is restricted by the copertura 
principle (Art. 81 of the Italian Constitution) that does not allow deficit-increasing 
amendments. In practice, this provision has proved ineffective to control budgetary 
policy for several reasons.7 First, due to executive weakness, the government tends to 
anticipate parliamentary opposition and takes into account parliamentary pressures at 
the formulation stage. The fact that the Italian executive is far from being a 
homogenous body in that individual party (and intra-party factional) interests are 
strongly represented in a divided cabinet also contributes to this phenomenon. 
Second, although in the 1960s there existed both a Keynesian and an orthodox 
interpretation of Art. 81, in the end the former prevailed. This indicates the greater 
importance of effective power relative to formal rules, especially since art. 81 had 
originally been drafted in an orthodox spirit. Third, although parliamentary 
amendments must leave the state sector deficit8 unchanged, in practice this constraint 
can be circumvented by way of parliament proposing higher spending to be 
implemented by local government and other external agencies (such as social 
security funds), through the overestimation of offsetting measures, through incorrect 
forecasts concerning the underlying fiscal developments as well as through making 
use of accounting loopholes. In other words, there exist no binding deficit targets for 
the general government sector (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1997: 106; Scioscioli 
1987; Milesi-Ferretti 1997). Hence the copertura principle is in fact widely
7 Note that these reasons apply equally to targets proposed by the executive during the budgetary 
process, as for example in the documento di programmazione economica e finanziaria (DPEF), that is, 
the Economic and Financial Planning Document (since the late 1980s).
8 The state sector covers the state, other bodies included in the central administration and autonomous 
national companies. It excludes, for example, social security institutions.
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acknowledged to be pro forma? Fourth, the primacy of political over procedural 
factors is corroborated by the fact that reforms of the budgetary process in 1978 and 
1988 that were intended to strengthen financial discipline did not result in any 
considerable improvement of Italian budgetary performance. This suggests that the 
‘political-institutional’ logic overrode merely ‘budgetary-institutional’ constraints 
(Della Sala 1988; Chiancone 1992; Hine 1993: 182-187; Eusepi and Cerioni 1993).
All this strongly suggests that formal constraints can be circumvented because 
of an executive unwilling or unable to prevent this from happening. This leads to the 
conclusion that ‘political-institutional’ executive strength outweighs procedural 
characteristics (for quantitative empirical evidence see Stein et al. 1999: 132). More 
generally:
The main difficulty in budgetary reform is that there is no real sanction against 
Parliament -  or the government -  for failure to meet self-imposed budget-deficit targets 
[...]. Ultimately, if  the government cannot control its own members of Parliament, and 
cannot agree within its own ranks on higher taxation or lower spending, the budget 
deficit will continue (Hine 1993: 187).
Scholars debate whether and to what extent parliament was responsible for the 
worsening of the budget balance proposed by government. This is not the place to 
discuss this in detail. Nonetheless, even if it were the case that parliament has not 
directly contributed to increasing deficits in the sense of altering or blatantly 
disregarding the budget deficit targets (De Ioanna 1993), it is likely that the ‘threat’ 
to do so induced the executive to take into account parliamentary (and indeed intra- 
coalitional) concerns and demands. This was certainly detrimental to budgetary 
control.
E' frequente osservare, infatti, nella vita parlamentare dellTtalia, come il governo si 
presenti all’appuntamento della sessione di bilancio non con la propria proposta da 
difendere con ogni determinazione e con adeguati poteri e con le corrispondenti 
responsabilita (cosi come avviene nelle democrazie occidentali), ma come si suol dire, 
con ampi spazi di manovra finanziaria, con ampie disponibilita di apertura alle categorie 
sociali, con la dichiarata volonta di contrattare con il parlamento le priorita di bilancio e 
con un pacchetto di proposte (di norma accrescitive del fabbisogno), da ‘concordare’
9 For detailed discussion of creative accounting methods see Alesina et al. (1998: 39-45), De Haan et 
al. (1999: 295) and Scioscioli (1987).
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con il parlamento stesso, o, piu di sovente, con spezzoni del parlamento medesimo
(Cavazutti quoted in Monorchio 1996: 422-423).10
This broad sketch of the Italian budgetary process shows that the Italian 
government is very restricted in terms of its autonomy and strength at all three stages 
of the budgetary process. This weakness is the result of a number of analytically 
distinctive but inter-related institutional features of the Italian political and budgetary 
system: a fragmented parliament produces a weak and fragmented executive that is 
forced to rely on unstable, multi-party coalitions; moreover, budgetary procedures 
are collegial and ‘intransparent’. This means that budgetary decisions and outcomes 
are to a very high degree the result of compromises between the various actors 
directly or indirectly involved in the policy process.
I would like to suggest that the most important deficiency of the Italian 
budgetary system is the executive’s inability (or unwillingness) to control budgetary 
policy. This is primarily a consequence of executive weakness. This weakness finds 
expression at various levels of the budgetary process and seems ultimately rooted in 
the political-institutional weakness of the executive relative to other actors in the 
policy process. At the formulation stage, the weakness tends to make the Italian 
government unwilling -  and unable - to pursue policies of fiscal adjustment. A 
government’s budget proposals will thus tend to anticipate what is politically 
acceptable to all relevant actors involved in order to pre-empt parliamentary 
opposition. This also explains budget overshoots that result from inaccurate and 
over-optimistic forecasts. These optimistic forecasts allow for softer budgets and thus 
reduce conflict. At the parliamentary stage, the government is generally unwilling 
(and unable) to use the means available to ‘get its own way’ such as using 
parliamentary procedures to seek greater party discipline and hence greater control
10 “In Italian parliamentary life it can indeed often be observed that the government starts the 
parliamentary budget process, not with its proposal to be defended with determination, and adequate 
powers and corresponding responsibilities (like in other Western democracies), but as one could say, 
with ample room for financial manoeuvring, with ample willingness to be open to the various social 
groups, with the declared will to negotiate budgetary goals with parliament, and with a package of 
proposals (of an expenditure-increasing nature) that needs to be ‘agreed upon’ with parliament, or, 
even more commonly, with parts of the very same parliament”. Similarly: “una certa connivenza da 
parte del govemo stesso, che ‘si spriva’ ben presto alle proposte di modifica parlamentare, senza 
opporre particolari resistenze” (Verzichelli 1999a: 62). [“A certain connivance on the part of the 
government, which ‘melts’ very quickly in the face of parliamentary amendments, without putting up 
any particular opposition.”]
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over committees and majority parties (Visco 1990: 209). Formally, at least, the 
government has the necessary instruments to induce greater discipline into the 
process, such as the ability to oppose lax amendments, ask to recall amendments, 
discipline majority deputies, or involve the finance office to show that amendments 
are deficit-increasing and inadmissible (Visco 1990; De Ioanna 1993). In practice, 
the government is politically too weak to make proper use of these instruments. At 
the implementation stage, the inability to rein in spending is at least partly the result 
of the inability (or unwillingness) of the finance and prime ministers to impose 
restraint on self-interested ‘political’ spending ministers.
In short, budgetary policy is strongly affected by executive power - or lack 
thereof. As a consequence of executive weakness, budgetary policy is short-termist, 
incoherent and resistant towards major policy reform. This weakness is particularly 
visible in a comparative and historical perspective (c f Von Hagen and Harden 1994; 
De Haan et al. 1999).
2.3 The Pension Policy-Making Regime
Similar to budgetary policy-making, a weak executive also plays an important role 
with regard to pension policy, and especially pension reform. In addition to executive 
weakness, the nature of the pension system and the structure of interest group 
representation also matter.
Pierson (1994) has pointed out that the logic and hence the factors behind 
welfare state expansion may be different to those behind welfare state retrenchment. 
Hence it is necessary to discuss in more detail the conditions that affect policy in this 
area. Common sense and historical evidence suggest that social welfare and, by 
extension, pension expenditure are always difficult to ‘reform’ (that is, cut). This is 
due to a variety of reasons. First, the welfare state tends to be very popular with 
public opinion. Second, social welfare expenditure is difficult to cut due to the 
existence of ‘frozen welfare landscapes’ (Esping-Andersen 1990), that is clientelistic, 
rent-seeking groups that have a vested interest in the existence of social welfare 
policies. As the ‘costs of retrenchment’ (or welfare cuts) are concentrated, while the 
benefits are dispersed, governments tend to avoid retrenchment in order to avoid 
confrontation with entrenched interest groups. Hence frequently governments seek to 
avoid cutting welfare programmes and opt, if possible, for higher taxes to
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compensate for the inability to reform welfare.11 Generally speaking it is true that 
“frontal assaults on the welfare state carry tremendous electoral risks [...] 
everywhere, retrenchment is a difficult undertaking” (Pierson 1996: 178-9).
However, how great these political-electoral risks are and how capable a state 
is of reforming the welfare system are also influenced by a number of institutional 
factors. In other words, even if politicians’ electoral self-interest makes social 
welfare reform unlikely to be initiated and difficult to implement successfully, 
certain institutional conditions can be hypothesised - and have empirically been 
found - to favour the initiation and implementation of welfare reform (Schlick 1993; 
Pierson and Weaver 1993).
The first institutional factor is related to the concept of executive strength. At 
first sight, executive strength seems to have an indeterminate effect on welfare and 
pension reform. On the one hand, the electoral system influences the extent to which 
a government is able to absorb the electoral consequences of unpopular welfare 
reform. For example, a plurality electoral system will tend to make a government 
unwilling to provoke popular opposition because the electoral consequences of small 
swings in voters’ preferences is likely to lead to outright defeat. By contrast, under a 
proportional system (like the Italian one), small shifts in electoral support have small 
consequences on the distribution of parliamentary seats. Theoretically, this would 
lead one to assume that governments in political systems where electoral regimes 
have hugely disproportional effects (such as a plurality system) would be less willing 
to pursue retrenchment policies.
On the other hand, the ability of a government to pursue a reform policy in the 
face of parliamentary and societal opposition should also be expected to matter. This 
ability is primarily the result of executive strength. Ceteris paribus, a ‘strong’ 
government with a high degree of control over a homogenous parliamentary majority 
is in a better position to implement unpopular reforms than multi-party coalition 
governments. This is so because the former system is characterised by a very small 
number of ‘veto points’ relative to the latter.
From an institutional point of view, there exists a trade-off for strong 
executives with regard to accountability and ability to impose costs. With respect to
11 “Expansion typically benefits a particular group with the cost diffused through general taxation. The 
losses are spread while the gains are concentrated. In the case of retrenchment the reverse it true: the
53
parliamentary regimes, a strong, homogenous, cohesive executive can easily be held 
accountable for the costs imposed by pension cutbacks but will be in a better position 
to push through reform thanks to its strong control over the policy-making process. 
By the same token, a weak, heterogeneous, multi-party government, even though it is 
able to ‘spread’ the impact of negative feedback and might therefore be more willing 
to initiate pension reform, will be less capable of realising reforms due to its 
weakness (Schlick 1993; Pierson and Weaver 1993). In short:
Where authority is concentrated [...] governments will be hard-pressed to avoid blame 
for unpopular decisions, but they will have a greater capacity to develop and implement 
strategies that minimize the need to force multiple policy changes through institutional 
veto points. However, they may find it easier to duck accountability for unpopular 
policies (Pierson 1996: 177).
Theoretically underdetermined, it is an empirical question whether capacity 
outweighs accountability. Empirically, both cross-national research and the Italian 
case suggest that the former outweighs the latter with respect to pension policy 
(Pierson 1994).12 In other words, a government’s incentive in terms of lack of 
accountability and hence potential greater willingness to engage in reforms is 
overridden by the inability to implement reforms -  and vice versa.
In addition to executive strength, a second set of factors should be expected to 
matter: the consequences of previous policy choices.
Social forces are important, because advocates of retrenchment are unlikely to succeed in 
the face of substantial political opposition. Nevertheless, institutional factors -  including 
the structure of formal institutions, but especially the consequences of previous policy 
initiatives -  are central in determining whether this political opposition actually emerges 
(Pierson 1994: 50).
This is so because “major important public policies also constitute important 
rules of the game, influencing the allocation of economic and political resources, 
modifying the costs and benefits associated with the alternative political strategies, 
and consequently altering ensuing political development” (Pierson 1993: 596).
gains (to taxpayers) are diffused through the population whereas a particular interest becomes keenly 
aware that it is damaged” (Taylor-Gooby 1999: 4).
12 The accountability-capability framework also accounts for the success and failure of budgetary 
reform. Alesina and Perotti (1995) found that ‘weak’, heterogeneous coalition governments are the 
most likely to initiate fiscal consolidation but are also much more likely to be unsuccessful. By
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Hence to the extent to which public policies establish rules and create constraints and 
incentives that shape behaviour, they can be understood as institutions (cf Section 
1.4). This definition of institutions is certainly consistent with the view historical 
institutionalism adopts of institutions (Bonoli et a l 2000).13
The institutional character of previous policy choices can be captured in the 
form of policy feedback which can involve various factors such as interest group 
effects, resources of and incentives for government elites and so on (Pierson 1993). 
With regard to pension policy, the so-called ‘lock-in’ effect and the ‘interest group’ 
effect can be hypothesised to matter most.
First, within the framework of an eamings-related pay-as-you-go system it is 
always difficult to reduce benefits, regardless of whether the reform seeks to 
introduce a re-balancing of the pay-as-you-go scheme or the replacement by, for 
example, a capitalisation-based system (Vitali and Visaggio 1996). This is so 
because once a pay-as-you-go pension system matures it becomes ‘locked-in’ 
because a re-balancing would create a ‘double-payment problem’ (that is, current 
workers would have to finance both the current pensioners’ retirement benefits and 
their own) and affect ‘acquired rights’ (that is, accumulated, ‘earned’ pension 
benefits).
Second, the interest group effect will mobilise trade unions (and other interest 
groups) to defend acquired rights. Even though the lock-in effect and the interest 
group effect are analytically distinct, in reality they are intimately related in that 
certain interest groups will tend to oppose retrenchment in general and will pay 
considerable attention (as will be shown below) to issues such as acquired rights and 
the ‘double payment problem’. The incentives for mobilisation are thus strongly 
influenced by the institutional characteristics of the pension regime -  and hence by 
previous policy choices.14
Policy feedback should be regarded as a process where institutions and actors 
interact as to bring about outcomes. The ‘rules of the game’ established by the
contrast, ‘strong’, cohesive one-party governments - though less likely to initiate budgetary 
retrenchment - are almost always successful in achieving it once it has been decided.
13 Note that Bonoli et al. (2000) argue that ‘well-established practices of policy-making’ should be 
regarded as ‘informal’ institutions. While the emphasis here is on ‘formal’ institutions (political 
system and pension regime), this wider definition potentially provides another justification for the 
inclusion of trade unions into the ‘institutionalist’ analysis (cf Section 1.4).
14 Note of course that the relative power of trade unions is not determined by the nature of the pension 
regime but by the institutional features of the political system.
55
current pension regime thus determines the costs and benefits of alternative policies 
and hence provides the incentives for the mobilisation of actors in this policy area. 
Thus, the pension regime (being the result of previous policy choices) can be 
regarded as part of the institutional environment that influences and structures the 
strategic interaction of the various actors (see discussion of relationship of 
institutions and agency in Section 1.4).
There is evidence from comparative and cross-national studies to confirm the 
relevance of institutional features (cf Bonoli 2000). Pierson (1994: part I), for 
example, has demonstrated that the fragmentation (partly private, partly public) and 
underdevelopment (in terms of benefits and maturity) of the British pension system 
in the early 1980s created a structure of pensioner-interest representation that made it 
relatively easy for a one-party government under Prime Minister Thatcher to 
radically transform British pension policy. By contrast, similar attempts in the USA, 
characterised by a cohesive, universal and mature public pension system, which was 
moreover backed by influential interest groups, failed, as they prevented an even 
relatively strong president such as Ronald Reagan from realising his radical reform 
proposals. There is also empirical support for this hypothesis from comparative 
analysis of pension reform in OECD countries that demonstrates the importance of 
the policy feedback process discussed above (Myles and Pierson 1998 quoted in 
Pierson 1998b).
What relevance do these theoretical considerations have for the Italian case? 
The Italian pension system of the early 1990s was characterised by segregated social 
insurance programmes financed by compulsory state social insurance. Thus in terms 
of the well-known classification of the ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ (Esping- 
Andersen 1990), the Italian pension system was characterised by a continental 
European, conservative Bismarckian regime. Continental European welfare regimes 
tend to rely on payroll taxes, provide eamings-related benefits, are transfer-oriented 
and are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. More specifically, the Istituto Nazionale 
della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) accounted for roughly three quarters of public 
pension spending (private-sector and most self-employed), while the state- 
administered public sector pensions accounted for roughly 25 per cent of spending. 
Schemes for public employees were more generous (for detailed description of 
pension system see Franco and Frasca 1992; Canziani and Demekas 1995; Cazzola
1995).
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Hence, in terms of the institutionalist analysis above, the conditions for 
successful pension retrenchment were unfavourable. First, the Italian government 
was traditionally characterised by (weak) multi-party governments. Second, in terms 
of a possible lock-in effect, the Italian pension regime in the early 1990s was 
characterised by: (1) inclusiveness; (2) no relevant private-sector options; (3) a high 
degree of maturity; and (4) a pay-as-you-go system (Franco and Frasca 1992). Third, 
in terms of the interest group effect, there were relatively strong trade unions that 
considered themselves defenders of the welfare state. The combination of these three 
characteristics would suggest that pension retrenchment is extremely difficult to 
achieve, as - in order to achieve reform - a weak government has to confront 
powerful and entrenched interest groups that have an interest in defending acquired 
and mature pension rights.15 This is borne out by the history of Italian pension policy 
(cf Franco 1993; also Section 2.6).
2.4 The Private and Public Wage Bargaining Regimes
There is great amount of theoretical and empirical literature regarding the 
relationship between wage bargaining institutions and economic policy outcomes, 
and more specifically wages, price stability and unemployment (for surveys see 
Brunetta and Dell’Aringa 1990; Iversen et al. 2000). There is disagreement as to 
whether and how labour market institutions affect economic outcomes. Firstly, there 
is a disagreement with regard to the question of whether there exists a stable 
relationship between certain institutional characteristics of the wage bargaining 
regime on the one hand, and wage outcomes on the other hand. Secondly, there is no 
agreement regarding the question of what kind of relationship there exists (if there 
exists a stable relationship at all). Notwithstanding this inconclusiveness, I will argue 
that Italian private and public wage bargaining was traditionally characterised by a
15The ‘lock-in’ effect of a pay-as-you-go system reinforces the ‘weak executive’ effect. This is so 
because a pay-as-you-go pension system provides an incentive for decision-makers to break the so- 
called golden rule (which stipulates that the implicit yield of pension contributions must not exceed 
the growth rate of the overall wage bill). Due to the low visibility and long-term nature of the resulting 
consequences, there is an ‘intrinsic tendency’ of the political system to intervene in a way that results 
in imbalances (Morley-Fletcher 1998: 25). This is exactly what was responsible for the problems the 
Italian pension system faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not infrequently, expansionary 
pension measures - similar to budgetary policy - were accompanied by wrong forecasts concerning 
future liabilities. These forecasts always tended to underestimate future liabilities (Modigliani and 
Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris 1996).
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number of unfavourable institutional characteristics that, at a minimum, made it 
difficult to achieve disinflation.
Wage Bargaining Regimes and Wage Policy
The neo-corporatist literature of the 1970s and 1980s argued that centralised wage 
bargaining arrangements were important with regard to wage moderation. The 
concept of ‘encompassingness’ played an important role (originally Olson 1965). 
The so-called ‘hump-shape’ hypothesis of Calmfors-Driffill (1988) that emerged 
from this literature was particularly influential. It posited that
large and all-encompassing trade unions naturally recognize their market power and 
take into account both the inflationary and unemployment effects of wage increases. 
Conversely, unions operating at the individual firm or plant level have very limited 
market power. In intermediate cases, unions can exert some market power but are led to 
ignore the macroeconomic implications of their actions (Calmfors and Driffill 1988:
13).
The practical implication -  for which Calmfors and Driffill claimed to have 
found empirical support -  was that unemployment, inflation and wage increases 
should be lower in countries with either decentralised or highly centralised 
bargaining regimes, while ‘intermediate’ countries should fare worse on these 
indicators. In practice, Calmfors and Driffill equated encompassingness with the 
‘level of wage bargaining’: an unitary, encompassing, centralised union movement 
will bargain at the national level; a union movement primarily organised on the basis 
of industry unions will bargain at an intermediate (or industry) level; decentralised, 
company-level unions will bargain at firm level. Influential as this theory was, there 
were several problems related to it.
On the one hand, some authors objected to the operationalisation16 of 
encompassingness by laying greater emphasis on the concentration of union 
membership (Schmitter 1981), the level of bargaining and degree of enforceability of 
agreements (Visser 1990), unions’ organisational strength (Cameron 1984; Golden 
1993), and the number and size of bargaining units and the vertical distribution of 
authority (Iversen 1999). Generally these critics did not question the importance of
16 For more detailed discussion of problems involved in the conceptualisation and operationalisation 
of ‘centralisation’ and ‘encompassingness’ see Iversen (1999: 48-57 and 57-60).
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encompassingness, which influences the willingness to contain wages and the ability 
to implement wage moderation on the part of the unions.
On the other hand, other authors have underlined the importance of increasing 
openness and the resulting conflict of interest between the non-tradables and exposed 
sectors as well as the importance of the monetary regime for wage outcomes (Crouch 
1990; Garrett 1998; Garrett and Way 2000). In a similar vein, yet others pointed to 
the importance of ‘bargaining co-ordination’, which under certain domestic and 
international conditions can function as a substitute for centralisation (Crouch 1985; 
Soskice 1990). These authors suggested that whether or not a certain set of 
bargaining institutions would lead to certain outcomes was conditional on a number 
of factors other than the nature of domestic bargaining arrangements (also Scharpf 
1991; Pontusson 2000; Baccaro and Locke 1998; Iversen 1999). Finally, if there ever 
was an empirical relationship between centralisation and low inflation (Paloheimo 
1990; Calmfors and Driffill 1988), then there is evidence that the Calmfors-Driffill 
relationship broke down in the 1980s and 1990s (Soskice 1990; OECD 1994b; 
OECD 1997b; Iversen 1999).
Thus, the Calmfors-Driffill argument has been cast into doubt from both a 
theoretical and an empirical point of view. In fact, the 1990s have even shown that in 
the context of an increasing competitive constraint and a hard-currency regime 
(whether this results from an independent, inflation-averse central bank or from 
fixing the exchange rate is immaterial), the cases of intermediate encompassingness 
were characterised by superior inflation performance. Theoretically, this was 
rationalised as follows.
Full encompassingness of bargaining centralization was not required to give the social 
partners a sufficient incentive to act in a martkonform manner. The labour-market actors 
simply needed to have enough organizational capacity to reach, and impose on their 
members, agreements, which recognized that a powerful third party outside the 
framework of negotiation, would behave in certain predictable ways unless they 
cooperated (Crouch 2000: 211; cf. Streeck 1994).17
In other words, recent studies have demonstrated that organisational 
centralisation and centralised wage bargaining (as the most extreme form of 
encompassingness) constitute an empirically and theoretically unnecessary condition
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for achieving wage restraint. The main thrust of this criticism essentially contends 
that: “Centralization is clearly one means of providing co-ordination, but there can be 
functional equivalents” (Crouch 2000: 204-205).18 Moreover, the effective wage 
constraint stemming from the introduction of a hard currency regime tends to be 
incompatible with the centralisation of bargaining, especially when centralised 
bargaining does not to allow for wage differentiation and results in wage 
compression (cf. Baccaro and Locke 1998; Pontusson 2000), as this leads to intra­
union wage competition and ultimately wage inflation (for detailed argument see 
Iversen 1999; Soskice 2000).
Prima facie all this would suggest a rather limited heuristic usefulness of 
domestic wage bargaining institutions with regard to predicting wage outcomes. 
However, what matters is not so much whether there exists a stable and empirically 
confirmed relationship between bargaining institutions and wage outcomes but rather 
what the institutional pre-requisites for a high degree of capacity for real wage 
moderation are. In this sense, the discussion so far strongly suggests that the 
relationship between wage bargaining institutions and macroeconomic outcomes is 
complex and that other potentially important variables have to be taken into account. 
However, even if other factors, such as economic openness, currency regime, 
exposed-sheltered sector conflict, also matter, this does not mean the notion of 
encompassingness in the sense of ‘co-ordination’ and ‘control over lower level units’ 
is irrelevant to an understanding of wage outcomes. It only means that an analysis of 
wage bargaining institutions needs to include other factors in order to account fully 
for wage performance.
The discussion so far also has another significance, which needs to be 
demonstrated empirically however: certain sets of institutions are not conducive to 
disinflation. With respect to the Italian case the question is then how wage 
moderation was achieved despite the fact Italy did not seem to share any of the 
characteristics (such as encompassingness or wage co-ordination) deemed important 
for its successful implementation (Locke and Baccaro 1996). Hence the question is 
rather how the domestic-institutional obstacles that characterised the Italian wage 
bargaining regime and that had played an important role in preventing Italy from
17 While in the German case this constraint was represented by the Bundesbank, in the Dutch, Austrian 
and Danish cases this constraint was ‘imported’ as a result of the de facto  currency peg.
18 This argument was first proposed as a critique of the Calmfors-Driffill model by Soskice (1990).
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achieving inflation convergence in the 1980s were overcome and how conditions 
were put in place that were compatible with - and ultimately conducive to - wage 
moderation. In a next step, whether or not - and to what degree - these reformed 
institutions affected wage moderation will have to be tackled. As these domestic- 
institutional variables -  mainly drawn from empirical studies, the ‘state strength’ 
literature and neo-corporatist theory - differ slightly between the private 
(manufacturing) and public (service) sector (Celia 1995),19 the two sectors are 
analysed separately.
The Private Sector Wage Bargaining Regime
The problems resulting from the Italian private sector wage bargaining regime are 
closely connected with the assumptions of neo-corporatist theory. (Again, this does 
not imply that there needs to exist a stable relationship between institutions and 
outcomes.) Traditionally, neo-corporatist theory regarded three factors as pre­
conditions for policy concertation in general and wage moderation in particular 
(Regini 1982; Lehmbruch 1984): (1) the parties to concertation, and especially the 
unions, have to possess the monopoly of representation; (2) these parties must be 
able to control the behaviour of their constituent parts; and (3) a pro-labour 
government must be present.
First, not only will encompassing unions tend to take into consideration the 
effects of their actions but also ‘wage competition’ between various sectors will be 
solved internally and hence without detrimental effect for inflation. In the case of 
national-level bargaining, for example, macroeconomic targets can explicitly be 
taken into account. Second, the ability of the union leadership to control its 
constituent parts is crucial as it determines to what extent the former can formulate 
and implement agreements reached at the national level. Third, the role of the 
government and more particularly the presence of a pro-labour government have 
traditionally been regarded as important. Neo-corporatist theories have assumed that 
there is a sort of exchange between wage moderation and expansion of social welfare
19 Roughly speaking, the exposed sector comprises manufacturing, food, parts of the financial and 
energy industries, while the sheltered sector includes government and public services, construction 
and virtually all private services. Even though it is an over-simplification, the private, exposed and 
manufacturing sectors on the one hand, and the public, service and sheltered sectors on the other hand, 
are lumped together. This is common practice in industrial relations research (see Garret and Way 
2000).
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policies. Naturally a left-wing, pro-labour governments would be - and historically 
were - much more inclined to enter such an exchange relationship than right-wing 
governments. Furthermore, Italian scholars, studying the Italian experience of wage 
policy concertation of the 1970s, have drawn attention to the importance of executive 
strength in the sense that - like the unions - the government has to (be able to) 
‘deliver’ in order to make exchange and concertation work. At least this is relevant in 
the case of tripartite concertation where the government is a party to the wage 
negotiations (Regini 1984).
As for Italy, none of these preconditions seems to have held. At the national 
level, unions were divided into at least three major, ideologically divided and 
competing confederations (that is, communist CGIL [Confederazione Generale 
Italiana del Lavoro], catholic CISL [Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori] 
and republican-socialist UIL [Unione Italiana del Lavoro]), which resulted in a lack 
of centralisation and representational monopoly. The control of confederations over 
lower units tended to be weak as demonstrated by past events, such as the Hot 
Autumn of 1969 or the failure to implement an incomes policy during the early 
1980s (cf. Section 2.6). Moreover, the Italian government was weak and frequently 
unable to ‘deliver’ and furthermore was never dominated by left wing, pro-labour 
parties (Celia and Treu 1998).
More generally, Italian industrial relations have been relatively conflictual, 
politicised and poorly institutionalised (Celia 1989; Regalia and Regini 1998; 
Pellegrini 1998; Negrelli and Santi 1990; Baglioni 1998). The level of wage 
bargaining frequently changed during the post-war period, leading from confederal 
bargaining in the 1950s to greater autonomy of industry unions and the bargaining 
pluralism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and finally evolved during the 1980s 
towards a system where the scala mobile20 (at the confederal level), industry and 
plant-level bargaining co-existed (Della Rocca 1998). Wage determination thus took 
place at three levels: at the economy-wide confederal level, bargaining took place 
between the three main union confederations, the main employer association, 
Confindustria, and other smaller employer organisations; at the national-industry 
level, industry-unions affiliated with the respective confederations bargained with the
20 In 1975 the so-called Agnelli-Lama agreement determined the introduction of fixed-amount 
quarterly increases based on the cost-of-living index (scale mobile), uniform for all categories of
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sectoral employer organisations; at the company-level where a variety of 
representational bodies existed, workplace representations and unions bargained with 
management (Treu 1994: 161-162; Pellegrini 1998). In this pluralistic and multi­
level system, there was no explicit wage co-ordination. In short, the presence of a 
fragmented union movement, the absence of a clear hierarchy between different 
bargaining levels and between medium-strength unions, made a co-ordinated or 
centralised voluntary policy of wage moderation difficult - if not impossible.
A final institutional problem in the private sector as far as insufficient inflation 
convergence is concerned was the existence of the above-mentioned wage indexation 
system (scala mobile) that made disinflation more difficult to achieve in both the 
private and public sector {cf. Section 2.6). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
scala mobile determined up to 80 per cent of annual wage increases (Regalia and 
Regini 1998). Even though wage indexation was downgraded in the mid-1980s, it 
still created a drag that prevented rapid disinflation. This not only led to the 
compression of wage differentials, but it also made it more difficult to achieve rapid 
disinflation.
As suggested in the previous section, at a minimum all these institutional 
features of the private sector wage bargaining regime combine to make disinflation 
and co-ordinated wage restraint difficult to achieve. Evidence for this claim will be 
provided in Section 2.6 and Chapter 5.
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The Public Sector Wage Bargaining Regime
In addition to obstacles regarding wage moderation and disinflation in the private 
sector, it was public sector wage policy that - in addition to fiscal policy -  
contributed to the relatively high levels of inflation in the 1980s {cf Section 2.6). 
This again was primarily due to institutional problems. One problem had to do with 
what has been described as ‘pluralism without a market’, that is, a system where the 
absence of market pressures combines with pressure stemming from a pluralistic 
form of union interest representation (Bordogna 1994). Another institutional problem 
has been identified as a ‘regime of double protection’ (Rusciano 1990), that is, a
workers (c f  Flanagan et al. 1983: 496-566). The regime was extended to the public service sector in 
1977.
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regime that combines collective bargaining rights with special public employee 
status. Finally, a ‘weak state’ or the absence of a padrone serio made it easier for 
unions to achieve wage increases (Salvati 1989).
First, in the 1980s the public sector experienced increasing fragmentation 
(pluralism) as a consequence of a rank-and-file revolt against the three main 
confederations. The centralisation of public sector labour relations (including the
99scala mobile) led, among other things, to a compression of wages and created a 
problem of ‘wage solidarity’ (Iversen 1999; Bordogna 1994). White collar and 
managerial employees as well as other occupational groups did not feel sufficiently 
represented by the confederations. This resulted in the rise of cobas (that is, rank- 
and-file committees) and sindacati autonomi (that is, unions independent from the 
three confederations CGIL, CSIL and UIL) (Carrieri and Tatarelli 1997).23 
Furthermore, in the absence of market competition, the incentive of public 
employees to moderate wage demands was low. Thus fragmentation (and 
competition between groups) as well as their relative invulnerability (due to the 
absence of market pressure) was responsible for increased wage pressures in the 
public sector, especially during the 1980s (Micossi and Papi 1996).
Second, in 1983 collective bargaining rights were introduced into public sector 
labour relations without abolishing the special status of public employees, thus 
giving rise to a regime of ‘double protection’. This not only added to the tendencies 
of conflict and fragmentation in public sector labour relations but also decreased the 
costs for small groups of employees with a great deal of disruptive power to strike 
and thus exert pressure on the government to grant them higher wages. This also 
contributed to growing representational fragmentation in the public sector.
Third, a weak government also contributed to the wage-push inflation in the 
public sector. More specifically, there existed a “pro-spending broad coalition of
21 The Italian public wage bargaining regime underwent several changes during the post-war period. 
This section will discuss the problems related to the public sector wage bargaining regime in the 
1980s (see Bordogna et a l  1999).
22 In addition to wage compression resulting from centralisation, other factors (such as satisfaction 
with work, union policies, orientation of policies) played a role in bringing about disenchantment with 
confederal unions among the rank-and-file and hence contributed to increasing fragmentation 
(Bordogna 1994: chapter 6).
23 The reason why anti-confederal groups have played a more important role in the public (service) 
than in the private (manufacturing) sector is that wage differentiation in the private sector was 
achieved through premia at the company-level (which was not possible in the public sector). 
Furthermore, the obstructive power of even small occupational groups is much greater in some parts
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politicians, bureaucrats, civil service unions, public employees and beneficiaries of 
spending programs” (Brunetta and Tronti 1995: 157). This kind of rent-seeking 
coalition exists in most countries where public employment makes up a sizeable 
share of total employment. In a political system, however, where accountability is 
dispersed and more importantly where the executive is weak and unable to act in a 
coherent and goal-directed, long-term manner, the temptation for decision-makers to 
nurture clientelistic relations and to avoid conflicts with militant public sector 
employees is much greater. Thus the absence of a padrone serio or - in the 
terminology adopted here - the presence of a weak executive made the control of 
public sector wages even more difficult to achieve.
Finally, as in the private sector, the wage indexation system was also applied in 
the public sector from 1977 onwards, thus making disinflation harder to achieve. 
Wage indexation represented another obstacle in that there existed relatively little 
(downward) wage flexibility. Although reforms during 1983-85 made the cost-of- 
living adjustment proportional to earnings, wage flexibility was still low (IMF 1998: 
21).
Although it is eminently plausible that these features affect wage moderation, 
cross-country research does not provide unambiguous results. Recent studies have 
found no evidence for a negative relationship between centralisation of public wage 
bargaining (arguably a proxy for executive strength) and public sector wage 
increases (OECD 1997a; Dell’Aringa and Lanfranchi 1999). In fact, if anything, the 
studies suggest that centralisation (a complex indicator made up of pay negotiation 
level, budgetary constraints imposed by the central government, pay bill adjustment 
at the central level and individual pay determination) is positively correlated with 
wage growth when controlled for employment variation. But not only are there 
methodological problems (data quality, comparability, period, sample size, 
periodisation), but these studies do not properly address the relationship between 
institutional and policy change, either. They moreover disregard a number of 
important institutional variables, such as government strength and structure of trade 
unions representation.
of the service sector (especially transport) relative to the manufacturing sector, thus decreasing the 
potential costs of fragmentation for break-away groups.
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Notwithstanding these empirical results, it is plausible to assume - and 
consistent with the historical-institutional approach taken here24 - that centralisation 
of and authority over public wage determination provide the executive with greater 
power over the setting of public wages and should hence ceteris paribus have a 
disciplinary effect on wage increases and economy-wide inflation.25 If Italy with a 
rather centralised system experienced above-average public wage increases, then this 
was due to factors discussed above and which were not captured by cross-national 
studies, such as low executive strength in political-institutional terms, 
fragmented and militant public sector unions and so on.
In conclusion, the institutional characteristics of the private and public sector 
wage bargaining regimes not only indicate the institutional obstacles Italy faced in 
achieving wage restraint and disinflation in the 1990s, but they also provide a good 
explanation of Italian wage and inflation performance during the 1970s and 1980s 
{cf. 2.6).
2.5 The Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy Regime
As pointed out in Chapter 1, various studies have shown that the degree of central 
bank independence has ceteris paribus a positive effect on price stability (Grilli et al 
1991; Cukierman et a l 1994; for survey of literature see Eijffinger and De Haan
1996). Qualitative studies tend to confirm the relationship between central bank 
independence and monetary stability (Goodman 1992).
Most of the explanations of this phenomenon point to the intuition that - for a 
variety of reasons - the ‘political’ interests of elected politicians differ from the 
‘bureaucratic’ interests of central bankers (Woolley 1984: 69-87): the greater central 
bank independence, the more fully central banker’s preferences for price stability can 
be realised. This can also be rationalised by the need of elected politicians to pursue 
short-term objectives, while appointed, independent central bankers can adopt a 
long-term view and pursue -  largely shielded from domestic pressure - sustainable 
policies. In any case, it is uncontroversial to state that “[cjentral banks are more
24 As one author put it: “Uno spazio, come si e visto, non sempre praticato, ma utilizzato ed 
utilizzabile nelle situazioni critiche” (Bordogna 1994: 240). [“A room for manoeuvre, as we have 
seen, that is not always made use of, but has been made use of, and is usable in critical situations.”]
25 This will be illustrated by a comparison with the French case in Chapter 7.
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conservative than political authorities in the sense that they attribute relatively more 
importance to the goal of price stability” (Cukierman 1992: 355).
However, the relevance of central bank independence for price stability is not 
universally accepted and has been criticised on empirical, conceptual and theoretical 
grounds. Some authors have pointed out that other factors such as the organisation of 
trade unions, the interests and influence of the financial community or the nature of 
industry-finance relations have to be taken into consideration (Hall 1994; Streeck 
1994; Goodman 1992). Others have claimed that the relationship between central 
bank independence and price stability is spurious (Posen 1993, 1998). Still others 
have pointed out the difficulty involved in conceptualising and operationalising 
‘central bank independence’ and hence doubt the validity of empirical results 
indicating a positive relationship between independence and price stability (Mangano 
1998).
What these critiques underline is the problem involved in determining the 
degree of central bank independence. Central bank independence, similar to 
executive strength, has to be regarded as a question of degree (Elgie and Thompson 
1998). If independence is a matter of degree rather than of kind, the problem is rather 
how to ‘measure’ central bank independence. Conceptualisation and measurement 
are concerned with how best to measure the underlying theoretical variable. This is 
not the place to discuss the problem in-depth. Rather it demonstrates the need to 
supplement any index drawn from surveys of central bank independence with an in- 
depth, qualitative analysis of the institutional features of this policy area. According 
to the complex indicators developed in the context of statistical studies the 
independence of the Italian central bank is rather limited (Table 2-1).
Table 2-1 Indices of Central Bank Independence in Selected Countries
CUKIERMAN
(1992)
PARKIN AND BADE 
(1982)
G RILLIE TAL. 
(1991)
MEAN
Sweden 0.24 0.2 - 0.22
Austria 0.82 - 0.50 0.66
Germany 0.96 1 1 0.99
France 0.26 0.2 0.25 0.24
Italy 0.32 0.2 0.13 0.21
USA 0.64 0.6 0.88 0.72
Source: Iversen (1999: 56)
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A qualitative examination confirms this. As in most countries, monetary and 
exchange rate policies in Italy are formulated and implemented by the executive. The 
only aspect of monetary and exchange rate policy which does allow for the discretion 
of parliament concerns the ratification of international treaties on exchange rate co­
operation (Walsh 1995). However, once an international monetary regime is in place, 
the day-to-day management of monetary and exchange rate policies is controlled by 
the executive or, rather, by the various bodies and actors within the executive. The 
crucial relationship here is the one between the Italian government and the central 
bank.
For the purpose of qualitative analysis, central bank independence can be 
conceptualised along three dimensions: political independence, economic
independence and goals (Eizenga 1993). Political independence can be defined as 
“the central bank’s ability to make policy decisions without the interference from the 
core executive” (Elgie and Thompson 1998: 24), namely the government’s ability to 
intervene in the internal decision-making process of the central bank. This dimension 
generally refers to the institutional insulation of the central bank from political 
influence over policy formation through means such as provisions concerning the 
nomination and dismissal of the governor and other key members of the central bank 
decision-making body, and budgetary independence.
As for nomination and dismissal, the Italian central bank enjoyed a relatively 
high degree of independence.26 All members of the Bank of Italy’s main decision­
making body, the Board of Management (comprising the governor, the director- 
general and two deputy director-generals) were nominated by the Board of Directors 
(a body comprising the governor and 13 elected directors) but had to be approved by 
the Council of Ministers and the President of the Republic. The terms of the governor 
and other members of the Board of Management were open-ended and they could not 
be dismissed for political reasons. Moreover, the central bank administered its own 
budget, which did not have to be approved by the government. This precluded the 
possibility of interference on the part of the government through ‘financial’ pressure 
(Eizenga 1993).
Economic independence can be defined as “the central bank’s ability to use the 
full range of monetary policy instruments without restrictions from the core
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executive” (Elgie and Thompson 1998: 25). More specifically, economic 
independence concerns the power to control monetary policy or the capacity to 
implement certain policies (concerning interest rates, exchange rates, market 
intervention, reserve requirement ratio and so on), and the ability to refuse to lend 
money to the government.
During the post-1945 period, the Bank of Italy’s formal power to control 
monetary policy was rather limited for both legal and technical reasons (Goodman 
1992: 56). Changes in the discount rate were proposed by the governor of the Bank 
of Italy but had to be approved and enacted by the treasury minister. Moreover, 
central bank independence was also absent with regard to changes in reserve 
requirement ratios which had to be approved by the Interministerial Committee for 
Credit and Savings27 (Passacantando 1996: 121), while foreign exchange regulations 
and currency controls required the signature of the minister of foreign trade.
As regards the fmancing of government deficits, until 1981 the Bank of Italy 
was under an obligation to finance or monetise part of the deficits through purchases 
of unpurchased government bills. This was part of an agreement reached in 1975 
between the Treasury and the Bank of Italy. The so-called ‘divorce’ of 1981 liberated 
the Bank of Italy from the obligation to act as a residual buyer of government bonds 
(Epstein and Schor 1989). Although this reform increased the Bank of Italy’s 
autonomy, its independence still remained limited in the sense that the Bank of Italy 
did not control all relevant policy instruments. The Treasury could still borrow 
foreign currency from the Italian Exchange Office28; and it could borrow up to 14 per 
cent of current government expenditures. Finally, the Bank of Italy was under an 
obligation to provide extraordinary advances to the Treasury beyond the 14 per cent 
limit, provided that parliament approved the Treasury’s request (Goodman 1992: 56).
The Bank of Italy enjoyed greater autonomy with regard to international 
monetary policy, except for exchange rate regulations and currency controls. 
Although the government decided the adherence to an exchange rate regime (in case
26 The following description refers to the monetary policy-making regime before the reforms of 1992 
and 1993.
27 The Comitato Interministeriale per Credito e Risparmio consisted of the Treasury minister as 
president, the central bank as technical agent and eight other ministers as members. Legally, the power 
to set credit policy was vested in this committee (Goodman 1992: 54-55).
28 The Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi “is responsible for the technical side of Italian foreign exchange 
management. Although legally a separate body from the central bank, the UIC [Italian Exchange 
Office] is nonetheless directly dependent upon the Banca d’ltalia, whose governor serves as its 
president” (Goodman 1992: 56).
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this required the ratification of an international treaty, parliament had to approve 
participation), the timing and size of the market interventions were at the discretion 
of the Bank of Italy (Passacantando 1996: 120).
The final dimension of central bank independence concerns the existence of a 
statutory task (such as price stability, inflation rate targets), or the ability to formulate 
monetary policy goals independently of the government. The Bank of Italy had no 
explicit mandate to pursue price stability. Beyond Article 47 of the Constitution, 
according to which “[t]he Republic shall encourage and protect savings [...]; it shall 
discipline, coordinate, and control the granting of credit” (quoted in Goodman 1992: 
54), there were no provisions that would give the central bank a clearly defined 
objective. This meant that the goal of price stability was of equal importance to other 
goals such as economic growth or employment. The Bank had the right to propose 
monetary policy objectives but the government, through the Interministerial 
Committee for Economic Planning,29 set general guidelines of economic policy. The 
central bank was supposed to follow the underlying scenario laid out by the 
government. In short, the Bank of Italy did not determine its monetary target 
independently of the government (Eizenga 1993).
To summarise, until the 1992-93 reforms, the Bank of Italy seemed to be 
relatively autonomous in terms of outside interference, but it enjoyed only limited 
autonomy with regard to the definition of monetary policy objectives and control 
over monetary instruments. This means that despite the 1981 reform (that is, the 
‘divorce’) the independence of the Bank of Italy should not be exaggerated.30 In 
strictly legal-institutional terms, the Treasury retained ultimate authority over the use 
of nearly all monetary policy instruments. Even with regard to the monetisation of 
government debt, there were still various ways in which the government was able to 
borrow money from the Bank and which could thus potentially threaten price 
stability. The abolition of the obligation to act as a residual buyer of government 
securities seems to have been the only characteristic that granted the Bank a certain
29 The Comitato Interministeriale p er la Programmazione Economica was created in the 1960s to set 
economic policy guidelines. By law, the Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings must take 
these guidelines into account when setting credit policy (Goodman 1992: 54).
30 Addis (1990) has suggested that the rather informal arrangement, whereby the Bank was relatively 
autonomous with regard to government interference in the context of Italy’s ERM membership (cf. 
Section 2.6), was consistent with the preferences of policy-makers as well as their inability to bring 
about normative change at the legislative level. Given the weakness of the Italian government in the 
policy-making process, this is in fact a quite plausible hypothesis and is indirectly supported by this 
study (cf. Chapter 6).
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degree of autonomy via-a-vis the government in as far as the control of instruments 
was concerned. Hence the Italian central bank enjoyed at best a moderate degree of 
independence from the government. Case studies of central bank decision-making 
tend to confirm the Bank of Italy’s only limited autonomy (Goodman 1992: chapter 
5).
However, some authors have suggested that while legally speaking the Italian 
central bank was only a technical agent, in practice, it did have much greater 
influence over monetary policy than a purely legal analysis would suggest. This -  it 
is suggested - was primarily due to its outstanding domestic and international 
reputation (Posner 1977). However, the fact that studies of Italian monetary policy 
demonstrated that the Bank of Italy was overruled several times throughout the 
1970s and that its preferences were disregarded several times by the Treasury in the 
early 1980s confirms the ultimate legal (and hence de facto) supremacy, of the 
Treasury over the Bank (Goodman 1992: chapter 5).
It is true that adherence to the ERM gave the Bank of Italy an informal 
mandate to pursue price stability. But this was always subject to the government’s 
willingness to accept the external constraint and the de facto degree of central bank 
independence. In fact, as I will argue in more detail in Section 2.6, the fact that 
Italian inflation throughout the 1980s was higher than in other European countries 
indicates that the Bank of Italy was not independent enough to be able to squeeze out 
entirely inflation, and that hence the only limited degree of central bank 
independence was at least one important explanatory factor with regard to Italy’s 
inflation performance in the 1980s.
Nonetheless, it also clear that, despite the low level of central bank 
independence, the Italian monetary policy-making machinery was more insulated 
from societal pressures than the fiscal policy-making regime. As a result, the 
executive enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy and strength. This is for several 
reasons. The Italian parliament had no direct power with regard to monetary and 
exchange rate policy, except for the ratification of treaties relating to international 
monetary regimes. It had no competence regarding the day-to-day management of 
monetary policy. In this respect monetary policy-making was more autonomous than, 
for example, fiscal or pension policy-making and hence less subject to parliamentary 
and societal pressures. The monetary policy process tended to be more insulated and 
hence executive strength tended to be greater, even though this was not entirely due
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to institutional factors. As Gowa (1988) pointed out, three factors potentially matter 
in this respect. The existence of international regimes (such as the EMS); information 
problems as regards the unclear and probably less visible consequences of monetary 
policy (at least compared to the distributional consequences of budgetary or pension 
policy); and the absence of influential interest groups that are solely concerned with 
the consequences of monetary and exchange rate policy (as opposed to, for example, 
groups defending interests related to public expenditure) also enhanced executive 
autonomy and by extension central bank autonomy.
This brief discussion strongly suggests that monetary policy and hence the 
Bank of Italy possessed a limited degree of autonomy, at least as long as the 
executive resisted from interfering with monetary policy-making. In the final 
analysis, however, the limited institutional independence from the executive made 
the Italian central bank much more vulnerable to domestic pressure than would have 
been the case if it had been independent.
2.6 Italian Macroeconomic Policy: A Preliminary Test o f  the 
Institutionalist Argument
The preceding analysis of the institutional characteristics of the policy-making 
regimes demonstrates that the Italian government enjoyed a low degree of executive 
strength. However, the importance of executive strength varied across areas. While 
executive autonomy and strength was arguably lowest in the fiscal and pension 
policy area, it was greater with regard to monetary policy (similar Tullio and Ronci
1997). Generally, however, the institutionalist analysis suggests the importance of 
executive weakness. If the institutionalist approach is of any value, it should explain 
past Italian macroeconomic policy performance on the basis of institutional 
weaknesses in these four areas.31
During the 1950s and 1960s, Italy like most other Western European 
economies experienced a long phase of economic expansion. In addition to 
favourable socio-economic conditions, domestic factors also contributed to rapid 
economic growth, price stability and good budgetary performance. The political 
hegemony of the industry-friendly DCI that pursued a policy of labour exclusion
31 For a similar account with a greater emphasis on partisan politics and ideological fragmentation see 
Salvati (2000).
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(Lange et al. 1982) as well as a divided labour movement (in combination with high 
unemployment) prevented labour from demanding ‘irresponsible’ wage increases or 
an ‘irresponsible’ expansion of social welfare programmes (Salvati 1985). As a 
matter of fact, during this period Italian monetary performance was so impressive 
that the Financial Times awarded the ‘monetary Oscar’ to the lira as the most stable 
currency in January 1960 (Ginsborg 1990: 265).
The weakness of the Italian economic policy-making regime was only fully 
exposed in the wake of the first oil shock in the early 1970s. A government unable to 
implement fiscal restraint and control the explosion in welfare spending, an at best 
moderately independent central bank and an industrial relations system not at all 
conducive to wage restraint meant that Italy fared worse in terms of monetary and 
fiscal performance than many other industrialised countries throughout the 1970s and 
never quite caught up in terms of fiscal consolidation and price stability with the 
best-performing countries in the 1980s (Table 2-2 and 2-3).
Table 2-2 Net Borrowing of Government, 1960-1990
(period average annual change; as a share of GDP)
1960-67 1968-1973 1974-79 1980-90
Italy 1.8 4.8 9.2 10.9
Major Seven* 0.3 0.5 2.6 3.2
Source: OECD Historical Statistics 1992 * G-7 countries
Table 2-3 Consumer Price Inflation, 1960-1990
(period average annual change in per cent)
1960-68 1969-73 1973-79 1979-90
Italy 4.0 5.8 16.1 10.6
Major Seven 2.9 5.6 9.7 5.5
Source: OECD Historical Statistics 1992
The inclusion of centre-left parties, such as the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) into 
the government coalition in the 1960s made the government more sympathetic 
towards demands from trade unions. Falling unemployment contributed to the 
increasing labour militancy that exploded during the so-called ‘Hot Autumn’ of 1969 
and subsequently led to economic turmoil in the face of external economic shocks 
(Ginsborg 1990: 309-337). Part of the reason for the subsequent wage explosion had
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to do with the inability of the leadership of the confederal unions to control the rank- 
and-file and industry unions. This was primarily an institutional problem, namely, 
the inability of the confederal leaderships to gain control over rank-and-file and 
industry unions resulted in demands for higher wages (Table 2-4). The government’s 
unwillingness and inability to counteract higher wages through appropriate monetary 
or fiscal policy measures led to higher inflation.
Table 2-4 Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing, 1960-1990
(period average annual change in per cent)
1960-68 1968-73 1973-79 1979-90
Italy 8.0 15.3 22.1 11.4
Major Seven n/a 10.3 10.5 5.4
Source: OECD H istorical Statistics 1992
The combination of a weak government and strong unions also led to an 
expansion of social welfare and pension programmes which would put strain on 
fiscal policy for decades to come. While the weakness of the Italian pension policy­
making system contributed to the rapid expansion of welfare and pension spending in 
the 1970s, it was also responsible for the failure to achieve welfare pension spending 
reform in the 1980s (Morcaldo 1993: Franco 1993; Ferrera and Gualmini 1999: 
chapter 1; Figure 2-1).
Figure 2-1 Old-Age and Survivors’ Pension Spending, 1980-1992
(as a share of GDP)
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Source: Eurostat 1996b * West Germany
Certainly, economic, demographic and labour market changes also mattered. 
Nonetheless, in a comparative perspective ‘political’ rather than socio-economic 
factors explain the disproportionate expansion of pension spending after 1975 
(Franco 1993). It is certainly true that the continuous expansion of pension 
expenditure was “congruent with the competitive mechanics of the Italian system of 
polarised pluralism”32 (Ferrera and Gualmini 1999: 33; Ferrera 1984: chapter 6). 
From an institutional perspective, however, expansion and retrenchment failure can 
be understood as the result of the fragmentation and low degree of executive 
autonomy vis-a-vis parliament and the presence of relatively influential societal 
groups. Moreover, the (institutional) lock-in effect discussed above made 
retrenchment difficult to achieve.
The 1980s provide further evidence. There were various retrenchment attempts 
(let alone proposals) but most of the measures were watered down by parliament. 
The fact that the government sought to push through these measures with the help of 
decree laws, which were subsequently substantially modified by parliament and 
sometimes not even converted at all, makes this evident. The combination of a weak 
executive and particularistic-clientelistic interests that were hostile to reform 
prevented coherent reform, regardless of the political will of the executive. There 
were at least three pension reform proposals between 1984 and 1992 but they all 
foundered because of the inability of the executive to prevail over parliamentary and 
societal opposition. If there was retrenchment, it was minor in terms of savings, and 
the savings more often than not were neutralised by expansion in other parts of the 
pension system (Ferrera 1984: chapter 5; Commission of the European Communities 
1996a: 76).33
32 The concept of ‘polarised pluralism’ was proposed by Sartori (1976) in order to describe a party 
system that is characterised by a high degree of party-political fragmentation and antagonism. To the 
extent that a highly fragmented social insurance regime allowed for the distribution of differentiated 
entitlements to a selected party clientele, the social security and pension regimes before 1992 can be 
regarded as a ‘natural’ complement to the Italian party system, which was indeed fragmented and 
highly polarised.
33 An international comparison also confirms this view. Not only was Italy characterised by the 
highest pension outlays as a share of GDP, high pension deficits and a rapid increase of pension 
spending. By international standards, the Italian pension regime was also characterised by very liberal 
eligibility requirements and generous award standards, namely the lowest retirement age, the highest 
accrual rate, one of the most advantageous systems for calculating pensionable salaries, the most 
favourable rules on seniority pensions, earnings- as opposed to inflation-linked indexation and liberal 
rules concerning the cumulability of benefits (Franco and Frasca 1992: 78).
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The weaknesses of the fiscal and monetary regimes also contributed to Italy’s 
comparatively poor performance in these areas during the 1970s. Deficit-financed 
fiscal expansion, which reflected executive weakness, was a way to soften the 
negative consequences of the oil crisis during the first half of the 1970s. Thus even in 
the face of adverse international economic conditions, “[s]trong unions continued to 
demand growth, and weak governments were only too willing to accommodate” 
(Goodman 1992: 146). The lack of central bank independence and in particular the 
obligation of the latter to finance public deficits resulted in comparatively high 
inflation rates during the 1970s (Table 2-3). Moreover, the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system and the failure of the ‘snake’ deprived the Italian government of an 
immediate external constraint to restrain domestic demands for macroeconomic 
expansion. This led to two balance-of-payment and financial crises during the 1970s 
(Goodman 1992: chapter 5).
In addition, the above-discussed weaknesses of the private sector wage 
determination system contributed to a high level of labour militancy in that the 
confederal unions were either unwilling or unable to control rank-and-file demands. 
In fact, the unions achieved 100 per cent protection of real wages against inflation 
through the 1975 agreement on the scala mobile (Salvati 1985: 444-5). By contrast, 
countries like Germany or Austria responded very differently by pursuing restrictive 
fiscal and monetary policies as well as relatively greater wage restraint. Different sets 
of labour, monetary and budgetary policy-making institutions enabled them to avoid 
balance of payments crises (Scharpf 1991). By contrast, institutional weaknesses in 
the monetary, fiscal and wage policy areas meant that Italian macroeconomic policy 
“remained hostage to political demands for growth” (Goodman 1992: 158) which 
resulted in poor fiscal and monetary performance.
However, the Italian experience of the 1970s also suggests that economic 
stabilisation policies (that is, policies aimed at re-gaining the confidence of 
international capital and foreign exchange markets through a reduction of fiscal 
deficits and inflation) were possible - under certain conditions. After the 
parliamentary elections of June 1976 and in the face of economic difficulties, the 
Christian-Democrat-led government under Prime Minister Andreotti formed a 
government of ‘national unity’ that depended on the support of the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) in parliament. When in September 1976 the lira came under 
attack once more and another crisis loomed, the PCI supported the government and
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its restrictive economic measures in order to avoid a major economic crisis.34 The co­
operation of the PCI helped to bring the trade unions into an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 1977 that subsequently resulted in the 
successful stabilisation of 1977-78, partly as a result of an agreed policy wage 
restraint.
Successful confederal (and quasi-centralised) bargaining and wage moderation 
was short-lived. Union confederations (and employer associations) and the 
government set non-enforceable targets for plant-level bargaining. However, 
increasing rank-and-file pressure and divisions among the main union 
confederations, as well as a government unable to live up to its commitments led to 
the rapid breakdown of co-ordinated wage moderation in 1978. In addition to 
conflicts at the political level between the PCI and the DCI, the breakdown of a 
concerted policy of wage moderation was the consequence of the absence of the 
features associated with successful incomes policy and ‘political exchange’, namely 
a weak government and divided, medium-strength confederal unions unable to 
control their constituent units and rank-and-file (Regini 1982; Golden 1988). This 
again suggests the importance of institutional factors.
It has been argued that the government of national solidarity and the 
consensus between the DCI, PSI and PCI (and their affiliated union confederations) 
acted as ‘functional equivalents’ to the institutional characteristics associated with 
policies of wage moderation and that it was a weak government and an obstructive 
bureaucracy that did not keep their promises rather than the inability of the unions to 
implement wage moderation that was responsible for the failure of centralised or co­
ordinated wage moderation (Regini 1984). While government weakness played an 
important role in the breakdown of centrally negotiated wage moderation, it cannot 
be denied that there were also substantial rank-and-file pressures that thwarted wage 
moderation. In short, wage moderation was made impossible as a result of the 
conflicting interests of the main union confederations as well as by their lack of 
authority over the rank-and-file (Golden 1988). Thus growing trade union dissent, 
which once more reflected the inability of the confederal leadership to control its 
members, and increasing friction between the PCI and the DCI, mainly due to the
34 The willingness of the PCI to support the government was of course also motivated by wider 
political concerns, such as the threat posed to the Italian Republic by terrorism and political
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continued costs of austerity, provoked a government crisis in January 1979 and led to 
parliamentary elections in June 1979.
Continued attempts during the early 1980s to achieve some sort of wage 
bargaining co-ordination and wage moderation broke down entirely with the conflict 
over the downgrading of wage indexation in 1984 and the resulting referendum of 
1985. This conflict pitted the PCI and the CGIL against the moderate union 
confederations and the Socialist-led government, which - after attempts to arrive at a 
negotiated solution had failed - issued a decree that downgraded wage indexation 
(Frieden 1994a).
The period of ‘consensual stabilisation’ was followed by a period of ‘semi- 
conflictual stabilisation’ between 1980 and 1992 (Salvati 2000: 48-54, chapter 5), 
with the return of the PCI to the opposition and increasing resistance among unions, 
especially within the communist confederal union CGIL, to wage restraint.
From an institutional point of view, this ‘semi-conflictual stabilisation’ can at 
least partly be understood as the result of institutional change that took place in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s and which subsequently affected policy outcomes. If until 
the late 1970s there existed an “endogeneity of monetary policy with respect to fiscal 
policy” (Fratianni and Spinelli 1997: 263), this changed as a result of the 
transformation of the institutional framework within which Italian monetary policy 
was conducted. In terms of international institutions, Italian membership in the fixed 
(but adjustable) exchange rate regime of the EMS had an important impact on Italian 
monetary policy. In terms of domestic institutions, the 1980s differed from the 1970s 
primarily in terms of greater central bank independence, which was the result of the 
so-called ‘divorce’ (cf. Section 2.5). Moreover, domestic institutional reform in the 
form of the downgrading of the wage indexation mechanism in the mid-1980s also 
helped to reduce inflation (Frieden 1994a).
Monetary policy change in the 1980s was a response to a changing 
international economic environment. In 1979 international conditions, which had 
been relatively favourable, changed again dramatically. The double impact of the 
second oil shock and the high-interest policy in the USA led the Bank of Italy to 
tighten monetary policy to defend the lira and avoid a depreciation-inflation cycle 
that would ultimately have led to yet another balance of payments crisis. The
instability. It also reflected a re-orientation of the PCI’s wider political strategy in terms of achieving
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response differed this time compared to the mid-1970s when a combination of 
monetary expansion and depreciation was seen as the solution. According to 
Goodman (1992: 164-165), increasing capital mobility, the potential negative effects 
of wage indexation on devaluation and the absence of immediate elections after June
1979 made the government sympathetic to the views of the central bank and hence 
accepted the Bank of Italy’s preferred policy option of non-devaluation and 
increasing interest rates.
In this situation, characterised by high inflation, deteriorating competitiveness 
and high interest rates, which aimed at defending the ERM peg, Confmdustria called 
for a devaluation of the lira and wage restraint. However, the government and the 
central bank resisted devaluation despite societal pressure. By resisting devaluation, 
the government forced the (exposed) manufacturing sector to resist union demands 
for higher wages and thus indirectly imposed monetary discipline on the most 
important part of the Italian economy. This contributed to the strikes of September
1980 and the subsequent defeat of the unions through the ‘March of the Forty 
Thousand’, which are commonly regarded a symbolic turning point in Italian labour 
relations and macroeconomic policy.35
Hence (semi-conflictual) stabilisation, partial wage moderation, and lower 
inflation were achieved during the 1980s in spite of - rather than thanks to -  domestic 
wage bargaining institutions. The degree of wage moderation that was achieved was 
mainly the result of the ‘implicit’ incomes policy imposed by the exchange rate 
constraint and the dominant position of the (internationally exposed) metalworker 
sector in private sector wage determination. Nonetheless, the institutional features of 
the wage bargaining system prevented rapid disinflation (due to the drag created by 
automatic wage adjustment) and made a policy of voluntary wage moderation 
difficult to implement (as a result of medium-strength unions, fragmentation and the 
lack of confederal control over lower level bargaining).
During the 1980s, the Italian executive was able to resist expansionary 
monetary policy by adhering to the ERM and a relatively hard currency policy. It 
was nonetheless only a relatively hard currency policy because Italy never fully
reform through co-operation (Ginsborg 1990: 378-401).
35 The strikes pitted Fiat middle-level managers and white-collar workers against the unions. In the 
end, the unions had to concede defeat. These events have traditionally been interpreted as the end of 
the political-social wave of trade union mobilisation and contestation that had started in the late 
1960s.
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converged on German inflation levels. Despite several devaluations between 1979 
and 1987, when the ERM turned into a quasi-fixed system, an anti-inflationary 
policy was still being pursued - as the size of the devaluation never fully 
compensated for the loss of competitiveness incurred through the previous real 
appreciation of the lira (Farina 1992: 11). But this was an indirect, gradual and 
ultimately insufficient way to resist societal demands and impose costs on powerful 
societal groups such as exporters and unions. Ultimately, this gradual strategy 
reflected external constraints and domestic opposition, as well as the presence of a 
weak executive.
This is broadly consistent with the political-institutional argument. As 
indicated above, executive strength in the monetary policy area increased in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. This was mainly due to ERM membership and the increased 
independence of the Bank of Italy, which had been liberated from the obligation to 
act as residual buyer of government bonds. In fact, monetary policy did indeed 
become more restrictive. In other words the executive became ‘stronger’ by using the 
external constraint. At the same time, domestic institutional reform, that is, the 
greater independence of the central bank, had a positive effect on monetary 
performance. But this change also affected macroeconomic performance in another 
way. Fiscal policy started to spin out of control because fiscal deficits translated into 
higher public debt as a result of the central bank’s ability to refuse to monetise 
government debt as well as a result of high interest rates stemming from the hard 
currency policy.
The political-institutional approach also explains why the government -  
although interested in fighting inflation and using the external constraint to achieve 
this goal - did not achieve convergence with German inflation rates. It is certainly 
plausible that persistent expansionary fiscal policies had an inflationary effect.
On the whole it seems reasonably sound to say that monetary policy has been aimed 
mainly at stabilising the exchange rate, with periodic concern not to allow it to 
appreciate too much, while on the other hand budget policy has been directed towards 
an extremely gradual reduction of the PSBR [public sector borrowing requirement].
This reduction becomes more substantial if we consider the primary PSBR, but the 
speed of improvement has been so slow that it has not been able to prevent further 
deterioration of public debt [...]. Italy, not having completed the real adjustment, did 
not succeed in the nominal one. She paid very low immediate costs, but managed to 
keep inflation under control, relying on the reputation of the Bank of Italy, and turned
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the inconsistency between monetary, fiscal and wage policies into an increase in the 
public debt (Onofri and Tomasini 1992: 81-82).
As far as fighting inflation is concerned, the Italian government was interested 
in reducing inflation but was searching for a very gradual way that would spread the 
costs over a longer period of time. Moreover the government’s inability and 
weakness in the budgetary realm, which prevented it from imposing the costs of 
fiscal restriction necessary to achieve inflation convergence, explains the ‘extremely 
gradual reduction of the PSBR’. However, in the absence of the ability to control 
fiscal policy, reducing inflation to European levels proved impossible. This also 
reflected the Italian government’s greater weakness with respect to budgetary policy 
relative to monetary policy.
Hence the view, according to which “[t]he government itself misperceived the 
systemic constraints when it allowed wages in the public sector to behave in a 
manner incompatible with the disinflationary target pursued by the monetary 
authorities through the fully stable exchange rate” (Onofri and Tomasini 1992: 90), is 
mistaken in that, rather than a misperception, it was both the government’s 
unwillingness and inability to overcome domestic opposition to a programme of 
fiscal austerity that made disinflation difficult, if not impossible, to achieve 
politically. The contrast with France’s successful convergence after Mitterrand’s U- 
tum that was accompanied by an extremely restrictive fiscal policy is illuminating 
(cf Muet and Fonteneau 1990).
Another, complementary, interpretation focuses more on the monetary side. 
Because the Bank of Italy was not independent enough from government discretion, 
it was not able to pursue a monetary policy restrictive enough to neutralise the 
inflationary consequences of an expansionary fiscal policy. Throughout the 1980s 
high public deficits and increasing debt (which was partly a consequence of the 
inability to monetise deficits) had inflationary consequences. Moreover, due to high 
(and positive) interest rates, the stock of public debt as a share of GDP increased 
very quickly. Although inflation fell from 11 per cent in 1982 to 7 per cent in 1985, 
the Bank of Italy was not able to eliminate the inflation differential with the best- 
performing ERM members. Due to its limited independence, the only way the Bank 
of Italy could hope to win support for low-inflation policies was by adhering to the
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ERM and to a relatively strong-lira policy. In this way it could achieve a reasonable 
degree of inflation without antagonising domestic groups too much.
Clearly, the Bank of Italy faced a difficult task. The existence of high public 
deficits led to considerable capital inflows that pushed the lira to the upper limit of 
the ERM band during the late 1980s. This problem was made worse by the 
liberalisation of capital controls in 1988 as well as by favourable market expectations 
concerning Italian EMU membership in the early 1990s. The problem with regard to 
Italian inflation performance was the following:
Italy’s higher inflation rate necessitated higher interest rates, eventually attracting 
large-scale inflows of short-term capital investment [...]. This meant an accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves [and] at times a downward pressure on interest rates that 
was not consistent with the fight against inflation. Given the exchange rate constraint, 
therefore, the monetary policy stance could not be tightened further to squeeze out 
inflation without at least temporarily aggravating the capital inflow (Sarcinelli 1995:
400).
During this period the Bank of Italy was trying to stabilise the exchange rate by 
intervening in the foreign exchange market while sterilising these interventions to 
keep inflation from rising. The dilemma hence was that the Bank of Italy could not 
raise the discount rate to dampen domestic inflation because it would have pushed 
the lira above the upper limit of its fluctuation band. As Italian competitiveness had 
already declined due to the persistent inflation differential, this was certainly not the 
preferred solution from the government’s point of view. On the one hand, 
devaluation would have been necessary to restore competitiveness. On the other 
hand, increasing interest rates to dampen inflation would have pushed the lira above 
the upper limit of band, increased the debt burden, and would have required a 
revaluation of the lira that would certainly have been bitterly opposed by domestic 
exporters (Walsh 1996: 286-88).
Despite the problem represented by this economic dilemma, the institutionalist 
argument is still valid. A truly independent central bank keen to reduce inflation 
could have pushed the government to revalue the currency or have raised interest 
rates to dampen domestic inflation and thus force the government to pursue more 
restrictive fiscal policies. Admittedly, this would have been a difficult thing to do for 
any central bank. But there are examples such as that of the Federal Reserve policy 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s when the U.S. central bank pursued a high-interest
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rate policy despite the worst post-war recession and despite declining U.S. 
competitiveness which resulted from the appreciation of the dollar and massive 
capital inflows. Sarcinelli (1995) shares this view:
[T]o be effective against chronic high inflation, monetary policy must impose very high 
social costs, which are hard to make people bear, especially when the mandate to ensure 
monetary stability is lacking or uncertain. Otherwise, monetary policy must be flanked 
by consistent fiscal policy and incomes policy (p. 400).
The limited independence of the Bank of Italy is not only indicated by the 
institutional weaknesses - but also in actual policy experiences. With respect to the 
1970s, the central bank did not think that it had the mandate not to accommodate the 
government’s indications for a relaxation of monetary policy (see Salvati 2000: 38, 
66; Goodman 1992: chapter 5). Clearly, the changes of the late 1970s and 1980s 
increased the independence of the Bank of Italy, but it had neither a mandate nor 
unlimited control over monetary instruments. Throughout the 1980s, the Bank was 
not independent enough to pursue a tough anti-inflation policy that might have 
allowed Italy to achieve monetary convergence (Bruni and Monti 1992: 48-49, 56).
This is not the place to discuss whether a totally independent Bank of Italy 
would have pursued this policy. Rather it serves to demonstrate that in the absence of 
an independent central bank, monetary convergence was impossible. This 
demonstrates the relevance of the institutionalist approach. The government was too 
weak to implement fiscal adjustment and the Italian central bank was not strong 
enough to impose the costs necessary to achieve full inflation convergence.
As already suggested, the relative weakness of the Bank of Italy was also 
reflected in its gradual approach to fighting inflation. The recourse to periodic 
devaluations that never fully compensated exporters for the accumulated loss of 
competitiveness can be regarded as evidence in that it shows the gradual and indirect 
way in which the Bank of Italy was constrained to impose monetary discipline. 
Between 1970 and 1987, Italy devalued no less than eight times in slightly more than 
eight years (Table 2-5).
Table 2-5 Devaluations against the German Mark, 1979-90
(vis-a-vis German mark, in per cent)
SEPT.
1979
MAR.
1981
OCT.
1981
JUNE
1982
MAR.
1983
JULY
1985
APRIL
1986
JAN.
1987
JAN.
1990
CUMULA­
TIVE
Italian
lira 2.0 6.4 8.8 7.2 8.2 8.5 3.0 3.0 3.7 63.5
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Dutch
guilder 2.0 - -- -- 1.9 ~ -- - - 4.0
French
franc 2.0 - 8.8 10.6 8.2 - 6.2 3.0 - 45.2
Source: Gros and Thygesen (1998: 69)
This changed after 1987 when the ERM turned into a quasi-fixed exchange rate 
system. However, during this period the inflation differential with the other European 
countries started to widen, mainly as a result of inflationary public sector wage 
settlements. While the exposed manufacturing sectors showed relative wage 
moderation during the 1980s as a result of the switch to a hard currency policy, 
domestic inflation was driven by inflationary wage settlements in the public sector, 
not least through its expansionary effect on fiscal policy deficits (Micossi and Papi
1996).
Comparative data on public service and private manufacturing sector strikes as 
well as wage increases confirm this view. Wages in the public sector increased more 
rapidly than in the manufacturing sector during the 1980s, and strike activity was 
more intense in the public sector, indicating greater wage pressures (Cesos [various 
years]; OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1997: 97, part ID). Despite various attempts to 
control public wages, successive Italian governments were unable to enforce public 
wage restraint for long, which eventually resulted in major wage increases. The 
proclaimed goal of government to rein in public wage increases was often ignored. 
Ministerial delegations would negotiate with their respective bureaucracies and 
would not infrequently disrespect ceilings on wage growth set by the government. 
Furthermore, ceilings would be circumvented by legislative action granting 
indemnities and premia to certain groups of public employees (Femer and Hyman 
1992: 571). Parliament (invoking the principle of par condicio) would extend above- 
limit wage settlements negotiated by individual ministers to the public sector as a 
whole. Overall:
In contrast to other countries, the expansion in the government wage bill continued in 
the 1980s, compromising efforts of fiscal consolidation. Recurrent hiring freezes 
introduced since 1983 had only a limited impact, due to the exemptions granted to 
individual administrations and lack of enforcement. Wage demands from militant 
unions met weak resistance from the government more interested in minimising
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conflicts than in avoiding distortions in wage differentials, budgetary overruns and 
risks of wage spirals (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1997: 96).
As suggested in Section 2.4, this has to be seen in the context of a weak 
executive and the institutional obstacles that characterised the public sector wage 
bargaining regime, such as increasing fragmentation and the loss of control over 
wage bargaining in the public sector by the confederal unions.
As a result of re-kindling inflation, the Italian current account balance that had 
been close to zero in 1987 moved into deficit due to the deterioration of the real 
exchange rate. This led to increasing criticism from exporters and import-competing 
sectors (Walsh 1996: 286-87). Nevertheless, the government refused to devalue. 
Whether it would have been willing and able to resist calls for devaluation under the 
increasingly difficult economic conditions of the early 1990s is impossible to say 
since attacks on the lira after the Danish referendum in June 1992 quickly forced 
Italy to renegotiate its exchange rate within the ERM and finally to float the lira in 
September 1992 (c f  Chapter 6). Ultimately, the 1992 devaluation has to be seen as 
resulting from the unsustainable character of Italian macroeconomic policy as 
reflected in the continued rise in public debt, high public deficits and persistently 
high inflation.
In short, an institutionalist approach - with a special emphasis on executive 
strength and variation of strength across policy areas -  explains post-war Italian 
macroeconomic policy well. The bias towards short-termism and incoherence in 
Italian macroeconomic policy-making was primarily the result of the need of 
governments to accommodate the interests of a variety of political and societal 
actors. This was the consequence of the government’s unwillingness or inability to 
impose the higher immediate, short-term costs required to successfully pursue long­
term objectives such as sustainability. This reflected the institutional deficiencies of 
the Italian macroeconomic policy-making regime. Hence this confirms the view 
according to which the domestic-institutional structure of the political system -  and 
especially the executive weakness - is a critical intervening variable without which 
the interrelationship between international economic pressures and domestic political 
strategies cannot be understood (Katzenstein 1976, 1977a, 1977b).
Not only does the institutionalist approach explain past macroeconomic policy 
well, but it also suggests that the pursuit of sustainable medium-term macroeconomic
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3 BUDGETARY POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF 
FISCAL ADJUSTMENT
Public policym aking in action is epitom ized through the budget (Wildavsky 1986 [1975]: 2)
The fiscal situation in Italy in the early 1990s was dramatic. Net borrowing was at 
11.1 per cent of GDP in 1990 and 10.1 in 1991 compared with an average of 1.8 and 
2.7 per cent in the other three major EU countries (France, Germany, UK).1 Gross 
public debt stood at 101.5 per cent and 108.7 per cent in 1991 and 1992 respectively 
(Table 3-1). The only good news was that the primary deficit (that is deficit net of 
interest payments) was close to zero in 1991. By then the high debt burden had 
become the major problem and accounted for the quasi-totality of public borrowing. 
Despite these unfavourable circumstances and the existing ‘fiscal deficit bias’ of 
political and budgetary institutions, Italy managed to reduce its net annual deficit 
from 9.6 to 2.7 per cent as a share of GDP between 1992 and 1997 and thus met the 
Maastricht deficit criteria. New borrowing was reduced by more than 6 points over 
the same period.
Table 3-1 General Government Net and Primary Borrowing and Debt, 1991-1998
(as a share of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Net
Borrowing
10.1 9.6 9.5 9.2 7.7 6.6 2.7 2.7
Primary
Borrowing
-0.1 -1.9 -2.6 -1.8 -3.5 -4.0 -6.6 -4.9
Debt 101.5 108.7 119.1 124.9 125.3 124.6 122.4 118.7
Source: Bank of Italy, A bridged  Report, 1999
The fact that growth averaged only about 1.2 per cent per annum and 
unemployment was standing at an all-time high of around 12 per cent during this 
period made the fiscal adjustment all the more remarkable from an economic and 
political point of view (Table 3-2).
Table 3-2 Real GDP Growth, 1992-1998
(annual change in per cent)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
0.8 -0.9 2.2 2.9 1.1 1.8 1.5
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium - Historical Statistics 1999
1 Unless indicated otherwise, the economic data refer to OECD Statistical Compendium 1999.
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As argued in Chapter 2, the history of Italian fiscal policy suggests that Italy’s 
dramatic financial position in the early 1990s has to be understood as the result of 
both ‘weak’ political-institutional and - to a lesser extent - budgetary-procedural 
characteristics of the fiscal policy-making regime. In Italy high public debt was 
primarily the result of the first oil shock in whose aftermath decision-makers were 
unwilling or at least unable to pursue adequate adjustment policies (Giavazzi and 
Spaventa 1989). Even though public debt remained at moderate levels in terms of the 
debt-GDP ratio until the late 1970s, it exploded afterwards as a result of the switch to 
a hard-currency policy in 1979-81 (ERM membership and ‘divorce’) and the 
resulting high (positive) interest rates. This led to the dramatic financial situation of 
the early 1990s (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1997: part III; Table 3-3).
Table 3-3 Net Borrowing, Primary Borrowing and Public Debt, 1985-1991
(as a share of GDP)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Net
Borrowing
8.3 11.4 11.2 10.5 11.5 12.3 11.4 11 10.7 9.8 11.1 10.1
Primary
Borrowing
3.2 5.3 4.2 3.1 3.5 4.5 3.1 3.2 2.8 1 1.6 -0.1
Public
Debt
57.7 59.9 64.7 70.8 76.3 82.7 86.5 90.6 92.8 95.8 98 101.5
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium - H istorical Statistics 1999
As will be shown in more detail in Chapter 4, although Italian public 
expenditure was low relative to the EU average, the increase in public outlays for 
social and public services was a major factor in preventing the government from 
exercising expenditure restraint. As a result, the (albeit unsuccessful) fiscal 
consolidation in the 1980s was primarily revenue-based, that is it relied above all on 
revenue increases (Franco 1993; De Ioanna 1993; Morcaldo 1993; Chiorazzo et al.
1994).2 However, by the early 1990s, the Italian government’s revenues as a share of 
GDP were almost identical with the EU average (Table 3-4).
2 Alesina and Mare (1996) have calculated the ‘full compliance deficit’ and have estimated that if tax 
evasion in Italy had been at comparable levels as, for example, in the UK, Italian public debt in the 
mid-1990s would have stood at about 60 per cent of GDP instead of 120 per cent. Political- 
institutionally speaking, the problems regarding the low efficiency of the tax administration, 
administrative weakness, the unusual complexity of the tax system, and the fragmentation of the 
production structure (that is, a large number of self-employed individuals and a high number of 
unlisted companies) were conducive to large-scale tax evasion (for a critical discussion of the Italian 
tax system see OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996; part IV; for most recent reforms see OECD 
Economic Surveys Italy 1999: 66-71; for problems involved in the administrative control of public 
spending as well as comparative evolution of revenue and expenditure see OECD Economic Surveys
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Table 3-4 Government Revenue by Category, 1990
(share of GDP)
I ta ly EU
Personal income tax 10.3 10.5
Corporate income tax 3.9 3.0
Employers’ social security contributions 9.2 6.2
Employees’ social security contributions 2.5 4.1
Property taxes 0.9 1.8
Taxes on goods and services 11.0 12.5
Other 1.3 1.5
Total Revenue 39.1 39.6
Source: OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996: 91
Both the long-term development of public finances and anecdotal evidence 
tends to confirm the view that the government was not able to adjust fiscal policy 
quickly enough. This is consistent with an institutionalist interpretation of Italian 
debt. During the 1980s interest group pressure on weak, multi-party governments not 
only prevented successful fiscal reform, it actually led to an overall expansion of, for
example, welfare spending, as a result of both discretionary action as well as ‘non-
'1
decisions’. This was also a reflection of executive weakness in other policy areas. 
Where non-decisions prevail strongly and are considered part of a country’s culture of 
government, the government budget becomes heavily dependent on institutions in the 
public sector, the social security system, the welfare system and labour market 
regulations. Non-sustainability of public finances may then be caused by weaknesses in 
these areas (Perotti etal. 1998: 45).
In short, a weak executive was neither able to control spending on, for example, 
social welfare, nor was it able to bring about adequate fiscal adjustment (Carfora and 
Cappellacci 1993: 211).
The period immediately preceding the phase of fiscal consolidation illustrates 
this well. In September 1991, the Andreotti VII government (April 1991 - April
1992) consisting of the traditional government coalition introduced a new package of
Italy 1997: part III; also Tanzi 1996). However, even if these problems played a role in bringing about 
high deficits, this does not undermine the institutionalist interpretation defended here. Similar to 
socio-economic conditions (cfi Section 1.5), tax evasion (and related tax-collection-related problems) 
can be regarded as exogenous relative to which a government has to adjust budgetary policy.
3 This is another reason why pension as well as (public and private) wage and monetary policy are 
analysed separately.
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fiscal restraint for 1991. Revealingly,4 it was almost entirely based upon revenue 
gains as well as one-off measures (such as advanced payments on imputed capital 
gains and tax amnesty). By the time the new three-year 1992-94 budget plan, which 
aimed to achieve a falling public debt-GDP ratio by 1994, was announced in May 
1991, it was clear that it would not meet its targets, as it relied on over-optimistic 
forecasts concerning interest rates and growth {The Economist, 5 October 1991; 
OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1992: 36-49). A detailed analysis of 1992 budgetary 
policy-making shows all those elements that have traditionally characterised Italian 
budgetary policy-making: intra-coalitional disputes, parliamentary amendments, 
weak government proposals, wrong estimates and forecasts, a weak executive and a 
weak prime minister (Verzichelli 1999b: 185-190).
As successful fiscal consolidation did take place in the 1990s, the question is 
how institutional obstacles - and particularly executive weakness as discussed in 
Chapter 2 - were overcome. I first analyse reforms of the early 1990s concerning 
political institutions as well as budgetary procedures. Sections 3.2 to 3.4 discuss 
budgetary policy during the three different legislative periods. Finally, the questions 
of how institutional reform affected policy outcomes and how policy reform came 
about in the absence of substantial institutional reform are addressed.
3.1 Political-Institutional and Budgetary-Procedural Reform in the 
1990s
Both political-institutional and budgetary-procedural factors have been identified as 
underpinning executive weakness in the budgetary process. Therefore it is necessary 
to analyse the institutional changes that took place during the period immediately 
preceding fiscal adjustment to evaluate to what extent this affected the government’s 
ability to implement more disciplined budgetary policies.
As this study seeks to understand both how institutions affect policies and how 
and why these institutions themselves change, it is important to analyse the ‘politics 
of institutional reform’. According to historical institutionalism, institutional reform
4 Budgetary consolidation was mainly based upon revenue increases rather than expenditure cuts. The 
latter is more difficult to implement due to ‘concentrated’ resistance by those on whom the cuts would 
primarily fall. Revenue increases (that is, tax increases) can be more evenly spread. As weak 
governments are more responsive to societal and parliamentary pressure, it is not surprising that 
Italian governments have primarily relied on revenue increases and have as a result been unable to 
bring about a decisive consolidation of public finances (c f  Alesina and Perotti 1995).
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is bound to be difficult as institutional arrangements are inert and because there are 
actors and interests that support them. Generally, institutional change tends to be the 
outcome of domestic and international pressures. But external and domestic 
pressures for change are themselves mediated by pre-existing institutional structures, 
and hence institutional change tends to be path-dependent (cf Section 1.4). 
Moreover, if institutional factors have visible distributional consequences, then there 
will be conflict over the reform of those institutions. During the 1990s, reforms of 
political and budgetary institutions took place in Italy. However, none of them 
achieved any significant strengthening of the budgetary policy system. Although this 
confirms - as will be shown - the ‘path dependency’ view of institutional change, it 
does raise the question of why and how fiscal consolidation was possible in the 
1990s.
Reform o f Political-Institutional Structures: The Politics o f  Electoral Reform5 
In Chapter 2, ‘government instability’, ‘distributional conflict’, and ‘electoral 
system’ were identified as contributing to fiscal instability, all of which ‘capture’ 
executive strength. In parliamentary systems like the Italian system, executive 
strength is to a large extent determined by electoral institutions. Roughly, the 
relationship can be envisaged as follows: ‘weak’ electoral rules (for example, 
proportional system) lead to parliamentary and executive fragmentation which in 
turn increases government instability, reduces party discipline, prime-ministerial 
strength and ultimately executive strength. By contrast, ‘strong’ electoral rules (for 
example, simple plurality) reduce fragmentation and strengthen executive authority.
Institutional reform with a view of strengthening the executive in general and 
the electoral system in particular had been on the agenda in Italy for quite some time. 
This was an implicit recognition of the dysfunctional nature of the Italian political 
system. Reformist forces among the political parties and Italian society demanded 
greater transparency, efficiency and ‘govemability’. Thus the Bozzi Commission 
(1983-85), the short-lived De Mita-Iotti Commission (1992-94) and more recently 
the so-called Bicamerale (1997-98) under D’Alema were dedicated to formulating 
proposals in this respect. Essentially all reform proposals came to nothing as a result
5 Note that the discussion of executive strength in this section is of similar relevance to all policy areas 
examined in this study. Hence the arguments and conclusions reached here should be borne mind 
when reading Chapters 4-6.
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of a series of crosscutting vetoes and the need to accommodate a diverse and large 
number of party interests. The Bozzi Commission, for example, produced six 
minority reports. The high number of parties with heterogeneous interests made any 
attempts to arrive at meaningful institutional reform impossible (Pasquino 1990; 
Pappalardo 1995). Constitutional changes (as opposed to electoral system reform) 
were even more difficult to achieve, as this would have required a ‘bipartisan’ 
approach due to the need for a two-thirds parliamentary majority.
The politics and outcomes of electoral reform also demonstrated the inability 
of the Italian political system in general and the executive in particular to bring about 
substantial change and hence confirm the relevance of path dependent institutional 
development. A weak, fragmented government, dependent on the support of several 
parties over which it had little control, was unable to impose change on a reluctant 
parliament. Parliamentary parties - and especially the smaller ones - opposed any 
reform of the existing proportional electoral system that would have resulted in a 
reduction of parliamentary parties, as it would have eliminated them from 
parliament. The bigger parties that might have been expected to benefit from a more 
reductive system were also reluctant to push for change, mainly as a result of their 
reliance on smaller coalition partners. Institutional inertia in terms of electoral and 
more generally political-institutional reform was hence primarily due to the pre­
existing proportional system that allowed for the existence of small parties, which in 
turn were able to block any reform that aimed at strengthening the electoral system. 
This was so because “proportional representation is a rather conservative electoral 
system; it preserves the existing forces, that is, a constellation of interests that 
strenuously oppose any change -  and have resources to do this -  and that indeed 
impede reform” (Pasquino 1992: 13; Nohlen 1984b).
Nonetheless, changes to the electoral system did take place in the early 1990s. 
They were primarily the result of referenda and public pressure and can be said to 
have come about despite parliament and political parties. An electoral reform 
movement headed by a cross-party coalition of reformers led by DCI dissident Mario 
Segni emerged as a response to the failure of successive attempts to achieve 
institutional reform in the 1980s -  and hence a response to the unwillingness and 
inability of government and parliament to bring about meaningful change (Pasquino
1992). More specifically, the declared goal of the electoral movement was to 
introduce govemability and transparency. Although this reform movement was not
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directly inspired by the realisation that macroeconomic reform was necessary, it is 
nonetheless important to examine the reform it induced in order to demonstrate the 
importance of path dependency and the potential effects of increased executive 
strength on macroeconomic policy.
A referendum initiated by the reform movement and held on 9 June 1991 
reduced the number of preference votes6 and led to the creation of a Bicameral 
Committee on Institutional Reforms whose task it was to produce a proposal for 
electoral reform. Due to obstruction by parliamentary parties and crosscutting vetoes, 
the committee initially came to nothing. Institutional reform was blocked by a 
parliamentary and political class that was unwilling and unable to implement change 
(Pasquino 1997). However, things changed with the April 1992 elections, which 
have been described as an ‘electoral earthquake’ and ‘landmark elections’ because 
the traditional majority coalition suffered dramatic losses (Pasquino and McCarthy
1993).
In 1992 the Italian political system and more particularly its parliamentary and 
party-political class underwent a major crisis (McCarthy 1995; Bufacchi and Burgess 
1998). Starting with the arrest of a mid-level PSI politician in early 1992, the 
judiciary began to unearth a network of corruption and collusion, including illegal 
party financing, public works contracts and so on. The press dubbed this corruption 
scandal Tangentopoli (Bribe City). At the height of the scandal more than half of 
serving members of parliament were under investigation and suspected of 
involvement in the scandal. Naturally this accelerated the de-legitimisation of the 
traditional parliamentary parties and especially the traditional government parties 
such as the DCI and PSI that had already been evident in the April 1992 general 
election. Subsequent elections at the of provincial, communal and regional elections 
(though not strictly comparable) suggest that the DCI, PSI and Republican Party 
(PRI) suffered a further decline of electoral support (Table 3-5).7
6 The abolition of preference votes was meant to increase the transparency of the electoral process and 
reduce ‘vote buying’ and corruption at the constituency level.
7 Note that the numbers from roughly June 1992 onwards also reflect the break-up of some parties.
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Table 3-5 National, Regional, Provincial and Communal Elections, 1992-1993
(vote in per cent)
1987
(0)
APR.
1992
(1)
SEPT.
1992
(2)
DEC.
1992
(3)
JUNE
1993
(4)
JUNE
1993
(5)
JUNE
1993
(6)
NOV.
1993
(7)
NOV.
1993
(8)
DCI 34.3 29.7 14.0 24.3 22.3 18.7 12.1 14.3 10.7
PSI 14.3 13.6 7.2 9.9 4.7 2.5 0.6 0.6 1.2
PRI 3.7 4.4 1.5 3.6 1.7 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.2
PSDI 3.0 2.7 0.8 4.9 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.9
PDS 26.6* 16.1 17.8 11.4 9.9 7.7 19.8 4.6 12.1
RC n/a 5.6 6.7 6.3 5.5 5.1 8.0 1.3 5.3
Rete n/a 1.9 2.7 4.0 1.8 2.0 1.8 5.2 3.1
LN n/a 8.7 33.9 13.7 26.7 11.7 30.5 9.6 6.2
Others 18.1 5.1 8.6 9.4 10.8 45.6 17.9 52.2 43.8
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Newell and Bull (1997: 86, 89) * PCI
Top row: (0) general election, (1) general election, (2) provincial elections [Mantova]
(3) communal elections [55 communes], (4) regional elections [Friuli,
Venezia, Giulia] (5) partial communal elections [1,192], (6) provincial 
elections [Gorizia, Ravenna, Viterbo, Mantova, Pavia, Trieste, Varese,
Genova, La Spezia], (7) regional elections [Trentino Alto Adige], (8) partial 
communal elections [424 communes]
Column: DCI = Christian Democratic Party; PSI = Socialist Party; PRI = Republican
Party; PSDI = Social Democratic Party; PDS = Democrats of the Left; RC = 
Communist Refoundation; LN = Northern League
Encouraged by the outcome of the 1991 referendum, the reform movement 
managed to organise a second referendum on 18-19 April 1993, which further 
increased the pressure for reform of the electoral system. This referendum abolished 
the 65-per cent clause of the electoral law for the Senate which had the effect of 
creating a single-member, simple-plurality system for three quarters of the Senate 
seats (Newell and Bull 1997) - and hence a ‘stronger’ electoral system. As the two 
houses of parliament had co-equal legislative power, this meant that the electoral law 
of the Chamber of Deputies also had to be modified.
In addition to the poor electoral performance in the general parliamentary 
elections, the positive outcome of the referendum in conjunction with the widening 
of the corruption scandal increased the pressure on parliament to realise electoral 
reform. While, on the one hand, this made the traditional parties even more reluctant 
to change the electoral rules at the national level, on the other hand, it meant that a 
further delay or rejection of the reform would have resulted in certain electoral
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defeat. At the same time, the technical government of Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi, who moreover had been asked to make electoral reform one of the priorities 
by President Scalfaro, pushed for the rapid adoption of a new electoral law. The 
Ciampi government left it to parliament to work out the new law but threatened to 
propose the electoral system of the Senate for the Chamber of Deputies in case 
parliament was unable (or unwilling) to reform the system. This made the threat of 
parliamentary elections, which would have been a ‘referendum’ on electoral reform, 
a real possibility (Katz 1995).
As a result, the two houses adopted a new electoral law on 3-4 August 1993. 
The reluctance to adopt a ‘stronger’ electoral system is nicely illustrated by the 
following incident. Attempts to introduce dilatory amendments and the resulting 
shuttling of the reform bill forced the president of the Chamber of Deputies to set a 
deadline which, if violated, would have resulted in new elections in order to get the 
legislation approved (Katz 1995). In short, it is fair to say that the electoral reform 
came about as a result of massive public pressure, a committed, disinterested prime 
minister and in the last instance through the threat of new elections that would 
certainly have resulted in a major repudiation of ‘obstructionist’ parliamentary 
parties.
These extraordinary circumstances notwithstanding, the content of the new 
electoral regime reflected inevitable inter-party compromise and hence indirectly the 
effect of pre-existing institutions. Instead of creating a plurality system that would 
have eliminated the smaller parties, the 1993 reform replaced the old party-list 
system of proportional representation with a hybrid system. The new electoral law 
foresaw a mixed system for the election of the members of parliament (MPs) by 
combining both proportional and majoritarian elements. Three fourths of the seats 
were to be distributed on the basis of the majoritarian and the remaining fourth on the 
basis of the proportional principle (Katz 1995; Parker 1996). Thus, the final result 
was - of course - a compromise solution that seemed acceptable to the overwhelming 
majority of party actors.8 It was a compromise in that it reflected as far as necessary 
the demands expressed by the 1993 referendum on the one hand, as well as the 
unwillingness of smaller parties to eliminate themselves (as would have been the 
case with the introduction of a fully-fledged majoritarian system) on the other hand.
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The 1993 electoral reform also showed the inability of the executive to determine 
decisively the content of electoral reform.9
As regards political-institutional features then, the 1990s brought no relevant 
institutional change, except for the reform of the electoral system. Institutional 
reform was not only incremental and highly path-dependent but also inadequate in 
that it did not result in any substantial strengthening of the executive -  as will be 
demonstrated below. As a result of the ‘necessary’ inter-party compromise, electoral 
reform only had a limited impact on executive strength. Although it introduced a 
bipolar logic at the electoral level, the system still allowed for the survival of smaller 
parties. In fact, the number of effective parliamentary and government parties 
increased after the reform; and the bipolarisation was at best an incomplete 
bipolarisation. In short, the electoral reform did not lead to a strengthening of the 
executive and cannot explain the successful fiscal consolidation of the 1990s.
Reforms of the Budgetary Process
After changes to budgetary procedures in 1978, 1983, and 1988,10 which had aimed 
at rationalising the budgetary process (but none of which had led to a substantial 
improvement in fiscal outcomes), further changes took place during 1989-92 (Della 
Sala 1988; Verzichelli 1999a). During this period parliamentary rules (mainly 
established during previous reforms) were interpreted and applied in a progressively 
restrictive way so that all the amendments to the bills during the budget process 
henceforth had to respect the restraints previously established. A certain 
rationalisation also resulted from the strengthening of the position of the presidencies 
of the two houses and of the relevant commissions with regard to controlling the 
admissibility of amendments (c f Chiorazzo et al. 1994: 240-243; Da Empoli et al. 
1995; Zangani 1996). Budgetary rules were reformed which introduced budget 
sessions and deadlines and which resulted in a greater rationalisation of the
8 For details regarding the precise characteristics of the new electoral system see Parker (1996: 46-7); 
for detailed analysis of party preferences and negotiations see Pappalardo (1995).
9 It is of course also true that, due to its technocratic character, the government only had a mandate to 
‘see through’ electoral reform but did not have the legitimacy to determine its precise content. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the government -  in addition to not being strong enough -  would have 
lacked the power to influence the reform substantially. Its power was negative in that it could push 
parliament to find an agreement, but it was unable to determine the reform content.
0 The 1978 reform introduced a new instrument, the finance law, that was to allow for the regulation 
of fiscal effects of existing legislation. The 1983 reform introduced procedural rules that were to
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budgetary process at the parliamentary stage (Verzichelli 1999a). Parliament also 
modified the treatment of the special funds in a stricter sense. Finally, there were also 
various reforms at the implementation level (see Sartore 1999).11
All this undoubtedly resulted in a greater rationalisation and transparency of the 
budget process. Nonetheless, this stricter interpretation left substantially unchanged 
the parity between parliament and government. Even though government proposals 
are given slightly more weight, the process still relies on a functioning majority- 
govemment cohesion and dominance over the budgetary process. The reforms did 
not achieve any substantial change in this respect. Overall, budgetary policy is still a 
co-decision process, as the greater rationalisation has not resulted in a tangible 
strengthening of the executive vis-a-vis parliament (for detailed discussion see 
Alesinaeffl/. 1998).
In short, despite a greater rationalisation of parliamentary procedures and 
greater transparency of the budgetary process as a whole, the Italian budgetary 
system is still a ‘parliamentary regime’ (as opposed to a an ‘executive regime’). 
Thus, although changes to parliamentary rules and procedures provided the executive 
with a wider range of formal instruments that allows it in theory to exercise greater 
control over the budgetary process, the executive continues to be weak politically (cf. 
Masciandaro 1996: 419; Della Cananea 1997). This interpretation is also 
corroborated by the most recent survey of Italian budgetary procedures and rules. 
Based on a mixture of political-institutional and budgetary-procedural characteristics 
of fiscal policy-making proposed by Von Hagen (1992) and Von Hagen and Harden 
(1994), De Haan et a l (1999) replicated these previous surveys and - on the basis of 
expert responses - found that the complex indicator for a ‘strong’ budgetary system12 
had changed little in Italy since the early 1990s (p. 275, 294-296).
Another related point concerns executive strength as well as the distinction 
between the procedural advantage the government enjoys over the legislature as well 
as the centralisation of the executive and the cohesion of the government majority. 
As argued in Chapter 2, Italian budgetary policy often succeeded in finding 
ingenious ways to circumvent formal rules if not to violate them blatantly. Arguably
ensure that the various budget documents be approved in time. The 1988 reform formally committed 
both government and parliament to respect pre-established targets (Chiorazzo et al. 1994: 240-241).
11 In April 1997 the reform of the central government budget was approved. This reform came 
however too late to have an effect on budgetary policy during the period under consideration (cf. 
Section 7.4 below).
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the executive has always theoretically had the procedural means to ‘get its way’ (De 
Ioanna 1993: chapter 16). If this is indeed so, then this further demonstrates that 
‘political power’ -  which primarily reflects political-institutional characteristics - is 
more important in determining budgetary outcomes than formal, budgetary rules.
This view is indirectly confirmed by the politics of budgetary-procedural 
reform. The reforms were aimed at rationalising procedures without however 
achieving any remarkable strengthening of the executive relative to parliament. The 
reforms do not seem to have encountered any opposition worth mentioning. Precisely 
this would have been expected in the case of reforms that change the relative power 
of the various actors in the budgeteray process. As Milesi-Ferretti (1996) has put it: 
“Proposals for reforms in the budgetary process are therefore likely to encounter 
resistance from vested interests -  and this may account for the lack of action in Italy 
on any of these proposals so far” (p. 27). In short, the fact that there was no evidence 
of substantial conflict over reform also indicates that the reforms did not 
substantially alter the balance of political power between the executive and 
parliament. The reforms largely resulted in the awto-regulation of parliament rather 
than increased executive strength (Degni 1999: 46).
As in the case of political-institutional change, the reform of budgetary 
procedures was ‘path-dependent’ to the extent that a weak government was unable to 
introduce or impose rules on a ‘strong’ parliament. Rules and procedures that might 
have reduced the influence of parliament over budgetary policy and concomitantly 
increased the effective -  as opposed to formal-legal -  control over the budgetary 
outcomes by the executive would not have been acceptable to parliament. A weak 
executive was (and would have been) unable to introduce stronger rules. Hence, as in 
the political-institutional sphere, institutional change with regard to budgetary rules 
was path-dependent, thus confirming the relevance of the historical-institutionalist 
approach and institutional inertia.
In sum, both the nature of budgetary-procedural changes and the ease with 
which a supposedly weak government was able to change parliamentary procedures 
also indicates that the reforms did not substantially alter the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature and hence did not substantially increase executive 
strength as a result of budgetary-institutional reform. Nor did political-institutional
12 See Chapter 1, footnote 4.
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(that is electoral) reform increase executive strength. If the absence of a strong and 
cohesive executive was the main factor in explaining the rise in creative accounting, 
budget overshoots, permanent public deficits, and if political power grounded in 
political-institutional characteristics of the state was the main factor determining 
executive strength, then the budgetary policy reforms between 1992-98 cannot have 
been the result of domestic-institutional change.13
Hence I argue that Italy achieved impressive budgetary policy reform after 
1992 in the absence of relevant institutional reform. I first present a stylised account 
of Italian budgetary policy between 1992-98. Due to a combination of the inevitable 
complexity of budgetary policy (that is, various phases of formulation, concertation- 
with-social-partners, parliamentary and implementation stages) and limited space, 
the reconstruction of the politics at the formulation and parliamentary stage will 
serve to illustrate my argument according to which policy reform and increased 
executive strength was primarily the result of intense external pressure rather than a 
domestic-institutional strengthening of the executive. The theory-driven 
reconstruction of historical events will primarily rely on news coverage by the 
Financial Times as well as on the purely economic-legal account by Zaccaria (1998) 
and only secondarily on official government and parliamentary documents.14
3.2 The Transition Governments o f  Amato and Ciampi, 1992-1994
The general elections of 5-6 April 1992 took place under the old (de facto 
proportional) electoral system (Bufacchi and Burgess 1998: chapter 2). In these 
elections, the traditional parties of government as well as the main opposition parties 
of the left suffered a combined net loss of votes amounting to almost 11 percentage 
points, while the new protest parties saw their combined share of the vote rise by 9 
points (Newell and Bull 1997). Even though the traditional government parties (DCI, 
PSDI, PLI and PSI) won enough votes to continue the coalition, they were weakened 
by this electoral outcome as well as by the corruption scandal, which started in early
13 This has naturally important theoretical implications for the institutionalist approach which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
14 Budgetary policy-making in Italy is an extremely complex process involving a great number of 
actors, rules and events. The Italian economic press provides detailed coverage (// Sole 24 Ore). As 
what is of interest here are the decisive moments and major conflicts surrounding budgetary policy, 
the Financial Times is the most appropriate source of information because it only focuses on the most 
important events. For the quantitative-economic aspects of budgetary policy the annual reports of the 
Bank of Italy and OECD surveys have been used.
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1992 (Table 3-6). Giuliano Amato became prime minister on 18 June 1992 with the 
support of a 16-seat majority in the Chamber.
Table 3-6 Chamber of Deputies Elections 1992
VOTES IN % TOTAL SEATS
-DCI 29.7 206
-PSI 13.6 92
- OTHERS (PRI*, PSDI, PLI*) 9.9 60
TOTAL (traditional parties of government) 53.2 358
-PDS 16.1 107
-RC 5.6 35
TOTAL (opposition parties of the left) 21.7 142
-LN 8.7 55
- OTHERS (Greens, Rete, Panella) 5.9 35
TOTAL (new protest parties) 14.6 90
OTHERS 10.5 40
TOTAL 100 630
Source: Newell and Bull (1997: 86)
* Note that the Republican Party (PRI) was not part of the 1992 government coalition 
± Liberal Party
The first major reform15 - and a watershed in Italian budgetary policy - took 
place under the Amato government (June 1992-April 1993) at a time when Italy was 
undergoing a severe economic as well as political crisis (McCarthy 1995; Bufacchi 
and Burgess 1998). In summer 1992 the general economic situation was precarious. 
Growth was slowing and set to reach a mere 0.8 per cent for 1992, competitiveness 
of industry had been declining16 for some time and the fiscal position was 
deteriorating despite repeated attempts to avoid the overshoot of the budget deficit. 
The state sector deficit17 was expected to reach L175,000bn (or almost 11 per cent of
15 For a detailed first-person account see Barucci (1995).
16 The cumulative increase in inflation relative to Germany, one of Italy’s main trading partners, 
betwen 1987 and 1992 was more than 18 percent (OECD Statistical Compendium 1999).
17 The state sector (settore statale) covers the state (central administration) but (since 1993) excludes 
other autonomous agencies and autonomous national companies. The general government sector 
(amministrazioni pubbliche) covers the state sector, local government, and social security institutions. 
The public sector (settore pubblico) covers general government and autonomous government 
companies and bodies in the market sector. With respect to TEU, the general government deficits are 
the relevant reference figures (c f  Zaccaria 1998: chapter 2). The budgetary figures quoted in the text 
refer to state sector figures until 1995 and to general government figures thereafter (unless indicated
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GDP) instead of the L128,000bn (or 8.5 per cent) originally planned (Financial 
Times, 11 July 1992; OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1992: 43). In addition to this 
already difficult situation, pressure on the exchange rate was increasing after the 
Danish referendum in June. Markets increasingly perceived Italian budgetary policy 
to be unsustainable and doubted that the Italian authorities would be able to sustain 
interest rate increases to defend the lira. The spread relative to German bonds was on 
the increase. In fact, it was to increase from about 5 to a peak of 8 points in October 
1992. Furthermore, in the absence of corrective action, a state sector deficit of about 
14.5 per cent in 1993 and about 19 per cent in 1994 was expected.
Visibly in response to these developments, the Amato government introduced 
an emergency package in early July to contain the fiscal slippage. Even though this 
still meant a budget overshoot of more than L20,000bn, it targeted fiscal 
retrenchment worth 30,000bn upon a combination of revenue gains (higher stamp 
duties, higher one-off taxes on real estate and bank deposits and higher social 
security contributions paid by employees) and expenditure cuts (freeze of public 
employment, lower transfers to local authorities and reduced calls on social spending 
and defence expenditure) in order to contain the budget overshoot. The package was 
presented to parliament in the form of a decree and was converted after the 
government made its approval an issue of confidence in order to eliminate 651 
amendments. The government won the vote in the Chamber with 318 to 246 after 
threatening potential deserters among their own ranks with sanctions (Financial 
Times, 30 July 1992). Despite the corrective measures, the 1992 state budget deficit 
overshot the original target by 2 percentage points (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 
1993: 38).
otherwise). This reflects the fact that fiscal targets in Italy are primarily formulated in terms of the 
cash-borrowing requirement of the state sector (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996: 42). However, 
with the EMU deadline approaching, fiscal policy increasingly targeted the general government 
deficit.
Note that a year-on-year comparison of budget outcomes as presented in Table 3-1 is not always a 
good indicator of the ‘political-budgetary’ strength of the adjustment. On the one hand, various 
changes and revisions of the definitions of ‘budget deficit’ took place between 1992-98 (Zaccaria 
1998: 126; also Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1997: 82-84). On the other hand, net borrowing 
figures contain of course a cyclical component. Due to these difficulties, the figures referring to 
budgetary adjustment ‘relative to trend’ best catch the ‘strength’ of the adjustment and are hence the 
most relevant indicators with regard to a (qualitative) analysis o f the politics of budgetary adjustment 
(for more detailed economic analysis o f budgetary outcomes see Section 3.5; also Appendix II; for 
economic analysis of budgetary policy in the 1990s see Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 2000: 108- 
116).
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During August and early September the pressure on the lira intensified and thus 
forced additional action on the government. At the height of the crisis -  just before 
the lira devaluation of 12-13 September - the Amato government called for 
emergency powers (10 September). Although President Scalfaro refused the latter, in 
October the prime minister won the parliament’s approval for a delegation law by 
both the Chamber (10 October) and the Senate (22 October). The delegation law (no. 
421, 1992) authorised the government - among other things - to cut public spending 
in four main areas through decrees (pensions, public employment, health and local 
government). After taking into account minor amendments in the Chamber (as, for 
example, the postponement of the abolition of seniority pensions18 by 2002), the 
government imposed confidence votes in both houses on all four articles. There was 
a considerable amount of opposition as evidenced by the large number of proposed 
amendments. However, the government prevailed (Zaccaria 1998: 117-119).
Once the delegation law had passed, the most important part of the 1993 
budget was secured19 and the rest passed parliament without any particular problems 
so that the government did not have to resort to a confidence vote. The 1993 budget 
sought to raise L93,000bn (or 6 per cent of GDP) in extra revenues and spending cuts 
to achieve a state sector deficit of L150,000bn or 9.6 per cent of GDP. The strength 
of the budget was also reflected in the relative importance of expenditure cuts, which 
represented almost half of the adjustment or L43,500bn. The 1993 budget was finally 
approved on 22 December (Barucci 1995).
With regard to the fiscal adjustment, there was considerable conflict between 
the executive and the legislature, and within the executive.20 There was also 
opposition from the government coalition parties, mainly from the DCI and PSI. 
There was vehement criticism from opposition parties, especially from the
91Rifondazione Comunista (RC) and Lega and there was also considerable societal 
resistance, mainly in the form of demonstrations by trade unions, pensioners and 
self-employed workers (The Economist, 26 September 1992; The Economist, 31
18 Seniority (or early retirement) pensions differ from normal pensions in that workers, after having 
worked for a minimum number of years, have the right to retire regardless of their age.
19 Thanks to the delegation law, the government achieved (1) a reduction in pension spending via the 
abolition of the indexation to real wage growth, (2) a freeze of public sector wages, (3) cuts in 
spending for education, and (4) restrictions on free health care.
20 There were persistent rumours that ministers were about to resign (Financial Times, 2 October 
1992).
21 Lega leader Bossi even called for a tax boycott.
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October 1992, Financial Times, 19 September 1992). Naturally, the government 
measures enjoyed a certain degree of qualified support, or at least some actors 
refrained from opposing the measures, such as Confindustria and PDS, both of which 
accepted the necessity of fiscal consolidation (Mattina 1993: 160).
It was thanks largely to the economic and political emergency situation that 
Amato was able to impose the biggest budgetary adjustment in Italian post-war 
history and thus to overcome the traditional obstacles to budgetary adjustment. The 
spread of Italian governments bonds over German ones had increased from about 5 
to 8 points since May. After the ERM exit, the lira had fallen from L750 per 
deutschmark to less than L900. This visibly forced the government to take strong 
action if it wanted to avoid a financial breakdown. That the government regarded the 
economic situation as very dramatic is reflected in Amato’s call for emergency 
powers. In addition to economic pressure, the weakening of parliament and 
traditional political parties - that resulted from the wide-spread delegitimisation of 
the Italian political class and state - increased the autonomy of the executive. 
However, it is clear that in the absence of economic pressure such a drastic budget 
would never have been possible. Moreover, the Italian state and political class was in 
crisis as a result of the corruption investigations. This reduced the ability and 
willingness of parliament to bring down the government, as this might have resulted 
in new elections.
In the end, Prime Minister Amato and Finance Minister Piero Barucci were 
able to prevail over the various veto players and defended proposals in parliament by 
using the formal instruments available and thus were able to impose their will on the 
cabinet and the majority coalition in a context of emergency and parliamentary 
weakness. It was this assertive attitude that allowed it to achieve an adjustment 
unprecedented in a large industrialised economy. Not surprisingly, the budgetary 
reform has been called la madre delle manovre (Bemardi 1994: 13). In April 1993 
Amato resigned, mainly as a result of his opposition to the 1993 referendum on 
electoral reform. At that time, the fiscal developments were already out of line with 
targets.
In April 1993 a new technical government was formed under ex-central bank 
governor Ciampi (April 1993-March 1994) at a time when the four-party governing 
majority (DCI, PSI, PSDI and PLI) had been weakened further by the rapidly 
spreading corruption scandal and a further weakening of the legitimacy of the
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political class (Pasquino and Vassallo 1995). This - in addition to the still precarious 
economic situation - provided the executive with greater policy autonomy.
An important feature of the Ciampi government was that the members of 
government did not have any strong political allegiances and were technocrats rather 
than party politicians. This increased the government’s autonomy from parliament. 
In principle, the technocratic government had the support of the traditional four-party 
coalition (as well as solid support from the PDS). The Verdi adopted a benevolent 
attitude towards the government. The broad outlines of government policy were 
determined by a letter from President Scalfaro in which he asked Prime Minister 
Ciampi to implement electoral reform, redefine parliamentary immunity, defend the 
lira and realise public administration reform (Pasquino and Vassallo 1995: 62).
By the time Ciampi took office, the economy was in recession (Table 3-2 
above). The expected budget shortfall of about L25,000bn put at risk not only the 
second tranche22 of an EC balance-of-payment loan but it also weighed on the value 
of the lira (Figure 3-1; Bank of Italy. Abridged Report, 1993: 76). In order to hold 
down the deficit to 9.6 per cent of GDP, the new government was forced to introduce 
a mini-budget in mid-May, raising L12,400bn in new taxes and spending cuts. Most 
of the L6,800bn extra revenue came from raising taxes (mainly petrol, increasing the 
size of the end-of-year advance VAT payments required of companies). The 
spending cuts consisted mainly of cuts in central government transfers to local 
authorities, the blocking of hiring new teachers and a selective freeze on 
disbursements from the Treasury’s numerous special funds.
Figure 3-1 Lira-German Mark Exchange Rate, 1992-1998 
(Lira per German mark)
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Source: Datastream
The government won the vote on the mini-budget by a large majority after 
making it a matter of confidence in the Chamber. Of the 522 deputies present, 311 
voted for the government, 98 abstained and 113 voted against. There was support 
from the four government parties as well as from the Republican and Radical parties. 
Main opposition came from the Lega and RC (.Financial Times, 7 July 1993). 
Finally, the newly defined23 state sector deficit for 1993 reached 9.8 per cent as 
compared to 10.5 per cent in 1992 and hence overshot the original target of 9.6 per 
cent only slightly (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1994: 71).
On 10 September, the government approved the 1994 budget with tough cost- 
saving measures. Of a total adjustment of L32,500bn, L28,000bn were to come from 
expenditure cuts. Cuts concerned pension benefits, health service, public 
administration, and also included a continued freeze on civil service recruitment [so- 
called paccheto Cassese] (.Financial Times, 4 July 1993; Zaccaria 1998: 121-125). 
The adjustment was to bring the state sector deficit down to L144,000bn (or 8.7 per 
cent) in 1994 (Financial Times, 11 September 1993; Financial Times, 14 September
1993).
Due to the continued threat of a financial crisis (the exchange rate worsened 
from L900 per deutschmark to L I000 during the second half of 1993) and the non- 
party character of his government, Ciampi enjoyed a considerable degree of 
autonomy. Anecdotally, this autonomy was reflected in the fact that the 
parliamentary majority was given little say in the preparation of the 1994 budget. A 
senior Christian Democrat politician was quoted as follows: “The first we knew of 
the details was from the newspapers” (Financial Times, 14 September 1993). The 
increased autonomy was of course also indicated by the content of budgetary 
legislation, which reflected economic and technical rather than overtly ‘political’ 
considerations in that it largely consisted of expenditure cuts.
This - by Italian standards - extraordinary degree of autonomy was the result of 
the continued precariousness of the economic situation, the prime minister’s
23 As pointed out, the new definition excludes autonomous government agencies and bodies 
transformed into limited companies (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1994: 71).
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readiness to resign (Financial Times, 25 November 1993) as well as the continued 
weakness of parliamentary parties as a result of Tangentopoli. By autumn 1993, 
many members of parliament were under investigation and MPs were understandably 
reluctant to risk losing their parliamentary immunity in case new elections were 
called (Financial Times, 17 November 1993). As a result, “[t]he Premier’s style of 
action both inside and outside the cabinet was not constrained in this case by the 
obstacles imposed by mutual vetoes of various party secretaries or by conflict among 
faction leaders present in the cabinet” (Pasquino and Vassallo 1995: 67).
Not being subject to the need to compromise at the formulation stage and 
willing to push parliament and resist societal opposition, the Ciampi government 
achieved considerable structural budgetary reform. The limited size of the adjustment 
relative to the Amato government has to be understood in the context of stagnating 
growth. Given that Italy was in recession in 1993, the 1994 budget was certainly 
constrained at an economic level by finding the right balance between a possible 
worsening of the recession and the slow-down of budgetary consolidation (Bank of 
Italy, Abridged Report, 1994: 75). However, given these unfavourable
circumstances, the total adjustment of L32,500bn was quite impressive, especially 
since it primarily relied on expenditure cuts. After realising the objectives of this 
limited mandate, Ciampi resigned in early 1994 and President Scalfaro announced 
new elections for March 1994.
To summarise budgetary policy under the Amato and Ciampi governments, 
both governments were able to achieve adjustment in the face of external pressure 
and a weakened domestic opposition (which was the result of the on-going 
corruption investigations and the decreasing legitimacy of the traditional political 
class) that was overcome thanks to decisive action through the use of formal 
instruments such as confidence votes. The relative to previous governments greater 
strength of the Amato and Ciampi governments was of course not only reflected in 
the size of the adjustment (cf. Annex B) but also in the fact that the adjustments 
strongly relied on spending cuts rather than tax increases (cf. Alesina and Perotti
1995).
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3.3 The Centre-Right Majority and the Berlusconi and Dini 
Governments, 1994-1996
The March 1994 parliamentary elections were the first elections to take place under 
the regime adopted in August 1993. Twenty lists obtained seats; there were 8 
parliamentary groups in the Chamber and 10 in the Senate, thus resulting in a slightly 
lower degree of party fragmentation in the Chamber (down from 13 in 1992) and no 
change in the Senate (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997: 116). While there was a 
reduction in the number of parliamentary groups, it would be misleading to interpret 
this as greater cohesion and less fragmentation. In terms of lists obtaining seats, the 
number of effective parliamentary parties actually increased. The left-wing alliance 
alone consisted of eight parties, which indicates the continued relevance of 
fragmentation under the new electoral regime.
Defeating the centre alliance of the Pact for Italy and the left-wing Progressive 
Alliance, the right-wing electoral alliance(s) mainly made up of Forza Italia (FI), 
Lega Nord (LN), Alleanza Nazionale (AN) won a clear, absolute majority (Table 3- 
7). Although the victorious right-wing alliance consisted of only three parties, the 
fact that this alliance consisted of two inter-linked alliances - the Alliance for Good 
Government (Alleanza Nazionale -  Forza Italia) and the Freedom Alliance {Forza 
Italia -  Lega Nord) - already indicated profound internal divisions. Silvio 
Berlusconi, the leader of the dominant party of the right-wing electoral alliance, 
Forza Italia, became prime minister (Katz and Ignazi 1996).
Table 3-7 Chamber of Deputies Elections 1994
LIST 
VOTES %
PROPOR­
TIONAL 
SEATS N
PROPOR­
TIONAL 
SEATS IN
%
PLURA­
LITY 
SEATS N
PLURA­
LITY 
SEATS 
IN %
TOTAL
SEATS
N
TOTAL 
SEATS 
IN %
Left-Wing
Alliance
34.3 49 31.6 164 34.5 213 33.8
Centre
Alliance
15.7 42 27.1 4 0.8 46 7.3
Right-Wing
Alliance
46.4 64 41.3 302 63.6 366 58.1
Others 3.6 0 0.0 5 1.1 5 0.8
Total 100.0 155 100.0 475 100.0 630 100.0
Source: Elaborated on Newell and Bull (1997: 96-97)
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Even before the parliamentary elections had taken place, the 1994 state sector 
deficit target of 8.7 per cent was expected to overshoot by about L15,000bn, or 
roughly 1 per cent of GDP (Financial Times, 23 March 1994). The overshoot was 
primarily the result of a deeper than expected recession and higher than anticipated 
social security spending as well as higher interest rates. The need for corrective 
action was evident. However, as the Berlusconi government came to power on the 
promise to relaunch the economy, reduce taxes and provide more jobs, it refused to 
introduce a mini-budget.24
Gradually, though, external pressure increased not least as a result of the 
government’s inaction {Financial Times, 14 July 1994). This was reflected in the 
increasing difference between Italian and German long-term government bond yields 
(rising to 470 basis points compared to a gap of just over 300 at the beginning of
1994), the fall of the Milan stock price index by more than 8 per cent during the 
same period and the weakening of the lira {cf. Figure 3-1 above; Figure 3-2). The 
weakening of the lira led to an increase in the discount rate in August to 7.5 per cent 
by the Bank of Italy and threatened to increase even further the pressure on fiscal 
policy given that a one-percentage point increase in interest rates increased the 
deficit by about L15,000bn.
Figure 3-2 Long Term Interest Rates, 1992-1998
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24 It is true that the Berlusconi government and especially certain members of the AN were less pro- 
Europe than the traditional government parties (see Dastoli 1996; F in a n c ia l T im es, 3 December 
1994). However, during 1994, meeting the convergence criteria was at best a secondary consideration, 
especially because EMU was not to come into being until at least 1997. By the standards of Italian 
politics, three years is an ‘eternity’.
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Source: Datastream
By the end of July there existed only a very broad plan on how to achieve the 
projected deficit target, which the Bank of Italy already criticised as relying on too 
optimistic assumptions (Financial Times, 4 August 1994). This also reflected the 
government’s indecisiveness. Apparently25 in response to a worsening fiscal situation 
and increasing international economic pressure (see above), the prime minister 
embraced the conservative Treasury line to bring the state sector deficit down to 
L139,000bn (or 8 per cent of GDP)‘ in 1995. In September, the government presented 
the budget law, broadly in line with the objectives of the medium-term economic 
plan. The government foresaw L21,000bn in revenue increases (without however 
increasing overall fiscal pressure by relying mainly on one-off measures such as a tax 
amnesty) and L29,000bn in spending cuts (mainly in the health and pension areas). 
The initial wavering reflected intra-coalitional differences (especially over welfare 
cuts) (cf. Chapter 4).
The budget was relatively tough, even if observers agreed that it relied on 
rather optimistic forecasts (Financial Times, 30 September 1994). Spending cuts 
accounted for two thirds - a considerable part of which was to come from welfare 
payments and especially pensions. By Italian standards, rather radical welfare cuts 
led the unions to call a national strike on October 13 and national demonstrations in 
November. Although Berlusconi vowed to stand firm, both the Lega and AN - 
reluctant to embrace social welfare cuts in the first place - took an increasingly 
critical position towards welfare cuts (cf Chapter 4). This stance was reinforced by 
the unpopularity of social spending cuts as well as of the government and of the 
prime minister more generally.27
25 That international pressure was the likely cause of the government’s change of mind can be inferred 
from the fact that Berlusconi refused to introduce a mini-budget a few months earlier. Increasing 
international pressure in terms of increasing bond spreads and a worsening of the exchange rate forced 
the government to take strong action -  stronger in fact than some members of the government 
coalition deemed acceptable (see below).
26 The head of the Confindustria research department, Stefano Micossi, was quoted as follows: “I 
scarcely believe that this government has dared do what no one else has dared to do - structural cuts in 
the pensions and health systems” (Financial Times, 30 September 1994).
27 Investigations by the magistracy and a poll in late 1994 that showed that 71.9 per cent of Italians 
were ‘little satisfied or not at all satisfied’ with the work of the government {L’Espresso, 25 
November 1994) further weakened the prime minister.
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Due to crumbling parliamentary support, the government had to make 
concessions on pension reform to trade unions and parliament and finally had to 
accept outright ‘capitulation’ on 1 December (Financial Times, 2 December 1994). 
After abandoning a large part of pension cuts, which was estimated to have cost 
about L4,000bn, and after another 0.5 point increase in interest rates (adding another 
L7,000bn to the government bill) as well as an increase of additional one-off 
expenditure items (mainly flood damage in the North, constitutional court sentence 
ordering the payment of arrears on certain minimum pensions), it was clear that the 
budget was unlikely to reach the .projected .8 .per pent target (Financial Times, .3 
December 1994). It was estimated at the time that the 1995 budget would require 
measures worth L25,000bn in order to meet the targeted deficit (Financial Times, 16 
December 1994).
As a result of political conflict and the prospect of a weak budget, the 
international economic pressure increased. At the end of 1994, the lira was heading 
for a historic low of around LI,050 per German mark. This meant that the lira had 
depreciated by more than 8 per cent since May. At the same time, the yield 
differential between Italian and German long-term government bonds widened (cf. 
Figures 3-1 and 3-2; Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1995: 79). In short, even though 
the government’s ‘compromise’ on pension reform cleared the way to the approval 
of the 1995 budget in an atmosphere of impending financial crisis, it was clear that 
the budget, despite its rather radical intention, was weak and unlikely to meet the 
deficit target. In addition, the 1994 fiscal year closed with a state sector deficit of 9.5 
per cent and hence the original target of 8.7 per cent was not achieved (Bank of Italy, 
Abridged Report, 1995: 74, 78). This increased the need for further adjustment in
1995.
To summarise, the difficulties the Berlusconi government experienced over the 
passage of the 1995 budget show the continued limited institutional autonomy of the 
executive despite the 1993 electoral reform as well as the importance of international 
pressure. The limited authority the government enjoyed was due to both intra- 
coalitional pressures, obstruction on the part of parliament and societal opposition. 
Clearly, the major reason for the weak government performance was the U-turn of its 
coalition partners. Unlike previous prime ministers, Berlusconi vowed to take a 
tough stance rather than negotiate and failed as a result of limited prime-ministerial 
and executive authority. In the end, Berlusconi was unable to control dissident
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groups within his majority, especially once the members of the government majority 
realised the unpopularity of the welfare cuts. Unable to control his parliamentary 
majority, the prime minister was constrained to give in to societal and parliamentary 
pressure. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the original budget was 
characterised by a relatively high degree of consistency (Zaccaria 1998: 138). 
However, the government’s weakness at the parliamentary stage unravelled what had 
been achieved at the formulation stage.
On the other hand, even though domestic pressure prevented pension reform, 
external pressure made the approval of the budget possible. The PP§ and .most of the 
other parties were eager to save the (however imperfect) budget and even refrained 
from bringing down the government in a context of impending economic crisis as 
reflected in the deterioration of market confidence. Even the cantankerous Lega - 
intent on bringing down the government of which it was a part - wanted to see 
through the budget before introducing a motion of confidence (Financial Times, 16 
December 1994). This strongly suggests that it was external economic pressure (in 
terms of rising interest rates and a weakening of the exchange rate) that allowed the 
passage of an however imperfect budget: parliamentary parties were not prepared to 
assume responsibility for a financial crisis that a delay of the budget might have 
caused. In short, even though external pressure was crucial in guaranteeing a speedy 
passage through parliament after the 1 December compromise, domestic politics and 
executive weakness explain the weakness of the 1995 budget. On 22 December, 
Berlusconi resigned, thus preventing a vote of no confidence that was going to be 
backed by both the opposition and the Lega.
After Berlusconi’s resignation, a technocratic government led by former 
Finance Minister Lamberto Dini was formed in January 1995. The Dini government 
(January 1995 - May 1996) did not have a clear majority in the Chamber but enjoyed 
the qualified support of the PDS (Democrats of the Left), the centrist PPI (Italian 
Popular Party) and Lega Nord. By contrast, AN and FI vowed to bring down the Dini 
government in order to achieve new elections (Pasquino 1996; Bufacchi and Burgess 
1998: chapter 10)28. The Dini government consisted mainly of university professors, 
none of whom was a sitting member of parliament (Financial Times, 23 January
28 Regarding himself as the bearer of an electoral mandate as a result of the 1994 elections, Berlusconi 
disputed the legitimacy o f the Dini government and called for new elections (Financial Times, 30 
December 1995).
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1995). Equipped with an emergency mandate from President Scalfaro, the Dini 
government vowed to implement reforms in four areas: improving public finances; 
reforming the state pension system; introducing a new electoral law for the regions; 
and providing for more balanced controls of the media. Dini vowed to step down 
once the government had implemented its programme. In case of obstruction, Dini 
threatened to resign (Pasquino 1996a: 140-141).
The first act of the new government was to introduce a mini-budget in order to 
bring the 1995 budget deficit back in line with the original 8 per cent target 
{Financial Times, 14 February 1995). The.government.sought .to .raise. Lf5,6Q0b.n in 
new taxes of which L8,700bn were indirect taxes. Spending cuts were to total 
L5,200bn, mainly coming from transfers to local authorities {Financial Times, 24 
February 1995). Compared with previous budgets, the proposed budget was 
relatively weak and ‘painless’ as almost three quarters of the adjustment were to 
come from higher taxes as opposed to spending cuts. The composition of the budget 
clearly reflected the need to secure the support of the centre-left parties on whose 
support the government depended for its survival.
As a result of the continued uncertainty surrounding budgetary and pension 
reform in early 1995, the international financial pressure was enormous. The day 
before the mini-budget went before parliament, the lira experienced the largest single 
fall since the crisis of September 1992. Over the two preceding weeks the lira had 
already lost about 8 per cent against the German mark {Financial Times, 28 February 
1995; also Chapters 4 and 6).
Despite these pressures, it was far from certain the mini-budget would be 
passed. Berlusconi had been demanding new elections all along and threatened to 
withhold approval of the budget in order to provoke early elections {Financial Times, 
27 February 1995). However, a further weakening of the lira and the emergence of 
critical voices within FI and AN, urging approval of the mini-budget and arguing that 
early elections would probably provoke a currency crisis, increased the pressure on 
Forza Italia to let the mini-budget pass {Financial Times, 28 February 1995).
Eventually, in mid-March, the mini-budget was passed after the Dini 
government had imposed a confidence vote on the Chamber with 315 votes in 
favour, 309 against and one abstention. The government was backed by the centre 
and left parties, including 17 of the 39 RC deputies. Given the closeness of the vote, 
this was decisive. Similarly, the centrist PPI, in the process of splitting into pro- and
I l l
anti-Berlusconi factions, also swung fully behind the government, despite strong 
pressure from Berlusconi. As announced, the right-wing parties voted against 
(Financial Times, 17 March 1995). A few days later, the Dini government won 
another confidence vote in the Senate (Financial Times, 22 March 1995). Eventually, 
the 1995 state sector deficit eventually undershot and reached 7.4 per cent - as 
compared to 8 per cent as targeted. (This was in large part due to a substantial 
increase in one-off increases and - relative to previous years - stronger economic 
growth of 2.2 per cent in 1995 [Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1996: 71].)
The 1996 budget introduced in September sought to raise. L32,50.0bn ainjing to 
reduce the state sector deficit from 7.4 per cent in 1995 to 5.8 per cent of GDP in
1996. The target for general government net borrowing was 5.9 per cent for 1996 
(OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996: 48). The 1996 budget was again rather weak 
and once more the result of considerable compromise between the executive and the 
centre-left parties supporting the Dini government (Financial Times, 28 September 
1995; Zaccaria 1998: 150). In absolute terms, spending cuts were small compared to 
each one of the budgets since 1993. Less than half of the adjustment (L14,600bn) 
consisted of spending cuts, while the rest of the adjustment fell on increases in 
revenue (L17,900bn). Furthermore, in addition to overly optimistic assumptions 
concerning inflation and interest rates, some of the measures (improved income tax 
assessment, and more efficient curbs on tax evasion) were weak so that the Bank of 
Italy expected a budget shortfall of about L10,000bn even before the budget had 
been passed by parliament (Financial Times, 29 September 1995).
Despite the rather weak character of the budget, its approval was far from 
certain. As the government faced a potentially interminable debate over some 2,000 
amendments, it decided to proceed through votes of confidence. Initially, Berlusconi 
had pledged to vote against the government. So did the RC (Financial Times, 15 
December 1995). However, in two votes of confidence on amendments to the 1996 
budget in the Chamber, the centre-right and centrist opposition refrained from 
bringing down the government. This ensured the budget’s survival. Thus the right- 
wing parties were able to maintain their opposition to the government proposals 
without having to jeopardise the budget.29 In fact, there were serious divisions in the
29 In fact: “The first vote was won by 306 for with 292 against and one abstention. But there were 28 
deputies absent, of whom 22 were from Mr Berlusconi's alliance. In the second vote, 310 deputies
112
right-wing opposition to the budget and over whether to bring down the government. 
These divisions apparently reflected the growing unease among certain parts of the 
right-wing opposition to bring down the government over the budget in a situation of 
increasing interest rates and a weakening of the exchange rate. Due to external 
pressure and the reluctance of parts of the opposition to risk financial turmoil, a 
‘behind-the-scenes deal’ was finally struck (Financial Times, 16 December 1995). 
Nonetheless, Dini had to retract from a final third vote of confidence which aimed at 
speeding up the passage of the remainder of the budget and instead preferred to reach 
a compromise centred around, retaining.the government’s fiscjal .amendments, while 
allowing a limited number of additions tabled by the Berlusconi camp, including 
substantial tax benefits for large stock market flotations (.Financial Times, 19 
December 1995). On December 30, Dini presented his resignation to President 
Scalfaro. After an initial rejection of the resignation and after consultations between 
the parties did not lead to any agreement, President Scalfaro decided to call new 
elections for April 1996.
In conclusion, the 1994-96 legislative period demonstrated the continued 
institutional weakness of the executive in the budgetary process. The Berlusconi 
government was unable to realise its budgetary objectives, mainly as a result of the 
fragility of its majority. In the face of enormous pressure from trade unions, the weak 
coalition crumbled and Prime Minister Berlusconi was forced to drop pension cuts 
and hence a considerable part of the planned savings of the 1995 budget. The result 
was a weak budget that looked unlikely to meet its targets. The technocratic Dini 
government could not even rely on any formal majority -  let alone discipline it. 
Because the Dini government had to take into account the parliamentary preferences 
of the centre-left on which it had to rely in the face of potential opposition from the 
right-wing parties, budgets were particularly weak in terms of the structural measures 
taken.
At the same time, the continued pressure on public finances and the value of 
the lira made all parliamentary parties more willing to accept a certain degree of 
budgetary discipline (Financial Times, 28 February 1995). There is also evidence 
that - at least with respect to the 1996 budget - the opposition parties were reluctant 
to bring down the government even when this would have been theoretically
supported the motion with 297 against and one abstention. On this occasion 19 deputies were absent,
113
possible.30 With the governments unable to make their preferences prevail 
(Berlusconi) or adjusting them to what was politically possible (Dini), budgetary 
policy could best be described as ‘muddling through’ in the face of external pressure. 
In sum, external pressures allowed the government to continue adjustment in 
accordance with systemic requirements but constrained by domestic party-political 
preferences and more generally by continued executive weakness. External pressure 
was the primary reason for the ability of the two governments to pursue a policy of 
budgetary consolidation, as domestic political actors were, for the most part, 
reluctant to bring dpwn the government over the budget .and assume, responsibility 
for a financial crisis (Bossi in 1994, Berlusconi in 1995).
3.4 The Centre-Left Majority and the Prodi Government, 1996-1998
Because the centre-alliance, consisting of parties that mainly emerged from the 
centre-oriented groups of the former PSI and DCI, was crushed in the 1994 election 
by the left- and right-wing alliances, from the 1996 elections there emerged a 
moderate-left (Ulivo) and a moderate-right coalition {Polo) both of which excluded 
extremist parties on either side. There was hence a development from tripolarity to 
bipolarity between 1994 and 1996, which followed the logic of the 1993 electoral 
reform. The victory of the Ulivo was more the result of tactical alliances than of a 
major realignment of the electorate. The split of the centre had allowed the left to 
widen the left-wing alliance to the centre, while the right-wing alliance split (Newell 
and Bull 1997: 103; Chiaramonte 1997).
The fragmentation of the government coalition and of parliament was 
considerable. The left-wing electoral alliance Ulivo consisted of four main 
components: (1) the PDS (inclusive of six tiny parties that refused to be absorbed by 
the PDS [the laburisti, United Communists (CU), Social Christians (CS), Social 
Democrats (SD), Reformist Unity (RU), Rete]); (2) a group constituted by the PPI, 
the Democratic Union (UD) and the South Tyrolese People’s Party; (3) the Dini List 
(made up of four parties); and (4) the Greens {Verdi) (Gilbert 1996; for the evolution
of whom 17 came from Mr Berlusconi's alliance” (Financial Times, 16 December 1995).
30 The same pressures - including a reluctant attitude among some parts of the right-wing opposition - 
had already been evident during the Mancuso affair during which Berlusconi sought to bring down the 
Dini government (Financial Times, 21 October 1995). During this affair, Dini only avoided defeat by 
pledging to step down by the end of the year. This won him the support of the 24 RC MPs. This
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of the main parties see Newell and Bull 1997: 95). By the same token, compared 
with the 20 lists that obtained votes in the 1994 elections, the 1996 elections resulted 
in only 13 lists winning seats. In terms of parliamentary groups, there were nine 
(formerly eight) groups in the Chamber and eleven (formerly 10) in the Senate 
(D’Alimonte and Bartolino 1997: 116). Hence, while the fragmentation in terms of 
parliamentary groups remained essentially unchanged, it decreased in terms of lists 
winning seats. However, the fragmentation of the government coalition was 
considerable. At best, the 1996 elections introduced a stronger element of bipolarity.
Thirty-two seats short of an absolute majority* a left-wing. government. uoder . 
the prime ministership of Romano Prodi (1996-98) was formed which had to rely 
mainly on the toleration of the RC. The latter was not formally part of the 
government coalition. The combined vote of the Ulivo and RC gave the government 
a majority of 319 (284 Ulivo, 35 RC) out of a total of 630 seats -  against 246 Polo 
seats (FI, AN, CCD-CDU) (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997; Table 3-8). As pledged, 
the government’s most important goal was to join EMU (Parker 1997).
Table 3-8 Chamber of Deputies Elections 1996
VOTE PROPORTIONAL
SEATS
SINGLE-MEMBER
SEATS
TOTAL SEATS
PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT
-PDS 21.1 26 17 146 31 172 27
-PPI 6.8 4 3 63 13 67 11
-Dini list 4.3 8 5 16 3 24 4
-Greens 2.5 0 0 21 4 21 3
TOTAL
Ulivo
34.7 38 24 246 51 284 45
-FI 20.6 37 24 86 18 123 19
-AN 15.7 28 18 65 14 93 15
-CCD-
CDU
5.8 12 8 18 4 30 5
TOTAL
Polo
42.1 77 50 169 36 246 39
RC 8.6 20 13 15 3 35 6
LN 10.1 20 13 39 8 59 9
Others 4.5 0 0 5 2 5 1
TOTAL 100.0 155 100 475 100 630 100
allowed him to defeat a motion of no confidence sponsored by Berlusconi by 315 votes to 291 
(Financial Times, 27 November 1995).
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Source: Newell and Bull (1997: 104)
Key: CCD-CDU = Christian Democratic Centre - United Christian Democrats
When Prodi took office, it was already clear that additional budgetary measures 
were needed to meet the 1996 general government budget target of 5.9 per cent. The 
overshoot - expected to be in the area of 0.6 per cent of GDP (Bank of Italy, 
Abridged Report, 1996: 77) - was primarily the result of too optimistic growth 
forecasts, which had overestimated growth by one percentage point, and higher than 
expected interest rates (.Financial Times, 10 April 1996). The growth rate would 
average 1.1 per cent in 1996 as compared to 2.9 per cent in 1995 (Table 3-2 above).
As a result, in June 1996 the government announced a mini-budget. The budget 
relied on a fall in the discount rate, which explains the difference between the 
L21,000bn adjustment needed to hold the deficit to L109,000bn and theH 6,000bn 
package of financial measures contained in the mini-budget. The LI l,000bn worth of 
cuts mainly consisted of transfers to various public bodies and agencies such as the 
state railways, the postal service and so on. Revenue-increasing measures included a 
tax on housing and anti-evasion measures (Financial Times, 20 June 1996).
The limited size and content of the mini-budget and especially its reliance on a 
fall in interest rates clearly reflected the weakness of the Prodi government as well as 
the conflicts within the government coalition that pitted Treasury Minister Ciampi 
against the PDS and the Dini faction. Measures affecting pension and health 
expenditure were successfully resisted by the unions. This reflected the need of 
Prime Minister Prodi to maintain the fragile balance between left and right within the 
government coalition and the necessity to secure parliamentary support from the RC 
(Financial Times, 21 June 1996).
Approved by the cabinet on June 19, the mini-budget was passed by parliament 
in early August. In order to avoid amendments (mainly tabled by the LN), the 
government called its first vote of confidence, which it won relatively comfortably 
by 319 to 284 votes in the Chamber. The passage through the Senate was a mere 
formality as the government had an absolute majority there.
In the DPEF of July the government proposed an adjustment of L32,000bn 
targeting a general government deficit of 5.5 per cent (and a state sector deficit of 4.5 
per cent) for 1997 (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1997: 62). The proposal was
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weak, as it did not include several expenditure items (such as VAT repayments to 
companies, the cost of a 1993 constitutional court judgement on pensions arrears) 
that in total amounted to almost L20,000bn. Not surprisingly, the European 
Commission taking account of these omissions projected the deficit to be in the area 
of 5.4 per cent or about one percentage point higher than the 4.5 per cent state-sector 
target set by the Prodi government (Financial Times, 10 July 1996).
At least since the Council of the EU meeting in Madrid in late 1995, it had 
been clear that the 1997 budgetary performance would be the decisive indicator 
regarding fiscal convergence. In other words, not only was Italy going.to.miss the 
Maastricht deficit target, but it was also unlikely to meet even its own (insufficient) 
target. German government officials and EU Commissioner Mario Monti criticised 
the Italian budget proposal as insufficient and made it clear that flexibility would not 
apply to the deficit criteria (Financial Times, 10 July 1996). However, the DPEF 
contained a paragraph that stated that the government would retain the option of 
speeding up fiscal adjustment in view of the meeting the convergence criteria in 
autumn 1996.
This time it was international ‘political’ pressure and more specifically the 
need to meet the deficit criteria, rather than economic pressure that allowed 
budgetary retrenchment. At the Italian-Spanish summit in Valencia in September 
1996, the Spanish government rejected an Italian proposal to seek a re-negotiation or 
delay of EMU (Financial Times, 27 September 1996).32
The initial Italian proposal to slow down EMU can be interpreted in two ways 
-  either of which is consistent with the weak executive approach. The Italian attempt 
to slow down EMU can be interpreted as an act of desperation and fear of being left 
out. This would clearly indicate the weakness of the executive to achieve sufficient 
domestic adjustment to meet the Maastricht criteria. The Italian proposal, and more 
specifically its rejection, can also be interpreted as a conscious attempt to create an 
external constraint in an attempt to strengthen the executive in dealing with potential 
domestic opponents over budget policy. Be that as it may33, the rejection of the
31 See Chapter 2, footnote 7.
32 Similarly, Dini had warned Italy’s EU partners not to reach a decision on EMU before May 1998 
(Financial Times, 6 December 1995).
33 Whether or not Valencia changed Prodi’s attitude towards meeting the EMU deadline is unclear. 
Prodi himself later denied it (see Radaelli 2001) and, in fact, the government programme certainly 
committed Prodi to joining EMU (Parker 1997). Nonetheless, Prodi is also on record for stating that it 
would not be a tragedy if Italy would meet the criteria a bit late (Financial Times, 2 October 1996).
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proposal to slow down EMU did result in a strengthening of the Italian executive in 
the budgetary process.34 Apparently in response to these international developments, 
the government introduced a new DPEF that sought to reduce the deficit by 
L62,500bn - instead of L32,000bn as originally planned (Financial Times, 30 
September 1996). The deficit target for general government was re-set from 5.5 to 
3.0 per cent and the state sector deficit from 4.5 to 3.1 per cent.
The first part of the budget foresaw L18,200bn in cuts (which affected mainly 
transfers to local authorities, social security institutions and public utilities) and 
L14,.100bn ;n revenue, gains..The.second, part.-.to. be introduced in early 1997> - • 
aimed at a total adjustment of L25,500bn - of which Lll,500bn were to come from 
the so-called euro-tax35 in early 1997 and L18,200bn of savings were to be achieved 
through ‘reclassification’ measures (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1997: 64). 
Further savings were expected to come from lower interest rates and hence reduced 
debt servicing as a result of falling interest cuts {Financial Times, 28 September
1996). Thus the budget made heavy use of treasury and accounting operations (such 
as delaying repayment of withholding taxes on bonds) as well as one-off measures 
(such as an extraordinary euro-tax which the government even promised to repay at 
some point) (Zaccaria 1998: 159-172; Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 2000: 113- 
114).
However, in an interview with the Financial Times shortly after the Valencia summit Prodi seemed to 
admit that the government changed its attitude once the government had realised that the criteria 
would not be allowed to be ’bent’: “The change occurred after the summer when I saw that other 
countries were making a serious effort to address their budget deficits (...). I realised Italy too could 
not miss the appointment with Europe" (Financial Times, 2 October 1996). As argued above, actions 
are more important than statements by politicians. Probably, the most plausible interpretation is that 
Prodi (and Ciampi) were committed to meeting the deficit criteria but were unable to overcome intra- 
coalitional opposition. The fact that Ciampi had asked for an initial adjustment of L40,000bn but then 
gave in to pressure from the Greens as well as the RC (Zaccaria 1998: 159-172) suggests that -  even 
though Prodi and Ciampi were committed to meeting the criteria -  they were unable to gather 
sufficient intra-coalitional support. Thus Valencia strengthened their position. This clearly reflects the 
importance the EMU constraint played in bringing about greater fiscal adjustment, and thus in 
meeting the deficit criteria (see below).
34 This account resembles two-level games a la Putnam (1988) where external constraints can be 
exploited to overcome domestic opposition, while domestic weakness can be used to strengthen the 
government’s international bargaining position.
35 Clearly, the name euro-tax was consciously employed by the Prodi government to mobilise support 
for further budgetary tightening. Given that Italian public opinion overwhelmingly favoured EU and 
EMU membership (cf  Chapter 1.5), the name of the tax reflected the government’s interest in 
‘selling’ it to the Italian public. More generally, the discourse of possible EMU exclusion (and ‘being 
left out of Europe’ more generally) was (consciously) exaggerated in the sense that it was only the 
timing of EMU membership that was at stake -  not membership in principle. This importance of 
‘discourse’ as an independent variable should not be exaggerated however, since for this kind of 
discourse to be effective there needed to be real external constraint -  and the possibility of failing to 
meet the convergence criteria was real in 1996.
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The one-off nature of the 1997 budget clearly reflected intra-coalitional 
conflict. Initially (that is before aiming for the three-per-cent deficit target), the 
Treasury had demanded an initial adjustment of L40,000bn but had to give in to 
opposition from within the majority (RC, Greens). However, after it had become 
clear that a greater budgetary effort was needed, no party opposed the size of the 
adjustment proposed by the government. There was widespread agreement between 
the government and the opposition on the need to cut the deficit. Instead, the 
disagreement shifted towards the right mix of expenditure cuts and revenue raising. 
Even the unions grudgingly assented to the measures after forcing sonje concessions 
on the government that would make the tax more equitable (.Financial Times, 20 
November 1996). The deficit target itself was at least formally and publicly not at 
stake.
This clearly showed the reluctance of parties to be held responsible for not 
securing EMU membership36 (Financial Times, 11 October 1996). The exclusion of 
pension and health cuts, for example, saw the Dini faction clash with the leftist wing 
of the coalition (and RC). As for parliamentary opposition, even though the centre- 
right criticised the budget (mainly because of its reliance on tax increases and 
excessive treasury operations), it finally abstained from a crucial vote in the 
Chamber. Even the RC - after obtaining the progressiveness of the euro-tax and the 
exclusion of pension measures from the 1997 budget -  did not vote against it. The 
budget was passed with 316 votes against 2 (and 2 abstentions) on 22 December in 
the Chamber without the government having to call a confidence vote (Financial 
Times, 23 December 1996).
The need to meet the deficit target clearly increased the bargaining position of 
the government. Interestingly, the government pushed ahead despite considerable 
opposition. In addition to some opposition to tax increases from a number of right- 
wing opposition parties, leading industrialists (Fiat CEO Cesare Romiti), usually 
among the strongest supporters of EMU, were rather unenthusiastic about further 
budgetary tightening (New York Times, 30 August 1996). Nonetheless, the 
government went ahead with its plan. This clearly shows the enhanced power of the
36 The importance of public support was shown in an opinion poll in the Corriere della Sera showed 
that 58 per cent of Italians were backing the euro-tax (Financial Times, 8 October 1996). Moreover, 
public support for EMU was high (Figure 1-1).
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government vis-a-vis domestic actors in budgetary politics as a result of external 
pressure.
Shortly after parliament had approved the 1997 budget, estimates indicated that 
Italy was likely to close the 1996 fiscal year with a general government deficit of 7.5 
per cent and significantly larger than the officially targeted 5.9 per cent.38 Given that 
parliament had just endorsed the 1997 budget aimed at cutting the public deficit by 3 
per cent of GDP, further fiscal restraint was necessary (Financial Times, 4 January 
1997). In the context of modest growth it was naturally difficult to find the necessary 
means to cover the expected shortfall. It was primarily .the political. opposition from 
the RC, the unions and the PDS against further cuts that made it politically difficult 
to introduce appropriate measures. However, when it transpired that the current trend 
in spending and receipts was expected to produce a deficit of almost 3.8 per cent 
(Financial Times, 19 March 1997), the government was forced to announce 
supplementary deficit-reducing measures worth some L15,500bn in March. The 
package agreed upon aimed to raise almost half the L15,500bn by raiding company 
funds (L6,000bn), while L4,200bn was to come from accelerated payment of 
inheritance taxes. Another third was to come from spending cuts (Financial Times, 
27 March 1997). As a result, the mini-budget had an even greater provisional 
character than the 1997 budget (for details see Zaccaria 1998: 173-176). The 
structural weakness of the mini-budget was also reflected in the International 
Monetary Fund view that the intervention was incompatible with consolidation as the 
1997 mini-budget structural impact was estimated to be a mere Ll,000bn.39 
Similarly, European Commission announced that Italy would miss the 3 per cent 
target by 0.2 points and European finance ministers criticised the Italian budget: 
“[T]he measures taken in 1997 which have a temporary nature should be replaced by 
structural measures with a permanent impact on the budget” (quoted in Financial 
Times, 13 May 1997).
While new deficit projections certainly weakened potential opponents of the 
mini-budget, as its rejection would almost certainly have meant Italy’s exclusion
37 Even central bank governor Fazio agreed with the initial (limited) DPEF, even though he admitted 
that a further reduction of the deficit in line with meeting the convergence criteria was ultimately a 
political decision (see Radaelli 2001).
Eventually, the 1996 fiscal year was officially closed with a general government deficit of 6.6 per 
cent (Table 3-1).
39 For a detailed discussion of the importance of Treasury operations and accounting reforms see 
Zaccaria (1998: 199-201) and Reviglio (1998: 20-25).
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from EMU, the Budget Commission of the Chamber nonetheless refused to convert 
the mini-budget decree-law40 and thus forced the government to submit legislation to 
the assembly. However, after the government made the conversion of the decree a 
matter of confidence, the mini-budget was approved by the Chamber with 318 to 260 
votes on 6 May. With a centre-left majority in the Senate the mini-budget 
encountered a smoother passage there (Financial Times, 7 May 1997). Eventually, 
however, Italy was able to meet the deficit target thanks to the impact falling interest 
rates had on interest payments (see Spaventa and Chiorazzo 2000: 85-87). (The 
general government deficit turned out to be,2.7 per,cent for 1997 )..............................
The weakness of the 1997 budget -  let alone of the 1997 mini-budget - in 
structural terms had been wildly criticised by European officials (Financial Times, 
13 May 1997; II Sole 24 Ore, 5 September 1997) and it was clear that the 1998 
budget would have to contain some structural measures in order for fiscal 
consolidation to be considered sustainable and indeed to hold the deficit below the 
three-per cent mark as the one-off measures were to peter out in 1998.
Visibly forced by the uncertainty as to whether or not Italy would meet the 
deficit target for 1997, at the end of May the government unveiled a three-year 
macroeconomic programme to cut the general government deficit to 2.8 per cent of 
GDP in 1998. The government finance bill eventually proposed an adjustment of 
L25,000bn (or 1.25 per cent of GDP) for 1998 in order to keep the deficit dowii to 
2.8 (rather than - in the absence of budgetary measures - letting it reach 4.1) per cent. 
Some L10,000bn were to come from revenue increases and L16,500bn from 
expenditure cuts, of which about L4,500bn were to come from pension cuts. 
Negotiations with unions as well as the RC over pension cuts dominated ‘budgetary 
politics’. Not only did this represent a significant compromise relative to the 
L6000bn-L7,000bn worth of cuts initially targeted (Financial Timesy 29 September
1997), but the fiscal correction was also one of the ‘mildest in a decade’ (The 
Economist, 4 October 1997; Annex B).
Despite the relatively limited degree of the proposed budgetary adjustment, 
opposition to the budget was considerable. The RC (and unions) opposed social 
spending cuts. Once more, the primary conflict was over the composition of the
40 Opposition came mainly from the RC and the centre-right parties. The RC demanded less welfare 
cuts, while the centre-right parties demanded greater cuts and less tax increases {Financial Times, 7 
May 1997).
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adjustment rather than its overall size. This was also reflected in the proposition of 
the right-wing opposition for a common manovra europea that reflected the overall 
consensus regarding the need to meet the Maastricht criteria.
This time the most important conflict pitted the government against the RC. 
The underlying conflict came to the fore on 1 October 1997 when the RC announced 
it would vote against the budget even though the government had announced that it 
would make the vote an issue of confidence. Given the overall consensus concerning 
the importance of meeting the convergence criteria, the government sought to force 
the issue by introducing a vote of no confidence, thus threatening early elections 
(Financial Times, 3 October 1997). It was clear that an election at this stage would 
have delayed the passage of the 1998 budget and provoked a severe backlash from 
the financial markets; The parties that were to bring down the government would 
have to take responsibility as a delay in the adoption of the budget might have meant 
an extension into the following year and hence the possibility of not meeting the 
crucial 1997 deficit target {The Economist, 4 October 1997). Prodi sought to force 
the issue by calling a vote in parliament. However, as the government was defeated 
by one vote, Prodi resigned {Financial Times, 10 October 1997).
After the prime minister had submitted his resignation, the public and political 
pressure on the RC to change its position became massive. There was harsh criticism 
from the media that held the RC responsible for Italy’s possible failure to join EMU 
and for risking a financial crisis. Even the normally hard-line CGIL metalworkers of 
the FIOM {Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici) - in agreement with the 
confederal leadership - spoke out against the RC (Legrenzi 1998). Moreover, the 
Milan stock exchange took a dive. Very obviously as a result of these pressures, the 
RC agreed to resume negotiations with the government and accept a compromise, 
including the introduction of a 35-hour week, and the exclusion of blue-collar 
workers from seniority pension cuts (Legrenzi 1998; Walsh 1998). This compromise 
is consistent with the ‘weak executive’ approach in that the government was not 
strong enough to impose necessary short-term costs in order to achieve long-term 
sustainability. Also, the introduction of a shorter working week only created an 
additional burden for the Italian economy in the future -  and thus represents a policy 
of short-term accommodation to the detriment of long-term sustainability. Thus, the 
RC’s change of position demonstrates the importance of the international political 
constraint embodied in the Maastricht criteria. This existence of this constraint was
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crucial in that it mobilised domestic public opinion against the RC, forced the RC to 
compromise, and strengthened the relative position of the government. It is hard to 
imagine that the RC would have backed down in the absence of the Maastricht 
constraint. This proves that the EMU constraint was an indispensable factor in 
strengthening the government, weakening potential opposition, and -  eventually -  in 
meeting the deficit criteria.
Having obtained the acceptance of the 1998 budget and especially pension 
measures from the RC, in early November the so-called ‘Prodi agreement’ on 
pensions (containing the .acceleration .of. the increase, in the early.retirement age, the 
gradual harmonisation of public and private pension regimes and increases in 
pension contributions paid by the self-employed) was reached between the 
government and the unions thus clearing the way for the intended expenditure cuts 
{cf Chapter 4). Having secured a compromise with the RC and the unions, the 1998 
budget passed both houses relatively comfortably. The government did not call a 
vote of confidence. This once more indicated the overall agreement concerning the 
need to keep the deficit below 3 per cent in 1998 - at least after a compromise had 
been struck (Zaccaria 1998: 189-197).
In April 1998, the EU finance ministers in Brussels announced that the Italian 
government’s 1998 budget deficit was likely to be 2.8 per cent of GDP. Italy had 
closed the 1997 fiscal year with a general government deficit equivalent to 2.7 per 
cent of GDP (Table 3-1; Spaventa and Chiorazzo 2000). In fact, the deficit for 1998 
would turn out to be 2.7 per cent of GDP (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1999: 
100).
In conclusion, the analysis of budgetary politics between 1996-98 shows that 
executive weakness still persisted and was largely the result of limited executive 
authority over the budgetary process. In the event, the multi-party character of the 
government majority, the lack of a cohesive majority and the lack of prime 
ministerial dominance over the budget formulation process were compounded by the 
lack of a government majority in the Chamber. Not only did Prodi have to 
accommodate RC demands but he also had to take into account the mainly partisan 
interests of his heterogeneous government coalition. Moreover, these weaknesses 
made the government more receptive to the demands of the trade unions.
This shows that the limited authority of the prime minister within the cabinet as 
well as in relation to the government majority parties was, despite the stronger
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tendency towards bipolarity, the main obstacle in implementing fiscal adjustment. 
Hence it is fair to say that the ‘old’ institutional logic prevailed in 1996-98. It was 
only thanks to international pressure, in combination with wide-spread support for 
EMU among the Italian public,41 that enabled Prodi to discipline his majority as well 
as to force the RC and unions to accept the need for budget cuts. The widespread 
consensus concerning the importance of EMU membership also played a crucial role 
as it allowed the government to ‘impose’ policies on its constituent parts that they 
would have been otherwise reluctant to accept. Hence the EMU constraint was a 
crucial factoi; ii* helping Italy tp meet the.deficit cri.ter.ia................................................
3.5 Conclusion: Fiscal Adjustment without Institutional Reform ?
From both a cross-national and an historical perspective, Italian fiscal consolidation 
from 1992 onwards was impressive. It is true that the fall in interest rates contributed 
to the good budgetary performance {cf. Table 3-1).42 With a more or less constant 
debt-to-GDP ratio, interest payments declined between 1992 and 1997 from 11.5 per 
cent to 9.5 per cent (Table 3-9).
Table 3-9 Breakdown of Public Administration Expenditure, 1991-1997
(as a share of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public Employees 12.7 12.7 12.5 12.0 11.4 11.7 11.8
Social spending 18.3 19.3 19.5 19.5 19.0 19.3 19.6
Interests 10.2 11.5 12.1 11.0 11.4 10.8 9.5
Investment 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.3
Other 9.4 9.3 11.2 10.1
oo00 9.1 8.3
Total 53.9 56.1 58.3 55.3 52.9 53.1 51.5
Source: Elaborated on Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1998
41 In 1996, seventy-eight per cent of Italians were in favour of EMU and only 9 per cent against 
(Commission of the European Communities 1996b: 45).
42 It has been suggested that certain measures between 1985-1990 had an important effect in 
subsequent years. Given that the primary deficit was almost balanced in the early 1990s, there is 
certainly some truth in that. Nonetheless, the five (!) manoeuvres between 1990-1991, for example, 
only resulted in temporary rather than structural reforms that were bound to lead to worse budgetary 
performance in the near future (Spaventa and Chiorazzo 2000: 50). Accordingly, the fiscal adjustment 
programmes between 1987-92 have been referred to as manovre senza risanimento (Verzichelli 
1999b).
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Nonetheless, discretionary budgetary policy played an important role in 
bringing about deficit reduction (cf. Annex B).43 The primary balance improved by 
almost 5 points between 1992 and 1997.
How was this by all means impressive fiscal consolidation possible given 
unfavourable domestic-institutional factors? First, I show that non-institutionalist 
explanations do not provide a sufficiently coherent explanation. Then I argue that 
neither political nor budgetary-institutional reform was substantial enough to explain 
fiscal consolidation during the 1990s. Although this leads to the conclusion that 
fiscal convergence was made possible thanks to inteqi^tiqnal e.conojnip pressure, and 
the constraint imposed by the Maastricht criteria, it is argued that fiscal reform came 
about despite institutional obstacles. In other words: both political and budgetary 
institutions need nonetheless to be taken into account for a satisfactory understanding 
of Italian fiscal convergence.
Various authors have referred to contingent factors in order to explain Italy’s 
impressive budgetary performance: Amato was a technocrat; his government was 
supported by the president and the corruption scandal weakened possible 
parliamentary opposition; Ciampi was a technocrat with a high reputation; his 
government was supported by left-wing parties in search of legitimacy and 
recognition; Dini was a technocrat and was supported by the PDS; the Prodi 
government was a quasi-technical government and was headed by a person with 
strong pro-European convictions and so on. Others have occasionally referred to a 
newly discovered ‘stability culture’ and a technocratic elite interested in 
implementing reforms (Vassallo 2000: 302-303; similar Dyson and Featherstone 
1996). It has also been suggested that the reform of budgetary procedures (Hallerberg 
2000) and the greater competitiveness of the parliamentary and party-political system 
introduced with the electoral reform of 1993 (Vassallo 2000: 306) made at least some 
contribution to budgetary reform. Others have also suggested that the emergence of 
new societal coalitions were responsible for the budgetary policy reform (Walsh 
1999).
There is insufficient space to argue against all of those explanations in detail. 
Some anecdotal counter-evidence will have to suffice here. The ‘technical’ or ‘prime
43 As the accounting changes and treasury operations were accepted by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the European Commission - and similar operations were used by other states they 
are not discussed here.
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ministerial government’ (Manzella 1996: 146) explanation seems to underestimate 
the tensions within the Prodi (and even the Amato) government as well as the 
different degrees of success the various governments experienced with respect to 
budgetary adjustment. Stronger budgetary procedures cannot account for the varying 
degree of success of budgetary adjustment during the 1992-98 period. Greater 
competitiveness of the electoral system does not explain the Amato reform, nor does 
it explain the failure of the short-lived Berlusconi government. A weakened 
parliamentary class eager to avoid elections does not explain budgetary consolidation 
after. 1994- Technocratic .elites and the increasing importance, of a. stability culture 
were no doubt present, but they cannot explain how an institutionally weak 
government was able to overcome traditional veto points.
From an institutional point of view one would expect that institutional reforms 
were crucial in bringing about budgetary policy reform. As already indicated in 
Section 3.1, neither the reform of the electoral system nor the modifications of the 
budgetary process have made any substantial contribution to fiscal consolidation. 
First, the qualitative analysis above suggests that fiscal consolidation was not 
correlated with the failure or success of political-institutional reform: both the Amato 
and Ciampi governments have to be regarded as strong governments, while the 
Berlusconi and Prodi governments were certainly less strong. Naturally this was 
primarily the result of the defection of the Lega and the Prodi government’s 
dependence on the RC. Nonetheless, this shows that - at least in terms of stable and 
strong majorities - the introduction of a more competitive electoral system did not 
affect the various governments’ ability to achieve budgetary reform. It might be 
argued that the tendency towards bipolarisation that resulted from increased electoral 
competition strengthened the authority of the government by virtue of its disciplining 
effect on the constituent parts of the majority or the groups supporting the majority in 
parliament (such as the RC). Once again this was not borne out by the Italian 
experience. In 1995 the Lega obstructed the government’s attempts to pass a ‘tough’ 
budget and deserted the right-wing coalition regardless. After 1996 the RC only 
backed off from bringing down the government because it faced massive internal and 
external pressure - not because of the electoral system’s disciplining effect.
If anything, the empirical analysis shows how governments after 1994 
experienced major difficulties in securing parliamentary support. The fall of the 
Berlusconi government and the conflicts between Prime Minister Prodi and the
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coalition parties - over at least the content of the budget - just represent different 
aspects of the same institutional problem: the limited control of the executive over 
parliament, the resulting fragmentation of the cabinet and hence the weakening of 
executive and prime-ministerial authority. In short, given the available evidence, the 
electoral reforms did not have any substantial impact on the success or failure of 
budgetary policy reform.
There are other reasons that suggest that electoral reform did not affect 
budgetary adjustment. First, on the political-institutional level, the electoral reform of 
1994 created at best an ‘imperfect bipolarism’ (Chiaramoqte. 19.97.). On the one hand, 
the 1994 reform did not lead to any substantial reduction in the number of coalition 
parties and parliamentary groups (Manzella 1996; Verzichelli 1997; Table 3-10).
Table 3-10 Number of Party Actors, 1987-1996
1987 1992 1994 1996
Lists with more than 0.5 per cent of votes 14 16 14 11
Number of lists obtained seats 14 16 20 13
Number of parliamentary groups*
- Chamber 12 13 8 9
- Senate 9 10 10 11
Source: D ’Alimonte and Bartolino (1997: 116) *at beginning of legislature
Italian governments were not significantly longer-lived than in previous 
periods, with the exception of the Prodi government. On the other hand, electoral 
reform did achieve a more bipolar structure. But this change should not be 
overstated: “The poles are only alliances of parties, and the parties retain their 
identities, interests and (sometimes) individual parliamentary behaviour” 
(D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997: 120). However, even those authors that have the 
greatest reservations concerning the effective changes admit that the Italian party 
system has become more competitive (Pasquino 1996; D’Alimonte and Bartolini 
1997; Pappalardo 2000). Nonetheless, if parliamentary and government 
fragmentation is the crucial characteristic, then the greater competitiveness should 
only be expected to have a marginal effect at best. Hence on theoretical grounds the 
electoral reform should not have been expected to matter very much anyway with 
regard to budgetary policy.
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It is true that the reforms of the 1990s went some way to rationalising 
budgetary procedures. Nonetheless, except for the absence of the provisional 
implementation of the budget, there is not much evidence that these changes were of 
any particular importance relative to international pressure. One might expect to find 
more coherent budgetary policies as a result of more rationalised budgetary 
procedures. The previous sections made clear that coherence was relatively high with 
respect to the 1993, 1994 and 1995 budgets.44 The greater fragmentation and 
incoherence of the subsequent budgets demonstrated though that ‘stronger’ budgets 
did not coincide. with ‘strengthened’ procedures.. By. contrast, .to. the .extent .that 
budgetary coherence was achieved it reflected the greater political influence of the 
executive over the budgetary process. This strengthening -  as repeatedly pointed out 
-  was due to international pressure and not to domestic-institutional reform.
The following numbers also support this interpretation. During the 1981-92 
period, deficit overruns averaged an annual 1.5 per cent of GDP - despite the 
introduction of supplementary budgets (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1992: 46-47). 
After 1992 the deviation was only about 0.8 per cent (Verzichelli 1999b: 214-215). It 
would seem though that this improved performance was due largely to the 
willingness (and ability) of respective governments to introduce mini-budgets rather 
than improved budgetary procedures. For example, even though it is true that 
forecasts of public deficits are difficult in the context of high public debt and volatile 
interest rates, the fact that the original budget forecast always overestimated revenues 
and underestimated expenditure during 1992-97 makes it plausible to assume that 
either the executive was not able to control parliamentary amendments, or it was at 
least eager to avoid tough budgetary measures by relying on biased forecasts. Either 
way this indicates that more rationalised budgetary procedures had no relevant effect 
on budgetary outcomes. By the same token, the fact that the budget target45 was 
undershot in 1995 and 1997 - as compared to the near permanent overshoots of the 
1980s - points to the increased strength of the executive once the slippage had 
occurred rather than a generally increased control over budgetary outcomes - as 
evidenced in the fact that the undershoots were only possible after additional mid­
year adjustments.
44 The 1995 Berlusconi budget proposal was strong and coherent but - contrary to the Amato and 
Ciampi budgets - was weakened at the parliamentary stage.
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Put differently, even if it is true that since 1990 parliament respected the -  
formal - objectives fixed by government and only decided the allocation of resources 
within the imposed limits (Giuriato 1997) and that the budget overshoots resulted 
from such factors as too optimistic government forecasts, creative accounting, and 
the favouring of (overestimated) one-off measures, then this would still indicate the 
continued ‘political’ weakness of the executive in budgetary policy-making.
In other words, if the legislative phase does not substantially alter budgetary 
outcomes in terms of debt and deficits, then the biased forecasts can be understood as 
the inability (or unwillingness), on the .part of the executive tp resist .pressure from -  
and overcome the opposition of - parliamentary parties, majority parties and societal 
actors. Hence the formulation phase would represent the crucial phase of budgetary 
policy-making (Verzichelli 1999a: 92). Therefore even if the modifications of 
budgetary procedures in the early 1990s decreased the ability of parliament to 
substantially alter budget targets, budgetary policy still represented a series of 
compromises reached at the formulation stage - if not the parliamentary stage in the 
case where the government was unable or unwilling to reject amendments.46
This confirms the view according to which the ‘political-institutional’ strength 
of the executive vis-a-vis parliament is more important than formal budgetary 
procedures. In other words, the insufficient extent of political-institutional reform 
means that there still persists a politics of the ‘least common denominator’ possible 
(Koff and Koff 2000: 130-131) - at least from an institutionalist point of view. In 
fact, the above analysis provides ample evidence for continued problems regarding 
the meeting of planned deficit targets as well as the important influence of intra- 
coalitional and intra-majority bargaining relative to ‘executive authority’.
On a theoretical level, it is equally plausible that the reform of budgetary 
procedures, to the extent that it affected budgetary outcomes, was only of limited 
importance. “It is clear that budget rules and changes in budgetary procedures cannot 
deliver more responsible fiscal policy decision per se, regardless of political will” 
(Milesi-Ferretti 1997: 35; De Haan et al. 1993: 94; Alesina et al. 1998: 14; Felsen 
1999).
45 The budget target was measured by the state sector deficit until 1995 and the general government 
deficit thereafter.
46 See also analysis by Promoteia (2000).
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If there is no evidence of an institutional strengthening of the executive in 
terms of internal cohesiveness of majority and centralised executive authority, how 
was budgetary consolidation possible? The above analysis strongly suggests that 
consolidation has to be understood in a ‘dialectical’ way, that is as the confluence of 
international pressure and the continued institutional weakness of the executive.
From this perspective, budgetary adjustment was the result of the impending 
financial and currency crisis (1992-95) and the increasing impossibility to disregard 
possible EMU exclusion (1995-98).
The Amato and Ciampi governments enjoyed a considerable, degree o f . . .  . 
autonomy from traditional party politics and were thus able to impose tough budgets 
on parliament. This autonomy was mainly the result of external pressures such as the 
impending exchange rate crisis, the devaluation of the lira and the dramatic debt 
situation, and partly the result of the weakening of political parties as a result of the 
corruption scandal. The problems of the Berlusconi government and the relative 
weakness of budgetary measures under the Dini government demonstrate the 
continued importance of executive weakness as well as the relevance of continued 
international financial pressure. The Prodi government most visibly demonstrated 
how the external constraint in the form of precise fiscal targets was used to overcome 
domestic opposition and executive weakness. Nonetheless, despite continued 
consolidation, budgetary policy from 1995 onwards was characterised by a 
‘bargained nature’. The conscious use of the external constraint to enhance the role 
of the prime minister and the executive was best reflected in the imposition of a 
tougher adjustment in autumn 1996 on the government coalition and its informal 
ally.
In other words, budgetary policy-making during the 1990s was determined by a 
dialectical relationship between external economic (international markets) and 
political (Maastricht criteria) constraints and domestic institutional weakness.
Through increasing international pressure (whether in the form of impending 
financial crisis or the EMU deadline) the lowest common denominator was raised. 
Nonetheless, Italian budgetary policy during 1992-98 provides evidence of the 
continued importance of executive weakness, as evidenced by such characteristics as 
the gradualist nature of budgetary adjustment, the composition of adjustment and the 
importance of external pressure.
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First, it is true that there were a high number of budgetary manoeuvres. 
Strikingly, on average the effective reduction of the budget deficit would have 
missed the planned target by about 30 per cent (Spaventa and Chiorazzo 2000: 61). 
As mentioned above, part of this underestimation is related to forecasting problems, 
it is very probable that estimation errors were used as a handy ‘political’ tool. (The 
fact that the estimates were biased in one particular direction makes this all the more 
plausible.) Not being able to make its preferences prevail in the annual budget, the 
government’s introduction of mini-budgets - often under severe external pressure - 
gave it a better chance to prevail over possible veto p layers........................................
Second, the composition of the adjustment involved a lot of tax raising and cuts 
in public investment (Table 3-9), measures that are usually associated with a ‘weak 
adjustment’ (Alesina and Perotti 1995). However, there were also elements of a 
‘strong(er)’ adjustment. More specifically, while the 1990-93 period was 
characterised by considerable tax increases, the 1993-95 budgets contained 
considerable cuts in structural spending. By contrast, the 1996 budget was 
comparatively weak in terms of structural measures. Similarly, even though the 1997 
budget coincided with considerable adjustment in terms of deficit reduction, both the 
1996 and 1997 budgets were largely monetary-based manoeuvres. According to 
Zaccaria (1998), 45 per cent of the 1997 fiscal adjustment was based on treasury 
operations (delay of expenditure or anticipation of revenue), while only 55 per cent 
can be considered as effective adjustment (pp. 206-8). In short, the 1996-97 budgets 
were characterised by a “carenza di una visione progettuale e quindi di un intervento 
sistematico sui conti pubblici” (Zaccaria 1998: 210) and hence by greater 
fragmentation, incoherence, temporary measures and window-dressing. In short, 
these budgets were weak, reflecting the weakness of the executive in the budgetary 
process. This was also confirmed by the qualitative analysis above.
Third, there is also plenty of evidence that external pressure strengthened the 
executive domestically. For example, while in 1997 the government was able to 
force the issue and negotiate (or rather ‘buy’) its way out of budget deadlock, in 1998 
-  with the EMU constraint gone -  the government fell.47 Even though the budget was 
not substantially altered under the new D’Alema government, it demonstrated the
47 The attempt by the Berlusconi camp to bring down the Dini government in spring 1994 (and 
autumn 1994) despite on-going international financial pressure represents the famous ‘exception that 
confirms the rule’ (see Section 4.3).
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continued institutional weakness of the Italian executive in budgetary policy-making. 
This indicates the existence of a cyclical pattern of Italian macroeconomic policy that 
results from a dialectic between international constraints and domestic-institutional 
weakness (see Section 7.1).
In short, greater executive strength and hence budgetary consolidation was 
primarily the result of a vincolo estemo. Between 1992 and 1995 it was the real 
possibility of an outright financial crisis that disciplined both majority and opposition 
parties with regard to budgetary policy. Between 1996 and 1998, with a diminished 
probability of a financial and currency crisis occurring, the .Prodi government 
successfully used the threat of EMU exclusion to impose more or less severe but 
necessary budgetary adjustment. Throughout this time though the executive’s 
institutional weakness continued to matter. Hence it is fair to say that Italian 
budgetary policy reform was in substance a ‘policy reform without relevant domestic 
institutional reform’. The theoretical implications for the institutionalist approach 
will be discussed in Section 7.3.
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4 THE POLITICS OF PENSION REFORM
Domani (Italian for English tomorrow)
An important area that underwent reform during the 1990s and thus contributed to 
fiscal convergence was welfare and particularly pension policy. Pension reform 
contributed to short-term budgetary consolidation in two ways. First, pension reform 
made a direct contribution to fiscal consolidation by reducing - or at least by 
preventing a greater increase of - the pension deficit that had to be financed by the 
government. Second, pension reform had a .positive effe.ct pn. investor confidence .and 
thus the stability of the lira and interest rates. The level of interest rates was 
extremely important given the high stock of public debt and the resulting interest 
payments. In the mid-1990s a one-percentage point increase in interest rates meant a 
L15,000bn increase in interest expenditure. As will be shown, both effects made an 
important contribution to successful macroeconomic convergence in the 1990s.
While Chapter 3 focused more narrowly on budgetary policy-making in terms 
of executive-legislature relations, this chapter will discuss the contribution made to 
fiscal consolidation by pension reform. Even though budgetary consolidation and 
pension reform are intimately related, there are several reasons why it is sensible to 
analyse them separately.
First, societal groups and more specifically trade unions have always played an 
important role in the formulation and implementation of Italian welfare and pension 
policy. Even though the participation of societal actors in the making of public policy 
can be found in almost all areas, Italian welfare and pension policy-making has 
always been characterised by a particularly high degree of trade union participation 
(Femer and Hyman 1992; Regalia and Regini 1998). Second, not only does social 
welfare spending constitute the single most important item of public expenditure, but 
pension spending also makes up the largest part of welfare spending. Hence social 
expenditure reform could potentially generate large savings. In 1992, spending on 
old-age and survivors’ pension alone represented more than 15 per cent of GDP, 
while public wages made up 12.7 per cent and interest payments 11.5 per cent of 
GDP. Total government spending was 56.1 per cent of GDP (Bank of Italy, Abridged 
Report, 1998: 99-113). Finally, given that from the mid-1960s onwards, public 
deficits coincided with the expansion of welfare (and pension) spending in general,
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reforming welfare and especially pension policy meant tackling an important source 
of public deficits (Franco 1993).
There are also several reasons to focus more narrowly on pension reform rather 
than on social expenditure reform in general. First, pension expenditure1 represents 
the largest item among social security expenditure. While social expenditure as a 
share of GDP is broadly in line with the EU average, the composition of Italian 
social spending is different. At the beginning of the 1990s, roughly 60 per cent of 
total social security spending was on old-age and survivors’ pensions. This is some 
20, poipts. above, the .EU .average (IMF. 1998:. 57).. Social, expenditure is thus 
disproportionately biased towards pensions. By comparison, health spending,2 as the 
second largest social expenditure item, was not only below the EU average, but its 
much smaller share of total expenditure offered less potential savings (Table 4-1).
Table 4-1 Social Expenditure by Function
(as a share of GDP)
EU ITALY
1980 1990 1993 1980 1990 1993
Sickness, Invalidity, Occupational Accident 8.7 8.8 9.4 6.3 7.7 7.6
Old-age, Survivors’ 10.1 11.1 11.9 9.9 13.6 15.5
Other 4.4 4.3 5.3 1.8 1.5 1.5
Total 23.2 24.2 26.2 18.0 22.8 24.6
Source: Eurostat (1996a)
Furthermore, while health expenditure had remained almost constant as a share 
of GDP, old-age and survivors’ pension outlays were the most dynamic component 
of public expenditure (Figure 4-1).
1 Generally figures refer to old-age and survivors’ pensions which represent by far the largest part of 
pension outlays. Social and invalidity pensions are negligible by comparison. For example, in 1992, of 
the L333,OOObn in social expenditure, L83,000bn were spent on health, L27,000bn assistenza 
(including invalidity and other types of pensions that combined made up less than L17,000bn) and 
L222,000bn on previdenza - of which L184,000bn alone were spent on old-age pensions (Ministero 
del Bilancio, Relazione generate sulla situazione economica del paese 1993 [Volume I: 73]).
2 While the financial effect of health policy on public finances was not negligible - the National 
Health Service was running a deficit of L8,600bn in 1989 (Mapelli 1999: chapter 4; Reviglio 1998: 
93-112) -, the greater dynamism of pension expenditure justifies the focus on pension reform.. As for 
the importance of privatisation, the proceeds from privatisation during 1994-97 (ca. L65,900bn) were 
used to reduce the stock of debt and thus had no direct impact on deficit reduction (Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri 1998; also Nicoletti and Goldstein 1996; Reviglio 1998: chapter 8). For welfare 
reform more generally see Ferrera (1997).
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Figure 4-1 Social Expenditure, 1980-1992
(as a share of GDP)
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As a state-run contributory pay-as-you-go pension regime, the state covers the 
shortfall between contributions and expenditures. As pension spending exhibited the 
greatest dynamism, the absence of pension policy reform was bound to create 
dramatic financial problems in the future, especially in the face of adverse 
demographic developments. In fact, social security contributions in other areas 
already financed the deficit of pension schemes (IMF 1998; Ferrera 1997: 234). In 
order to meet its pension liabilities, the system traditionally made recourse to 
extensive direct allocations and off-budget transfers (IMF 1998: 62). The precise 
extent of the pension deficit and the impact on public finances is however difficult to 
establish.
L’impatto dei disavanzi delle gestioni pensionistiche sulla finanza pubblica non e di 
agevole misurazione, in quanto tra i conti della previdenza i trasferimenti dello Stato 
(compresi quelli a copertura dei disavanzi di tesoreria) sono inclusi tra le entrate; cio 
naturalmente altera il saldo (Faustini 1996: footnote 47; Ferrera 1984: 81; IMF 1998: 60- 
61).3
3 “The impact of pension deficits on public finance is not easy to measure, since the revenues are 
included in the social security accounts and state transfers (including those to cover Treasury deficits); 
this of course alters the balance.”
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Although it is hard to quantify the precise impact of pension spending on 
public finances, the chronic deficit between contributory revenues and social outlays 
of the major pension schemes was considerable as partly reflected in the deficit- 
benefit ratios (Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris 1996). The deficit-benefit ratios indicate the 
importance of the pension deficit financed by the government (Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-2 Deficit-Benefit Ratios
(per category)
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While the deficit-benefit ratios demonstrate the importance of state transfers, 
the figures in Table 4-2 give an idea as to the actual amount of state financing. Given 
that the numbers in Table 4-2 relate to the previdenza deficit and given that part of 
the pension deficit was financed through surpluses of other social security schemes 
within previdenza, the actual extent to which the government finances the pension 
system is higher than reflected in these figures. While many other EU countries are 
also characterised by public transfers to social security institutions and especially the 
pension system, the Italian case was particularly dramatic in that the shortfall was 
financed through public deficits rather than through current revenues.
Table 4-2 Consolidated Account of Previdenza *4
(as a share of GDP)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
0.43 -1.17 -1.37 -2.06 -1.92 -2.09 -2.07 -1.66 -2.23 -2.30 -2.64 -2.51 -3.16
Source: Visaggio and Vitali (1995) based on Ministero del Bilancio, Relazione generate sulla 
situazione economica del paese
* all institutions/ net of contributions of central and local administration
Apart from the question of the precise impact of pension spending on public 
finances, it was clear that given that there was a limit to increases in contribution 
rates,* budget* transfers *were* bound to* increase with the maturing of the system and 
the worsening of demographic and occupational trends. Hence not only would 
pension cuts contribute to budgetary consolidation but leaving the system 
unreformed would further increase the pressure in the future (D’Ercole and Terribile
1998). In short, the reform of the pension regime in particular became a crucial 
component in preventing a deterioration of the fiscal situation and achieving 
sustainable public finances.
Although projections of future pension expenditure5 varied, all of them painted 
a bleak picture in terms of future spending (INPS 1991; Ragioneria Generale dello 
Stato 1991).6 A further deterioration of pension deficits was hardly sustainable in 
terms of either international competitiveness or public finances: the government 
already financed a substantial part of the pension deficit and large increases in 
contribution rates would have been hard to sustain at a time when these rates were 
actually falling on EU average (Ferrera and Gualmini 1999: 93).
Reform was also necessary because the TEU stipulated sustainable public 
finances (Art. 109j). A ‘sustainable position of the public finances’ in the medium- 
term was crucial since budgetary consolidation had to result from the reduction of 
financial imbalances in all sub-sectors and particularly in the social security system.
4 Previdenza does not include invalidity, disability or social pensions. The deficit hence only reflects 
the approximate impact of the old-age pension deficit on public finance.
5 Clearly, forecasts concerning pension expenditure are always risky as they depend on rather 
uncertain assumptions concerning economic growth and demographic developments (Commission of 
the European Communities 1996a: 15). Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of studies in the 
1980s and early 1990s demonstrated that the Italian pension system was going to face major 
difficulties (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 1991; INPS 1991). Trends were even more worrying in a 
cross-national perspective. In the late 1980s, the OECD (1988a, 1988b) estimated that the ‘hidden’ 
Italian pension debt was about 2.4 times of GDP (compared to 1.6 in the UK and Germany).
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In the short term, deficits in the pension system can be accommodated with tax 
increases. However, in order to satisfy the Maastricht fiscal criteria, medium-term 
sustainability was as important as achieving quantitative budget targets.
In the event, Italian pension reform was crucial in the effort to consolidate 
public finances. The fact that Italy experienced three reforms between 1992 and 1997 
also illustrates this. Following the discussion of the Italian pension policy-making 
regime in Chapter 2, the question is how a poorly insulated and weak executive was 
able to achieve relatively successful pension reform in spite of powerful, entrenched 
.interests and the. difficulties .created, by the. existence of a pay.-as-you.-go pension. 
regime. To answer this question, the politics of the various reform efforts between 
1992 and 1998 are analysed: the Amato reform; the failure and success of the 
Berlusconi and Dini reforms respectively; and the 1997 Prodi ‘reform’.7 In the 
concluding section I discuss to what extent a historical-institutionalist approach can 
explain Italian pension reform.
4.1 Reforms under the Amato Prime Ministership
As discussed in Section 3.2, throughout 1992 Italy’s fiscal situation deteriorated 
rapidly. At the end of May, the Bank of Italy, for example, urged the government to 
reform the pension system in order to re-gain control of public expenditure (Bank of 
Italy, Abridged Report, 1992: 153-166). The worsening of public accounts and 
increasing international pressure on the Italian lira within the ERM prompted the 
Amato government to present a delegation bill (disegno di legge delegaf in July. 
Revealingly, the initial project was not characterised by any particularly rigorous 
elements. The retirement age for old-age pensions, for example, was to be increased 
on a voluntary or incentive-basis. In short, the government took an accommodating 
rather than a problem-solving attitude (see Cazzola 1995: 36). This changed with the 
August crisis (see Section 3.2), the devaluation in September and the subsequent exit
6 As in other advanced industrialised countries, changing demographics are the driving factor behind 
increasing pension expenditure. Nevertheless, the reform of pension policy still requires a political 
explanation.
7 Rather than present a detailed description of changes to the pension system, the purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate how the reforms can be explained with the help of the institutionalist and 
‘weak executive’ approaches (for detailed description of changes between 1992 and 1995 see Cazzola 
1995).
8 As discussed in Section 2.1, a decree-law is introduced by the executive but has to be converted 
within a certain time. A delegation law -  once obtained - authorises the executive to introduce and
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from ERM in response to which the delega concerning pension reform was 
substantially revised (Cazzola 1994: 67).
In order to recuperate international confidence, the Amato government 
introduced a decree-law in mid-September as part of the 1993 budget which among 
other things made changes to the pension system and aimed at saving L ll,000bn in 
1993, mainly thanks to the suspension of seniority pensions and higher contribution 
rates. The emergency measures were converted into law no. 438 (1992) on 14 
November. The government prevailed, despite strong societal opposition as 
evidenced in demonstrations against the government, and mainly thanks to a 
surprising ‘discipline among majority parties’ (Cazzola 1994: 67-68). This discipline 
certainly reflected the external economic pressures in the wake of the currency crisis 
and the continued nervousness of the financial markets as reflected in the bond yield 
spreads and the lira value (Figure 4-3). Moreover, the deepening domestic political 
crisis made the majority parties unwilling to bring down the government despite 
considerable reservations regarding the measures undertaken (c f  Section 3.2).
Figure 4-3 Interest Rate Differentials and the Lira-DM Exchange Rate, 1992-1998
(interest rate differentials, in per cent [left-hand scale]; exchange rate, Lira/DM [right-hand
scale])
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In October 1992 the government obtained a delegation law (no. 421, 23 
October 1992) from parliament granting it special powers to cut primary spending in
change legislation by decree within the limits established by the delegation law but without having to 
ask parliament for approval.
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four main areas: health services, pensions, local government and public employment 
(Gazzetta Ujficiale, no. 257, 31 October 1992). The main goal of the delegation law 
was to neutralise the causes of explosive growth of public debt and to assure 
international markets of Italy’s commitment to both economic consolidation and -  at 
least on a rhetorical level -  to ERM re-entry (cf. Section 6.1). In as far as pensions 
were concerned, the law set three main objectives: (1) financial soundness of the 
pension system (that is, stabilising the ratio of pension outlays to GDP); (2) equality 
of treatment (in terms of benefits for public and private sector employees); and (3)
development of group or individual retirement provisions............................................
Subsequently, the government issued a number of decrees determining the 
content of the reform within the framework established by the delegation law 
(Corrente 1993; Cazzola 1995). The most important features of the Amato reform 
were the following (see Ferrera 1997; Monorchio 1996):
• increase in the retirement age from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 65 for men 
(private employees) to be phased in by the year 2002
• gradual increase in the minimum contribution requirement for old-age benefits from 10 
to 20 years
• gradual extension of the reference period for pensionable earnings from the last five 
years to the last ten years (and to the whole career for new entrants in the labour 
market)
• gradual increase of the contribution requirement for seniority pensions to 36 years for 
all workers (including civil servants, who enjoyed a much lower requirement of 20 
years)
• increase in contribution rates
• changes to the indexation mechanism for benefits
The adoption of the delegation law was made possible through determined 
government action. Anticipating parliamentary opposition, the government made the 
non-amendability of the most important articles a matter of confidence (Financial 
Times, 23 October 1992). After some changes in the first session of the Budget 
Commission of the Chamber, the delegation law was passed thanks to imposing 
confidence votes on all four articles (cf. Chapter 3). Clearly, the government was in a 
position of strength due to the economic turmoil and pressure on the exchange rate, 
which allowed it to impose confidence votes on major reform projects that hitherto 
would have been impossible.
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Although the unions were broadly in agreement with the harmonisation of the 
public and private pension regimes9 and the need to ensure the financial viability of 
the system (at least in principle), they did object to particular reform measures.10 
Understandably they were far less enthusiastic about a ‘downward’ harmonisation as 
this would infringe upon the acquired rights of their core constituencies such as 
public employees and private sector workers. In short, trade unions were certainly in 
favour of greater equality of treatment but not in favour of benefit reductions. 
Precisely because the executive was in a predominant position once the delegation 
law had been passed, the trade unions, had no.possibility of obstructing the less liked 
aspects of the pension reform. Under the normal procedural framework, changes 
would not have taken place or would have been substantially watered down. The 
difficult economic situation put the government in a position of strength and made it 
willing - using the formal means available - to take strong action.
It is true that the Amato reform was characterised by a certain number of 
weaknesses (Castellino 1996; Gronchi and Aprile 1998). Above all the gradual 
phasing-in of changes regarding retirement age and seniority as well as the real 
labour income de-indexation demonstrated that the government pursued a policy of 
‘blame minimisation’ by avoiding the immediate costs of modifying the less visible 
elements of the pension system. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, in a historical 
perspective, the Amato reform represented the most extensive reform in decades. The 
Amato reform was “strikingly innovative for the Italian policy-making system” 
(Regini and Regalia 1997: 212). This is reflected in the amount of savings and in the 
breaking the reform deadlock.
The proclaimed aim of the reform was to hold future public pension 
expenditure constant as a share of GDP. Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is not 
clear whether this would have been achieved. As for private sector employees, an 
INPS study (1993) projected that the equilibrium contribution rate (ECR)11 would 
fall/rise from 42 per cent (and pension spending as a share of GDP from 7.7 per cent)
9 For example, well before the reforms, the CGIL criticised the government’s generosity towards civil 
servants in terms of pension policy (Financial Times, 1 April 1992).
10 Interview with CISL official, 12 October 2000, Rome.
11 The ECR is defined as the contribution rate required for the various pension regimes to be in 
balance.
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in 1992 to 40/4712 per cent (and 6.8/8.0 per cent) in 2010 as a result of the reforms, 
rather than rise to an ECR of 54 per cent and pension expenditure of 9.2 per cent. 
The Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1994 quoted in Commission of the European 
Communities 1996: 79), which had initially projected an ECR of 50 per cent (and 
pension expenditure of 8.8 per cent) in 2010, revised its estimates for private sector 
employee pension spending downwards. As a result of the reform, the ECR was 
expected to fall/rise to 36/46 per cent, while pension expenditure as a share of GDP 
was to decrease/increase to 6.2/ 8.0 per cent in 2010.
Similarly, the projections for central government and local authorities . 
employees were revised downwards. The Ragioneria Generale (1994 quoted in 
Commission of the European Communities 1996a: 80) had projected an ECR of 73 
per cent (and pension expenditure of 5.6 per cent) in the absence of reform, while 
with the reforms it projected an ECR of 46/55 per cent (and pension expenditure of 
3.5/4.2 per cent) in 2010. The Centro Europea Ricerche (1994 quoted in 
Commission of the European Communities 1996a: 81) evaluated the effect of the 
reform on total expenditure of main schemes. It estimated that total pension 
expenditure of all main schemes as a share of GDP would rise from 12.4 to 13.0/14.9 
per cent in 2010 as opposed to 16 per cent in the absence of reform. Other estimates 
calculated that the Amato reform would reduce future total pension expenditure 
commitments by about one quarter (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 2000: 112; see 
also OECD Economic Surveys Italy 2000: 112). Naturally these projections depend 
to a great extent on uncertain assumptions. Nonetheless, relevant projections at the 
time indicated a considerable relative improvement even if in a European perspective 
the situation still looked rather difficult.
With expected savings in the area of Lll,000bn (1993), L15,000bn (1994) and 
L20,000bn (1995), the Amato reform undoubtedly contributed to short-term 
budgetary consolidation in the area of 0.8 per cent per year (Servizio Bilancio del 
Senato quoted in Cazzola 1995: 71). More importantly, it sent positive signals to 
international markets that the government was willing and able to achieve 
macroeconomic consolidation and tackle structural imbalances. Indeed, long-term 
interest rates, the exchange rate and the stock market showed encouraging signs
12 The first figure assumes price indexation, the second wage indexation. The Amato reform even 
though it introduced price indexation, allowed for wage indexation to be introduced with the yearly 
budget.
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towards the end of 1992 which are at least partly related to the Amato government’s 
success in pushing through pension reform (Figure 4-3 above).
In sum, compared with previous reform efforts, the Amato government was 
able to overcome societal and parliamentary opposition and obstruction by staking its 
survival on the realisation of -  among other things -  pension reform in the context of 
what was widely acknowledged to be a ‘national emergency’.13 This allowed the 
government to prevail over potential opposition and obtain a delegation law, which 
subsequently offered the government a great degree of autonomy to determine the 
content of pension reform within the framework established by the delegation law 
and without undue interference and watering-down tactics by parliament. Similarly, 
unions - though broadly supportive of the aim of harmonising the pension system - 
did not like certain details of the reform (especially those attacking acquired rights). 
But due to the difficult economic and political situation unions were unwilling and 
unable to oppose the government.14 Hence it is fair to say that: “The pension system 
was extensively reformed in 1992, under the pressure of the exchange rate crisis and 
the urgent need to curb the deficit” (Commission of the European Communities 
1996a: 77). At the same, it is also true that “considering the unusual generosity of 
previous legislation and the fact that the changes adopted in 1992 were not enforced 
immediately, but were meant to be phased in over a fairly long period, the 1992 
reform constituted only a very limited attempt to deal with a very serious problem in 
financing pensions” (Bonoli 2000: 155; Ferrera 1997; also Section 4.4).
Under the technocratic Ciampi government (1993-94) further changes to the 
pension system were introduced mainly by decree (Cazzola 1995; Corrente 1998). 
The changes introduced with the 1994 finance bill primarily concerned seniority 
pensions, especially the cumulation between income and seniority as well as stricter 
controls of the beneficiaries of disability benefits (law no. 537 in Gazzetta Ufficiale, 
No. 303, supplement no. 121; also Correnti 1998). In terms of their financial effect, 
these changes were worth about L4,000bn. As they largely concerned disability 
rather than old-age pensions, there does not seem to have occurred any major conflict 
between the government and the unions (Cazzola 1996).
13 Some measures concerning seniority pensions were dropped after union opposition (Cazzola 1995: 
55). However, interviews with union officials confirmed the strong position of the government and the 
grudging acceptance of the details of reform on the part of the unions, despite their overall agreement 
in principle.
14 Interview with CISL official, 12 October 2000, Rome.
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4.2 Failure and Success o f Pension Reform under Berlusconi and 
Dini
In 1994, a centre-right majority consisting of three parties {Forza Italia, Alleanza 
Nazionale and Lega Nord) under Prime Minister Berlusconi won the general 
elections. Both the pension and the fiscal situation deteriorated rapidly, despite the 
1992 reforms, and expenditure forecasts were substantially revised upwards. During 
the course of 1993-94, several new, revised projections of future pension expenditure 
raised the* spectre of a contribution rate of around 50’ per cent by’ 2010 instead of 
2030 as originally forecast (Commission of the European Communities 1996a: 77). 
This clearly demonstrated the urgent need for further reform. At the same time, the 
pressure on the government to pursue budgetary consolidation was increasing {cf. 
Section 3.3). The 1994 budget target was set to overshoot. The external weakness of 
the lira not only created the possibility of a debt crisis but -  through interest rate 
increases -  also led to a worsening of fiscal position and to a loss of confidence by 
the international markets (Figure 4-3 above).
As Berlusconi had pledged not to raise taxes, the only other way to bring 
public finances under control was to cut expenditure. Welfare spending and more 
specifically pension spending were areas where important savings could potentially 
be made. Initially, the government discussed reform proposals with the unions 
{Financial Times, 14 September 1994). However, after the government was unable to 
strike a deal with the unions, it ‘unilaterally’ proposed changes to the pension system 
in the 1995 finance bill {Financial Times, 30 September 1994). Of the 27,000bn in 
spending cuts for 1995, L7,000bn-L8,000bn of savings were to come from pensions. 
The importance of the reform proposal did not so much regard actual short-term 
savings but rather its impact on long-term pension expenditure.
The most important of the proposed changes were: (1) acceleration of increase 
of retirement age from 56 to 60 for women and 61 to 65 for men; (2) the 
‘downwards’ harmonisation of the rate at which pensions accrue annually from 2 to 
1.75 per cent for both private and public employees; (3) penalisation measures for 
early retirement pensions (which would de facto have resulted in their abolition); (4) 
blocking of pension requests for four months; and (5) indexation of pensions on 
programmed rather than real inflation (Cazzola 1995: chapter 2; Castellino 1996).
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This proposal was radical and strongly attacked acquired rights through rapid 
downwards harmonisation.
Not surprisingly, the plans met with considerable resistance. Under pressure 
from the unions as well as from within the coalition, the Berlusconi government 
agreed to several changes such as the easing of hardship cases (Financial Times, 27 
October 1994). But the pressure on the government continued and came increasingly 
from within the majority. Thus the plan to index pensions on programmed inflation 
fell victim to intra-majority opposition (Cazzola 1995: chapter 2). The trade unions 
organised a national strike on 14 October and a demonstration on l2 November — the 
largest recorded in post-war Italian history with 1.5 million people in Rome alone 
{Financial Times, 16 November 1994). Clearly, the unions acted as defenders of 
acquired rights.15
Initially the prime minister vowed that the provisions would not be altered 
under any circumstances.16 However, the weakening of Berlusconi’s right-wing 
majority through the defection of the Lega Nord,17 increasing criticism from 
Alleanza Nazionale and the other centre-right parties outside government as well as 
the prime minister’s own political weakening due to his increasing involvement in 
the corruption scandal weakened the executive. In mid-October, Lega leader 
Umberto Bossi demanded the revision of the pension and health plans. Intra-majority 
opposition was even expressed in parliamentary voting. The defection of the Lega, 
for example, in a crucial vote in the Chamber on the government’s proposal to reduce 
the accrual rate of pensions led to the defeat of this part of the reform (Financial 
Times, 19 November 1994). At the same time, the possibility of introducing a vote of 
confidence - Berlusconi was considering this to overcome parliamentary resistance - 
was received critically by parliament and, given Lega opposition, would hardly have 
succeeded.
The combination of intra-coalitional pressure and public and trade union 
opposition to the pension plans forced the prime minister to negotiate with the 
unions. An agreement was reached on 1 December where both the government and 
the unions accepted austerity measures in principle. Both sides agreed: (1) to make
15 Interview with CISL official, 12 October 2000, Rome.
16 “Not one, not 10 nor 100 general strikes will alter the budget” {Financial Times, 3 December 1994).
17 The defection of Lega was at least partly caused by differences over welfare cuts (Cazzola 1995: 
chapter 2) which led Lega leader Bossi to believe that it would be more beneficial to leave the
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the contributions paid by the individual more closely correlated to the benefits 
received; (2) to relate pension benefits to life expectancy at the date of retirement; 
and (3) to move towards equal treatment for the different categories of pensioners. It 
was agreed that pension reform should be negotiated with the unions setting 30 June 
1995 as a deadline.
Thus the government was forced to withdraw the most controversial provisions 
and hence planned cuts were reduced to L4,000bn (Financial Times, 2 December
1994). The ‘compromise’ was thus estimated to have cost some L4,000bn (Financial 
Times, 3 December 1994). Of the original reform elements only the temporary .freeze 
of seniority benefits and the acceleration of the retirement age survived. By contrast, 
the two-per cent accrual rate and the indexation on real inflation were maintained. In 
short, the government was forced to drop most of the provisions that attacked 
acquired rights in too radical a way.
Despite operating in a context of increased international pressure and a 
worsening domestic economic situation -  the exchange rate against the German mark 
had worsened from L950 to almost LI ,050 in the six months to December and the 
difference in long-term bond yields vis-a-vis benchmark-setting German bonds had 
increased (Figure 4-3 above; OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996: 31-36) - the 
Berlusconi government was not able to introduce important change unilaterally as a 
result of strong trade union resistance and the crumbling of his parliamentary 
majority. This showed the limited strength of the Italian government. Executive 
weakness - embodied in the heterogeneity of the government coalition - was a crucial 
factor that led to the defeat of reform plans. Although Berlusconi vowed to take a 
strong stand and sought to force the issue, the fragility of the government coalition 
made it clear that this was impossible. In the end, it was both parliamentary and trade 
union opposition that prevented the government from realising pension reform and 
ultimately forced it to capitulate. It is fair to say that the government was too weak in 
terms of disciplining the majority parties to be able to push through a tough pension 
reform. (It would also be fair to say that Berlusconi as a newcomer sought to 
disregard the ‘rules of the game’, which required ‘bargaining’ rather than ‘executive 
imposition’, and that thus the institutional features of the system prevailed.)
alliance. The defection was also due to other intra-coalitional disputes, especially between the AN and 
the Lega.
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Berlusconi resigned in December 1994 so that the task of reforming the 
pension system and achieving structural savings fell on his successor Lamberto Dini 
who took office in January 1995. As already pointed out, the Dini government was a 
technocratic government and as such did not have the support of a well-defined 
majority in parliament. However, the pressure on the government and unions to 
achieve reform increased in early 1995. On the one hand, the general economic 
situation and the latest projections of future pension liabilities released in 1995 
projected a dramatic worsening of the financial sustainability of the pension system 
(for survey see Commission of the European Communities 1996a). At the same time, 
the overall pension deficit for 1995 was estimated to exceed L80,000bn - or more 
than 4 per cent of GDP (.Financial Times, 19 May 1995). On the other hand, 
international financial markets became more nervous. The lira was weakening 
further, which led the Bank of Italy to raise interest rates, thus further increasing the 
pressure on Italian public finances. In March the value of the lira had fallen to 1270 
lira per German mark. This represented a depreciation of 25 per cent over four 
weeks. Inflation was rising and the rise in the discount rate bore the risk of a 
solvency crisis. All this put pressure on domestic actors to achieve reform.
In conformity with the December agreement, the so-called Dini reform, 
negotiated with the union confederations throughout the first half of 1995 and 
adopted by parliament in August 1995, introduced several important changes (Bank 
of Italy, Economic Bulletin, 1995; Cazzola 1995: chapter 4; Fererra and Salvimini 
1999; Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 190, 19 August 1995, supplement no. 101). The main 
elements of the reform were the following (Corrente 1996):
• shift from an earnings-based system to one where benefits are linked to contributions 
paid over a life time period (capitalised on the basis of nominal GDP growth)
• adjust coefficients every ten years to take into account economic growth and 
demographic changes (with the first revision to take place in 1998 in case savings not 
as large as expected)
• link between benefits and residual life expectancy at retirement age (allowing flexible 
retirement between 57 and 65 years)
•  phased increase from 35 to 40 years of contributions required for seniority pension
• ceiling on the incomes for which pension rights can be accrued
• creation of incentives for stimulating the growth of private pension funds
How was the pension reform possible from a political and an institutional point 
of view? With the 1 December agreement the unions had accepted the need to 
overhaul the pension system. The negotiations started from a union proposal that 
represented the common platform of the three major confederations. The proposal
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was based on the suggestions of the progressive faction of the CGIL (after prevailing 
over the communist one) and favoured a contribution-based system. CISL and UIL 
agreed to it, provided that the rights of workers with a seniority of more than 15 
years (as of 1996) would be respected. Compared to 1992 and 1994, when unions 
were only marginally involved in the reform process, the 1995 reform was the result 
of extensive union-govemment consultations.18
After reaching an agreement, the unions submitted it to a referendum among 
their members and the government had to push it through parliament. The union 
leadership lobbied for acceptance of the reform (Braun 1996: footnote 29). The union 
referendum (29 May-1 June 1995) -  in which both active workers and pensioners 
participated -  accepted the govemment-union agreement with 65 per cent voting in 
favour of the reform. Given that a considerable part of trade union membership was 
made up of pensioners (Table 4-3), it was not surprising that the reforms largely 
maintained advantageous provisions for those already retired, while the main costs 
would fall on the currently active workers and primarily the young workers.
Table 4-3 Composition of Union Membership, 1995
(in million)
CGIL CISL UIL
Active Workers 2.4 2.0 1.2
Pensioners 2.8 1.7 0.4
Total 5.2 3.7 1.6
Source: Cesos, Le relazione sindacali in Italia: Rapporto 1995-96 (1998)
This explains partly why the unions fought so hard to retain the system - 
characterised by eamings-related benefits and seniority pensions - as much as 
possible by stretching transition periods in order to defend the interests of their 
constituencies. It is plausible to assume that a more extensive reduction of acquired 
rights would have resulted in the failure of the pension reform. This clearly limited 
possible reform outcomes.
As for the government, it submitted the proposal to parliament (Law no. 335 of 
August 8, 1995). In the Chamber, the proposal met with resistance and a great 
number of amendments, mainly by the RC, which alone tabled 2,700 amendments 
(.Financial Times, 15 June 1995; Cazzola 1995: chapter 2). However, given the
18 Interview with CISL official, 12 October 2000, Rome. Also Castellino 1996.
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support the Dini government enjoyed from the centre-left parties and the co­
operative attitude of Forza Italia, Dini was able to call a parliamentary vote of 
confidence after having reached an agreement that Forza Italia would abstain. By 
contrast, the AN announced that it would vote against the government. With three 
votes of confidence, the government was able to speed the passage through 
parliament and neutralise some 3,500 proposed amendments (.Financial Times, 15 
July 1995). The final margin secured by the government in the Chamber was 
comfortable with 284 deputies voting in favour and 147 voting against -  with the 
c^nfre-left parties and Lega Nord^ support Alleanza Nazionate and/partial) RC 
opposition.19 Forza Italia abstained. In the Senate the legislation enjoyed a much 
smoother passage (Financial Times, 14 July 1995; Financial Times, 4 August 1995).
Having reached an agreement with the unions, it was clear that the centre-left 
would not obstruct pension reform. As for Forza Italia, it initially criticised the 
pension reform as insufficient when it was announced. However, the centre-right 
appeared anxious to avoid being seen by the financial markets as ‘irresponsibly 
blocking vital reforms’ (Financial Times, 13 July 1995).20 This was also the reason 
why Forza Italia was rather co-operative in that it only added amendments that were 
broadly in agreement with the government proposal (Cazzola 1995: 89). This makes 
it plausible that with continued international pressure the main political forces were 
not prepared to defeat the government on a bill that was seen as crucial for economic 
recovery and whose rejection risked triggering a financial crisis. Thus it is fair to say 
that the government’s decisive action and the safe passage of the reform through 
parliament were the result of executive autonomy and the co-operative behaviour of 
the main political parties in parliament.
It was certainly also important that the reform was ‘approved’ by the trade 
unions before it was submitted to parliament. This is why the reform content was 
primarily determined at the negotiation stage between the government and the unions 
in which both in principle were co-equal partners, especially since it was hard to 
imagine that a technical government - relying on the support of the centre-left - could
19 The RC split with the departure of 14 of the 39 deputies announcing that they would back the 
general line of the reforms (Financial Times, 15 June 1995).
20 In addition to external pressure, there were also political-tactical reasons for Forza Italia to abstain: 
“Mr. Berlusconi appeared anxious to avoid being seen by the financial markets as irresponsibly 
blocking vital reform. At the same time, quick approval of the pension reform would help pave the 
way for an autumn general election which Mr Berlusconi has been pressing for” (Financial Times, 13 
July 1995).
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have credibly threatened to do what a centre-right majority had failed to do, that is, to 
introduce pension reform unilaterally. However, the consensual manner in which the 
reform had to take place had an effect on the outcome.
Not surprisingly, a rather critical view was expressed by the Bank of Italy 
which regarded the reform as insufficient and, in particular, too gradual (Bank of 
Italy, Abridged Report, 1996: 159-160). Confmdustria rejected the reform outright 
and lobbied parliament hard for a shorter transition period (Financial Times, 19 May
1995). Even if these statements were politically motivated in the sense that neither 
central banks nor industry associations are ever satisfied with ret^epchmQnt. policies, 
it is clear that the unions were able to defend their most important interests and 
especially the acquired rights of their constituency (that is, of their active and retired 
members).
The gradual character of the reform was the consequence of the lock-in effect 
and more specifically the result of the defence of acquired rights by the trade unions. 
This was reflected in the fact that the main issue of contention concerned seniority 
pensions (the government wanted 40 years of contribution, the unions insisted on 35 
years), a low minimum retirement age (52 years with 35 years’ contributions) and a 
very gradual rise in the minimum pension age to 57 by the year 2008 (Financial 
Times, 10 May 1994). The strong stance taken by the unions on acquired rights and 
especially workers with higher seniority was the reason why the transition to a pro­
rata system would not be completed until 2013.21 This was also acknowledged by the 
CGIL leader Sergio Cofferati: “Ensuring that pensioni di anzianita will not be 
abolished immediately was one of the hardest issues in the negotiations” (Financial 
Times, 28 July 1995).
However, while there were considerable safeguards and gradualism (as 
evidenced by the guarantees for workers with 15 years of seniority in 1993) as well 
as ‘soft’ eligibility requirements (as a result of a low retirement age), the introduction 
of a contribution-based system (in which workers eventually would receive only 
around 70 per cent of their earnings as compared to generally more than 80 per cent 
under the previous system) represented a major policy innovation. While this may 
seem surprising given the nature of the Italian policy-making system, from an 
institutional point view, this puzzle can easily be solved. Precisely because the
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system was unable to impose short-term costs and to infringe on acquired rights, the 
policy innovation was the only way to ensure medium-term stability by shifting 
‘costs’ in terms of lower benefits to the future. This confirms the short-term character 
of pension policy, which tends to be more pronounced in Italy due to the presence of 
relatively strong trade unions and a weak government. The weakness can also be 
seen by comparing the Italian pension system after the Dini reform with those of 
other European countries. The Italian system is still characterised by a lower 
retirement age and a higher income replacement rate. It is also the only country with 
provisions, fo.r seniority pensions ,(B.an.k <?f Italy,. Economic Bulletin .1995; f(?r details 
see Brindisi 2000).
What about the reforms’ financial effects? The reform was supposed to save 
L10,000bn a year over 10 years or 0.6 per cent of GDP per year, or 108,000n over 
1996-2005 (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996: 49-55). Given that the unions had 
advocated proposals that would have achieved about Ll,500bn over the next three 
years, while the government had initially pledged yearly savings of about L15,000bn 
over the same period, the reform clearly reflected a compromise. Although the 
government insisted that the original government target of saving L15,000bn over 
the three years between 1995-97 (and L10,000bn a year over a decade) would be 
met, Confindustria calculated there would be a shortfall of L4,500bn as a result of 
concessions to the unions (Financial Times, 9 May 1995). The INPS estimated 
savings to be L23,600bn by 1998. This indicates both the weakness to achieve wider 
reform and the need to pay lip service to placate financial markets (cf. Padoa- 
Schioppa Kostoris 1996a).
Although most observers estimated that the reforms would not be sufficient in 
terms of re-balancing the system (Bank of Italy, Economic Bulletin, 1995; Castellino 
1996; Haman 1997), in terms of the long-term sustainability, equilibrium 
contribution rate and spending as a share of GDP, the reform was ambiguous. The 
Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1995a) projected that the ECR for private 
employees’ schemes (without adjustment of coefficients) would decline from 47.3 
per cent (1995) to 40.3 per cent (2010) and spending as share of GDP from 7.3 to 6.3 
per cent between 1995 and 2010. In the long term, the ECR would reach 47.7 per 
cent (2030) or 7.4 per cent of spending as a share of GDP and only decline
21 An immediate change to a contribution-based system would have been perfectly possible and was in
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afterwards. Relative to trend, which would have resulted in an ECR of 42.2 and 
expenditure of 6.5 per cent in 2010, this did not represent a major improvement in 
the medium term but would make expenditure more sustainable in the long term, and 
more specifically after 2030.
Accordingly, the Bank of Italy (Economic Bulletin 1995) took a rather critical 
view and considered it unlikely that private sector employees’ pension expenditure 
would be reduced by the reforms. On the whole, it seems likely that the reform 
helped to make future pension expenditure more sustainable (OECD Economic 
Surveys Italy 1996: 49-55; OECD Economic Syryeys Italy 20Q0; p3rt.n i; .Figure. 
4-3 above).
In sum, the Dini reform was important in two respects: it achieved savings and 
it increased the confidence of international financial markets in the Italian economy 
by signalling its willingness to tackle the long-term unsustainability of the pension 
system (Regini and Regalia 1997). The reform was the result of a government driven 
by international financial pressure and the need to achieve savings. Unions -  aware 
of their responsibility and the ultimate unsustainability of pension policy -  were 
willing to negotiate reform. However, the reform outcome reflected and was right 
from the beginning circumscribed by the presence of relatively powerful unions and 
a weak government. Even though Dini claimed that the reform was “the maximum 
we could exact from this country at this time” (The Economist, 12 August 1995), it 
would be more accurate to say that it was the maximum that a weak government in 
the presence of reasonable co-operative unions could achieve within the constraints 
of the Italian political system and pension regime. That greater savings would have 
been possible was demonstrated by changes introduced two years later by the Prodi 
government (cf. Section 4.4).22
As for the unions, they accepted reform in principle as a result of the difficult 
domestic situation and continued external pressure (Figure 4-3 above). However, it is 
also fair to say that in a certain sense they were pushed to accept reform by 
Berlusconi’s failed attempt to unilaterally impose reform. The fact that there were no 
reform proposals from the unions between 1992-94 indicates that the Berlusconi 
proposals were important in that they forced the unions to accept more fundamental
fact recommended by the 1997 Onofri Commission (see below).
22 EMU was not even mentioned once in a two-hour discussion of the Amato and Dini reforms with a 
CISL official, 12 October 2000, Rome.
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reform in principle: there certainly is a difference between agreeing that reform is 
necessary and the actual political readiness to achieve it. This was true for Italian 
trade unions in 1994-95. Braun (1996) has argued that the failure and success, 
respectively, of the Berlusconi and Dini reforms were due to the unions’ defence of 
their co-decision making power. The analysis provided here suggests that the unions 
were only willing to accept systemic change in exchange for the large-scale 
preservation of acquired rights. The importance unions attached to acquired rights 
reflects the relevance of the ‘lock-in’ and policy feedback effects discussed in 
Section 2.3 - and hence the institutional effects of previous policy choices (that is, an 
eamings-related pay-as-you-go system). To the extent that these effects - in 
combination with a weak government and strong unions - precluded a truly radical 
reform, any reform had to be gradual.
Although unions acknowledged the importance of the long-term financial 
viability of the pension system, and although they were in favour of greater equity in 
terms of contributions and benefits, they nonetheless had a vested interest in 
defending acquired rights. On the one hand, the trade unions insisted on the 
preservation of acquired rights (such as seniority pensions). On the other hand, they 
accepted their responsibility for the long-term sustainability of the pension regime. 
This is precisely what made the relatively radical transition from an eamings-related 
to a contribution-based system possible. Hence a government unable to impose 
reform unilaterally and the lock-in effect of previous policy choices explain pension 
policy reform in 1994-95 well.
4.3 The Centre-Left and Pension Reform: The Prodi Compromise
In May 1996 a centre-left majority with Prime Minister Prodi took office with the 
declared goal of securing Italian EMU membership (Parker 1997). The economic 
situation had stabilised in terms of the valuation of the lira, economic growth and 
budgetary consolidation (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1997). In November 1996 
Italy returned to the ERM (cf Chapter 6), the public deficit was decreasing and 
international markets had rediscovered their confidence in the Italian economy after 
the Dini pension reform - as reflected in long-term interest rates (Figure 4-3 above). 
In short, the threat of an imminent economic crisis had disappeared. After autumn 
1996 Italian macroeconomic policy was exclusively concerned with meeting the 
EMU budget deficit criteria.
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The Dini reform had determined that a review of the reform would not take 
place until 1998. Given that the INPS deficit was still widening, it was clear though 
that cuts in welfare spending and more specifically pension expenditure would be 
necessary at some point (Financial Times, 21 July 1997). The cabinet and the 
governing coalition were divided on further pension measures. As described in 
Chapter 3, in the initial mini-budget of 1996, pension policy remained untouched. 
Similarly, the 1997 budget did not contain any cuts in social welfare including 
pension spending (cf. Chapter 3). This was mainly the consequence of intra-majority 
division and the fact that the centre-left majority was hostile to. further pension 
expenditure cuts after two pension reforms. In summer 1996, for example, Labour 
Minister Tiziano Treu ruled out an overhaul of the reform (Financial Times, 4 July
1996).23 Similarly, Finance Minister Vincenzo Visco reiterated in November that the 
pension review should be conducted in 1998 rather than 1997 (Financial Times, 25 
November 1996). However, due to the need to introduce structural savings with the 
1998 budget and meet the sustainability criteria, Prodi - backed by Treasury Minister 
Ciampi - announced in October 1996 that the government wanted to bring forward a 
review of the country’s pension system to 1997 (Financial Times, 28 October 1996).
Trade union opposition to further reform was strong. The general secretary of 
the CGIL, Sergio Cofferati, stated that there was no basis for concluding that the 
1995 reform needed overhauling (Financial Times, 4 July 1996). The unions thus 
also opposed bringing forward the 1998 review of the pension reform agreed in 1995 
(Financial Times, 28 October 1996). When the Prodi government called for an early 
national debate on the pension system, this met with immediate criticism from the 
unions, which called the government’s stance on pensions ‘masochistic’ (Financial 
Times, 25 November 1996).
In early 1997 a government-sponsored report of the Commissione per VAnalisi 
della Compatibillita Macroeconomiche della Spesa Sociale (Commissione Onofri
1997) showed that significant savings could be achieved if: (1) the retirement age 
was raised; (2) early retirement pensions abolished; (3) the period of introducing the 
1995 reforms accelerated; and (4) schemes for public and private sector employees 
harmonised. This put further pressure on all involved actors in view of continued 
budgetary consolidation, for not only did the need to achieve structural cuts impose
23 Treu was quoted as follows: “It would be counter-productive to look at the reform again” (Financial
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itself but the report also showed that further cuts were technically feasible. 
Undoubtedly, part of the reason why the government sponsored this report was 
precisely to increase the pressure on other actors, raise public awareness and 
mobilise public opinion, and thus enhance its bargaining position.24 In combination 
with the continued need to achieve ‘sustainability’, this provided the government 
with a tactical advantage in the coming debate on pension reform.
In May 1997, projections showed that the deficit would reach 3.8 per cent of 
GDP. Given the need to meet the three-percent budget target, this increased the 
pressure to achieve further -  if possible structural - savings. In order to bring the 
deficit down to 2.8 per cent, at the end of May, the government proposed fiscal 
measures worth L25,000bn of which L6,000bn-L7,000bn in spending cuts were to 
come from pension reform {Financial Times, 19 June 1997, 22 May 1997). Once 
more, pension reform was a response to international pressure. This time it was not 
so much the pressure of international markets (Figure 4-3 above) but rather the need 
to meet the three-per-cent deficit target in 1998. In short, EMU membership was 
directly at stake and because of this the government was able to impose its agenda on 
antagonistic actors.
This was clearly demonstrated by, for example, CGIL’s change of position 
during the first half of 1997 when it declared that it would be ready to talk about 
reform, provided that all political parties backing the government endorsed reform 
{La Stampa, 17 April 1997; Financial Times, 14 May 1997) Whether this was a 
tactical measure in order to deflect growing pressure on the unions -  hoping that the 
RC would not accept any further pension cuts -  or not, the change of rhetoric shows 
the pressure prospective EMU membership put on domestic actors.
Nonetheless, in the context of the 1997 reform, the government encountered 
major opposition from both unions and its own (informal) ally, the RC, which made 
the negotiations between government and unions extremely difficult. Initially, 
seeking to reduce the various veto players’ hostility to welfare cuts, the 1998 budget 
vowed to promote ‘growth and jobs’, which was clearly aimed at heading off a 
serious clash over reform. Of the L25,000bn of fiscal tightening, only some 
L5,000bn of cuts in welfare spending were eventually to be introduced with the 1998
Times, 4 July 1996).
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budget, of which L4,500bn (as compared to the L6,000-7,000bn originally planned) 
were to come from reductions in pension outlays. More specifically, the Prodi 
government was eager to introduce the following modifications which mainly (but 
not exclusively) aimed at accelerating the phasing in of the Dini reform: (1) a new 
system for calculating pension benefits based on lifetime contributions to the state 
scheme rather than a (favourable) percentage of the final years’ salary; (2) the 
accelerated introduction of a higher minimum retirement age bringing forward the 
minimum age of 57 (or 40 years of contributions) from 2006 to 2002; and (3) a 
freeze on early retirement pensions of public sector employees...................................
When the government introduced the finance bill in late September,
government and unions were still negotiating the details of the pension package
(.Financial Times, 29 September 1997). Despite its readiness to negotiate and 
compromise, the government encountered stiff opposition from the RC which 
threatened to withdraw parliamentary support (.Financial Times, 29 September
1997); at the same time, unions while not against reform in principle were opposing 
the type of large-scale reform envisaged by the government (Financial Times, 2 
October 1997). Things came to a head between the government and the RC when, 
with a vote of confidence on the budget proposal scheduled in early October and
with the government’s refusal to make significant changes to the 1998 budget
(including pension cuts), the RC announced that it would vote against the budget 
(Financial Times, 3 October 1997; Legrenzi 1998).
This led to the resignation of PM Prodi and the threat of new elections. 
However, due to strong pressure on the RC leadership from the media, public 
opinion, the rank-and-file and even the unions, the RC returned to the negotiating 
table and finally reached a compromise. In addition to the introduction of a 35-hour 
week, the RC obtained the exemption of blue-collar workers from the tightening of 
seniority pension rules - costing an estimated L500bn in 1998 (Financial Times, 15 
October 1997).
After reaching an agreement with the RC on pension measures, the government 
had to win the approval of the trade unions in order to guarantee a safe passage 
through parliament (Financial Times, 29 October 1997). The CISL under D’Antoni
24 This is consistent with the view that the creation of a government-sponsored expert commission that 
had been asked to produce a proposal for a definitive reform o f the pension reform presented a change 
from a consensual towards a more technocratic style of policy-making (see Radaelli 2001).
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was most strongly opposing the reform of early retirement pensions, which was not 
surprising given that the CISL was particularly strongly represented in the public 
sector. The ensuing discussion revolved precisely around the issue of seniority 
pensions. A final agreement was reached in early November, aiming to achieve 
4,100bn in savings, and just in time to be introduced with the 1998 budget (Financial 
Times, 3 November 1997). Eventually the reform contained the following measures 
(D’Ercole and Terribile 1998):
• acceleration of the gradual harmonisation of public and private pension regimes 
(eligibility requirements, benefits and so on)
• , increases in pension contributions paid by self-employed
• a more rapid increase in the minimum retirement age for seniority pensions
• temporary stop of access to new pensions
• temporary suspension of price indexation of highest pensions
However, important parts of the original reform plan -  including the some of
the proposals made by the Onofri Commission - fell victim to compromise as a result
of the unions’ defence of their members’ ‘acquired rights’. In addition to the 
exemption of blue-collar workers from some pension measures, a revision of the 
calculation mechanism was not achieved. Overall, the accelerated phasing-in of the 
Dini reform could have been quicker (Commissione Onofri 1997). The limited 
acceleration reflected the Italian government’s need to accommodate domestic 
opposition. This resulted in short-termist policies and costly medium-term 
concessions.
The Prodi government did not achieve the initially intended structural 
reductions in long-term pension spending, even if it did achieve some structural cuts. 
The immediate financial impact was very modest, especially when compared to the 
previous reforms. In terms of its financial effect, the Prodi reform only achieved 
L4,100bn worth of savings in the 1998 budget. The pension savings amounted to 
about 0.22 per cent of GDP (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1998). The 
L4,100bn of savings in the 1998 budget, for example, are less than half of what the 
government set out to achieve in early 1997 (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000: 257). The 
reform was the ‘bare minimum’ to ensure EMU membership (Financial Times, 4 
November 1997).
In conclusion, the limited degree of the Prodi reforms was the result of a 
stronger-than-usual but still relatively limited executive strength: the government had 
to take into account the opposition and interests of other actors such as parties of the
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majority, the RC and the unions. The negotiation of the reform showed that reform 
was not unchallenged inside the cabinet. The reform was only possible after it was 
more or less impossible to avoid it, given the need to keep the 1998 budget deficit 
within the three-per-cent range. Even then the government had to make important 
concessions to win approval. At the same time, potential veto players had to accept 
reform in principle as the government coalition (at the beginning of 1997) and trade 
unions did (during the first half of 1997); or the acceptance was forced upon them (as 
in the case of the RC in October 1997).
Undoubtedly, it was impossible for major actors to reject pension reform 
outright in a situation where EMU membership was at stake. This obviously also 
reflected the extent and depth of support for EMU membership among the Italian 
public as well as among major societal and political actors. This also provides 
evidence for the continued importance of the weak government and lock-in effect of 
with regard to pension reform despite the presence of a vincolo estemo. The pension 
reform under Prodi clearly showed the importance of external pressure, and more 
specifically the need to reduce the budget deficit in view of meeting the Maastricht 
deficit criteria. But it also demonstrated the necessity for the government to tread 
carefully and shows that the government (and the prime minister) enjoyed only a 
temporary-tactical rather than a longer-lasting-strategic advantage. However, this 
temporary-tactical advantage was just about sufficient to overcome opposition to 
further pension cuts. Counterfactually, it is difficult to imagine how an Italian 
government could have achieved reform in the absence of the threat of EMU 
exclusion.
Once more, the gradual character of the reform and the issues of conflict 
clearly demonstrate the importance of the institutional characteristics of the Italian 
pension policy-making regime: a weak government and a strong lock-in effect, due 
to the existence of relatively influential trade unions and the issue of acquired rights, 
made more substantial reform practically impossible.
4.4 Conclusion: Domestic Institutions and Pension Reform
First of all, there is no doubt that pension reform contributed to Italy meeting the 
convergence criteria through relative to trend reduced pension spending and deficits. 
As described, the Amato reform led to Lll,000bn (or roughly 0.8 per cent of GDP)
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in savings in 1993, the Dini reform to L10,000bn (or 0.6 per cent) in 1996, and the 
Prodi reform to about L4,000 (0.2 per cent) in 1997. All reforms were expected to 
bring about similar savings in the following years. Through their structural effect, the 
various measures also resulted in lower-to-trend spending in subsequent years 
(Figure 4-4 below). Second, by making future pensions spending more sustainable 
and thus calming international investors, pension reform also decreased the pressure 
on the exchange rate and especially interest rates and hence fiscal policy (Figure 4-3 
above).
In the late 1990s, the Ministero del Tesoro (1998: 27-29) estimated that 
without pension reform pension spending as share of GDP would have reached 23.2 
per cent (2040) before eventually declining. By contrast, with the reforms of the 
1990s, it is now expected to peak at 15.8 per cent in 2032. This has put the future of 
Italian budgetary policy on a more sustainable path (c f  also ISTAT 1998: 87-90). In 
other words, pension expenditure is poised to increase slightly before it stabilises at 
around 16 per cent of GDP. Although some forecasts project rising pension outlays, 
it is clear that relative to trend the three pension reforms made the system more 
sustainable and made a considerable contribution to medium- term fiscal 
consolidation.
Figure 4-4 Pension Expenditure Projections
(as a share of GDP)
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No doubt, by Italian standards, the changes of the pension system were 
unprecedented (<cf Annex C).
In judging the current situation, the importance of the past reforms needs to be 
recognised. Available studies point to a significant improvement in the underlying 
situation. Treasury forecasts suggest that the increase in pension spending in the 
absence of reforms would have reached as much as 25 per cent of GDP around 2030.
The increase in taxes necessary to balance the generational accounts on the basis of the 
pre-Amato system would have been 160 per cent rather than the current 5 per cent 
(OECD Economic Surveys Italy 2000: 113).
While it is certainly fair to say that the reform represented a major 
achievement, several scholars are sceptical of the long-term sustainability of the new 
pension regime.25 A number of scholars tend to regard each of the three successive 
pension reforms as nothing more than short-term measures designed to confront the 
most pressing fiscal problems (Haman 1997; Gronchi 1996; Faustini 1996; Zaccaria 
1998: 198; OECD 1996b; for variety of opinions see various contributions in Padoa- 
Schioppa Kostoris 1996a). In the medium term, and despite three reforms, estimated 
state financing of the pension deficit was still bound to increase from 3.9 (1993) to 
4.2 (2010) (cf. Ministero del Tesoro 1998; Bank of Italy, Economic Bulletin, 1998: 
36-43). Other simulations take an even less optimistic view of future pension 
expenditure (cf Roseveare et al. 1996; OECD 1996b). Under the baseline scenario 
(excluding the Prodi reform), these simulations forecast a rise in Italian public 
pension spending from 13.3 per cent in 1995 to 20.3 per cent of GDP in 2030 
(OECD 1996b: 38; for more detailed discussion in a comparative perspective see 
Section 7.2). Leaving the question of the long-term sustainability aside (a problem 
with which other stronger policy-making regimes such as the French and German 
ones are confronted as well), relative to trend the reforms had a major impact and 
were unprecedented in Italian pension policy-making (for a comparative perspective 
see Chapter 7).
25 Note that the assessment by the OECD Economic Survey is exclusively based on Italian government 
projections that were published in the context of Italy’s bid to become an EMU member (Ministero 
del Tesoro 1998; for updated projections see Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1999, 200.0)). This is 
not the place to evaluate these projections. However, given the continued criticism of actors such as 
the Bank of Italy, the conclusion that the Italian pension system will not need to undergo further 
reform should be evaluated carefully, especially since the tendency of the Italian government to 
downplay long-term problems is well known (cf. Section 2.3). -
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If this shows that pension reform made an important contribution to 
macroeconomic consolidation and hence to meeting the Maastricht criteria, the 
question from a political point of view is: how were the reforms of the pension 
system possible given unfavourable domestic policy-making institutions? A variety 
of explanations has been proposed, the majority of which point out the importance of 
corporatist decision-making and ‘political exchange’ (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000; 
Braun 1996; Castellino 1996; Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000). None of them 
systematically includes the domestic-institutional conditions or ‘rules of the game’ 
under which reform was achieved. With the help of the concepts discussed in Section 
2.3, the question is how the traditional obstacles to pension reform were overcome, 
namely, (1) the insufficient strength of the government, (2) strong unions acting as 
defenders of status quo, and (3) the lock-in effect of a pay-as-you-go pension system.
As has been confirmed in a recent comparative study of welfare reform in 
European countries, the government’s capacity to intervene in welfare policy is a 
crucial variable in achieving successful welfare reform (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 
2000). In the Italian case, an institutionally weak government was able to increase its 
autonomy and power, primarily as a result of external pressure. This made it possible 
to push both the unions and parliament to accept reform as well as to overcome 
traditional veto points. More specifically, the threat of a financial crisis as well as the 
concern for the long-run viability of the pension system in 1992 and 1995 and the 
need to meet the convergence criteria in 1997 strengthened the position of the 
executive relative to such veto players as unions, parliament and majority parties.
The history of pension reform demonstrated this. Relative to parliament and 
intra-executive dissent, the Amato and Dini government were able to act relatively 
autonomously. The Amato government was facing a major potential financial crisis 
and was able to push through reforms by way of a delegation law and subsequent 
decrees. While the imminence of crisis allowed the Amato government to impose 
reform, Dini had to reach an agreement with the unions in the context of continued 
economic pressure as reflected in interest and exchange rates developments. Thus 
both governments were also able to overcome otherwise likely parliamentary 
obstruction. By contrast, the Prodi government was to a much greater extent 
constrained to take into account intra-coalitional preferences and accommodate RC 
interests. But again, international pressure (represented by the convergence criteria) 
was a necessary condition both to prevail over domestic veto players and make intra-
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coalitional actors accept pension reform. The October 1997 crisis is just the most 
striking example how far the executive had to go in order to make veto players 
accept pension reform. However, the contrasting case of the failure of the 1994 
Berlusconi reform shows that the government’s bargaining position was only 
relatively stronger and that veto players inside and outside government were able to 
block reform.
Contrary to the government, the relative position of the unions - as the most 
influential defenders of the status quo - was weakened through external constraints 
and they were thus constrained to accept responsibility for the financial viability of 
the Italian economy and later Italy’s success or failure regarding EMU membership. 
In the face of external pressures, the unions had no choice but to accept reform in 
principle. Thus they were willing to accept reform under a certain number of 
conditions (negotiated reform, greater equity between public and private sector, 
preferential treatment of the unions’ main constituency and so on). As described 
above, the reform outcomes strongly reflect the influential position of trade unions in 
the policy-making system (that is, formal institutions) as well as the character of the 
pension regime itself (that is, acquired rights).
To characterise pension reform as an exchange whereby the unions accepted 
reform for future benefits (Ferrera and Gualmini 1999; Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000) 
seems incorrect. However, the future benefits were negligible at least in material 
terms. The few available resources that were allocated to employment creation and 
the Mezzogiomo through the agreements and legislation concerning Prodi’s Patto 
per il Lavoro and D’Alema’s Patto Natale (let alone their poor implementation so 
far) cannot be characterised as an exchange in terms of current sacrifices against 
future benefits. Essentially, Italian unions found themselves in an extremely 
defensive position and accepted the inevitable need to realise retrenchment in the 
face of international pressures or otherwise accept responsibility for a major financial 
crisis and EMU exclusion.
Nonetheless, the unions were potentially able to obstruct reform and thus shape 
its outcomes. While Amato pushed through pension reforms in the context of a 
national emergency, Berlusconi failed to realise his reform package under difficult
26 As suggested above, union preferences were strongly influenced by ‘internal’ distributional politics, 
notably by the fact that a considerable share of trade union members were retired (or about to retire) 
and were thus benefiting (or about to benefit) from acquired rights.
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financial circumstances. Unable to push through a pension against the opposition of 
unions, the government was henceforth forced to accept the limits imposed upon 
reforms by unions. Both Dini and Prodi were forced to reach an agreement that was 
acceptable to the unions. In short, pension reform outcomes were determined by 
domestic as much as external factors, while the possibility of achieving reform 
emerged as a result of external constraints.
The importance of the institutionalist argument is also reflected in the 
following observations. First, the limited degree of reform in terms of potential 
financial savings, the extremely gradual transition period and the strong emphasis on 
temporary measures supports the institutionalist claims. Second, the gradualism of 
the reform was not only reflected in the fact that there were three reforms in only five 
years. It was primarily reflected in the long-transition periods with which certain 
changes were phased in (such as a higher retirement age in 1992 or the contribution- 
based system in 1995). The lock-in effect of a pay-as-you-go system limited the 
speed with which a transition can be phased in. Nonetheless, the fact that eventually 
an acceleration of the phasing-in of the Dini reforms was politically and 
economically feasible (seniority pensions under Prodi in 1997; also retirement age 
under Berlusconi in 1994) shows that the gradualism reflected political resistance 
and limited executive authority. Even though reforms in other countries were also 
gradual and piecemeal (cf. II Sole 24 Ore, 23 October 2000), many countries were 
already characterised by stricter eligibility requirements and less dramatic pressure 
on pension spending (Brindisi 2000), thus potentially reducing the relative pressure 
to achieve reform. If Italy was not able to achieve a more sustainable policy despite 
greater external pressure, then this has to be attributed to the domestic factors 
discussed above.
Interestingly, in a comparative perspective, the 1995 reform was strikingly 
innovative and achieved what had been impossible in the preceding 25 years 
(Regalia and Regini 1997; Faustini 1996: 22). Especially the shift from an eamings- 
related to a contribution-based pension system represented much greater institutional 
innovation than anything that place in France and Germany during the same period 
where there was no shift towards a contribution-based system (see Chapter 7). 
Nonetheless, even this innovation had a limited effect because of the long transition 
period negotiated for phasing in the new system. This innovation is easily 
understandable. As a policy-making system with a low capacity for long-term policy,
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‘benefit gradualism’ and ‘pension innovation’ were the only way to tackle long-term 
imbalances as they left the current situation essentially unchanged. Hence policy 
choice was restricted by the potential short-term effects of reform and by the inability 
of the executive to impose short-term costs on opposing groups.
In short, to the extent that the pension reforms were possible and to which they 
were successful, they were the result of international pressure; to the extent that the 
reforms were limited with regard to what could have been achieved, they reflected 
the institutional limits a weak executive faced in introducing more wide-ranging 
pension reforms. Pension reform outcomes were co-determined by the various 
institutional characteristics of the policy-making arena, while the possibility of 
successful reform depended on the vincolo estemo. This allowed weak governments 
to take decisive action in tackling the pension problem and more often than not 
forced other actors to co-operate.
What Cazzola (1995) observed with regard to the reforms between 1992 and 
1995, namely that “i govemi politici non erano in grado di assumersi la 
responsabilita, in primo luogo perche non vi erano le condizioni di una maggioranza 
parlamentare sufficientemente adeguata [...] a sopportame Vimpatto sociale” (p.
132), reflects at best a part of the truth. Given the relative strength of unions and the 
relative weakness of the executive, the limited reform resulted from the institutional 
features of the Italian system of pension policy-making rather than an incapacity that 
resulted from partisan-political contingencies.
27 “The political governments were not able to assume responsibility, in the first place because the 
conditions of a sufficiently large parliamentary majority, capable of withstanding the social backlash, 
did not exist.”
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5 THE POLITICS OF WAGE RESTRAINT
It is ironic that at a time when incomes policies are being 
abandoned in their Scandinavian homeland, they are being revived 
in Italy, a country with none of the institutional supports or 
legacies once deemed essential for such arrangements to succeed 
(Locke 1995a: 194)
Wage policy is a major factor influencing the level of inflation in an economy. If 
wage increases are above productivity increases, the price level in an economy will 
rise (so-called cost-push inflation). Hence a policy of wage restraint - imposed or 
agreed - can effectively contribute to lowering the inflation rate and improving the 
international competitiveness of an economy. Finally, wage restraint in the public 
sector also helps curb public expenditure and can thus have a positive effect on 
public finances as well as on price stability.
Historically, Italy suffered from relatively high inflation, mainly as a result of 
inadequate wage bargaining institutions and a weak government unable to control 
public wage expenditure (cf. Section 2.4). In the 1990s, Italy was able to overcome 
all these obstacles and successfully implemented a co-ordinated policy of wage 
restraint. This strongly contributed to Italy’s good inflation and interest rate 
performance and thus helped Italy meet the Maastricht monetary criteria (Presidenza 
del Consiglio dei Ministri 1998).
The discussion in Chapter 2 demonstrated that Italian wage policy contributed 
to Italy’s comparatively poor inflation performance. It also showed that these 
problems were the result of institutional deficiencies. First, while the 1980s and early 
1990s were characterised by an ‘implicit’ incomes policy in the private sector (due to 
the external constraint), the confederal unions were nonetheless divided and had 
limited control over rank-and-file. In order to implement a policy of co-ordinated 
wage moderation, union confederations -  in addition to overcoming their division - 
would have to assert control over lower bargaining units in order to prevent wage 
drift at the company and firm level. Second, the above-average levels of inflation 
during the second half of the 1980s were largely the result of the government’s 
inability to control public wages,1 which in turn was related to various institutional
1 Public sector wage policy was important with regard to macroeconomic policy: public employment 
as a share of total employment in the 1990s was 23 per cent; public wage expenditure as a share of 
total public expenditure was 31 per cent (net of interest) (OECD 1998b: 11). Hence the inability to
164
weaknesses: the increasing fragmentation of trade unions in the public sector; a 
weak, accommodating government; and regulations encouraging union 
fragmentation and militancy. Third, the wage indexation mechanism was a problem 
in that it decreased wage flexibility and made disinflation harder to achieve.
This chapter is concerned with how these institutional deficiencies were 
overcome and neutralised. First, I analyse the institutional reforms of public and 
private wage policy-making during 1992-93. Then the policy and politics of wage 
moderation in both the private and public sectors between 1992 and 1997 are 
discussed. The final section examines why institutional reform was possible and to 
what extent it contributed to disinflation.
5.1 Reform o f the Public Sector Wage Bargaining Regime, 1990-93
The Italian public sector wage determination system has been referred to by such 
terms as ‘spoils system of pluralistic pressure’ (Lange and Regini 1989) and 
‘distributive collusion’. This system pampered public sector employees in order to 
create party-political support for the government (Regalia and Regini 1998: 488). 
Reforms during the 1980s did not change this. After negative experiences with the 
‘legislative’ regime (characterised by parliamentary authority over public wage 
determination, which tended to be uncoordinated due to the inability and 
unwillingness of the executive to control parliament) and even worse experiences 
with the ‘mixed’ regime2 (where parliamentary intervention was accompanied by 
‘clientelistic’ bargaining between the executive - and more specifically ministers - 
and their respective bureaucracies), reforms in the early 1990s introduced a 
‘bargained’ regime, whose characteristics were described in Section 2.4.
A first major change to the system of public employment relations occurred in 
1990 and hence well before TEU.3 After previous attempts had failed, a major reform
control public wage policy had important inflationary effects for the economy as a whole. In fact, 
while in the 1970s the average public worker earned about the same as a worker in the private sector, 
by the end of 1980s the former earned about 25-30 per cent more than the latter (Lucifora 1999). This 
shows the extent to which public sector wage policy was out of line with the (exposed) private sector.
2 In fact, the introduction of bargaining rights into public sector wage bargaining in 1983 contributed 
to the ‘regime of double protection’. It thus indirectly contributed to public sector driven inflation. 
Moreover, parliament was still able to interfere in the wage setting process through legislative 
intervention.
3 Although the 1990 reform took place before February 1992, it is discussed due to its relevance with 
respect to subsequent policy outcomes and in order to demonstrate the importance of international 
pressure with respect to the 1992-93 reforms.
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was achieved with the introduction of law no. 146 of June 1990 that regulated strikes 
in ‘essential public services’. Essentially this law required public sector trade unions 
and employers to agree on the level of public service to be maintained during strikes, 
the rules concerning early notification of strikes, the length and forms of work 
stoppages, and the definition of ‘essential services’. The law introduced penalties in 
case of the violation of these rules and even threatened to deprive groups of their 
collective bargaining rights in case they disrespected the rules.
The purpose of reform was to limit the negative consequences of the ‘regime of 
double protection’ in both the public sector and public utilities. In other words, it was 
meant to limit the bargaining power of especially occupation-based unions whose 
strike actions tended to have highly disruptive effects (for example, air control). To 
monitor compliance with the law, the Commissione di Garanzia dell’Attuazione della 
Legge sullo Sciopero nei Servizi Pubblici Essenziali was created, consisting of nine 
experts nominated by parliament and the president (Napoli 1998: 84-93; cf. 
Salomone 1991: 51-52).
A second major reform took place during the Amato and Ciampi prime 
ministerships in 1992-93. The July 1992 agreement intended to bring about greater 
convergence in terms of pay determination in the public and private sectors (Lucifora 
1999). The so-called ‘privatisation’ of public employment sought to bring the public 
sector in line with the private one in an attempt to bring public spending under 
control and to enhance efficiency (Napoli and Alessi 1996; Della Cananea 1997; 
Brunetta and Tronti 1993, 1998; OECD 1994c: appendix). Apart from increasing the 
efficiency of public services through changes of management guidelines, the 
‘privatisation’ also brought about considerable change in the framework of public 
wage determination. The reforms relevant to wage determination were the following.
First, legislative changes in 1993 determined that public employment relations 
should entirely be regulated by collective bargaining, while the government retained 
unilateral pay determination for some parts of the public administration. Unilateral 
pay determination was retained for higher-level diplomats, state lawyers, judges, 
university teachers, the police corps and the armed forces -  or a total of 0.6 million 
public employees. For the majority of public employees (3 million or 20 per cent of 
dependent employees) wages were to be determined through collective bargaining, 
excluding the privatised state railways and postal service (Bordogna et al. 1999: 96). 
Second, the reform foresaw that both the basic pay for different grades and the
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maximum amount that can be added to basic pay through the negotiations taking 
place at the decentralised or local level should be determined at the national level. 
This was meant to make the system of wage determination very centralised in the 
public sector and potentially increased executive control over public pay.
Another important change concerned the bargaining agents. The reform created 
an independent agency, the Agenzia per la Rappresentanza Negoziale delle 
Pubbliche Amministrazioni (ARAN), which negotiated on behalf of the employer, 
that is, central and sub-national governments and administrations, but had to follow 
government guidelines negotiated between unions and the government at the central 
level (Bordogna 1998). This was meant to do with away with ‘clientelistic’ 
bargaining (as represented by ministerial delegations) as well as to protect public 
wage negotiations from undue intervention by parliament or administrative courts. In 
short:
The creation of an agency for compulsory representation of public administrations in 
collective negotiations at the national level (Aran) replaced a multiplicity o f parties that 
previously intervened in the bargaining process, and helped to insulate collective 
negotiations from the political and parliamentary arena -  at least to a much greater 
degree than in the past (Bordogna et al. 1999: 109).
According to the 1993 legislation, ARAN was to follow the guidelines laid 
down by the minister of public service. However, the 1992 agreement stipulated that 
the government link public sector pay to anticipated inflation (OECD 1994c: 
appendix).
A final important change was the result of the July 1993 agreement. The main 
trade union confederations and the government agreed that sectoral national 
collective agreements were to have a four-year duration with respect to normative 
issues, and a two-year duration for pay issues (Bordogna et al. 1999: 116) and that 
only performance-related pay would be discussed at the lower level. Moreover, only 
those unions that signed sectoral nation-wide agreements were recognised as 
representative in the relevant sector (including the confederations with which they 
are affiliated).4 Sectoral agreements were to aim to preserve the real wage.
4 Similar to the private sector, the introduction of a bargaining unit at the decentralised level (so-called 
rappresentanze sindacali unitarie [RSU]; for a detailed discussion c f  Section 5.3) was aimed at 
strengthening the confederal unions. In order to have the right to sign a national agreement, a union 
needs to gain five per cent of a combined average of RSU seats and votes. Even though these reforms 
led to a strengthening of the confederations (Interview with CGIL official, 11 October 2000, Rome),
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To summarise, from an institutional point of view, the reforms resulted in 
greater centralisation and potentially greater executive control over public pay 
determination. The reform certainly strengthened the executive’s potential control 
over wage expenditure and wage increases as a result of the exclusion of parliament 
and clientelistic ministers. The commitment to achieve real wage preservation at the 
sectoral level and to residual bargaining at the decentralised level committed the 
government (and the trade unions) to a policy of wage restraint. Like the French and 
German systems of public pay determination, the Italian system is among the most 
centralised (Perotti etal. 1998: 44; OECD 1997a; Dell’Aringa and Lanfranchi 1999).
As a result of the reforms, Italian public pay is negotiated in eight functional 
sub-sectors; levels and wage increases for all sectors are decided at the central level 
between unions and the government. The only minor element of decentralisation is 
the existence of performance-related pay, which however - at least formally - is 
under rigid control of central level (Dell’Aringa and Lanfranchi 1999: 38). Hence the 
Italian public sector wage bargaining regime can best be described as a regime of 
‘controlled decentralisation’5 within which the government possesses strong formal 
means to control public wages.
The importance of the reforms is hence obvious. Most importantly, the reforms 
made bargaining more centralised. The creation of ARAN reduced the number of 
veto points. Moreover, the institutionalisation of a decentralised level of bargaining 
potentially increased the strength of confederal unions relative to the cobas. The 
question is then how these reforms were possible in a political system where the 
executive is weak and societal interests and parliament are usually strong enough to 
obstruct change?
The 1990 law on the regulation of strikes in the public sector was the outcome 
of widespread agreement between confederal unions and the government (Gazzetta 
Ufficiale, no. 137, 14 June 1990). Actually the legislation very much reflected the 
interests of the three confederations whose proposals on this matter strongly 
influenced the legislative process and the final legislative outcome (Treu 1991: 191). 
The union confederations actively demanded that the system of self-regulation based 
on an informal agreement be substituted by a system of legally binding rules in the
this reform -  contrary to the private sector -  was of no importance with regard wage restraint in the 
public sector during 1992-97, as the first elections were not held until 1999.
Term by ARAN official, 20 September 2000, Rome.
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public utility sector (including postal service, banks, transport and so on).6 While the 
introduction of self-regulation in 1983 primarily reflected the confederations’ 
concern about their public image, the conversion of these rules into law had the 
explicit goal of extending the rules to the autonomi and cobas, which tended not to 
respect the rules. The re-assertion of control - stemming from the weakening of the 
non-confederal groups’ bargaining power - was also driven by the wish to exercise 
greater control over wage bargaining in the public sector (Locke and Baccaro 1996: 
296).7 To this extent, the reform reflected the confederal unions’ growing concern 
over national competitiveness and macroeconomic stability.
The government’s interest in restricting strikes was even more obvious. 
Regardless of the potential clientelistic benefits political factions might derive from 
allowing anti-confederal groups to thrive, it was in the government’s interest to 
strengthen its control over public sector wage expenditure and reduce the number of 
disruptions due to public sector strikes. These strikes were not only embarrassing, 
but they also made control over public wages - and indirectly over macroeconomic 
policy - difficult to achieve, not least because of the knock-on effect of public wage 
agreement in other sectors.
While the 1990 reform was the result of ‘negotiated’ legislation, the 1993 
reform was characterised by greater unilateral executive action. The 1993 reform of 
wage bargaining arrangements and the acceptance of wage restraint in the public 
sector coincided with a major political and economic crisis (Della Cananea 1997). 
For the government the 1993 reform represented a means to reduce public 
expenditure and centralise decision-making and the bargaining process. The 
emergency situation helped strengthen the executive and neutralise opposition within 
the government coalition as well as from parliament. It also increased the power of 
the executive vis-a-vis trade unions. Having obtained a delegation law which foresaw 
the re-ordering of employment relations in the public sector, the government was in a 
position of strength vis-a-vis the union confederations, cobas and so on (cf. Section 
3.2). In short, while previously executive weakness and a resulting unwillingness and 
inability to stir up confrontation with ‘disruptive’ unions and parliament had impeded
6 Interview with CGIL official, 27 October 2000, Rome. By enhancing the power of the Commissione 
di Garanzia, law no. 83 of 2000 continues this logic and indicates the importance attributed to it by 
the confederal unions.
7 Member of the Commissione di Garanzia, 6 September 2000, Rome.
169
reform in this area, the crisis forced and allowed the executive to act forcefully and 
overcome potential opposition (cf. Carrieri and Tatarelli 1997: chapter 4).
Similar to the 1990 legislation on essential public services, the confederal 
unions acknowledged in principle the need to align the public sector to the private 
sector in order to avoid the problems of the 1980s as well as the need to strengthen 
their position vis-a-vis non-confederal groups in the public sector. Thus, the 
acceptance on the part of the trade unions that excessive public wage policy was a 
problem for both competitiveness and public finances led to a real re-orientation of 
trade unions’ attitudes and the acceptance that wage moderation in the public sector 
can help achieve (or at least contribute to) lower inflation and other macroeconomic 
goals, such as competitiveness and stable public finances. This re-orientation of 
strategies and the change in attitudes reflected the increasing acknowledgement of 
the importance of the external constraint, that is, the need to converge on European 
standards and avoid a potential financial crisis. The guarantee to maintain real wages 
within the new bargaining framework is what made wage restraint acceptable to 
unions.8
There were differences in terms of the degree of support these reforms enjoyed. 
For example, the CGIL leadership was more strongly in favour of the reform than the 
CISL leadership, which largely reflected the greater presence of the CISL-affiliated 
unions in the public sector and the greater importance of the GGIL-affiliated unions 
in the internationally exposed manufacturing sector. But generally, both unions 
accepted the underlying necessity to bring the public sector in line with the private 
one in order to favour international competitiveness, domestic employment and 
financial stability. In short, the trade unions accepted the need for reform even if 
there were some objections to certain parts of the decree.9 As for the cobas, they 
were not a party to the negotiations of the reforms of the early 1990s and were hence 
unable to prevent an agreement between the government and the confederal unions.
This clearly demonstrates that institutional reform was mainly driven by 
international pressure. The existence of an external constraint in the form of a hard 
currency policy and in the context of the increasing openness of the Italian economy 
forced the private sector to adapt. However, due to the institutional separation 
between private manufacturing and the public service sector, the latter had no
8 Interview with CGIL official, 11 October 2000, Rome.
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incentive to pursue a policy of wage moderation. With the government unable to 
resist pressure from public sector workers and unions, this situation became 
increasingly incompatible with an international context where above-average 
inflation resulted in decreased competitiveness and where devaluation was 
increasingly perceived to be a short-term instrument that could potentially trigger a 
financial crisis rather than a means to restore competitiveness in the long run. In 
short, the leadership of the confederal unions, acknowledging the existence of this 
external constraint, accepted the need for increased macroeconomic control.10 This is 
not say however that change was easy or went unchallenged within the union 
movement.
Counterfactually, in the absence of an externally induced economic crisis, it is 
hard to imagine that, first, the Italian government would have been able to gain a 
position of strength and push through wide-ranging changes of public sector labour 
relations and, second, that the unions would have relatively willingly accepted the 
wide-ranging reform of public sector wage setting. At the very least, union-internal 
opposition to reforms would have been much stronger and would have probably 
prevented the confederal leadership from adopting an, on the whole, rather co­
operative attitude. In this sense, the emergency situation was crucial in that it put the 
executive in a position of strength and the unions on the defensive - especially those 
groups within the union movement opposed to reform.
Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish contingent (that is, the emergency 
situation) from underlying structural (that is, the consequences of inflationary wage 
settlements in the public sector - and the subsequent loss of macroeconomic control - 
and international competitiveness) factors that induced the reform of public sector 
wage bargaining. In principle, the unions were in favour of reform and accepted the 
need for wage moderation in the public sector (as a result of structural, long-term 
constraints). In practice, an outright crisis was necessary for the government to take 
decisive action and for the unions to desist from forcing upon the government 
potentially acrimonious negotiations (and - not least of all - to prevail over union- 
internal opposition).
The crucial question with regard to Italian macroeconomic convergence is 
whether and why these reforms had the intended effect in terms of controlling public
9 Interview with CGIL official, 11 October 2000, Rome.
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sector wages and public wage expenditure. Before tackling this question, the 
institutional reforms of private sector labour relations, which were an integral part of 
the reform of the wage policy-making regime, are discussed.
5.2 Reform o f the Private Sector Wage Bargaining Regime, 1992-93
Similar to public sector labour relations, wage bargaining in the private sector 
underwent considerable change during the first half of the 1990s. Agreements in 
1992 and 1993 between unions, employers and the government led to substantial 
change of private sector bargaining institutions. Indeed, together with the reforms in 
the public sector, these reforms aimed at establishing the conditions for a national 
incomes policy. The reforms sought
to reduce industrial conflict in the service sector, rationalise labour relations in the 
public sector, restructure collective bargaining arrangements at both the national and 
company levels, and re-establish tripartite, neo-corporatist ‘concertation’ between the 
social partners at the national level (Locke and Baccaro 1996: 290).
In what follows, the main institutional changes and the question of how these 
changes were politically possible are discussed. The 31 July 1992 agreement foresaw 
a programme of inflation reduction, the abolition of the scala mobile as well as a 
suspension of company-level bargaining in 1993 (Locke and Baccaro 1996).11 
Except for the abolition of the wage indexation mechanism, the 1992 agreement did 
not result in any permanent institutional change in the private sector. By contrast, a 
second agreement, reached on 3 July 1993, led to considerable institutional reform. 
The core element of the agreement was an incomes policy based on a joint but 
autonomous commitment to peg wage increases to the expected inflation rate in 
order to achieve currency stability and inflation convergence with other European 
countries (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1993). On a more narrowly defined 
institutional level, the government, employers and unions agreed on the following 
features of the new bargaining regime:
(1) introduction of a four-year national contract to regulate labour relations; wage 
increases were to be kept within the projected inflation rate and reviewed every two 
years in light of effective inflation;
10 Interview with ARAN official, 20 September 2000, Rome.
11 It also included the non-renewal of civil service contracts until the end of 1993.
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(2) individual companies were to raise wages only if they have made profits, and on the 
basis of productivity increases;
(3) government, employers and unions were to meet twice a year to define common 
objectives on inflation, GNP and employment levels;12
(4) once a national contract has expired - and in the period in which a new one is being 
negotiated - only limited increases will be allowed to compensate for inflation;
(5) The scala mobile was definitely abolished.
A separate inter-confederal agreement provided for the creation of the 
rappresentanze sindacali unitarie (RSUs). Compared to the pre-reform situation, 
which was characterised by a great heterogeneity of workplace representation, the 
RSU were to be recognised by all three confederal unions and the employers as 
legitimate bargaining agents at the company- and plant level (Regini and Regalia
1997). The agreement regarding the RSU also established electoral rules according to 
which two thirds of worker representatives were to be elected by all the workers and 
one third appointed by those higher-level industry union organisations that signed 
national-sectoral agreements. This was clearly aimed at weakening and 
delegitimising the cobas’ claim to represent specific factions and was thus intended 
to increase the relative power of confederal unions. In fact, the reform resulted in the 
domination of confederal unions over company-level representation and hence the 
re-assertion of control over the rank-and-file.13
This brief overview of changes to the bargaining framework suggests that the 
importance of the 1993 agreement lies precisely in overcoming those institutional 
obstacles that had thus far made general wage moderation difficult. The re-assertion 
of control over the RSU would enable the confederal unions to gain loyalty of and 
greater control over plant-level bargaining and thus allow the unions to ‘live up’ to 
the agreements reached at the central and sectoral level; the agreement of all three 
union confederations to accept the content and framework of an incomes policy 
lessened inter-confederal competition; the agreement to abolish wage indexation
12 Every year in May and June, prior to the presentation of the DPEF, which outlines budgetary policy 
objectives for three years in advance, government, employers and unions determine jointly agreed the 
targets for programmed inflation rates, GDP growth and employment. In September, during the 
preparation of the finance bill, the government consults the ‘social partners’ in order to define the 
practical measures to be included and to ensure consistency in the behaviour of the social partners 
(Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1993).
13 The confederal unions achieved domination by winning about 90 per cent of RSU seats (Pellegrini 
1998:153).
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would facilitate the process of disinflation. As the 1992-93 agreements paved the 
way for the subsequent implementation of wage moderation, it is important to 
explore how the agreement was made possible, especially since reforms had been 
blocked for such a long time (Femer and Hyman 1992).
On one level, the 1992 agreement was the result of a ‘national emergency’ 
situation in which the government was able to push the social parties to agree on a 
number of stabilising measures. In summer 1992 the budgetary situation was getting 
out of hand, the pressure on the exchange rate led to increasing interest rates in a 
context of slowing growth, rising unemployment and diminishing competitiveness 
(also Chapter 6). The need to restore competitiveness, regain the confidence of 
international markets and avoid devaluation forced action on the social partners and 
the government. This is not the place to analyse in detail the bargaining strategies 
and the sense of political drama that surrounded the 1992 agreement: the CGIL 
almost split; its secretary (temporarily) resigned (invoking ‘national interest’ and 
referring to the on-going economic and political crisis); the prime minister threatened 
to resign; and wild-cat strikes opposing the agreement broke out in the North (Treu 
1994; Locke and Baccaro 1996). This shows that neither the 1992 agreement nor the 
subsequent agreement of 1993 concerning the reform of the wage bargaining system 
was a foregone conclusion.
There was slightly less drama in 1993 (Locke and Baccaro 1996). Union 
leaders stressed the responsibility of the unions to help overcome political instability 
and economic crisis (CGIL official Cofferati in D’Agostino 2000: 14). What is true 
for the CGIL is certainly also true for the CISL and the UIL which had been more 
inclined to come to an agreement on abolishing wage indexation and co-operative 
bargaining all along. The confederal leaderships accepted that Italy needed to 
undergo major economic reform and that policy innovation was necessary.14 
Nonetheless, it would be too simplistic to regard the national emergency as the cause.
As suggested above, slowing growth and high (and rising) unemployment - to 
the extent that they were not already the reflection of increasing international 
pressure - and decreasing international competitiveness, especially during the early 
1990s, demonstrated the importance of the international constraint and certainly 
weakened the ability and willingness of trade union confederations to put up strong
14 Interview with CISL official, 26 October 2000, Rome; CGIL official, 27 October 2000, Rome.
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resistance to reform. In 1992 alone, for example, 200,000 jobs were lost in industry, 
and unemployment as a whole rose to more than 10.5 per cent. The unemployment 
rate was expected to rise to more than 12 per cent by 1994 (OECD Economic Surveys 
Italy 1994).
At the same time, various other developments influenced the attitude of Italian 
unions. Union strength had been declining. Overall, union density had fallen from 49 
to 39 per cent between 1980 and 1990. Moreover, the confederal unions were facing 
increasing competition from both rank-and-file organisations and independent unions 
especially in the public sector (Regalia and Regini 1998: 473). Under these 
circumstances the institutionalisation of bargaining rights as well as of a political role 
were certainly incentives to reach an agreement. Finally, it is true that, after the fall 
of the Berlin wall, the Italian union confederations re-oriented their strategies, with 
CISL ‘pursuing social solidarity’, UIL seeking ‘represent workers as citizens’ and 
CGIL aiming to create a ‘German-style industrial democracy’ (Mershon 1992; 
Femer and Hyman 1992: 551).
In short, both international economic pressure and domestic changes coincided 
and undoubtedly contributed to wage bargaining reform. Above all, though, it was 
the systemic constraint resulting from the increasing openness of the Italian economy 
that helped bring about a major re-orientation of confederal trade union strategy. The 
main unions came to accept the external constraint and recognised the potential 
threat of the inflationary consequences of currency depreciation and hence the need 
to stabilise the lira - not least because high inflation rates and continued devaluations 
meant the erosion of workers’ real wages.15
In fact, the crucial role played by long-term international pressure is indicated 
by the fact that the 1992 agreement was in a sense the result of a process that had 
started in the late 1980s16 when the increasing loss of international competitiveness17 
and increasing unemployment had induced both employers and unions to search for 
an anti-inflationary pact (Femer and Hyman 1992; Somaini 1998). As the abolition 
of wage indexation was a taboo, partly because of the high symbolic importance that 
was attached to it by the strongest and traditionally most militant private-sector
15 Interview with CGIL official, 27 October 2000, Rome.
16 That is, with the switch to a hard currency and anti-devaluationist policy.
17 Between 1987 and 1992, the cumulative inflation differential between Italy and Germany was more 
than 18 percent, and more than 8 percent relative to EU countries as a whole (OECD Statistical
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industry union FIOM, unions and employers entered into negotiations seeking to 
reduce labour costs and thus re-establish competitiveness by focusing on social 
security contributions and taxes. From this perspective, it is fair to say that the 
deteriorating domestic and international economic situation of 1992 was the event 
that ‘triggered’ the parties to accept the 1992-93 reforms. Tellingly, the December 
1991 protocol, which preceded the 1992 and 1993 agreements and was signed by the 
unions, recognised the importance of a wage policy that would aim at a structural 
decrease of the inflation rate, the reduction of the inflation differential relative to the 
other major European countries, the defence of competitiveness and exchange rate 
stability (Negrelli 1994: XV). The official name of the 1992 accord made this even 
more explicit as it was called ‘Protocol on Incomes Policies, the Struggle against 
Inflation, and the Cost of Labour’. In short, this indicates that the 1992 crisis had a 
‘trigger’ effect but that the willingness of the different actors to reach an agreement 
has to be seen in the light of long-term external constraints on domestic wage policy.
Talani (2000) argued that “the trade unions, given the extent of their internal
divisions, were not in a condition to resist the pressures that the government was
exerting on them by continuously underlining the negative effects of the labour costs
issues on the Italian economic and financial situation” (p. 197). Although this is true,
it does not - as just argued -  do justice to the fact that the strategies and goals of the
18larger part of the Italian unions had already changed by the early 1990s.
What about executive strength? There is general agreement that the 
government in the context of fiscal consolidation did not have sufficient resources to 
‘exchange’ in order to secure wage moderation (Treu 1994).19 It is true that the 
government introduced a number of reforms demanded by the unions. But these 
reforms had nothing to do with the ‘exchange’ of classical incomes policy. Thus, at 
best, the government was instrumental in bringing about reform by way of the Amato 
and Ciampi governments threatening to resign in case an agreement would not be 
reached {Financial Times, 28 June 1993; Treu 1994). By shifting responsibility to the 
societal actors under conditions of economic emergency, unions and employers were
Compendium 1999). This suggests how severe the external competitiveness constraint was for the 
trade unions (and employers).
18 This view is supported by both various interviews with union officials (see footnote 14) and the 
strategic re-orientation of the CGIL during the 1991 congress (Mershon 1992).
19 As in other European countries, the government was simply not capable of offering much in 
exchange for wage moderation except the ‘institutionalisation’ o f wage bargaining rights (Pochet 
1998; IMF 1998: 41).
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pushed to reach agreement by the two governments. This should however only be 
regarded as having facilitated agreement. The underlying factors are to do with 
external long-term pressure as explicated above. In short, executive strength with 
regard to changes in the private sector wage policy regime was negligible and thus 
reflected its relative irrelevance. This was also reflected in the voluntary character of 
the incomes policy in that the executive was reliant upon the social parties reaching 
an agreement. This contrasts with reforms in the public sector where the government 
was able to re-order employment relations unilaterally on the basis of the delegation 
law.
In sum, the 1992-93 agreements resulted in a fundamental reform of private 
sector employment relations and bargaining institutions. While the reforms of public 
sector wage bargaining were largely the result of the re-assertion of government 
policy authority in context of an economic emergency, the reforms in the private 
sector were the result of an agreement between unions and employers. The 
government - except for the formal recognition of the ‘concertation function’ of 
unions and the threat to shift the blame to unions and employers by resigning - did 
not make any substantial contribution to private sector bargaining reform. Reform 
was mainly the result of long-term international pressure and the resulting acceptance 
of the international economic constraint by (relatively encompassing) unions and 
more specifically by the recognition that repeated devaluations did not represent a 
long-term competitive strategy in the context of increasing economic integration.20 
The primacy of the long-term, systemic constraint over other potential factors, such 
as the possible need to meet the Maastricht criteria, was also reflected by the fact 
both reforms were at the time regarded primarily as an Italian problem. It was in the 
words of a trade union official an issue ‘tutto italiano’.21 In short, the long-term 
competitive constraint in combination with the immediate political and economic 
emergency situation were the factors that made successful reform possible.22
If the rationale for the confederal union leadership was clear, that is “the three 
confederal unions [...] exchanged income protection for their commitment [...] to 
support the government’s austerity policy, and thus engage in self-restraint in terms
20 Interview with CGIL official, 18 October 2000, Rome. This is not to say that policy-makers were 
unaware of the Maastricht criteria and what this would entail for Italian macroeconomic policy. 
Nonetheless, policy reform was above all driven by the need to confront the long-term, systemic 
pressures and the economic emergency situation.
1 Interview with CGIL official, 11 October 2000, Rome.
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of both bargaining and industrial conflict” (Locke and Baccaro 1996: 292), the 
question still remains as to how wage moderation was sustained beyond the context 
of emergency. In short, given that previous emergency responses (in the 1970s) were 
of a short-lived nature, the successful implementation of the agreements requires an 
explanation.
5.3 Wage Policy in the Public and Private Sectors, 1992-97
After having explained why the unions and the government managed to agree on 
major institutional reform, the critical question with regard to inflation control is how 
the agreement was maintained and the related measures implemented. More 
specifically, the question is how the government was able to keep its promise to 
restrain public wage growth in the face of potential trade union and party-political 
pressure, and how the confederal unions were able to control rank-and-file and 
managed to avoid intra-union competition.
First of all, Italian macroeconomic figures undoubtedly establish that public 
and private wage restraint did take place and was indispensable in bringing about 
good inflation performance and reduce pressure on public finances (Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri 1998; Pellegrini 1998; Negrelli 1998). As a quantitative 
description does not indicate why the agreements held up, a qualitative approach is 
necessary. Due to lack of space, the complexity of wage bargaining, the great 
number of sectors and bargaining rounds, the analysis will have to be confined to 
pace-setting metal-sector negotiations in the private sector. Due to the lack of 
detailed studies of decentralised public sector wage bargaining (Ruffini 1998: 16), an 
explanation will be provided on the basis of interviews with trade union and 
government officials.23
Wage Policy in the Public Sector (and in the Public Utilities)
A purely quantitative analysis shows that public sector wage moderation was 
considerable after 1992. After overruns in 1988-90 and a watered down public wage 
freeze in 1990, the freeze on public sector pay, and the abolition of wage indexation
22 See above for official statements by unions leaders referring to political and economic instability.
23 See Cesos [various years] and Bank of Italy, Abridged Report [various years], Ministero del 
Bilancio, Relazione generate sulla situazione economica del paese [various years] and ARAN 
[various issues] for a more complete assessment of Italian industrial relations and wage bargaining 
during the 1992-98 period.
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in 1992 contributed to the considerable decline in real wages during 1992 and 1995 
(cf. IMF 1998: 37; Table 5-1).
Table 5-1 Real Wage Growth, 1990-1997
(annual change in per cent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Agriculture -1.41 -0.52 5.49 0.29 -3.43 -3.21 -1.77 -0.88
Industry 0.30 3.00 1.04 -0.94 -0.73 -1.96 -0.55 1.67
Services
- Financial 
Services
1.10 0.94 0.96 -2.27 -3.70 1.83 1.90 1.60
- Transport & 
Communication
0.93 1.80 0.30 -1.38 -3.00 -1.13 -1.11 -0.76
Public
Administration
3.89 2.73 -2.66 -3.50 -3.63 -3.59 1.36 4.25
General 0.98 2.61 -0.03 -1.65 -2.03 -2.12 0.14 2.16
Source: IMF (1998: 37)
Certainly, the inflationary wage agreements of the previous decade had created 
room for a downward adjustment. In 1992 public sector contracts were not renewed, 
the scala mobile was abolished and the 1993 budget froze almost all wage 
components in response to the dramatic economic situation. This was the result of 
strong government action in the face of impending crisis. However, with falling 
inflation and the attempt to achieve compensation for the real wage loss, national 
agreements in the various sectors led to a recuperation of the initial loss in 1996-97 
and thus introduced compensation for the decline in real wages that had resulted 
from repeated the inflation overshoots between 1992-95. Thus after an initial decline 
in real wages public sector workers achieved real wage preservation over the 1993- 
97 period (Table 5-2).
Table 5-2 Wage Increases in Public Sector, 1994-1997
(annual change in per cent)
1994 1995 1996 1997 CUMULATIVE
INCREASE
1994-97
Contractual wages 0.9 2.6 5.6 3.7 -
Supplementary
components
- 0.1 0.8 -
Total 1.8 3.7 5.8 4.5 16.8
Target inflation rate 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.0 13.1
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Actual inflation rate 3.9 5.4 3.9 2.7 16.9
Industrial earnings 3.7 3.9 5.1 5.0 19.0
Source: OECD Economic Surveys Italy (1997: 99)
Wage moderation in the public sector has also been confirmed by econometric 
studies. Evaluating the effect of the 1990 and 1993 reforms, La Valle found that the 
reforms were coincided with wage moderation in all sectors - except transport (La 
Valle 1996). The quantitative analysis thus indicates that not only wage moderation 
was a crucial factor in bringing down inflation, easing interest rates and reducing the 
public deficit but that wage moderation coincided with institutional changes of 1990 
and 1993. Even if real wage growth accelerated after 1995, the wage increases were 
in line with the 1992-93 agreements. In short, institutional reform coincided with 
policy reform: the reform of public sector labour relations coincided with a sharp 
decline in conflict as well with a remarkable degree of wage moderation (Bordogna 
etal. 1999).
Clearly, wage moderation was negotiated at the ‘political level’ between 
government and unions in preparation of the yearly budget with the explicit goal of 
maintaining real wages. ARAN only conducted negotiations within the limits agreed 
upon by the major trade unions and the government. Given that there was overall 
substantial agreement at the formulation stage between the union confederations and 
the government, the implementation was on the whole rather smooth,24 at least once 
the targets had been determined.
This is not to say that wage determination was conflict-free. On several 
occasions, tensions rose after the government conceded generous wage agreements to 
some militant non-confederal groups in the transport sector {Financial Times, August 
1994).25 Moreover, the repeated overshoot of the inflation target and especially the 
increase in inflation of up to 5.8 per cent in 1995 resulted in severe union criticism of 
government policies (as well as of employers’ pricing policies). Interestingly and 
ironically, there was pressure from the confederal unions on the government to resist 
excessive wage settlements in the (non-ARAN managed) public utilities. This 
reflected unions’ worries regarding a potential knock-on effect in the public sector
24 Interview with ARAN official, 20 September 2000, Rome.
25 Note however that the transport sector does not fall under the authority of ARAN.
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(Financial Times, 7 July 1994) and thus interest of the confederal leadership to avoid 
above-inflation-target wage increases in other sectors.
In addition to concerns that this violated the agreement, this also reflected the 
worry of the confederations about keeping lower level unions organisation in line. 
Otherwise rank-and-file would certainly have been difficult to control and convince 
of the continued need for wage moderation (.Financial Times, 9 July 1996). With the 
confederal unions - as relatively encompassing unions - recognising that low 
inflation was important, this shows how the 1993 agreement created what could be 
called a ‘low-inflation pact’ in which the confederations had a crucial part to play in 
terms of linking wage policies across the various sectors of the economy. It also 
demonstrates that the acceptance of the need for wage restraint on the part of the 
confederal unions was an integral part of the success of wage policy during this 
period.
Data and anecdotal evidence suggest that overall wage restraint was less 
successful and conflict greater in the transport and public utility sector (La Valle 
1996; Financial Times, 27 September 1995; Bordogna and Provasi 1998).26 This 
indicates the importance of the crucial role the structure of union representation in 
the various sectors and hence the co-operation of confederations played with respect 
to achieving wage moderation in the public sector as opposed to the largely ‘non­
public’ utility sectors and especially the transport sector: non-confederal groups in 
the public utility sectors tended to be less willing to accept wage restraint, while the 
relatively encompassing confederations in public administration were willing to 
accept greater wage restraint and influence lower level units in this sense.
Hence the distinction between the public sector (under the responsibility of 
ARAN and dominated by unions associated with the three confederations) and the 
public utility (not ARAN-managed and characterised by a strong presence of non- 
confederal and hence non-encompassing groups) suggests the important role 
confederal unions played with regard to wage moderation in the public sector. On the 
whole, once an agreement was reached between the confederal unions and the 
government at the formulation stage at the central level, ARAN - immune at that 
stage from party-political interference - simply implemented it within the limits
26 The figures in Table 5-1 suggest that even though real wages declined (for communications and 
transport), wage restraint in this sector was relatively weaker than in the public administration sector, 
thus supplementing the anecdotal evidence provided above.
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determined by prior agreement and within budgetary constraints, while the 
confederal unions enforced their obligations with regard to rank-and-file.
In sum, with regard to public wages (excluding public utilities) “wage 
increases negotiated at national level have remained within the planned inflation 
rates fixed by the budget laws of the state, without the excesses often witnessed in 
the 1980s, when such ceilings were often ignored, not least by the ministers 
responsible for the negotiations” (Bordogna et al. 1999: 118). The repeated 
overshoot of the inflation target was on the whole recuperated and hence the 
agreement fulfilled (Ruffini 1998: 25).27 Wage restraint was possible because of 
institutional reform and primarily as a result of the strengthening and the co­
operation of confederal unions rather than the increase of executive strength (as 
continued executive weakness in the public utilities suggests). Economic conditions 
played a less important role, as the incentives for unions in the public sector to 
exercise wage restraint was not directly affected by decreasing international 
competitiveness. To the extent then that public sector wage increases were moderate 
they certainly reflected the interests of relatively encompassing unions and the 
greater centralisation and isolation of bargaining from party-political interference 
rather than a newly gained executive-domination of the wage determination process. 
The economic emergency situation certainly reinforced the incentives for the 
executive to control public wage but their ability to achieve control was equally 
dependent on the co-operation of the confederal unions.
Thus the wage determination system in the public sector introduced between 
1992-93 worked well in that it achieved its aims during the 1992-97 period. Given 
that private sector wages had scope for increases in the aftermath of the 1992 
devaluation, wage restraint in the public sector was a pre-condition for successful 
wage restraint in the private sector, since private sector employees could hardly be 
expected to exercise restraint while public sector employees were enjoying above- 
inflation-target wage increases.
27 Interview with CGIL official responsible for public sector, 11 October 2000, Rome.
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Wage Policy in the Private Sector
Similar to the public sector, the incomes policy accord whereby national-industry- 
level wage increases would be linked to the official inflation forecast were largely 
respected by the unions.
The employment relations system has performed surprisingly well. Major national 
agreements were concluded and made a large contribution towards lowering inflation.
When the currency came under downward pressure, unions were helpful in restoring 
international confidence by making major concessions. At lower levels, industry 
agreements were reached in accordance with established procedures and wage increases 
were at levels compatible with the goal of lowering inflation (Pellegrini 1998: 165).
The figures confirm this evaluation. Econometric studies for the first half of the 
1992-98 period indicate that the 1993 agreement on wages and inflation had a 
positive effect on inflation performance independent of economic conditions (La 
Valle 1996; Table 5-3).28
Table 5-3 Wage Policy in Private Sector, 1993-1997
(total increase over duration of contract, in per cent)
FIRST
ROUND
SECOND
ROUND
Effective
Date
Target
Inflation
Nominal
Wage
Increase
Actual
Inflation
Effective
Date
Target
Inflation
Nominal
Wage
Increase
Actual
Inflation
Paper Jul-93 7.3 7.5 8.7 Jul-95 7.4 7.9 7.9
Chemicals Jan-94 6.1 7.9 9.5 Jan-96 6.6 8 5.8
Petroleum Jan-94 6.1 6.7 9.5 Jan-96 6.6 7.9 5.8
Banking Jan-94 6.1 9.1 9.5 Jan-96 6.6 7.7 5.8
Insurance Jan-94 6.1 5.9 9.5 Jan-96 6.6 7.9 5.8
Metal Jul-94 5.3 7.6 9.8 Jul-96 4.6 8.6 n/a*
Tourism Jul-94 5.3 7.2 9.8 Jul-96 6.1 9.2 n/a*
Publishing Oct-94 5 6.1 9.8 Oct-96 5.5 7.5 n/a*
Trade Jan-95 4.6 8.3 9.5 Jan-97 5.1 9.1 n/a*
Food Jun-95 7.6 7 8.3 Jun-97 4 4.5 n/a*
Textiles Jul-95 7.5 8.6 7.9 Jul-97 4.7 5.3 n/a*
Source: IMF (1998: 36-37) * not available at time of publication in 1998
28 This econometric study only covers the period until 1996 during which inflation targets were 
repeatedly overshot. It is true that after 1996 wage moderation was less pronounced. But this largely 
reflected the catching-up of nominal wage increases with higher than expected inflation throughout 
the previous periods.
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As the metalworkers sector, characterised by the strongest unions, traditionally 
set the benchmark sectoral agreement that the other 14 sectoral trade unions tend to 
follow, the analysis focuses on private sector wage bargaining in this sector during 
1992-97. The first round of wage bargaining took place for the 1994-95 contract 
period. The agreement for the 1994-95 period was reached without any strikes or 
substantial conflict for the first time since 1945. This was certainly partly due to the 
difficult economic situation as reflected in continuous pressure on the exchange rate 
and long-term interest rates (cf Figure 4-3). Although the 1992 devaluation 
theoretically offered the opportunity for wage increases from a sectoral point of 
view, national-sectoral agreements were by and large in line with programmed 
inflation (IMF 1998: 16-17; Table 5-3; Rossi 2000: 104-109).29 Tellingly, there was 
no attempt to fully recover the loss in earning power at the sectoral level that had 
resulted from the 1992-93 recession. However, workers in the metal sector were 
compensated by year-end productivity and profitability bonuses (Financial Times, 7 
July 1994).
While the 1994-95 agreements had been easy to achieve, the renewal of the 
pace-setting metalworker contract for 1996-97 was characterised by a much higher 
degree of conflict and was not concluded until February 1997. The metalworkers 
demanded at least a 3 per cent rise plus recovery of part of what they have lost in real 
terms over the 1994-96 periods as a result of the continued inflation overshoot 
(Financial Times, 9 July 1996; cf. Table 5-3). Federmeccanica, the metal-sector 
employer association, refused to simply add-on the difference between actual and 
projected inflation demanded by the unions and claimed that the sector’s industrial 
prospects be taken into account in determining the wage increase for the period 
ahead. It also argued that the increase demanded by the unions did not take into 
account the element of inflation that was imported in the wake of the lira devaluation 
(Financial Times, 15 October 1996). (The 1993 agreement did indeed allow for some 
interpretational scope regarding this point.)
After a period of increased conflict, a compromise was reached in spring 1997 
involving the extension of the pay award of L200,000 a month over 30 rather than 24 
months (.Financial Times, 4 February 1997). This compromise clearly demonstrated 
that although the conflict showed considerable differences - and even differences
29 The difference between target inflation and nominal wage increase reflects the catch-up element.
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regarding the very core of the new bargaining regime (especially whether or not to 
compensate workers for past inflation overshoot), the final agreement reflected the 
respect of the 1993 accord as well as the importance both sides attached to the 
maintenance of the agreement. The 1993 reforms were regarded as too important by 
both sides as to risk their unravelling.30
In addition to the interest in preserving the system, it is clear that the repeated 
threats by the Bank of Italy, which had constantly argued that an inflationary wage 
agreement would not be compatible with continued disinflation, to raise interest rates 
also had an impact on the position of the bargaining parties. The Bank also argued 
that the loss in real wages had already been compensated by wage increases at the 
decentralised level (II Sole 24 Ore, 1 November 1996). This indicates the 
institutional influence of an independent central bank on the wage bargaining 
process.
In sum, wage moderation in the private sector was quite successful. The unions 
fulfilled their promise regarding wage restraint, despite the fact that inflation rates 
repeatedly overshot the agreed inflation target. Wage moderation was achieved 
despite the scope unions had to increase their wages in the aftermath of the lira 
devaluation. Thus, the incomes policy resulted in wage moderation, preserved the 
competitive advantage of the Italian economy in the wake of the 1992 devaluation 
and more importantly allowed the Bank of Italy to bring down interest rates as well 
as prevent an inflationary upsurge in the wake of the substantial depreciation of the 
lira. In short, wage policy was a crucial element in achieving disinflation in the 
1990s (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1998).
It is true that company-level bargaining in the private sector during the period 
immediately preceding the reforms had been largely consensual (Regalia and Regini
1998). However, the Italian private wage bargaining regime in the 1980s was 
characterised by an ‘implicit’ incomes policy in which three bargaining levels were 
involved (that is, confederal, national-industrial and company levels). This type of 
‘uncoordinated’ wage bargaining however was unlikely to have resulted in the same 
level of wage moderation, especially after the 1992 devaluation and the abolition of 
the scola mobile. Co-ordination within the private sector as well as between the 
public and the private sectors was crucial with regard to achieving wage restraint,
30 In fact, Confindustria had submitted a request to the president of the Republic before the general
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especially given the presence of medium-strength unions capable of using the space 
opened for upward wage adjustment by the lira devaluation.
This suggests that the co-operation of the confederations and their affiliated 
industry unions was also important. In the private sector, initially, union division was 
overcome because none of the actors wanted to be responsible for causing an 
economic crisis. Subsequently, wage moderation was maintained, which to a 
considerable extent reflected a re-orientation of strategy on the part of the confederal 
leadership. Contrary to the 1970s and 1980s, even the FIOM, as the traditionally 
strongest and most militant union, came round to accepting wage moderation. This 
reflected the increasing importance of international competitiveness for exposed 
sectors and hence the effects of economic internationalisation. The union 
confederations and the most important (exposed) industry unions accepted their 
responsibility for disinflation in exchange for the preservation of real wages.31
As regards the issue of control over lower level units, a comparison of public 
utilities and private industry is revealing. Wage moderation worked much better in 
the ARAN-managed public and the private sectors than in the transport sector, where 
confederal unions were weaker (cf Table 5-1). This reflected both the organisational 
strengthening through the introduction of the RSU32 as well as a general consensus 
within the confederal unions as to the desirability of wage moderation and real wage 
preservation. Through the introduction of unified workplace representations, lower 
level units were linked to confederations in a more consensual way; it also well as 
strengthened the confederations (and industry unions) relative to the rank-and-file.34 
In short, a combination of consensus, international pressure and institutional change 
was responsible for an overall successful policy of wage moderation in the private 
sector. What this means with regard to institutionalist approaches to wage bargaining 
and policy is discussed in the following section.
elections of 1994 demanding the maintenance of the 1993 agreement.
31 This responsibility was not least of all the consequence of the trade unions’ commitment to EMU 
membership which was regarded as favouring economic development (Interview with CGIL official, 
27 October 2000, Rome).
32 This is only true for the private sector, as the RSU were not formally in place in the public sector 
until 1997.
33 Interview with CGIL official, 18 October 2000, Rome.
34 Interview with CGIL official, 18 October 2000, Rome.
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5.4 Conclusion: Employers, Unions, the Italian Government and 
Incomes Policy
The Italian system of labour relations underwent dramatic institutional and policy 
change in the 1990s. The policy of wage restraint in both the public and private 
sectors agreed in 1992-93 turned out to be successful in that wage moderation 
contributed to disinflation and monetary convergence - something that Italy had 
failed to achieve since the mid-1960s. In the context of a considerable depreciation 
of the lira and nervous international markets, the importance of public and private 
wage moderation cannot be overestimated. Without a policy of wage restraint, the 
devaluation would have resulted in much higher inflation. Ford and Krueger (1995), 
for example, find that their econometric model overpredicts Italian wage and price 
inflation in the wake of the 1992 lira devaluation (also La Valle 1996). The authors 
attribute this to the changes in labour market institutions (that is, abolition of scala
o r
mobile and so on).
Counterfactually, it is hard to imagine that Italy could have achieved the same 
level of disinflation in the absence of a policy of public and private wage restraint. 
First of all, the 1992 exit from the ERM softened the external constraint and hence 
the ‘implicit’ incomes policy of the 1980s. As already noted, in the absence of a 
policy of wage restraint, the lira devaluation offered space for wage increases 
without the risk of running into the competitiveness constraint in the short term. The 
agreement to keep wage increases in line with inflation was hence crucial to 
achieving lower interest rates and preserving the increased competitiveness resulting 
from the lira devaluation. Second, the abolition of the scala mobile was equally 
instrumental in lowering inflation. The continuation would have created a drag 
especially in a situation when inflation would have picked up as a result of higher 
import prices and inflation. Disinflation would have been much more difficult to 
achieve. Finally, in the context of jittery financial markets, considerable wage 
increases would have likely resulted in an even greater depreciation of the lira, thus 
contributing to higher inflation.
35 Another - admittedly extreme comparison - illustrates the importance of wage restraint. While in the 
wake of the devaluation in the early 1970s unit wage labour costs in industry increased by 96 per cent 
between 1972-76, they rose by only 2 per cent between 1991-95 (Rossi 2000: 109).
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Having established the importance of wage moderation, the question is how 
wage moderation was possible. Previous attempts to implement a policy of wage 
restraint as well as the institutional characteristics of the Italian private and public 
wage bargaining regimes did not bode well (Golden 1988; Regini 1984, 1997). 
Talani (2000), for example, explained the 1992-93 labour market reforms in terms of 
distributional politics taking place in the context of increasing international economic 
integration. Increasing unemployment and shrinking profit margins and market 
shares gave employers the upper hand and forced reforms on confederal unions, 
which were themselves divided over the issue. While domestic distributional politics 
are no doubt important, it does not explain how the domestic institutional problems 
were overcome and how the agreement was upheld in the medium term.
As suggested above, while the crisis was the ‘trigger’ factor and long-term 
competitive pressures represented the underlying ‘cause’ of institutional and policy 
reform, the co-operation of the confederal trade unions was also partly induced by 
prospective EMU membership. Although initially the 1992-93 reforms were 
primarily regarded as an exclusively Italian problem (cf. Section 5.3), it is true that 
there was an awareness of the need to converge with other European countries in 
order to remain a full participant of the European integration process (Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri 1993). This can be interpreted as follows. While the 1992-93 
reforms were above all a response to the impending crisis and the long-term 
competitive pressures that Italy endured as a result of ERM membership, the trade 
union leaderships’ commitment to make the agreement work in spite of the short­
term economic costs endured has also to be seen in the context of wider economic 
and social goals that the confederation regarded as being tied up with EMU 
membership. In this sense, wage policy after 1992-93 certainly represented a 
‘consensual’ response to external pressure and can explain how trade union division 
was initially overcome {cf. 1970s crises discussed in Chapter 2). However, this 
would still not explain how the leadership was able to control lower level bargaining. 
In fact, the renewal of the wage contract in 1996 demonstrated that industry unions in 
the metalworkers’ sector were prepared to potentially risk the breakdown of the 
1992-93 agreements and thus potentially cast into doubt Italy’s commitment to meet
36 Interview with CISL official, 26 October 2000, Rome; Interview with CGIL official, 27 October 
2000, Rome.
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the Maastricht criteria. A more detailed discussion of the post-1992 wage bargaining 
regime is therefore warranted.
Put in terms of the theoretical concepts discussed above: how were domestic- 
institutional obstacles to an incomes policy overcome: that is, in the private sector, 
(1) the division of confederal unions, (2) the weak authority of union leaderships 
over lower levels, and (3) a weak government unable to fulfil its promises (Regini
1997); and in the public sector, (1) the fragmentation of union representation, (2) the 
absence of international competitive pressure, and (3) a weak government unable to 
control public wages.
First, how were union division and fragmentation overcome?37 The willingness 
of employers and unions to agree on the abolition of wage indexation can in fact be 
understood in terms of the negative distributional consequences resulting from 
increasing international constraints. Employers wanted a reduction in labour costs in 
the face of increasing international competition. Confederal unions (or at least their 
leadership) were willing to accept wage restraint in exchange for real wage 
preservation in the context of rising employment. Hence it is fair to say that both 
parties accepted the external constraint and agreed on the need to a system-stabilising 
response. In addition to the evidence provided above (see footnote 14), this suggests 
that there has indeed emerged ‘a shared vision of national competitiveness’ in the 
private sector (Dore 1994; Katzenstein 1985). As already suggested, even though it is
o o
essential that actors possess a ‘shared vision’, it is only likely to be shared -  and 
capable of being implemented - under certain institutional conditions.
In this sense, trade union division was neutralised - both of which helped to 
overcome the private/ public sector dualism (Celia 1995). This suggests that a limited 
degree of confederal fragmentation can be overcome through co-ordination 
especially in the presence of an international constraint such as a hard currency 
regime {cf. Section 2.6).
Second, the willingness of the union leadership to accept institutional and 
bargaining reform does not explain how the confederations were able to make lower 
units accept an arrangement that demanded short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-
37 During the 1990s, the fragmentation of the employer side was also reduced with the unification of 
various employer federations such as Asap, Intersind and Confindustria (Lanzalaco 1998). Employers 
have not been the focus here as the analysis focuses on the demand-side.
38 This conception of ‘shared competitiveness’ is not simply cognitive but reflects primarily a change 
in attitude, strategy and goals as a result of international competitive pressure.
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term benefits, such as systemic stability and international competitiveness. How were 
the unions able to control rank-and-file despite considerable resistance to this policy? 
Regini (1997) has suggested that ‘legitimacy’, achieved through workplace 
representation in the form of the RSU, acted as a functional equivalent to the (neo- 
corporatist) triad of centralisation-autonomy-control of the confederal leadership: 
“the potential crisis of representation has been channelled and controlled not by 
securing a legal monopoly of representation but by mechanisms for the articulation 
of ‘voice’ within, rather than outside the trade unions” (p. 270). While this is 
plausible, it is equally clear that the strong position of confederal unions and their 
affiliates in the workplace following the 1993 reforms discussed above also provided 
the leadership with greater control and influence over lower-level company wage
O Q
bargaining. Non-institutional factors such as rather unfavourable economic 
conditions during 1992-97 also helped prevent wage drift at firm level and thus 
contributed to the acceptance of wage restraint by lower-level actors. However, the 
fact that wage moderation continued, despite the catching-up from 1996 onwards, 
suggests the importance of the domestic-institutional change.
Hence, on the one hand, the 1993 reform seems to have been instrumental in 
ensuring wage moderation at the national and rank-and-file levels in that it enabled 
greater control of confederal unions over company-level wage bargaining and thus 
prevented potential wage drift. On the other hand, it seemed acceptable to the 
majority of workers to exchange real wage preservation in the context of a national 
economic crisis and the continued presence of external constraints. The CGIL, the 
confederation most hostile towards bargaining concertation, for example, held a 
union-internal consultation in which members voted in favour of the institutional 
changes, thus indicating the importance of consensus.40 This was true for the 
majority of workers, with the exception of the leftist faction within the CGIL. 
However, this consensus should not be overestimated. While there existed a certain 
degree of consensus (especially in the presence of the threat of economic crisis in 
1992 and to a lesser degree in the following year), the conflicts of 1996-97 in the 
private sector also indicated a certain degree of fragility.
In short, in the absence of detailed studies of collective bargaining rounds, it is 
difficult to evaluate the relative importance of institutional reform, economic crisis
39 Interview with CGIL official, 20 October 2000, Rome.
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and consensus, even if a comparison with the similarly structured German system 
suggests that the new bargaining arrangements are conducive to low inflation and 
competitiveness {cf Streeck 1994; Dustman and Von Soest 1999). Industry unions 
and workplace representations are linked; and the latter are in fact dominated by the 
main confederal unions (or at least their affiliated industry unions). Within the 
private sector, the internationally exposed metalworkers traditionally set the pace- 
setting agreement with which most of the other private sectors fall in line. The 
competitiveness constraint and an inflation-averse central bank, which can credibly 
threaten to tighten monetary policy in case of above-productivity wage increases, 
also affects wage policy. This suggests that the Italian system of private sector wage 
determination has moved from a system of uncoordinated bargaining characterised 
by confederal, national and company-level wage agreements to a ‘coordinated 
system’ - and indeed a ‘Germanic’-style system of co-ordinated industry bargaining 
{cf Section 7.4), where export-oriented unions dominate wage-setting in the private 
sector through a system of wage leadership and control over company-level 
bargaining.
A third problem with regard to wage moderation has been identified as the 
‘weak executive’. However, the 1992-93 reforms represented neither a political nor 
an economic exchange between the trade unions and the government. The role of the 
latter was not very relevant with regard to private sector wage bargaining. The issue 
of executive strength is however important as regards public sector wage policy­
making.
The reform of public wage bargaining was undoubtedly a response to 
international economic and domestic financial crisis. Control of public wages was 
important not only in order to keep inflation under control but also to prevent 
private-sector employees from demanding higher wages in turn. In the public sector, 
the government was able to increase its authority in the area of public wage policy by 
introducing a number of institutional changes. While the reforms were introduced in 
a more or less unilateral way in the wake of an economic emergency, the successful 
implementation of wage moderation also depended on the co-operation of union 
confederations that had an interest in restraining public wage growth and in re­
asserting their influence in the public sector, where it had been severely undermined
40 Interview with CGIL official, 11 October 2000, Rome.
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as a result of the emergence of occupation-based anti-confederal unions. As 
suggested in Section 5.2, the role of the core executive with respect to public sector 
wage bargaining was strengthened, the authority of the confederal unions enhanced, 
and the power of cobas (and of clientelistic ministers) weakened. This strengthening 
has partly to be attributed to domestic-institutional reform.
While the government was strengthened in that it centralised public sector 
wage bargaining within the executive and increased its transparency, it would be 
exaggerated to speak of a ‘depoliticisation’. After all, the formulation of guidelines is 
still subject to union (and coalitional-political) pressure as the conflicts over inflation 
targets in the 1990s demonstrated. Nonetheless, once decided, ARAN negotiated and 
concluded contracts within the guidelines set at the ‘political’ level. But it was clear 
that the control of wage bargaining was enhanced as a result of strengthened 
confederal unions and the weakening of the cobas. Similarly, the creation of the 
Commissione di Garanzia in 1990, which was successful in reducing strike activity 
in most sectors (except transport), also increased the ‘bargaining’ position of the 
executive relative to disruptive groups in the public sector (cf. Bordogna and Provasi
1998). In short, the lesser vulnerability of the executive, the greater centralisation of 
bargaining under the auspices of the prime minister and ARAN (and the greater 
bargaining co-ordination of the various parts of the public sector that this allowed) as 
well as the reduced influence of cobas and the resulting stronger position of the more 
encompassing confederal unions all contributed to more responsible wage policies in 
the public sector.
In sum, there is no doubt that international pressure induced reform as much as 
domestic factors shaped the outcome and nature of reforms. The institutional reform 
of 1992-93 removed some obstacles and introduced new rules of the game that made 
a policy of wage restraint possible. The successful policy of wage moderation in both 
the public and private sector also depended a great deal on the co-operation of the 
three union confederations. Yet the ability of the confederation to co-operate 
successfully was in turn the result of institutional reform. The importance of 
domestic institutions with respect to wage bargaining reform is also reflected in the 
fact that it took 10 years to abolish wage indexation (1983-93) and to institutionalise 
a system of private and public wage setting consistent with the external constraint:
L’incapacitii per un lungo periodo successivo di superare una forma di centralizzazione
impropria (automatica ed inerziale e non finalizzata e strategical ha determinato il
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prolungarsi piu che in qualsiasi altro paese avente analogo livello di sviluppo, di
disfunzioni (alta inflazione ed elevata disoccupazione) (Somaini 1998: 401).41
This incapacity was due to the importance and inertia of domestic 
institutions.42 A weak government and a medium-strength, ideologically divided 
union movement were not able to achieve adequate change of the wage policy 
regime. To the extent that medium-strength unions and an uncoordinated bargaining 
system are regarded as institutional features, the policy change in Italy was path- 
dependent rather than purely functional (cf. Section 1.4). Not only can the delayed 
adjustment and policy reform be attributed to the domestic-institutional obstacles 
(weak executive, strong unions), but also bargaining decentralisation was not an 
option in the context of medium-strength unions. Hence for a weak government - 
unlike the British government in the late 1970s or the French government in the early 
1980s -  as well as for employers, the only solution consisted of convincing the 
unions to accept wage restraint in exchange for bargaining reform and real wage 
maintenance. The introduction of a system of ‘controlled decentralisation’ (Traxler 
1995, 1996) rather than complete decentralisation was the only realistic way to 
achieve wage moderation. This further indicates that domestic institutions are in fact 
an intervening variable that mediate between external-international and domestic- 
societal pressures and thus limit possible outcomes.
In a comparative-institutional perspective, it is fair to say that Italy had the 
‘misfortune’ of being a large country with a low degree of openness, medium- 
strength unions and weak government that after the oil shocks of the 1970s became 
an increasingly ‘small country’ in terms of economic openness 43 Institutions such as 
the scala mobile persisted despite their apparent inadequacy in relation to a changing 
international context and their resulting dysfunctional character. The government 
was more often than not unable to control public wage expenditure, despite its
41 “The inability, for a long period of time, to overcome a form of inappropriate centralisation (which 
was automatic and inert and not goal-oriented and strategic) was responsible for the persistence -  
longer than in any other country with a similar level of development -  of dysfunctions (high inflation 
and high unemployment).”
42 Rhodes surprisingly calls this ‘societal effect’ which is defined as “the complex relationship 
between the key elements of national economic systems which make them resistant to change and 
critical in the mediation of any external pressures” (1997: 4).
43 By contrast, Germany had a stronger government, an inflation-averse central bank and a medium- 
strength union movement that was more homogenous and was dominated by the export-oriented metal 
sector (Scharpf 1991). France had a strong government able to control both fiscal and monetary policy
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obvious incompatibility with intensifying international constraints. The crises of the 
early 1990s just provided the focal point, and triggered institutional reform and a 
corporatist response to international pressure that other, smaller countries had 
experienced before (Maier 1984; Katzenstein 1984, 1985). In sum, it is fair to say 
that a combination of external pressure and domestic institutional reform led to a 
policy of wage restraint. This made it possible for Italian inflation to converge to the 
level of the best-performing European countries.
and - after the turmoil of the late 1960s - unions unable to push up inflation (cf. Table 7-1 in chapter 
7).
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6 MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY: THE 
POLITICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRAL BANK 
INDEPENDENCE
La giustificazione dell’autonomia della banca centrale dal Tesoro si 
troverebbe in tal caso nel postulare una maggiore 'lungimiranza' della 
autorita monetaria rispetto alia visione tendenzialmente short-sighted 
delle autorita di govemo (Arcelli 1992: l l ) 1
In 1991-92, Italian inflation and long-term interest rates were high. Italian consumer 
price inflation stood at an annualised 6.5 per cent in 1991, which was well above the 
EU-15 average of 5.2 per cent. Long-term interest rates were far above the European 
average. The average annual nominal long-term interest rate in 1991 was 13.1 as 
against a rate of 8.5-9.5 per cent in most other EU countries.
As pointed out, given Italy’s monetary performance in the second half of the 
1980s and early 1990s, the prospects of Italy achieving monetary convergence were 
not promising (Table 6-1). Nonetheless, despite losing the external stability anchor of 
ERM membership in September 1992 and despite considerable depreciation of the 
lira (of up to 25-30 per cent against the currencies of its major trading partners), Italy 
was actually able to reduce domestic inflation from 5.3 per cent in 1992 to just under 
2 per cent in 1998. Moreover, Italian long-term interest rates were brought down 
from an annual average of over 13.3 per cent in 1992 to 4.9 per cent in 1998. Both 
monetary indicators were below the respective reference values. As for the exchange 
rate, after rejoining the ERM in November 1996, the lira had not been subject to 
severe tensions and its parity did not have to be re-adjusted during the period until 
May 1998 (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1998). Thus Italy managed to 
satisfy all three monetary criteria in time.
Table 6-1 Consumer Price, 1982-1992
(in per cent)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Inflation 16.4 14.9 10.6 8.6 6.1 4.6 5.0 6.6 6.1 6.5 5.3
Source: OECD Economic Outlook [various years]
1 “The justification o f the central bank’s autonomy from the Treasury would in this case be found 
postulating a greater far-sightedness of the monetary authority, compared to the often short-sighted 
vision of government authorities.”
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Institutional change, that is, the granting of independence to the Italian central 
bank in 1992 and 1993, was a major factor contributing to Italy’s monetary 
performance. Theoretically and empirically one would expect central bank 
independence to matter (Goodman 1992; Effijinger and De Haan 1996; Chapter 2). 
In order to establish that central bank independence made a major contribution to 
Italy’s good monetary performance, I show that at various points of time the central 
bank pursued stability-oriented policies despite major opposition from domestic 
political and societal actors.
In this chapter, I first discuss influences and interests in Italian monetary and 
exchange rate policy leading up to the 1992 EMS crisis. A detailed analysis of the 
1992 crisis is important because it radically transformed the context in which 
monetary policy was to be conducted, and because it allows for an understanding of 
the interests of the various actors regarding monetary and exchange rate policy 
thereafter. Second, the process of central bank reform in 1992-93 is examined. Third, 
monetary policy and decision-making under a floating regime are analysed. Fourth, 
the reasons for the 1996 ERM re-entry and the politics of monetary policy thereafter 
are discussed.2 The final section provides further evidence regarding the importance 
of central bank independence for greater price stability after the 1992-93 reforms.
6.1 EMS Crisis and Regime Change
The modification of the domestic-institutional framework (April 1992, November
1993), that is the granting of increased independence to the central bank, roughly 
coincided with the change of the international framework (September 1992) of 
Italian monetary policy. International regime change is analysed first to gain an 
understanding of the interests of the actors involved.
After 1987 successive Italian governments had clearly shown a desire to avoid 
devaluation. In January 1990 the lira joined the narrow fluctuation band and despite 
the lira’s persistently worse inflation performance relative to other European 
currencies and the concomitant loss of competitiveness, the Italian authorities ruled 
out devaluation (.Financial Times, 8 February 1991, Financial Times 29 August
1992). Eventually the 1992 EMS crisis forced Italy to devalue and ultimately leave
2 The analysis will mainly focus on the central bank’s discount rate policy since this was the single 
most important instrument of which the Bank of Italy made use in conducting monetary policy. 
Moreover, the discount rate was the primary cause of conflict over monetary policy.
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the ERM. The ERM exit had considerable consequences for future Italian monetary 
and exchange policy in that it removed the exchange rate constraint on the conduct of 
domestic monetary policy. Another consequence was that by leaving the ERM Italy 
was potentially not meeting the exchange rate criteria and would hence need to re­
enter the exchange rate system at some later stage.
Domestic and international factors contributed to the unsustainability of Italian 
ERM membership. The three major underlying causes of the EMS crisis in 1992 are 
well known and are only briefly reviewed here (Ungerer 1997: chapter 22; Delli 
Gatti et al. 1995; Busch 1994). First, the weakness of the U.S. dollar and high 
interest rates in Germany led to an appreciation of the German mark within the ERM 
and a weakening of the other currencies. From the beginning of 1992 to July 1992 
the Bundesbank raised its discount rate several times (to counteract the inflationary 
consequences of economic policies resulting from German re-unification). High 
German interest rates forced other ERM member states to raise their interest rates, 
even though these were gradually moving into recession.
Second, part of the tensions within the ERM were essentially due to 
insufficient economic convergence among ERM member states. Italy in particular 
had not been able to achieve a sufficient degree of macroeconomic convergence. 
Italian inflation had consistently been above the ERM average and public debt 
increased rapidly due to persistent public deficits. A combination of slowing growth, 
rising unemployment and increasing current account deficits made the high interest 
rate policy - aimed at defending an overvalued lira - increasingly incredible and thus 
eventually unsustainable. Italian authorities sought to shore up the exchange rate 
through high interest rates. However, this ‘buying of credibility’ finally failed when 
market expectations concerning the creation of EMU were cast into doubt.
This happened as a result of the third condition which was triggered by the 
uncertainties resulting from the rejection of the TEU in a referendum in Denmark on 
2 June 1992 as well as from the uncertainties surrounding the French referendum on 
the same issue due to take place at 20 September. The change in market expectations 
exposed what has been called ‘undeserved credibility’ (Artus and Bourginat quoted 
in Ungerer 1997: 262).
These pressures affected Italian monetary policy. Clearly Italian monetary 
policy faced a difficult situation in the early 1990s. Since the second half of 1989 the 
Italian economy had experienced relatively low growth. Already high interest rates to
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counteract domestic inflation were pushed even higher by the attempt to defend the 
external value of the lira. A persistent inflation differential led to an effective real 
appreciation of the lira in the ERM and the loss of competitiveness (Table 6-2). At 
the same persistent wage pressures and considerable increases in real wages fuelled 
domestic consumption (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1992: 19-23). The Bank of 
Italy sought to counteract these inflationary consequences by pursuing a high interest 
rate policy (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1993: 158).
Table 6-2 Italian Cumulative Inflation Differentials, 1987-1992
(annual change in per cent)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Vis-a-vis Germany 4.4 8.1 11.9 15.3 18.2 18.4
Vis-a-vis EU-15 1.6 3.2 4.8 5.5 7.1 8.1
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium 1999
Attacks against the lira (among others) began in the second half of August 
1992, after the Danish referendum and remarks by Bundesbank president Helmut 
Schlesinger concerning a possible realignment in the ERM, (Micossi and Padoan
1994). Despite massive intervention by both the Bank of Italy and the Bundesbank 
and a total increase in the Italian discount rate by 1.75 points to 15 per cent between 
4 August and 4 September, the lira remained below its floor. In the context of 
slowing growth and rising employment this was clearly an unsustainable policy 
stance.
The dilemma that the Bank of Italy confronted had been reflected in the cut in 
interest rates in August 1992. In a desperate attempt to balance domestic and 
international pressures, that is, weakening growth which demanded lower interest 
rates and the defence of the lira which required higher interest rates, the Bank of Italy 
lowered both of its rates by half a percentage point following the agreement to 
abolish the wage indexation mechanism (II Sole 24 Ore, 4 August 1992; cf. Chapter 
5). Domestically strong opposition to the high interest (and thus implicitly exchange 
rate) policy came from industry. In fact, the situation was perceived to be so dramatic 
that Confindustria publicly asked the government for an emergency meeting (II Sole 
24 Ore, 4 September 1992). It also published a report talking of the ‘unbearable cost 
of money and de-industrialisation’ (II Sole 24 Ore, 5 September 1992; II Sole 24 Ore, 
9 September 1992).
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After further increases in interest rates and massive but unsuccessful 
intervention3 by both the Bundesbank and the Bank of Italy, the EC Monetary 
Committee was convened and Germany agreed to a moderate easing of its monetary 
policy in exchange for 7 per cent devaluation of the lira on 12-13 September 1992. 
Despite the realignment, the attacks on the lira continued which finally led the Italian 
government to suspend ERM membership on 17 September. In the meantime, the 
president of Confindustria, Luigi Abete, called for lower interest rates in the 
aftermath of the devaluation (11 Sole 24 Ore, 15 September 1992).
Retrospectively the Italian ERM exit may look inevitable. Even though it is 
plausible that the devaluation was inevitable once the markets doubted that EMU 
might come into existence, this does not yet explain why Italy decided to leave the 
ERM altogether. After all, other countries such as Spain and Portugal devalued 
(repeatedly) without leaving the ERM. What then were the actors and interests 
behind Italy’s ERM exit? While initially the Bank of Italy had been cautious towards 
ERM membership, it gradually came to favour it because it helped impose monetary 
discipline on the Italian economy (Epstein and Schor 1989; Walsh 1995).
The steady real appreciation of the lira within the EMS was an essential part of Italian 
exchange rate policy. It helped bring Italian inflation down towards the European 
average and spurred firms and unions to conclude agreements that safeguarded 
competitiveness by containing costs and raising productivity (Santini quoted in Walsh 
1996: 298).
If ERM membership in combination with a not fully accommodating exchange 
rate policy had been an integral part of the Bank of Italy’s anti-inflation strategy in 
the early 1980s (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1987: 164; Oatley 1997: chapter 5), 
the Bank had certainly realised that the exclusive reliance on an external anchor was 
not sufficient to achieve monetary convergence with Europe’s best-performing 
countries.
However, when pressures on the exchange rate increased in summer 1992 the 
Bank of Italy resisted devaluation. Ultimately, it was the government that was 
responsible for determining exchange rate policy and hence membership in exchange 
rate systems. As for the Bank, it certainly feared the loss of hard-earned credibility 
(Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1993: 158-160) and the start of a devaluation-
3 At the end of September 1992, net currency reserves had fallen to their lowest since 1978, that is,
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inflation cycle that might only be avoided by even higher interest rates, unless 
decisive domestic policy measures were taken to regain the confidence of the 
markets. For example, the head of the Bank of Italy’s foreign department thought 
that it would be disastrous to devalue before the 1993 budget was approved 
(Financial Times, 4 August 1992). However, running low on reserves and with 
Italian public finances in a state of crisis, devaluation became inevitable. With 
devaluation and the resulting loss of credibility, bank officials probably considered it 
more prudent to urge the government to leave the ERM and pursue a policy of price 
stability outside a fixed exchange rate system, especially since the Bank had gained 
increased independence in April 1992. In other words, while initially the Bank 
certainly sought to save its credibility by trying to ‘ride out the storm’, it is plausible 
that it actually favoured exiting the ERM since this would allow it to pursue a low- 
inflation policy in the new context of increased domestic independence and increased 
external flexibility.4 Although the ERM had served as an external anchor to impose 
disinflation on the domestic economy in the early 1980s, during the second half of 
the 1980s, the adherence to a fixed parity became a problem more than a solution in 
view of the aim of achieving inflation convergence.
The Italian experience in the EMS, however, made it clear that running a monetary 
policy independent of exchange rate policy is an almost impossible task. In the very 
period in which it was acquiring greater formal independence, the Bank of Italy was in 
fact losing actual autonomy because of the determination of the government to defend 
the position of the national currency inside the EMS (Graziani 1998: 177).
In short, with the 1992 reform in place and the 1993 reform in sight, full 
independence offered the Bank the prospect of controlling monetary policy more 
successfully outside the ERM. Thus the Bank certainly had no objections to being
L32,917bn as against L108,581bn a year earlier (.Financial Times, 15 December 1992).
4 No central bank officials were available to confirm this. As exchange rate policy is under the 
authority of the government, Bank of Italy publications do not reveal where the Bank stood on the 
issue of devaluation and ERM membership. But even if it were the case that the Bank of Italy was a 
staunch defender of ERM membership, this does not affect the general argument defended here, 
namely that not all major actors were in favour of a hard-currency policy or ERM membership. 
Nonetheless, it is plausible that the Bank was at least not opposed to leaving the ERM or devaluing 
the lira. This is also the sense one gets from the formulations used by the head of the Bank of Italy’s 
research department (Rossi 2000: 93-99) in describing the events of 1992 such as “questo si traduce, 
per la Banca d ’ltalia, nelTimpegno alia difesa della lira” (p. 97) [“for the Bank of Italy this translates 
into a commitment to defend the lira”] or “la Banca d ’ltalia adempie al dovere di difendere il cambio 
della lira” (p. 98) [“the Bank of Italy abides by the duty to defend the exchange rate of the lira”].
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liberated from the exchange rate constraint and pursue disinflation in the context of 
increased policy flexibility.
The Italian government had consistently rejected a realignment prior to the 
crisis (Financial Times, 8 February 1991) and only once it had become clear that the 
peg was unsustainable for both economic as well as domestic political reasons did it 
decide to devalue and then abandon the ERM. Still in late August, Treasury Minister 
Barucci declared: “The government will adopt any measures that may become 
necessary towards maintaining the current central rate of the lira within the European 
Monetary System” (Financial Times, 29 August 1992). Similar to the Bank, the 
government was hoping to ride out the storm. But it is also equally clear that there 
were strong incentives for devaluation. On the one hand, the loss of competitiveness 
since 1987 as a result of persistently higher inflation certainly required a downward 
adjustment of the exchange rate (Table 6-1). On the other hand, slowing growth and 
growing unemployment made a continuation of a high interest rate policy politically 
difficult to sustain. Eventually market pressures overwhelmed whatever resistance 
there was on the part of the Italian government and the government requested a 
general re-alignment of ERM currencies. Once credibility had been lost and the 
turmoil and pressure on the lira exchange rate continued, the prospect of further 
maintaining or even increasing interest rates to defend the newly adjusted external 
value of the lira certainly provided the government with a major incentive to float the 
lira.
After leaving the ERM, the government repeatedly professed its willingness to 
re-enter the ERM as soon as possible {Financial Times, 15 December 1992, 19 
January 1993). However, the assertion to re-join as soon as possible was more 
rhetoric than a serious commitment. This was reflected in the fact that the 
government did not lay out any timetable for future re-entry {Financial Times, 26 
November 1992). Furthermore, the fact that the lira only re-entered the ERM four 
years after its exit also casts doubt on this declared intention. It is hence plausible to 
assume that the considerable depreciation of the lira suited the government. After all, 
the pursuit of a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, made possible through the ERM exit, 
contributed to domestic recovery through higher exports. It also gave Italy time to 
tackle its economic problems.
As pointed out above, industry and more specifically its political 
representation, Confindustria, had been complaining about the loss of
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competitiveness from at least 1990 onwards (Walsh 1996: 287). High interest rates 
were criticised in the run-up to the crisis (// Sole 24 Ore, 5 September 1992: 76; II 
Sole 24 Ore, 9 September 1992). When confronted with rising interest rates and an 
economic slowdown in 1992, the opposition to interest rate rises became stronger. It 
is true that the official anti-devaluationist stance of both the government and the 
Bank of Italy was not questioned publicly by Confindustria (.Financial Times, 14 
September 1992). But if industry publicly never quite came out in favour of 
devaluation or exit from the ERM, it was clear that it preferred a devaluation of the 
lira to restore competitiveness and lower interest rates in order to stimulate domestic 
economic activity.5 In particular, there was considerable pressure from the small- and 
medium-sized export-oriented firms of Northern Italy to bring about a considerable 
adjustment of the lira exchange rate (Graziani 1998: 177). Similarly, the banking 
sector - due to its strong relationship with industry through loan exposure - was also 
concerned about national competitiveness and favoured devaluation (if not a float) in 
order to restore competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, provided of course that 
the low inflation policy would not be jeopardised (Walsh 1998: 109-114; Talani 
2000: chapter 4).
Unions were also concerned about the high interest rates but do not seem to 
have publicly expressed any strong view concerning ERM membership or the future 
international framework of Italian monetary policy as such. On the one hand, high 
unemployment and slowing growth should have led one to expect that unions would 
favour devaluation. On the other hand, as a result of these external pressures as well 
as domestic pressure from employers, the unions accepted a policy of wage 
moderation and thus co-operated -  or were forced to co-operate - in an effort to save 
the exchange rate peg through the Amato protocol of July 1992. However, on the 
whole, the unions were agnostic towards devaluation since on the one hand 
devaluation held the prospect of increased competitiveness and employment; on the 
other it was seen as potentially provoking a vicious cycle that could possibly lead to 
even higher interest rates.6
Taken together the analysis of the interests of domestic actors suggests that 
there was - in addition to the eventual inevitability of the devaluation - considerable 
domestic pressure on the government to devalue if not to leave the ERM altogether.
5 Interview with CGIL official, 27 October 2000, Rome.
201
This would provide time to solve the most severe economic problems, restore 
competitiveness and even provide greater internal and external monetary flexibility. 
The Bank of Italy and the government hoped to be able to avoid devaluation in an 
attempt to save ‘earned’ credibility.7 However, once this credibility had been lost, it 
was difficult to find a lobby in favour of preserving the exchange rate peg.
In short, Italian monetary policy in the wake of the signing of the TEU was 
primarily oriented towards defence of the exchange rate peg. With the government in 
charge of determining the exchange rate regime, the Bank of Italy policy was obliged 
to defend the lira. In terms of executive strength and central bank independence, the 
evidence suggests that the government was able to defend the exchange rate peg and 
ERM membership against strong pressure from industry until the government was 
finally overwhelmed by external economic pressure. The central bank’s control 
(since April 1992) over discount rate changes was of limited importance because of 
the massive external pressure and a difficult domestic economic situation that would 
have overwhelmed even the most independent central bank. Furthermore, greater 
central bank independence did not matter since it was the government that had legal 
authority over exchange rate policy.
Thus the analysis of domestic political conflict over devaluation showed that 
there did not exist an unambiguous position towards monetary and exchange rate 
policy. While the government certainly sought to avoid devaluation and ERM exit, 
the Bank of Italy might have secretly favoured exit in order to be in a better position 
to pursue a low inflation policy. Confindustria very likely favoured devaluation 
hoping to restore competitiveness and achieve lower interest rates, while the unions 
on balance held a relatively agnostic position, even though they certainly favoured 
lower interest rates as the 1992 agreement with industry demonstrated. It is important 
to keep in mind the position of the various domestic actors in order to understand the 
politics of monetary and exchange rate policy between 1992-98.
6.2 The Politics o f  Central Bank Independence
One actor was going to dominate monetary policy after 1992: the Bank of Italy. The 
relative strength of the Bank of Italy with respect to monetary policy and hence with
6 Interview with CISL official, 26 October 2000, Rome.
7 This consideration had also played an important role in British exchange rate policy and sterling 
devaluation (Thompson 1996; Stephens 1996).
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regard to monetary outcomes was considerably strengthened as a result of domestic 
institutional change. While the ERM exit removed the external constraint on 
monetary policy, domestic-institutional changes increased the authority of the Bank 
over monetary policy decisions. In order to account for improved monetary 
performance, it is important to explain institutional change rather than to regard it as 
exogenous.
During the 1980s and 1990s the Italian monetary and financial regime 
underwent dramatic change both on a technical and political-institutional level 
(Sarcinelli 1995; Passacantando 1996). As described in Chapter 2, after the 1981 
reform there were still plenty of ways in which the government could potentially 
influence monetary decisions. The government still retained ultimate authority over 
monetary policy decision-making: discount rate changes had to be approved by the 
Treasury; reserve ratios were determined by the Interministerial Committee for  
Credit and Savings; it was still possible to finance the government budget deficit 
through the 14 per cent overdraft facility as well as through a parliamentary vote for 
extraordinary advances. All these features of the Italian monetary policy-making 
regime limited the central bank’s control over the conduct of monetary policy.
Despite these institutional features, which suggest a rather limited degree of 
central bank independence, there is also evidence for a relatively higher degree of de 
facto central bank independence. First, Sarcinelli (1995: 412) claims that discount 
rate changes proposed by the governor were never rejected by the treasury minister. 
Second, although the overdraft was de jure not abolished until 1993, according to 
central bank governor Fazio, it had not been used during the early 1990s (Financial 
Times, 10 December 1993). Even if this is true for the early 1990s, empirical 
evidence for the 1980s at least confirms the view of the Bank of Italy as being de 
facto constrained in its decision-making. For example, in the first half of the 1980s, 
the stock of the overdraft facility rose from 24.5 per cent to 45.8 per cent of the 
central bank’s total assets (Passacantando 1996: 87). Furthermore, Goodman (1992: 
chapter 5) cites various instances in the early 1980s where the Bank accepted to 
monetise government deficits -  either in response to severe pressure by the 
government or after a parliamentary vote on advances.
Hence even if there were no visible instances of government interference with 
central bank policy in the early 1990s, it is plausible to assume that the central bank 
was sensitive -  if not responsive -  to government pressure. For instance, arguably, a
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fully independent Bank of Italy would have been able to raise interest rates further to 
stamp out inflation during the second half of the 1980s even if this would have 
conflicted with the exchange rate constraint. Aware of its legal-political status and of 
the domestic opposition such a move would have provoked, the central bank 
presumably felt that it was not in a position to pursue this option (c f Section 2.6).
In any case, the modification of the central bank’s legal framework during the 
early 1990s undoubtedly increased the Bank’s independence considerably. In 
accordance with the TEU, which stipulated that national central banks had to be 
given independence, parliament approved a number of important legal-institutional 
changes concerning the relationship between government and central bank.8
Reform concerning central bank independence took place in two steps. In 
February 1992 law no. 82 of 1992, which entered into force in April 1992, was 
passed. This law attributed the exclusive right to set the discount rate to the Bank of 
Italy. Previously, discount rate changes had to be approved by the finance minister 
who acted upon a proposal from the central bank. Following the February 1992 
legislation, law 483 of November 1993 further increased the Bank of Italy’s 
independence from political authorities (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1993: 85). 
First, it assigned the power to vary reserve requirements, which had been a 
prerogative of the Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings, exclusively to 
the Bank of Italy within the limits established by the law.9 Second, the government’s 
overdraft facility with the Bank of Italy was abolished and advances of any kind by 
the Bank of Italy to Treasury were prohibited. The outstanding credit of the overdraft 
facility was converted into bonds with an average maturity of thirty years 
(Passacantando 1996: 98, appendix I). These reforms put the Bank into a position to 
control effectively the monetary base.
The Bank of Italy thus obtained a high degree of political and economic, as 
defined in Chapter 2. With respect to the statutory task or, alternatively, the freedom 
to choose monetary policy goals, it is true that neither the Constitution nor the central 
bank statute specify the objective of monetary policy, and therefore the objective of 
price stability is implicit at best. Moreover, the government retained the right to set 
general guidelines concerning macroeconomic goals. Indeed, both the absence of a
8 For chronology of technical changes see Passacantando (1996: appendix II).
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statutory task and the right of the government to set general macroeconomic goals 
were regarded by the Maastricht Watch Report as problematic:
In generate mentre in alcuni Paesi e in atto una revisione normativa che dia indipendenza 
di diritto e di fatto alia banca centrale, in Italia la convergenza si limita a eliminare le 
norme in contrasto con la lettera del Trattato, senza risolvere il dissidio tra l ’ampio grado 
di indipendenza di fatto della Banca d’ltalia e l ’incertezza della situazione giuridica 
sottostante (quoted in II Sole 24 Ore, 20 December 1993).10
By contrast, other observers regarded this less of a problem and suggested that 
in institutional terms the Bank enjoyed a degree of independence similar to the 
Bundesbank (Financial Times, 10 December 1993). While it may be difficult to 
determine the exact degree of independence relative to other central banks based on 
these indicators, it is uncontroversial that the Bank of Italy was more independent in 
determining and controlling monetary policy than it was before the 1992-93 reforms 
(OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996: 29-31). In short, the changes arising out of the 
institutional changes would lead one to expect to find a more stability-oriented 
monetary policy and ceteris paribus better monetary outcomes in terms of price 
stability.
Before demonstrating the importance of the tight monetary policy pursued by 
the Bank of Italy with regard to achieving the monetary criteria, it is necessary to 
analyse how and why central bank independence was possible. Given executive 
weakness, it is interesting to analyse how the government was able to overcome 
opposition, especially since granting full independence to the central bank would 
result in a relative weakening of other actors such as industry, unions and the 
government and certainly reduce their (indirect) influence on monetary policy.
The reform concerning discount rate changes11 was introduced in September 
1991. Treasury Minister (and ex-central bank governor) Guido Carli presented a bill
9 The new law set an upper ceiling of 22.5 per cent. The Italian minimum reserve ratio at the time was 
higher than in other European countries. This meant that there was space for downward adjustment. 
The upper ceiling was hence of no practical importance.
10 “In general, while in some countries legal changes have been enacted that grant the central bank de 
jure  and de facto  independence, convergence in Italy is limited to the elimination o f those laws that 
contradict the ‘letter’ o f the [Maastricht, MJ] Treaty, without resolving the discrepancy between the 
Bank of Italy’s high degree of de facto  independence, and the uncertainty resulting from the current 
legal situation.”
11 Article 104 (1) of the TEU (in conjunction with related articles) stipulated that governments abolish 
the possibility of monetary financing of government deficits during stage 2 (1994-1996/98). Art. 107-
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to parliament to grant the Bank of Italy full discretion over the discount rate. As a 
member of the technocratic elite and former Governor of the Bank of Italy, Carli had 
favoured greater central bank autonomy for a long time (// Sole 24 Ore, 24 April 
1993, 12 November 1993). The law was quickly approved in sede legislativa by the 
Senate (13 November 1991) and in session by the Chamber (30 January 1992) 
(Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 37, 14 February 1992). Even though the Chamber, on the 
suggestion of the president of the Commission for Constitutional Affairs, Silvano 
Labriola (PSI), affirmed the responsibility of the government for guidelines 
concerning general economic policy, the assignment of full discretion over both 
interest rates found full approval (II Sole 24 Ore, 31 January 1992). To the extent to 
which this reflected a cautious attitude towards full central bank independence 
among the Socialist party, it also reflected the importance of the general consensus 
regarding EMU among all parliamentary parties (II Sole 24 Ore, 19 January 1992). 
The re-affirmation in the form of an ordine del giomo was not considered by the 
government to infringe upon central bank independence in any way (Camera dei 
Deputati, Discussioni, 30 January 1992).
Judging from the debates in both houses, the importance of short-term capital 
movements, the institutional convergence with other European countries, and the 
legal obligation to introduce an institutional framework consistent with the TEU 
obligations, were the most important reasons for the smooth adoption of the reform 
(Senato della Repubblica, Commissione XI, 13 November 1991; Camera dei 
Deputati, Discussioni, 30 January 1992). The fact that TEU obligations12 were 
mentioned in the parliamentary debates indicates that both the government and 
parliament were aware of the legal obligation to change the central bank law.
The reform concerning reserve requirements and overdraft facility that resulted 
in law 483 of November 1993 went equally smoothly (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1 
December 1993, no. 282). The bill was presented by Treasury Minister Barucci on 
19 March 1993 and was approved with minor amendments (regarding the upper 
ceiling of the reserve requirement ratio) in sede legislative by both Senate (6 June
1993) and Chamber (11 October 1993). Except for the opposition from the
108 of the Treaty (in conjunction with the Art. 7 and 14 of the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) [Protocol no. 3 annexed to the Treaty]) determined that national central banks 
had to be granted full discretion over the setting of the discount rate and reserve requirements.
12 The TEU was only agreed upon in December 1991, but its content regarding central bank 
independence were already known during the parliamentary debates on central bank reform.
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Communists, there was general approval of the changes (Senato della Repubblica, 
Commissione VI, 6 October 1993; Camera dei Deputati, Commissione X, 11-13 
November 1993). Similar to the preceding reform, the importance of institutional 
convergence with other European countries as well as the need to meet the TEU 
requirements were emphasised in the parliamentary debates.
While it is true that Italy was not obliged to introduce changes at such an early 
stage, it was clear that these legal changes had to be implemented at some point, as 
the failure to do so would have resulted in EMU exclusion. The fact that changes 
were introduced rather early almost certainly reflected external economic pressure 
and hence the advantages that could be derived from making the Bank more 
independent. With TEU in place (or about to be in place), the government was in a 
much better position to overcome potential opposition to greater independence. 
There has always existed a large consensus among Italian political parties with 
regard to the desirability of European integration, including monetary integration. All 
parties -  with the exception of those at the far end of the party spectrum - welcomed 
the TEU (Istituto Affari Intemazionali 1993: 128; c f Chapter 1). As a result, 
opposition to central bank independence was weak and marginal and never serious 
enough to obstruct it.
Why was an in principle rather fundamental reform approved with visibly no 
serious challenge? Before dealing with this question, the interests and attitudes of the 
major societal actors are evaluated. On the whole, trade unions should have been 
expected to oppose central bank independence. However, given that a relatively hard 
currency policy was already a reality and that trade unions had consistently 
supported European political and monetary integration,13 there was virtually no 
debate among unions. The trade unions kept a low profile. This was similar to the 
absence of union views regarding the 1981 reform (Epstein and Schor 1989).
Confindustria did not voice any opposition against central bank independence 
either. The export-oriented part of the manufacturing industry at the time was 
certainly more concerned about the exchange rate regime and high interest rates than 
central bank independence. Even though industry criticised the high interest rate 
policies of the Bank of Italy in the early 1990s and complained about the loss of 
competitiveness incurred through a policy of non-devaluation (Walsh 1996: 287), it
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had never questioned the desirability of either ERM or EMU membership and hence 
the resulting commitments such as granting full independence to the Bank of Italy.
The Bank of Italy had been in favour of greater independence for some time. 
Successive central bank governors had demanded the institutional separation of the 
monetary and fiscal policy-making authority. Famously, Ciampi first expressed these 
demands in the governor’s annual Concluding Remarks in 1982 where the Bank of 
Italy demanded full autonomy over monetary policy as a precondition for monetary 
stability (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1982).
In short, and contrary to what should have been expected, there does not seem 
have been much public debate about changes to the status of the central bank. 
Several reasons can explain why there was neither much public discussion nor 
controversy: the obligatory, EMU-related nature of central bank reform; its technical 
character; the absence of immediate distributional consequences; and the de facto 
existence of an already relatively independent central bank.
In short, the 1992-93 central bank reform granted the Bank of Italy a degree of 
independence comparable to the one enjoyed by the most independent central banks. 
Central bank reform -  though reflecting the requirements determined by the TEU - 
seems to have enjoyed a wide consensus among political and societal groups, or at 
least, there was no opposition to it worthwhile mentioning. Reform was largely 
uncontested. Other factors also help explain the relative ease with which the ‘weak’ 
Italian government was able to achieve reform. The reform certainly increased the 
autonomy and independence of the Bank beyond the relatively high degree of de 
facto independence (Nardozzi 1992). While these factors may have played a role, it 
seems that the relative high degree of independence was the result of two factors. On 
the one hand, the independence from both parliament and factional interests lies in 
both the limited use factional and micro-sectional interests such as political parties 
and interest groups can make of monetary policy. As discussed in Section 2.5, the 
distributional consequences of monetary and exchange rate policy are difficult to 
evaluate, in practice and in theory, at least as compared to budgetary policy. On the 
other hand, increasing international pressure in terms of confidence crises (as 
experienced in the 1970s), which were reinforced by capital account liberalisation, 
made the manipulation of monetary policy by the executive a ‘risky business’. Hence
13 Interview with CISL official, 26 October 2000, Rome; Interview with CGIL official, 27 October
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not only were there other, more suitable means of distributing benefits to clientelistic 
interests; the risks of triggering a major crisis was simply too great a risk to take. All 
these factors made it relatively easy for the government to achieve the 1992-93 
reforms.
6.3 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy outside the ERM , 1992- 
1996
The exit from the ERM in September 1992 changed the framework of Italian 
monetary policy. Instead of achieving domestic price stability by pegging the lira to a 
strong currency, Italian monetary policy-makers found themselves managing a float. 
Similar to 1979-81, the change of the international framework coincided with 
domestic monetary reform. While the floating regime gave the Bank of Italy greater 
flexibility with regard to both interest rates and the external value of the lira, it 
certainly increased the risk of instability in terms of exchange rate volatility and at 
various points posed the risk of a depreciation-inflation cycle.
However, having gained full independence between April 1992 and late 1993, 
the Bank of Italy was able to pursue a cautious monetary policy unresponsive to 
more or less explicit calls from politicians and societal actors to ease monetary policy 
in order to boost growth and curb the public debt burden.14 The tight monetary policy 
was a major reason why, despite a considerable depreciation of the lira, Italian 
inflation fell from 5.3 per cent in 1992 to around 3 per cent by the time the lira re­
entered the ERM in November 1996 (Figure 6-1; Bank of Italy, Abridged Report 
1997: 87).
Figure 6-1 Consumer Price Inflation, 1992-1998
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As a consequence of slowing economic growth, rising unemployment and the 
loss of international competitiveness, annualised consumer price inflation had 
dropped to below 5 per cent by September 1992. There was clearly space to adjust 
Italian interest rates downwards. During the last quarter of 1992 Italy experienced 
negative growth, resulting in higher unemployment (which increased by nearly 2 
percentage points between first and the last quarter of 1992). With exclusive control 
over the discount rate, the Bank lowered rates in a gradual and cautious way from a 
peak of 15 per cent in September 1992 to 8 per cent in October 1993 (Figure 6-2). 
Figure 6-2 Discount Rates, 1992-1998 
(in per cent)
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Hence it is fair to say that:
Italian monetary policy was directed initially towards defending the lira’s central rate in 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism; from mid-September onwards, when this objective had 
to be abandoned owing to the pressure on the lira, the actions of the Bank of Italy were 
aimed at countering the inflationary implications of the devaluation while at the same 
time permitting a gradual restoration of more relaxed monetary conditions (Bank of Italy, 
A b r id g e d  R e p o rt, 1993: 77).
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Similarly, “the central bank pursued its immediate aim of steering high interest 
rates gradually down to levels more commensurate with the steady decline in 
inflation and the weak state of the economy” (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1994: 
33). The cautious monetary stance was reflected in the gradual character of the 
downward trend in official interest rates and in the number and size of the cuts as 
well as the temporary suspension of downward cuts between March and August 1993 
when a weakening of the lira and political instability risked to re-kindle inflationary 
tensions (Figure 6-1).
Economic recession made the voices demanding a faster easing of monetary 
conditions to boost growth even more audible than during the high interest rate 
period preceding the EMS crisis. Ever since the exit from the ERM individual 
industrialists as well as Confindustria had been calling for large and swift rate cuts 
(// Sole 24 Ore, 24 October 1992; II Sole 24 Ore, 12 December 1992; II Sole 24 Ore, 
28 January 1993). The Bank of Italy argued that due to the external weakness of the 
lira and its possible effects on domestic prices the stance had to remain tight and that 
the easing was going to remain gradual (II Sole 24 Ore, 20 March 1993). Even as the 
economy gradually started to recover, there was hardly a month where the 
representatives of industry did not call on the Bank to cut interest rates (II Sole 24 
Ore, 1 April 1993; II Sole 24 Ore, 1 July 1993; II Sole 24 Ore, 10 September 1993; II 
Sole 24 Ore, 24 October 1993). Despite considerable pressure, the Bank was able to 
persist in its policy of cautious easing which was consistent with its price stability 
orientation.
After negative growth in 1993, the Italian economy started to pick up again in 
1994 reaching almost 3 per cent in the third quarter of that year. At the same time 
inflation was continuously decreasing, falling below 4 per cent in June. The easing of 
monetary policy continued in the face of these trends. Following German rate cuts, 
the Bank lowered its discount rate from 8 to 7.5 per cent in February 1994. A further 
cut took place in May 1994 with the lowering of the discount rate to 7 per cent, thus 
implementing the twelfth cut since the exit from the ERM in September 1992. All 
these cuts were taking place in a relatively favourable environment characterised by 
falling inflation (Figure 6-1).
At first sight, it may seem that the decrease in the discount rate between 
September 1992 and early 1994 was dramatic and that this might this might suggest 
an overly loose monetary policy, and possibly an accommodating stance on the part
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of the Bank of Italy. However, Italian discount rates in September 1992 were (from a 
domestic point of view) unnecessarily high as a result of the attempts to try to 
maintain the lira parity. Moreover, the monetary easing throughout this period took 
place in the context of minimal growth and at times outright recession (Table 3-2). 
Finally, interest rate decreases took place in an environment of falling inflation. All 
this strongly suggests that the Bank of Italy did act in a sensible manner given 
general economic conditions. And even if it may be argued the Bank underestimated 
the potential threat to price stability that resulted from the considerable depreciation 
of the lira, this would still not demonstrate that the Bank was re-acting to domestic 
political pressure (for a more detailed discussion see Section 6.5).
However, after July 1994 there were signs of accelerating inflation. 
Furthermore the combination of the lira depreciation, which had reached 25 per cent 
over two years to August, and accelerating domestic economic expansion which 
reached almost 3 per cent during the third quarter of 1994 further contributed to the 
decision by the Bank of Italy to raise the discount rate by 50 basis points to 7.5 per 
cent in August 1994 -  the first increase in the discount rate since September 1992 
(Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1995: 83). This was consistent with the officially 
announced central bank goal of protecting price stability and ensuring that inflation 
would not return as the domestic recovery strengthened. The Berlusconi government 
was not happy about the increase, especially since it worsened the fiscal situation by 
increasing interest payments. This added to the already tense relationship between 
the Bank of Italy and the government {Financial Times, 24 November 1994).
Judging from press coverage, there was little public criticism from societal 
actors of the central bank’s policy during 1994. This was probably due to the 
acceleration of economic growth and a relatively stable inflation rate of around 4 per 
cent which left everyone satisfied: industry and unions enjoyed the benefits of 
growth, the Bank kept inflation under control and the government received higher 
revenues.
In 1995 the Italian economy experienced continued expansion of a yearly 
average of 3 per cent. The acceleration of growth put pressure on prices. Inflation 
increased from just below 4 per cent in early 1995 to a peak of 5.7 per cent in 
August. While yearly inflation had declined from 4.6 per cent in 1993 to about 4 per 
cent in 1994, it rose to 5.2 per cent in 1995 on a year-on-year basis. In addition to the 
inflationary pressures stemming from higher growth, higher import prices and an
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indirect tax hike (as a result of March 1995 Dini mini-budget) led to a higher year- 
on-year inflation rate (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1996: 29-36).
Increasing inflation and increases of the discount rate were responsible for 
increased conflict in terms of increased criticism of the Bank’s policy in 1995. The 
three major trade unions, CGIL, CISL and UIL, and especially, Confindustria 
criticised the raising of lending rates by commercial banks, visibly trying to avert the 
Bank of Italy to follow suit (II Sole 24 Ore, 13 January 1995). The pressure had no 
effect on the Bank’s policy stance. In a situation of lira weakness, the lira had just 
reached LI, 100 per German mark, and accelerating inflation, which had increased 
from 4.0 to about 4.2 per cent in February, the Bank of Italy raised the discount rate 
by a considerable 75 basis points to 8.25 per cent in February 1995 (La Stampa, 22 
February 1995). Even the trade unions -  usually more cautious than industry on these 
occasion -  expressed the view that the Bank should have waited before raising 
interest rates, while Confindustria expressed fear that the rate increase might damage 
the real economy (II Sole 24 Ore, 22 February 1995).
Even though the Bundesbank lowered interest rates in April 1995, the Bank of 
Italy raised interest rates once more by three quarters of a point to 9.0 per cent in 
May after an acceleration of producer and consumer prices, the latter increasing to 
over 5 per cent in April and May. Naturally neither unions, which called for a 
resumption of concertation, nor business were happy about the move in interest rates 
(La Stampa, 27 May 1995). Confindustria regarded the interest rate move as 
unnecessary, arguing instead that the inflationary tendencies were mainly due to the 
external weakness of the lira rather than domestic reasons.
Despite widespread criticism of the interest rate rise, in his annual address in 
May, Governor Antonio Fazio warned that the Bank would be ready to raise interest 
rates further if necessary and announced an inflation target of 4 per cent for 1996 and 
set a 1995 target 4.5 per cent - net of the effect of increases in indirect taxes (Bank of 
Italy, Abridged Report, 1995: 78; II Sole 24 Ore, 1 June 1995; Financial Times, 1 
June 1995). In mid-1995, the Italian lira weakened further reaching almost L I,200 
per German mark. Fearing a rise in interest rates due to a weakening of the lira and 
persisting inflationary tensions, Confindustria president Abete warned against an 
increase in interest rates, again arguing that lira weakness was the main cause of the 
inflationary tensions (II Sole 24 Ore, 1 July 1995).
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In August 1995 international monetary conditions eased with the Bundesbank 
cutting its discount rate further. But with inflation still running at 5.6 per cent in July, 
after hovering around the same value in June, the Bank of Italy excluded an easing of 
its monetary stance. Confindustria however kept up pressure, claiming that German 
interest rate cut would provide space for a reduction of rates (II Sole 24 Ore, 25 
August 1995).
Given the persistence of inflationary tensions and continued quarterly growth 
of about 2.6 per cent in 1995, the Bank left interest rates unchanged. In November, 
the president of Confindustria stated that it would be a ‘mistake’ if the Bank of Italy 
raised interest rates and demanded instead that the emphasis should be laid on wage 
and fiscal policy (II Sole 24 Ore, 24 November 1995). A month later, Abete 
explicitly demanded the lowering of interest rates (Financial Times, 30 December
1995), despite the fact that annualised inflation rate had remained largely unchanged. 
In the presence of stable monthly inflation rates of 5.5-5.7 per cent, the Bank 
however left interest rates unchanged.
The strong growth in 1995 was followed by a sharp cyclical downturn during 
the first half of 1996 as a result of weak domestic demand and decreasing exports, 
which were partly the result of the strengthening of the lira. The downturn led to an 
increase in unemployment, which rose to a record level of 12 per cent. This 
contributed to an easing of inflationary tensions, and inflation for 1996 fell below 4 
per cent.
A combination of lower prices of imported inputs, an appreciation of the lira, 
which rose by 10 per cent in real effective terms in 1996, and hence lower import 
prices, continued wage restraint, productivity growth and higher unemployment 
contributed to this achievement. Despite rapidly falling inflation and an economy 
that was sliding into recession, the Bank maintained a tight monetary stance.
To ensure that the external price impulses stemming from the undervaluation of the lira 
were not transmitted to domestic markets via rising inflation expectations, the Bank of 
Italy left its two key lending rates, the discount rate and the rate on fixed-term 
advances, unchanged at 9 and 10.5 per cent respectively from May 1995 to July 1996, 
the longest period of interest-rate stability in many years (OECD Economic Surveys 
Italy 1997: 3-4).
The pressure on the Bank, under conditions of slowing growth and falling 
inflation, was quite considerable. Again Confindustria was the most vociferous
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among the voices calling for a loosening of monetary policy (II Sole 24 Ore, 21 
January 1996; II Sole 24 Ore, 24 April 1996). However, the Bank of Italy reiterated 
its prime goal of reducing the difference between Italian inflation and inflation in the 
main competitor economies as well as that of meeting the inflation target of 4 per 
cent. With annual inflation running at 5.2 per cent in 1995 as compared to around 2 
per cent in other European economies, a tight monetary policy was necessary indeed 
(Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1997: 87).
In the course of the year, pressure increased massively. In March 1996 the 
Osservatorio Monetario expressed its view that rates could be lowered (II Sole 24 
Ore, 27 March 1996). After a cut in German rates in April, the pressure on the Bank 
of Italy to cut its interest rates increased even further (II Sole 24 Ore, 19 April 96). 
The press started to talk of the ‘tough line of Via Nazionale’ and Confindustria even 
called the Governor ‘obstinate’ and accused the Bank of ‘slowing down the 
economy’ (La Stampa, 24 April 1996).
During 1996 even the government joined those demanding rate cuts. Prime 
Minister Prodi, obviously concerned about cutting the budget deficit, implicitly 
threatened the Bank by declaring in an interview that if the rates did not come down 
it would not be possible for Italy to become an EMU member (La Stampa, 24 April
1996). Given the eagerness of public opinion to join EMU, this represented severe 
criticism indeed. With the threat of a major financial and currency crisis passed and 
with the new centre-left government eager to respect the convergence criteria, it was 
understandable that the government was trying to exert pressure on the central bank 
to reduce interest rates as this would have greatly helped to reduce the deficit (cf 
Section 3.4).
Committed to achieving the announced inflation target, the Bank of Italy 
continued its cautious monetary policy. In order to gain and retain credibility in the 
eyes of international financial markets, the Bank of Italy was not willing to relax its 
policy, even when this resulted in considerable domestic criticism. Obviously, the 
continued resistance on the part of the Bank of Italy to cut the discount rate until 
inflation was set to reach the 4 per cent target increased the pressure on the 
government to pursue a tighter fiscal policy than would have been necessary 
otherwise (Financial Times, 26 April 1996).
In May pressure on Bank grew even further. In addition to industry, ex- 
Treasury Minister Mario Arcelli criticised the Bank of Italy as being too cautious and
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even trade unions joined industry in demanding an easing of monetary policy {La 
Stampa, 19 May 1996). In short, during this period the criticism of the Bank was 
massive. However, the Bank persevered and indicated that future interest rate moves 
would depend on tight budget and moderate wage agreements following the 
expiration of the freeze of public salaries at the end of June {La Stampa, 19 May 
1996; La Stampa, 1 June 1996). Despite continued criticism and pressure on the 
Bank to lower interest rates, the Bank announced an even more stringent inflation 
target for 1997 of less than 3 per cent. The Bank also reaffirmed its commitment to 
meeting the inflation target of 4 per cent for 1996 (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 
1996: 86-87, 166-67).
Economic indicators continued to improve. Inflation fell below 4 per cent in 
June and the lira continued to strengthen, which naturally increased the pressure put 
on the Bank by domestic actors {II Sole 24 Ore, 26 June 1996). In response to reports 
that annualised consumer price inflation had dropped to below 4 per cent, the central 
bank finally lowered the discount rate by three quarters of a point to 8.25 per cent in 
July. However, immediately after the rate cut, industry was criticising it as 
insufficient {11 Sole 24 Ore, 24 July 1996).
In the meantime, growing confidence in economic stabilisation by international 
markets led to capital inflows and the nominal exchange rose by roughly 9.5 per cent 
in 1996, further contributing to an easing of inflationary tensions (Figure 6-1 above). 
Notwithstanding considerable criticism from industry and falling inflation, the Bank 
left lending rates unchanged for another two and a half months until October when it 
lowered the discount rate by 0.75 percentage points to 7.5 per cent. By then 
consumer price inflation had fallen to 3 per cent and the Bank was on its way to 
meeting the 4 per cent target for 1996 (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1997: 91-92). 
Again despite the size of the cut, industry demanded further cuts pointing to the real 
interest differential with regard to other EU countries as providing space for cuts in 
Italian rates {II Sole 24 Ore, 24 Oct 1996).
The view that the Bank was under severe pressure to lower interest rates was 
shared by others at that time. “Mr Antonio Fazio, governor of the Bank of Italy, has 
been under strong pressure to bring Italian rates more into line with its EU partners 
but he has obstinately resisted, insisting inflation must come down to 3 per cent” 
{Financial Times, 24 October 1996). Hence the cut in October turned out to be 
consistent with the Bank’s inflation target, even though it caught some observers by
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surprise.15
Thus, in 1996 the Bank of Italy pursued a very tight and cautious monetary 
policy in the context of low growth and in the face of strong domestic pressures to 
ease monetary policy by industry, trade unions and the Italian government. Despite 
these pressures and calls for a less restrictive policy stance the Italian central bank 
persisted and thus achieved its inflation target of 4.0 per cent for 1996.
To summarise, under the floating regime Italy was able to reduce inflation. 
Despite a major depreciation of the lira after 1992, inflation dropped from 4.9 per 
cent in September 1992 to 2.9 per cent in November 1996. Long-term interest rates 
fell from 12 to 8 per cent over the 1992-96 period, reflecting greater confidence in 
the Italian economy as a result of macroeconomic consolidation to which the Bank of 
Italy’s cautious monetary policy certainly contributed (Figure 6-3). Clearly the Bank 
acted in a very independent manner pursuing and realising its primary aim of 
meeting its announced inflation target. When after the 1993-94 disinflation period 
inflationary pressures became visible in 1995-96, the Bank did not hesitate to raise 
interest rates and then maintain a tight anti-inflationary stance by leaving the interest 
rates unchanged between May 1995 and July 1996, that is, until the inflationary 
consequences of the lira depreciation started to subside.
Figure 6-3 Long Term Interest Rates, 1992-1998
(in per cent)
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15 The decision came as a surprise to some observers, as it was widely expected that the central bank 
would not lower interest rates until early November when the producer inflation data for October 
would be available. It was suggested that the Bank acted in the face of indications that economic 
growth was slowing to no more than 0.8 per cent in 1996 (Financial Times, 24 October 1996).
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Source: Datastream
As for the exchange rate, it experienced a considerable depreciation of 
temporarily up to 30 per cent compared to its value in September 1992. During the 
second half of 1995 the lira appreciated considerably and in 1996 it further 
appreciated by 6.9 per cent. It is certain that an institutionally dependent Bank of 
Italy would not have regained the same degree of confidence of the international 
financial markets and would very likely have pursued a less strict monetary policy -  
if only because it would not have had the legal mandate to pursue such an 
independent policy (cf. Chapter 2). This is so because on the one hand financial 
markets would have been less assured of the continuation of a tight, anti-inflationary 
policy and would have demanded higher interest rates reflecting the higher risk. On 
the other hand, the government had every incentive to pressure the Bank for a 
quicker downward adjustment of interest rates, as this would have lightened the 
burden of fiscal adjustment. In short, central bank independence was a major factor 
in bringing about rapid disinflation during 1992-96. This created the conditions for a 
return of the lira to the ERM.
6.4 Re-Entry and the Final Move towards EMU
Despite repeated affirmations by successive Italian governments that Italy would re­
enter the ERM after the exit in September 1992, Italy did not do so until November
1996. The Maastricht exchange rate criteria stipulated “the observance of the normal 
fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism of the European 
Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing against the currency of 
any other member state” (TEU, Article 109j, 7 February 1992). Put differently, if 1 
January 1999 was the latest possible starting date for EMU, November 1996 was the 
penultimate month to re-join the ERM if Italy wanted to remain eligible for EMU 
membership.
General economic conditions in late 1996 were relatively favourable for ERM 
re-entry. Between early and mid-May 1996 the lira had appreciated by 7.4 per cent in 
effective terms proving the renewed confidence of the markets (Figure 6-4). Inflation 
was gradually coming down from 5.5 per cent in January to just above 3 per cent in 
October. The 1997 budget had won final approval in mid-November (Financial
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Times, 23 November 1996). On 25 November 1996 the Italian lira re-joined the ERM 
four years after it had left.
Figure 6-4 Lira-German Mark Exchange Rate, 1992-1998
(Lira per German mark)
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The Prodi government had the greatest interest in re-joining the ERM. It was 
the government’s declared goal to become a founding member of EMU and thus it 
staked its reputation on the realisation of this goal. Retaining responsibility for 
exchange rate policy and the choice of the exchange rate regime, the government 
initiated re-entry negotiations. There does not seem to have been any opposition to 
government policy. The most contentious issue was the exchange rate level. The 
government preferred LI,000 but finally had to settle for L990 per German mark as a 
result of opposition from its European partners. Prodi expressed satisfaction with the 
entry rate.
Industry was less upbeat as it had preferred an exchange rate of LI,050 or at 
least LI,000 and had expressed worries about the strong valuation of the lira and 
pointed to problems of competitiveness (Financial Times, 25 November 1996; II Sole 
24 Ore, 26 November 1996). Unions, on the other hand, responded more favourably 
to the entry rate and expressed their hope for a ‘more courageous’ interest rate policy 
(// Sole 24 Ore, 26 November 1996). The unions approved of re-entry as a necessary
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step towards EMU membership.16
The Bank of Italy was not thought to have been particularly happy about the 
ERM re-entry in general as long as the inflation differential was still high {Financial 
Times, 22 June 1996). This was probably due to the fact that the Bank was afraid that 
the defence of the exchange rate might compromise the price stability objective or 
compromise its interest rate policy, especially in a context where political events 
might lead to speculative attacks on the lira exchange rate. The 1992 crisis was 
presumably still looming large in the Bank’s memory. However, with the 
government committed to EMU membership and responsible for international 
monetary policy and with the deadline for re-entry nearing, neither the Bank nor the 
other actors had any choice but to go along with government policy, whatever the 
Bank’s preferences.
The Bank claimed that the re-entry of the lira into the ERM did not change its 
monetary stance (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1997: 92). The Bank maintained its 
tight monetary stance and the pursuit of independently chosen inflation targets. 
Whereas central banks had often used the joining of the ERM as an opportunity to 
cut interest rates, the Bank of Italy resisted doing just that in November 1996, even 
though the lira had been enjoying renewed confidence of international markets and 
had been performing well (Figure 6-4).
The economy was dipping into recession during the last quarter of 1996. 
During this period pressure grew -  especially from the government that was eager to 
reduce interest payments - for a further easing of monetary policy. For example, 
Prime Minister Prodi stated that if he had been in charge of monetary policy, he 
would have already cut interest rates and that there would be a ‘future without the 
madness of interest rates that kill you’ {II Sole 24 Ore, 26 November 1996).
Despite negative GDP growth in the last quarter of 1996 and inflation moving 
towards the Bank’s inflation target, the lowering of interest rates did not take place 
until January 1997 when the Bank cut rates by three quarters of a point to 6.75 per 
cent {II Sole 24 Ore, 22 January 1997). It is true that the cut in the discount rate 
coincided with stalled negotiations in the metal-sector which had been going on for 
more than eight months {Financial Times, 23 January 1997). But it is also clear that
16 Interview with CISL official, 26 October 2000, Rome; Interview with CGIL official, 27 October
2000, Rome.
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decreasing inflation and a stagnating economy allowed for this considerable decrease 
in interest rates without endangering the inflation target.
With negative GDP growth of almost 1 per cent during the first quarter, the 
voices for a further easing of monetary conditions became louder. The pressure on 
the Bank to cut interest rates intensified. La Stampa wrote in April 1997:
A1 govematore della Banca d’ltalia Antonio Fazio, perche si muova, si appellano un po’ 
tutti. Lo fa forse con un pizzico di rancore il ministro degli Esteri Lamberto Dini, lo fa 
per dovere di ruolo il ministro dell’Industria Pierluigi Bersani, lo fa naturalmente la 
Confindustria e le altre associazioni imprenditoriali, lo fanno i sindacati (La Stampa, 22 
April 1997).17
In addition to the constant pressure from industry (La Stampa, 8 May 1997), 
pressure from the government increased further during this period. The government 
was desperate to boost growth and reduce debt payments in its attempt to meet the 3 
per cent deficit target for 1997 (Chapter 3). In May 1997 a meeting between Prodi 
and Fazio took place. According to II Sole 24 Ore, there existed a cold climate 
between the Bank and the government (II Sole 24 Ore, 15 May 97). Despite 
considerable pressure on the Bank, Fazio announced an even more ambitious 
inflation target of 2 per cent for 1998 in May (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1997: 
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In June pressure on the Bank of Italy was growing as the government 
suggested that in the face of decreasing inflation there was ‘room for the reduction of 
the cost of money’. Confindustria official Innocenzo Cipolletta claimed that a further 
delay in the reduction of interest rates would create risks for the economy (II Sole 24 
Ore, 22 June 1997: 2). The so far rather implicit government pressure also increased 
further. Probably the clearest criticism from the government came during the G-7 
summit in Denver in June where the three most important members of government 
more or less overtly demanded a lowering of interest rates. Prodi spoke of ‘extremely 
high interest rates’ and Treasury Minister Ciampi -  more diplomatically - stated that 
he would like to see an inflation rate of 1.8 rather than 1.5 per cent. Foreign Minister 
Dini expressed the view that the ‘official rates were very high with respect to market 
rates and that the inflation as well as the return on treasury bills was decreasing, thus
17 “More or less everyone is appealing to the governor of the Bank of Italy, Antonio Fazio, to do 
something. The Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini does so with a little rancour perhaps; Industry
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making it a question of time until official rates would fall’ (// Sole 24 Ore, 22 June
1997). This overt criticism was easy to understand given that it was more than 
uncertain whether Italy would meet the three-per-cent deficit target by the end of the 
year (cf Section 3.4). Decreasing interest rates would give a necessary boost to reach 
this objective.
Finally, at the end of June with year-on-year inflation below 2 per cent for the 
second month in a row, the Bank reduced the discount rate by 0.5 points to 6.25 per 
cent (II Sole 24 Ore, 28 June 1997). It did not take long however until in the face of 
weak growth and the need to reduce public debt, criticism of the Bank’s tough 
monetary stance intensified (II Sole 24 Ore, 15 November 1997). Similar to the 
period preceding the interest rate cut in June, more or less explicit government 
pressure was also a constant feature of public speeches and announcements 
throughout this period. For example, Treasury Minister Ciampi pleaded for ‘more 
flexibility or otherwise the growth will slow’ and Prime Minister Prodi ‘predicted’ a 
decrease of short-term interest rates (II Sole 24 Ore, 20 November 1997). Given the 
need to achieve the three-per-cent deficit target for 1997, increased criticism did not 
come as a surprise. Again, despite this pressure, the Bank of Italy did not decrease its 
discount rate until late December when it was lowered by 0.75 points to 5.5 per cent 
(La Stampa, 24 December 1997). The interest rate cut was a response to inflation 
reports that predicted an annualised inflation rate of just 2 per cent. Thus the Bank 
undershot its three-per-cent target for 1997 by one percentage point.
The conditions for a fall in inflation were rather favourable in 1998. In the 
context of a stable lira, a deficit-reducing fiscal policy and moderate domestic growth 
of 1.5 per cent in 1997, there emerged room for further cuts in interest rates. 
However, the Bank of Italy lowered official rates gradually, being visibly concerned 
with the domestic inflation target and possible speculative attacks on the ERM in the 
wake of continued international financial turmoil (that is, South-East Asian crisis). 
The tightness is reflected in the real short-term interest rate differential with regard to 
other European economies despite almost identical inflation rates (Figures 6-2 and 6- 
4 above). Nonetheless, the Bank left rates unchanged until April 1998 when the Bank 
of Italy cut the discount rate to 5.0 per cent. On 3 May 1998, the Council of the 
European Union deliberated that Italy fulfilled the convergence criteria (Financial
Minister Pierluigi Bersani does so out of duty; Confindustria and other employer associations do so
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Times, 4 May 1998). With inflation just around 2 per cent, long- and short interest 
rates below respective reference values and a stable lira exchange rate, Italy fulfilled 
the monetary criteria. Thus Italy became one of eleven founding members of EMU.18
In short, monetary policy after the ERM re-entry in November 1996 remained 
very tight. The Bank gave priority to meeting its announced inflation target and did 
not respond to domestic pressure. The detailed examination of discount rate policy 
demonstrates this. Hence it is justified to claim that an independent central bank was 
instrumental in bringing about disinflation and meeting the monetary criteria as laid 
down in the TEU.
6.5 Conclusion: Central Bank Reform, Monetary Policy and 
Monetary Outcomes
To appreciate the importance of central bank independence it is useful to recall the 
interests of the most important actors with regard to monetary policy as evidenced 
during the 1992-98 period. The unions were certainly not in favour of an overly tight 
monetary policy but they accepted the need to achieve inflation convergence and 
meet the convergence criteria, not least because any positive difference between 
actual and programmed inflation would mean a temporary loss of real wages. Even 
though this did not prevent the unions from criticising the Bank of Italy occasionally, 
on the whole, they abstained from exercising pressure.19
By contrast, Confindustria and - especially from 1996 onwards - the 
government20 sought to put public pressure on the Bank of Italy in order to achieve 
lower interest rates. This reflected industry’s concern for growth and the 
government’s role as a debtor and its eagerness to alleviate the burden of fiscal 
consolidation in view of the need to meet the three-per-cent target by the end of
1997. This indicates that the most important political and societal actors by no means
naturally; trade unions do so as well”.
18 The conservative policy of the Bank was also clearly reflected in the discount rate policy after Italy 
had become a member of EMU. Even though after the decision on EMU membership the likelihood of 
attacks on the exchange rate had hugely decreased, Italian monetary policy remained very cautious. It 
was not until December 1998 that the Bank of Italy allowed the discount rate to converge fully on the 
European level (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1999: 120-121).
19 Interview with CISL official, 26 October 2000, Rome.
20 Judging by press reports, political parties kept a very low profile in the debates surrounding 
monetary policy during the 1992-98 period. This is consistent with the discussion above according to 
which monetary policy does not lend itself well to the pursuit o f micro-distributional and clientelistic 
goals.
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favoured an uncompromising hard-currency policy as pursued by the Bank of Italy. 
In the absence of complete central bank independence this would have likely resulted 
in less complete monetary convergence.
As for the Bank of Italy, its position on price stability was absolutely clear. Its 
primary and sole objective was the achievement of price stability and convergence 
on the best-performing countries in terms of inflation performance and not - at least 
explicitly - the meeting of the Maastricht criteria more generally. Practically of 
course, these two goals coincided. Nonetheless, both the Bank’s rather reserved 
attitude towards re-joining the ERM in 1996 and its uncompromising position on 
interest rates, which potentially threatened the objective of fiscal convergence, 
indicates that its primary aim was price-stability rather than the pursuit of wider 
political goals such as EMU.
On a more general level, several problems arise in validating the proposition 
that Italian central bank reform in 1992-93 had a decisive impact on both monetary 
policy and monetary outcomes. First, a simple reform of the legal framework should 
not necessarily be expected to have an immediate effect on policy and policy 
outcomes (Passacantando 1996: 99). This is even more true since the Bank of Italy 
had enjoyed a certain degree of de facto independence even before the 1992-93 
reforms. As far as the institutionalist argument is concerned, a second difficulty 
arises out of the fact that it can be difficult to tell whether in a given situation a 
central bank cut interest rates as a result of pressure or in response to prevailing 
economic conditions. As pointed out above, a third difficulty has to do with the 
possibility that the relationship between price stability and central bank 
independence might be spurious.
The empirical evidence provided in this chapter largely refutes these three 
possible objections and corroborates the institutionalist argument. First, central bank 
policy after the exit from the ERM did reflect greater political independence from the 
government relative to previous periods. For example, the Bank of Italy reacted 
immediately to signs of rising inflation by tightening its policy.
It is [...] hard to deny that greater central bank independence did improve the 
performance of monetary policy in some specific respects. The reforms greatly 
enhanced the flexibility of short-term interest rates and the ability of the central bank to 
steer them ... [T]he increase in the discount rate in response to inflationary pressures
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was much swifter and faster in 1994 than in previous turning points of inflation 
(Passacantando 1996: 100; similar Bini 1998).
This also supported by quantitative evidence.
Comparison of the movements in official rates and short-term interest rates at the time 
of the last three upturns in consumer price inflation [...] shows that the tightening of 
monetary policy was timely last year [...]. In 1979 the increase in interest rates occurred 
almost a year after the rise in inflation [...]. In 1986-87 there was a delay of around four 
months between the reversal o f the trend in inflation and that in Treasury bill rates [...].
In 1994 the increase in official rates and Treasury bill rates occurred before consumer 
prices accelerated (Bank of Italy, Abridged Report, 1995: 84-85).21
It may be possible to pinpoint instances where retrospectively the central bank 
does not seem to have been ‘tough’ enough. It may be claimed that the Bank of Italy 
lowered interest rates too much in 1994 and that it did not raise interest rates 
sufficiently to prevent the surge in inflation in 1995. However it would be wrong to 
assume that this was due to a lack of independence. On the one had, the monetary 
stance and monetary outcomes disconfirm that the Bank of Italy was responsive to 
domestic pressure. On the other hand, the Bank did raise interest rates three times 
during this period: in August 1995 immediately after the emergence of increasing 
inflation, and in February and May 1996 when interest rates were raised by 0.75 
respectively. If the Bank did not raise interest further, then this was primarily due to 
economic rather than political considerations. Since the higher inflation was the 
result of one-off measures such as a VAT increase and the effect of lira weakness, 
the Bank was presumably cautious about not tightening its policy too much since the 
inflationary pressures in the economy were expected to be only temporary.
Indeed political pressure during the 1994-95 period did not seem particularly 
strong at least compared to periods of slow or negative growth. Thus the Bank 
certainly had fewer ‘incentives’ to loosen policy than for example during the low- 
growth period of 1996 and early 1997. All this supports the claim that the Bank 
behaved in a much more independent and hawkish manner than before. Indeed, even 
The Economist acknowledged that Governor Fazio had established an international
21 The greater efficiency of banking and financial markets that resulted from various ‘technical’ 
reforms increased the speed with which market rates react to changes in official rates. This also 
contributed to the central bank’s increased ability to control of inflation (Eizenga 1993; Passacantando 
1996).
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reputation as an inflation hawk {The Economist, 8 November 1997) -  a rare 
compliment indeed.
As regards the second objection, the preceding detailed analysis of monetary 
policy shows that decisions on monetary policy were above all concerned with price 
stability and were rather unresponsive to domestic political pressure. Certainly, there 
is some interpretational scope with regard to whether individual monetary policy 
decisions reflected political pressures - even after accounting for the presence of 
objective macroeconomic circumstances and projections. However, in addition to the 
historical analysis, which on the whole indicates how the Bank resisted domestic 
political pressure, probably the most convincing indicator of the central bank’s 
independent policy stance was reflected in its ability to announce an annual inflation 
target and meet it.
Moreover, Italian monetary policy even met the government inflation targets as 
laid out in the long-term financial programme four out of six times between 1992 and 
1998 as compared to once out of seven times between 1984-91. Certainly, favourable 
fiscal and wage policies facilitated the realisation of these targets after 1992. 
However, the Bank met its inflation target three out of four times (Table 6-3). This 
indicator is particularly revealing, especially as the central bank -  relative to the 
second half of the 1980s -  faced massive political pressure to ease monetary policy.
Table 6-3 Inflation Targets and Actual Inflation, 1984-1998
(in per cent)
YEAR GOVERNMENT
TARGET
ACTUAL
INFLATION
YEAR GOVERNMENT
TARGET
CENTRAL
BANK
TARGET
ACTUAL
INFLATION
1984 10.0 10.8 1992 4.5 — 5.3
1985 7.0 9.2 1993 4.5 — 4.6
1986 6.0 5.9 1994 3.5 . . . 4.1
1987 4.0 4.7 1995 4.7 4.5* 5.2
1988 4.5 5.0 1996 3.9 4.0 4.0
1989 4.0 6.3 1997 2.5 3.0 2.0
1990 4.5 6.5 1998 1.8 2.0 2.0
1991 5.0 6.3
Source: Bank of Italy, Abridged Report [various years]; OECD Economic Surveys Italy [various years]
* net of the effect of indirect tax increases
With regard to the third possible objection according to which the more 
conservative monetary stance might just be a reflection of a cultural change or
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underlying domestic societal and political coalitions, the above analysis has amply 
shown that the central bank was criticised and urged to pursue a less stringent 
monetary policy by all important domestic groups and actors, including the 
government. Not only did the Bank of Italy not give in to demands from industry and 
trade unions, but it was also unresponsive to more or less explicit criticism from the 
government and its leading members. Thus in defiance of all those forces, the central 
bank successfully pursued and achieved its price stability objectives. Hence the 
relationship between central bank independence and monetary policy is not spurious 
and the restrictive central bank policy was anchored in institutional change, thus 
confirming the institutionalist argument.
Counterfactually it is difficult to imagine that the Bank would have been 
unresponsive to societal pressure, and in particular to politicians* criticism in the 
absence of the 1992-93 reforms. On the one hand, there was a general consensus 
regarding ERM membership during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
which was shared by both the Italian government and the Bank of Italy and which 
was part of the reason why the government did not interfere with central bank policy. 
On the other hand, though, Italian monetary policy under a floating regime certainly 
left a much greater scope for debate and conflict. Had the central bank not been 
independent, monetary policy and monetary outcomes would very probably have 
been different. Even if the government was unlikely to question the objective of 
inflation convergence in principle, the government would have been tempted to 
lower interest rates in order to relieve the burden of fiscal adjustment and ease fiscal 
convergence or -  not being able to deflect domestic criticism of monetary policy -  
would have been inclined to give in to industry and trade union pressure.22 This 
would have had an effect on the Bank’s policy stance. Either way it would have 
resulted in a less restrictive monetary policy and higher inflation. Hence the 
institutional separation of monetary and fiscal policy removed the temptation of the 
government to resolve the tension of achieving simultaneously disinflation and a 
reduction of the debt burden.
22 Judging from press coverage, the unions seem to have been much more cautious about criticising 
the Bank of Italy than industry. There were two reasons for this. On the one hand, the unions’ 
commitment to an incomes policy meant that higher-than-programmed inflation would result in the 
erosion of real wages. On the other hand, they had a strong commitment to joining EMU and hence to 
achieving inflation convergence. This is why trade union criticism of interest rate policy was far more 
moderate than the criticism voiced by Confindustria (Interview with CISL official, 26 October 2000, 
Rome; cf  Chapter 5).
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Hence institutional reform introduced a policy of greater far-sightedness than 
would have been case in the absence of institutional reform. Moreover, although this 
cannot be measured, the increased credibility of Italian monetary policy - after 
granting formal independence to the central bank - certainly decreased the 
nervousness of international financial markets and ceteris paribus had a positive 
effect on monetary performance (that is, interest rates and the exchange rate).
What does the above analysis suggest with regard to the concept of executive 
strength? By transferring decision-making responsibility to an independent central 
bank, the Italian executive paradoxically increased its autonomy and strength. At 
least this is true in the context of European monetary convergence and the specific 
goal of Italian monetary policy to achieve monetary convergence and price stability. 
In other words by granting the Bank of Italy full discretion over the conduct of 
monetary policy, the Italian government succeeded in ‘tying its hands’. Similar to the 
decision to join the ERM in 1979, the transfer of monetary policy responsibility 
away from the (weak) government to an independent agent allowed the Italian 
government to deflect pressure and criticism with regard to the conduct of monetary 
policy (Oatley 1997: chapter 5). This certainly increased the government’s strength -  
at least in terms of achieving its long-term objectives (that is, inflation convergence).
Moreover, central bank independence was also important with regard to its 
ability to affect the behaviour of other actors in the areas of wage, fiscal and pension 
reform. In the absence of central bank independence, the government would have 
been tempted to press the Bank of Italy to pursue a less tight monetary policy in 
order to compensate for the inability of a weak government to implement policy 
reforms in other areas. This temptation would have been particularly strong in the 
absence of a direct external constraint after 1992. In short, domestic-institutional 
reform - and more particularly the greater independence of the central bank - was 
instrumental with regard to achieving monetary convergence.
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7 DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS, EXECUTIVE 
STRENGTH AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY
The proper study of politics is not man but institutions (John Plamenatz quoted in Sartori 1997 [1994]: IX)
In this concluding chapter the results of this study are summarised and discussed. 
Then the Italian case is contrasted with the French case to demonstrate the wider 
applicability and heuristic utility of the domestic-institutional approach. The 
following section places this study in the context of the current academic debate on 
economic internationalisation and domestic politics and suggests aspects for further 
study. Finally, the sustainability of Italian EMU membership is evaluated.
7.1 The Institutional Determinants o f  Macroeconomic Policy
and a Changing International Environment: The Case o f Italy
As pointed out in Chapter 1, a purely historical approach is rich in detail but 
generally not comparative. This study has sought to combine cross-national 
statistical, comparative and case study methods in order to understand how Italy was 
able to achieve major macroeconomic reform in the 1990s and meet the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. By doing so, it demonstrated how institutional factors that had 
strongly influenced Italian macroeconomic policy up to the early 1990s were 
overcome and macroeconomic convergence achieved.
The Italian economy had entered the 1990s with relatively high inflation, 
excessive public debt, and an institutional framework characterised by executive 
weakness, an unsustainable pension regime, wage indexation, uncoordinated private 
sector wage bargaining and limited central bank independence. During the 1990s, 
substantial policy reform in all relevant areas took place. What makes the policy 
adjustment particularly impressive is that it happened during a period of recession 
and sluggish economic growth and in the absence of any substantial institutional 
strengthening of the executive. Given that the Italian political system and the 
economic policy-making regime were still characterised by a high degree of internal 
fragmentation, the diffusion of responsibility and a great number of veto points, 
successful macroeconomic convergence was surprising indeed.
What clearly emerged from the analysis of Italian macroeconomic policy is the 
crucial role played by external pressure. However, despite the importance of
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international pressure, this study has argued that Italian macroeconomic convergence 
cannot be properly understood without taking into account the role played by 
domestic institutions. On the whole, institutional obstacles were overcome thanks to 
the reluctance of various political and societal actors to be regarded as responsible 
for causing a financial crisis or Italy’s failure to join EMU. This enhanced both the 
autonomy and the power of an otherwise weak executive and thus created a window 
of opportunity to achieve policy reform. However, the executive’s autonomy and 
power were still strongly circumscribed.
In addition to international market pressure, Italian economic policy has also to 
be seen in the context of an overwhelming and almost all-encompassing consensus 
regarding the desirability of EMU membership. All major political parties were 
characterised by pro-European attitudes (Istituto Affari Intemazionali 1993: 44-46). 
All relevant interest groups were publicly in favour of EMU, if for different reasons: 
industry and finance were pro-EMU because of the effect convergence and monetary 
union was going to have on monetary policy and public finance; trade unions 
favoured EMU because of the social policy and political goals related to EMU 
(Talani 2000: chapter 6).
Besides the attitudes of economic and political elites, public opinion showed 
considerable enthusiasm -  indeed the greatest support among all European countries 
for most of the 1992-98 period - for European integration as well as EC and EU 
membership (Commission of the European Communities 1998). Moreover, Italian 
public opinion in favour of EMU was by far the strongest among all European 
countries, even in the face of the major sacrifices that resulted from economic 
reforms. In 1996, for example, after three years of restrictive macroeconomic 
policies, 78 per cent of Italians were in favour of EMU, while only 9 per cent were 
opposed to it. This made Italian public opinion the most pro-EMU by far (see Figure 
1- 1).
At the same time, Italians have always displayed the highest level of 
dissatisfaction with their own political system and government. In 1994 only 19 per 
cent of Italians were satisfied as against 77 per cent dissatisfied (Commission of the 
European Communities 1994). Under these circumstances, assuming responsibility 
for either a financial crisis or for the failure to join EMU was something none of the 
major political and societal actors were willing to risk. This was so despite the fact
230
that macroeconomic adjustment imposed considerable short-term costs on Italian 
society (Brunetta and Tronti 1995; Simonazzi and Vianello 1998).
The emphasis on domestic institutions does not imply that individual 
leadership was unimportant. It certainly was in the cases of the Amato, Ciampi and 
Prodi governments. Nonetheless, personal leadership was circumscribed by 
institutional constraints (as Berlusconi experienced). On various occasions, these 
constraints were softened thanks to international pressure. Nonetheless, institutions 
were constraints on actions and tended to circumscribe (though not in an absolute 
way) potential outcomes. Although the underlying institutional logic characterising 
Italian macroeconomic policy was partly weakened by international pressure, the 
results of policy reforms provided ample evidence for the continued influence of 
domestic institutions - if not in terms of obstructing policy reform -  then at least in 
terms of shaping reform outcomes. This demonstrates that the interplay between 
external pressure and domestic institutions is central to an understanding of reform: 
The effectiveness of government strategies and the opportunities provided by broad 
currents of public opinion will always depend to some extent on contingent aspects of 
the political and economic situation. Nonetheless [...], both distributive conflicts and 
the possibilities for sustained adjustment will depend heavily on more institutionalized 
patterns of political representation (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 30).
The study also suggests that Italian macroeconomic ‘politics’ can be 
categorised in terms of ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ politics (cf. Financial Times, 27 
October 1995). Put more concisely, under ‘normal’ circumstances (that is, permissive 
international environment) the logic of domestic institutions prevails, while under 
‘extraordinary’ circumstances (that is, restrictive international environment) other 
influences override domestic politics and institutions to bring about policy results 
that could not have been achieved in normal times. However, crisis and international 
pressure have always to be analysed in the context of agency and, above all, the 
constraining effect of domestic institutions.
Crisis is clearly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to initiate reform. It has 
nevertheless often played a critical role in stimulating reform. In extreme cases [...] the 
crisis of the ancient regime may be so profound as to create an opening for [...] 
‘extraordinary politics’ -  a widespread willingness to suspend the usual political rules 
(Williamson and Haggard 1994: 565).
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In the Italian context, this meant that executive weakness, partitocrazia and 
veto power of societal interests were ‘suspended’, or - to put it more conceptually - 
veto points (and institutional obstacles) were ‘neutralised’, even if only temporarily 
and to varying degrees. This suspension of rules had an important effect on executive 
strength and autonomy.
Extraordinary circumstances created both greater consensus and provided the 
government with greater autonomy to initiate and achieve policy reform. It is fair to 
say that institutionally speaking the Italian political system - characterised by a weak 
executive, strong parliament, medium-strong societal actors - is a ‘system of 
bargained pluralism’ {cf Chapter 2) in which the executive is but one actor among 
many. Extraordinary circumstances tend to increase the relative ‘bargaining position’ 
of the executive and suspend to a certain degree the ‘rules of the game’ and thus 
make it possible to achieve policy innovation. On those occasions, to paraphrase 
Allum (1973), one may actually talk of a ‘republic with a government’.
My contention is then that the interaction between international pressure and 
underlying institutional conditions tended to make Italian macroeconomic policy 
move in cycles - with ‘state’ autonomy as an important intervening variable. This is 
also consistent with the observation in Chapter 2 according to which Italian policy is 
to a very high degree of a reactive type {cf Dente 1990). The lack of executive 
autonomy and fragmentation of decision-making in macroeconomic policy-making 
prevents the imposition of coherent, long-term, sustainable policies. The inability to 
produce goal-directed, anticipating policies is the reason why macroeconomic policy 
responds to domestic factors during ‘normal times’ but to international factors during 
‘extraordinary times’. ‘Revolutionary politics’ and reform take place during the 
latter. Once the situation stabilises and international pressure becomes weaker, the 
domestic consensus breaks down and the logic of domestic institutions re-emerges. 
Politics will revert back to ‘normal’ politics. This results in a cyclical pattern of 
policy that remains nonetheless re-active at all times. It is certainly no coincidence 
that the Prodi government fell after Italy had achieved EMU membership. The fact 
that the 1999 budget, which was the issue over which Prodi was forced to resign, 
contained the smallest fiscal adjustment in years further corroborates this view 
{Financial Times, 21 September 1998). (To what extent this domestic-institutional 
logic may have been modified as a result of the 1992-98 reforms in the various 
relevant policy areas will be discussed below.)
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Hence in terms of the classical distinction between international, societal, 
domestic-institutional and cognitive-ideational factors (Hall 1997), this study 
emphasises the importance of domestic institutions for a proper understanding of 
Italian convergence. As for societal explanations, Walsh (1999) suggests that Italian 
macroeconomic adjustment can be understood as a result of distributional-societal 
politics in which the victory of a ‘exposed sector coalition’ (including employers 
and unions in these sectors) made possible the transition from a purely monetary- 
based to a comprehensive macroeconomic adjustment (including fiscal policy). 
Interestingly, Walsh (1999) considers the potential relevance of domestic 
institutions:
Italy experienced little change in the institutions governing politics, the labour market, 
and the financial system from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The only leverage over 
institutional effects is the case of electoral and party institutions. An electoral system 
based on proportional representation and a political system with many parties, are often 
seen as the underlying causes of Italy’s series of short-lived coalition governments, but 
these institutionally derived characteristics had little effect in the timing and content of 
macroeconomic adjustment (p. 81).
This reveals a rather narrow -  deterministic - view of institutions. I agree that 
the ‘political-institutional’ changes were of limited importance with regard to policy 
change. It is also true that contingent circumstances (such as the weakening of 
traditional parties, technocratic governments) played a role in bringing about 
macroeconomic adjustment. However, neither of these contingent circumstances can 
explain policy reform during the 1992-98 period in its entirety. Not only did 
institutional change take place in other areas and was important with respect to 
policy change (for example, monetary policy), but a purely societal interpretation - 
like the one proposed by Walsh - discounts the possibility that executive strength can 
vary as a result of external pressure (for theoretical implications see Section 7.3 
below). In particular, the societal approach neglects the government’s scope for 
autonomous action, especially in a crisis situation. To give an example: as described 
in Chapter 3, in 1996 prominent voices among the economic-financial elite took a 
rather cautious attitude towards the strong fiscal adjustment proposed by the 
government in view of meeting the convergence criteria. Nonetheless, the 
government, and more specifically the prime minister and the finance minister, 
forced the issue and pursued fiscal tightening in order to meet the 1997 deficit
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criteria. Similarly, Chapter 4 demonstrated how the government was able to set the 
agenda and ‘force’ trade unions to accept further pension cuts as a result of 
increasingly powerful external constraints: in 1992, Amato was able to override 
potential trade union and parliamentary opposition; in 1995, the Dini government 
pushed the rather reluctant unions to accept pension reform; in 1997, the Prodi 
government once more pushed the unions to accept further reform. Clearly, the trade 
unions were not enthusiastic supporters of these reforms. Chapter 6 showed that there 
was considerable societal opposition to the Bank of Italy’s monetary policy. It was 
only in the wage policy area, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, that the unions changed 
their position quite considerably. But even in this area reform was not uncontested. 
In short, the 1990s did not bring about a major re-alignment of the trade unions as the 
most important interest groups. As demonstrated, the domestic-institutional-cwm- 
extemal-constraint approach provides a much better explanation.
Finally, some accounts have emphasised the importance of ideas (McNamara
1998). This study has not dealt with ideational factors in detail - other than 
suggesting that the presence of a pro-European attitude in Italy was very important. 
The importance of other ideational factors such as ideology and discourse seems to 
have been spurious, or at least dependent on the presence of external pressure.
First, it has been acknowledged that ‘ideas’ changed (for example, among the 
trade union leadership with regard to wage policy). This change of ideas, however, 
was mainly induced by external pressure (such as capital mobility, exchange rate 
instability and loss of international competitiveness). Something similar is certainly 
true with respect to pension reform where trade unions came to accept a contribution- 
based system as a result of the obvious unsustainability of the eamings-related 
system and the pressing need to achieve reform - rather than a new-found enthusiasm 
for a contribution-based system and the introduction of complementary private 
pensions. These examples suggests that the independent causal influence of ideas on 
macroeconomic policy change was marginal at best. Second, one might argue that 
discourse (that is, the self-conscious use of symbolisms, appeal to identity of actors 
rather than their material interests) can explain macroeconomic policy reform. It is 
certainly true that the government used discourse to overcome potential opposition to 
its policies. Between 1992-95, Italian government appealed to societal and political 
actors to help overcome the political and economic crisis Italy was facing by 
appealing to their sense of responsibility and the need to achieve a national
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consensus. After 1996, the government invoked the need for Italy to join EMU and 
thus continue to be at the forefront of European integration. The government thus 
appealed to Italians’ self-identity and thus appealed to various societal and political 
actors to overcome narrow partisan interest for the benefit of the country. 
Nonetheless, the importance of ‘discourse’ was still limited in an explanatory sense.
While government appeals to societal and political actors and its attempt to 
‘sell’ policies were clearly important in mobilising support and overcoming 
traditional institutional obstacles, this kind of discourse could only be effective in the 
presence of a real external constraint. Put differently, in the absence of the economic 
and political crisis and the EMU constraint, appeals to the national interest would 
hardly have been successful. This suggests that, on the whole, ideational accounts do 
not perform as well as the institutionalist-cwm-extemal constraint account. Discourse 
-  however exaggerated at times -  always also reflected the existence of real external 
constraints. In other words, for discourse to be effective, an external constraint had to 
exist.
To speak of institutional learning -  thus invoking the dynamic aspect of 
institutions -  seems by and large unsatisfactory. This study has argued that politics is 
about power, and power is to a very high degree determined by domestic institutional 
arrangements. All four analysis chapters provide plenty of evidence that policy 
reform was about the executive trying ‘get its way’ in the face of opposition from a 
variety of political and societal actors. Moreover, the uneven course of reform during 
the 1992-97 period (and the post-1997 experience) showed the domestic-institutional 
logic that dominated Italian politics re-emerged, if indeed, it had ever disappeared. 
However, if learning is a gradual, cumulative process, then an explanation of Italian 
economic policy reform in terms of learning is not satisfactory.
More generally, had a major realignment of interest groups occurred, had 
ideational factors been crucial, or had learning occurred, the history and nature of 
Italian policy reform should have been much more continuous and progressive -  and 
even easier to achieve. However, the fact that government stability increased and the 
reform of budgetary and pension policy slowed down after 1997 (that is, after the 
relaxation of the external constraints) strongly suggests that the domestic- 
institutionalist-cMm-extemal-constraint framework provides the most adequate 
explanation for Italian macroeconomic policy reform in the 1990s.
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Similarly, a purely international, systemic-functional approach (such as the 
capital mobility hypothesis, the optimal currency theory, or trade integration) 
interprets Italian adjustment as a simple response to international pressure and 
disregards the importance of domestic-institutional factors. By constrast, this study 
argued that in order to account for the nature of adjustments as well as for the nature 
of institutional changes, it is necessary to take into account domestic institutions. In 
any case, the case study of Italy shows that domestic politics interfered with a 
‘natural’ tendency towards functionally efficient adjustment. For example, with 
regard to the belated budgetary policy reform, the pension problem or the problems 
related to wage policy, it is clear that domestic institutions mattered.
While neither approach can explain Italian policy reform entirely, the domestic- 
institutional-CMm-intemational-constraint approach performs best. No doubt, other 
factors affected economic policy at times -  but only in a contingent way. This is 
entirely consistent with the historical-institutionalist framework adopted in this 
study. In short, there was no major re-alignment of interest groups; ideational factors 
were only effective due to the presence of considerable international constraints; 
institutional learning cannot explain the uneven nature of policy reform; a pure 
systemic-functional approach cannot explain the difficulties economic policy reform 
encountered (nor why it was so slow and insufficient at times). In short, a historical- 
institutionalist with a special emphasis on international constraints seems to be the 
most appropriate way of understanding Italian macroeconomic policy and policy 
change in the 1990s.
7.2 Extending the Argument: The Strong French ‘State’ and 
Macroeconomic Convergence in the 1990s
The argument so far has primarily relied on counterfactual reasoning before a 
background of institutionalist hypotheses that found a certain measure of 
confirmation in statistical and comparative studies. In methodological terms, this 
study represents a ‘deviant’ case study in the sense that it examines a case that did 
not fit the predictions of institutionalist theory. Contrasting the weak Italian with the 
strong French ‘state’1 thus represents a further test of the institutionalist argument.
1 A comparison of Italy with another parliamentary regime might seem more interesting than a 
comparison with the French semi-presidential regime. However, the point that I would like to make is 
that what matters is executive strength and executive autonomy. The executive can be strong or weak
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The French Political System: Institutions and Actors
A sketch of French institutions and policies offers interesting insights concerning the 
institutionalist approach to macroeconomic policy. Traditionally the French ‘state’ 
represents the ideal-type of a strong ‘state’. Cultural as well as historical factors have 
contributed to this: (1) an absolutist, centralised ‘state’ and bureaucracy dating back 
to the 17th century; (2) an ideology that emphasised anti-corporatism; and (3) the 
glorification of the ‘state’ and individualism (Ehrmann 1983: 182-183). The 
constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 certainly put into place institutional 
structures that reflect these traditions and created an ‘executive-dominated’ political 
system.
Studies have confirmed the importance of ‘state’-centred policy networks in 
France that affect both content and continuity of various economic policies 
(Katzenstein 1976; Zysman 1977a, 1977b; Zysman 1977b; Hall 1986). A highly 
centralised, unified and powerful executive relative to decentralised and divided 
societal actors tends to produce coherent and consistent policies with little 
interference from societal actors or parliament (Simonian 1985; Kaltenthaler 1997; 
Josselin 1997; Walsh 1994; Goodman and Pauly 1993; Cemy 1989; Loriaux 1991; 
Hayward 1986). Even though some studies critique the ‘strong state’ thesis, mainly 
by pointing out that the French government’s capacity to implement policies should 
be distinguished from its autonomy to formulate them (Feigenbaum 1985; Milner 
1987, 1988), the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that policy in France is 
characterised by executive-domination. This ‘strength’ and ‘autonomy’ have their 
roots in the institutional characteristics of the French political system. A brief sketch 
of the institutional features that underpin executive strength will have to suffice here.
On the political-institutional level, the French government is undoubtedly 
strong. The French government has wide-ranging powers with regard to intervention 
in parliamentary deliberations and adoption of legislation. In fact, its proposal and 
decree powers place the executive in a dominant position with respect to the 
legislative process. The government has considerable powers with regard to 
determining agenda items and their order of consideration and can demand ‘package
with regard to macroeconomic policy-making in both parliamentary and presidential systems (for 
example, UK, USA). Clearly, a comparison of two parliamentary regimes would more clearly 
underline the importance of the features of the electoral system. A stylised comparison with the 
German and British parliamentary systems is suggested in Table 7-1 below.
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votes’ and declare a vote of confidence. Parliamentary committees cannot block the 
final consideration of legislation by not reporting it. Parliament’s amendment powers 
are very limited. The government proposes and accepts amendments. The 
government can even issue decrees that permit it to modify laws. Furthermore, the 
constitution allows a vast domain to be regulated by executive decrees. The strong 
position of the executive relative to the legislature is the reason why the French 
parliament has been described as an ‘arena legislature’ as opposed to a 
‘transformative legislature’ (Polsby 1975). In the former, the executive largely 
controls the outcomes of the legislative process. In the latter, parliament puts its own 
imprint on legislation by originating, modifying or even ‘killing’ legislation. While 
the Italian parliament is of a ‘transformative’ type in that it possesses considerable 
influence on the final legislative outcomes, the French parliament is primarily a body 
that enacts government proposals and is hence of an ‘arena’ type.
The executive is powerful not only because it has many tools to intervene in 
the legislative process but also because it is largely independent from parliament. 
The French president is directly elected for a seven-year term and has extensive 
powers, especially concerning the nomination of the prime minister and the 
dissolution of the Assemblee Nationale (National Assembly) - cohabitation excepted. 
Ministers are responsible for the various policy sectors but they have only limited 
power (unlike in Italy). This is so because “[t]he Prime Minister of the Fifth Republic 
is not simply a primus inter pares. He or she can impose decisions, take strong 
measures and force a recalcitrant Minister to submit or to resign” (Meny 1996: 129- 
130).
Finally, the electoral system of the National Assembly is a two-ballot majority 
system (uninominal a deux tours). This system tends to produce bi-polarisation as it 
forces parties to seek alliances. However, contrary to the British first-past-the-post 
system, the French system has resulted in a system of multi-party bi-polarity. The 
multi-party aspect is - contrary to Italy - not a problem as the majority tends to be 
relatively cohesive as a result of the overwhelming powers of the executive. This 
aspect means that a comparison of the French and Italian electoral systems is only of 
limited usefulness to the extent to which the Fifth Republic is a semi-presidential 
regime and in that the parliament, on which the executive depends, finds a 
counterweight in the president. Hence to attribute executive strength solely to the 
bipolar tendency of the electoral system would certainly underestimate the
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importance of the strong position the prime minister has as a result of its (generally) 
close relationship with the president. In fact, the post-1994 Italian experience 
suggests that bipolar multi-partyism results -  or at least can result - in ‘weak’ 
executives. Nonetheless, it is clear that the French electoral regime of the Fifth 
Republic has resulted in a bipolar structure that is characterised by greater coherence 
than a purely proportional electoral regime.
The most outstanding feature of the French political system relative to the 
Italian one is the position of the executive vis-a-vis parliament (Suleiman 1980). On 
balance, the executive’s power of dissuasion (dissolution of parliament) is more 
powerful than parliament’s power of dissuasion (vote of no confidence), which in 
combination with the extensive powers of the executive to interfere in the legislative 
process gives rise to a strongly executive-dominated regime. Hence it is fair to say 
that the Fifth Republic combines the virtues of both presidential and parliamentary 
regimes. As a semi-presidential system (except for periods of cohabitation), the 
French system combines the independence of the executive (typical of presidential 
systems) and the control over parliament (typical of parliamentary regimes - at least 
those with a low degree of parliamentary fragmentation). Very clearly, the French 
government is extremely strong, autonomous and centralised in terms of the 
decision-making process. In short, “the executive of the Fifth Republic is at the heart 
of the political system [...]. Efficiency, governmental solidarity, concentration of 
power and the authority of the leader take priority over pluralism, debate and a 
system of checks and balances” (Meny 1996: 137).
In addition to the institutional characteristics of the French ‘state’, the 
weakness of societal interests in France, which tend to be weakly organised and 
fragmented along ideological -  rather than functional - lines, further enhances the 
government’s strength (Wilson 1987; Labbe 1994). If the executive has traditionally 
been strong, societal interests have traditionally been weak. This weakness is of 
course partly the result of such features as the high degree of centralisation of 
decision-making and the weak position of parliament - both of which reduce the 
number of access points for societal groups.
All this demonstrates the considerable difference between the French and the 
Italian political systems in terms of executive strength. To evaluate the executive 
strength and institutionalist argument, it is necessary to establish how strong the 
executive is in the areas of budgetary, pension (and welfare), wage and monetary
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policy and to analyse how this strength affected policy outcomes. This will also 
allow for an evaluation of the importance of the other institutional characteristics that 
have been found to be important with regard to Italian macroeconomic policy.
Budgetary Policy-Making
The control of fiscal policy has never represented a serious problem in France. This 
was largely the result of a political system that is characterised by a powerful, 
cohesive and centralised executive and a weak parliament. The political-institutional 
features and budgetary institutions suggest that the French budgetary system comes 
close to being an ideal-type of a centralised, hierarchical and executive-dominated 
budgetary policy-making regime (Lord 1973; Le Cacheux 1994; OECD 1995a: 109- 
13; Von Hagen 1992). For example, all finance laws are reserved to government 
initiative. Parliament is prohibited from initiating increases in public expenditures or 
reductions in government revenues. Combined with the features of executive 
dominance, a high degree of prime-ministerial authority within the cabinet, the 
centralisation of the budgetary process and the power and prestige of the finance 
ministry (Mamou 1988), the French executive is extremely powerful and is able to 
pursue and impose its preferences without undue interference from other actors.
Not only does the constitution forbid parliament to increase costs or decrease public 
revenue, but the government is reluctant to accept proposals affecting its own plans, even 
when they imply no extra cost, or would bring in extra revenue in ways unacceptable to 
the Minister of Finance. This curtailment of powers is considerable by comparison with 
Italy or the United States, where the assemblies have sizeable prerogatives over revenue 
and expenditure (Meny 1996: 120).
The French executive enjoys insulation and is in a dominant position vis-a-vis 
parliament in terms of political-institutional and budgetary-procedural 
characteristics. The contrast with Italian fiscal policy-making could not be greater 
(cf. Section 2.2).
France was never close to experiencing excessive fiscal deficits and public debt 
comparable to Italy in the 1980s and early 1990s (Figures 7-1 and 7-2).
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Figure 7-1 General Government Net Borrowing, 1982-1998
(as share of GDP)
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Figure 7-2 General Government Gross Financial Liabilities, 1982-1998
(as a share of GDP)
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After the 1982-83 reversal of budgetary policy, the French government 
achieved fiscal consolidation with relative ease during the 1980s (Virard 1993; Muet 
and Fonteneau 1990; Walsh 1994; Le Cacheux 1994). The increase in the budget 
deficit between 1992 and 1994 reflected a looser fiscal policy stance in response to 
stagnating growth and an extremely restrictive monetary policy that aimed at
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defending the parity with the German mark rather than domestic inflation. The 
relative looseness of fiscal policy was has to be regarded as a conscious response to 
economic pressure rather than as an inability to control budgetary policy.
This - and hence the ‘executive dominance’ argument -  is supported by events 
after 1994 when subsequent French governments that were elected on the promise to 
pursue (expenditure-increasing) employment policies were able retract on their 
promises and pursue policies of fiscal consolidation instead. Thus the Juppe (1995- 
97) and the Jospin (1997- ) governments achieved fiscal convergence with relative 
ease. Admittedly, the 1995 strikes in response to the Juppe government consolidation 
policies led the government to accept negotiations with the trade unions. But these 
negotiations primarily concerned pension reform and the government was still able to 
achieve the larger part of its intended budgetary savings from health reform (see next 
section). On the whole, there can be no doubt that despite considerable resistance to 
fiscal austerity from unions, public opinion, voters and opposition parties, successive 
French governments were able to pursue sustainable and long-term-oriented 
budgetary policies (Cameron 1996).
Welfare and Pension Reform
Compared to budgetary policy, the position of the French government in (welfare 
and) pension policy is less strong. On the one hand, the French pension policy­
making regime is characterised by a strong, insulated executive with considerable 
control over the legislature. Furthermore, trade unions, the traditional defenders of 
the welfare state, are rather weak. This gives the executive - at least from an 
institutional point of view - a strong ability to formulate, legislate and implement 
reform. On the other hand, the French pension system is primarily Bismarckian: it 
has a compulsory pay-as-you-go pension system financed out of contributions which 
- similar to the Italian system of the early 1990s - is characterised by great 
complexity and fragmentation (that is, regime general, regimes complementaires, 
regimes speciaux); the latter regime covers mainly public employees in public 
companies and utilities (such as railway and postal service). Employees in these 
sectors generally enjoyed special privileges (Damaut 1997; Taylor-Gooby 1999; 
Bonoli and Palier 1996; Bonoli 1997; for detailed description see Brindisi 2000: 95- 
109).
242
In the early 1990s, there clearly was a need for social expenditure and more 
specifically pension reform (Beduc 1993). In general, French social security accounts 
of the general scheme began to be characterised by deficits. In 1993 borrowing 
reached more than FRFlOObn (or 1.4 per cent of GDP) and remained at a level of 
around 1 per cent in 1995 (Damaut 1997: 209-211; OECD Economic Surveys France 
1997: 47). The major sources of this financial imbalance were the health and old-age 
functions. In 1995, for example, the deficit of the general pension scheme was 
FRF39.5bn (see Bonoli 2000: 130).
Clearly, any comparison with Italy faces limits as both countries face slightly 
different employment patterns, rates of demographic change and so on. However, on 
the traditional criteria for evaluating sustainability, the Italian situation was much 
more dramatic than the French situation - both in terms of the impact of the pension 
regime on the public deficit and in terms of spending as a share of GDP (Bonoli 
2000: 131; Figure 7-3) and especially regarding future expenditure trends (see 
Franco and Munzi 1997). The contribution rate to finance the increase in expenditure 
was projected to rise from 18.9 (1990) to 30.9 per cent (2040) in the best-case 
scenario and to 41.9 in the worst-case scenario (Bonoli 2000: 130).
Figure 7-3 Old-Age and Survivors’ Expenditure, 1980-1993 
(as a share of GDP)
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Interestingly it was in the pension policy area where the French government 
encountered considerable difficulties in bringing about reform and reducing the
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negative impact of pension spending on public finances (Le Cacheux 1994; 
Commission of the European Communities 1996a: 60-65).
In 1993 a reform that exclusively concerned the basic pension schemes, which 
accounted for 42 per cent of pension spending, took place. The pension reform under 
the Balladur government foresaw a ‘pension recovery plan’ which increased the 
general solidarity tax for a pension liability fund and introduced price indexation for 
pensions as well as a gradual extension of the contribution period. Although there 
was not as much opposition to the reform as in 1995, the government succeeded in 
making the social parties sign a tripartite protocol after threatening to regulate by 
decrees (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000). This indicates that the introduction of these 
changes was relatively easy. The most important elements were the following 
(Commission of the European Communities 1996a: 61):
•  pension adjustments were to be based on price dynamics rather than on wage dynamics
•  basic pensions were to be calculated on the 15 best-paid years.
•  the number of years required for the payment of a full pension was gradually raised from 
27.5 to 40
•  a new Fonds de Solidarite Vieillesse was created in order to transfer from the pension 
schemes to the central government the responsibility for welfare pension expenditure
The financial impact of the 1993 reform was largely due to the switch to price 
indexation. While in the absence of reform the ECR of the Caisse Nationale pour 
VAssurance Vieillesse (CNAV) would have increased from 18.5 (1995) to 24.5 per 
cent (2010), with the reforms it was projected to reach 22.5/19 per cent3 
(Commission of the European Communities 1996a: 61). As a result, the General 
Planning Committee (1995) estimated that the deficit would remain stable until 2005. 
In the longer term, the General Planning Committee expected an increase in the ECR 
of 5 points until 2015 and 14 points until 2040 instead of 9 and 20 points 
respectively. Confirming these projections, the OECD (.Economic Surveys France 
1995: 31-44) estimated that the 1993 reform would keep the general pension scheme 
close to balance until 2010 and that it would rapidly deteriorate thereafter, reaching a 
deficit of 4 per cent of GDP in 2030 (for similar results cf. Briet 1995). In short, the 
1993 reform guaranteed financial sustainability in the medium term {cf Bonoli 2000: 
141).
2 Since 1986 parliament decided on an annual basis whether to index pensions on wages or prices. De 
facto  pensions had been indexed on prices since 1987.
3 The first figure represents the projection on the basis of wage indexation, the second figure on the 
basis of price indexation.
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Until 2005, and conditional on a favourable macroeconomic environment, the social 
security system should not be subject to significant pressures. Until this time, the 
social security net borrowing would result mainly from the health insurance system, 
whereas the pension scheme, due to the effects of the July 1993 reform, would not as 
a whole experience financing difficulties (Damaut 1997: 232).
Considerable savings could have been achieved if the 1993 reform had been 
extended to the special schemes. The 1995 reform precisely sought to extend 1993 
reform to the special pension schemes (affecting primarily workers in the public 
sector) in order to achieve short-term savings as well as to pre-empt major 
imbalances that were expected to result from this scheme after the year 2000 (Briet 
1995).
In June 1995 the government laid out a timetable that foresaw a reduction of 
the budget deficit from 5 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 4 per cent in 1996 and 3 per 
cent in 1997. The reform of social security was to make a major contribution to 
achieving this goal. The 1995 reform concerned mainly health insurance.4 It also 
foresaw the reform of the special pension schemes. While the health reform was 
implemented by decree, the pension reform had to be postponed due to major strikes 
and societal opposition (Damaut 1997: 219). Announced by the Juppe government in 
November 1995, the pension reform proposal provoked the largest protest and strike 
movement since 1969. More specifically, the pension part of the Juppe plan foresaw 
the reform of the special pension schemes {regimes speciaux) by harmonising 
(downwards) benefit formulas and entitlement conditions of employees in the public 
sector, covered by regimes speciaux, with those of private sector employees, covered 
by the regime general.
4 The 1995 reform aimed at: (1) emergency measures to bring social accounts back to balance by 
1997; and (2) structural reforms aiming to constrain durably social and more specifically health 
expenditure. Among other measures, it created the Caisse d ’Amortissement de la Dette Sociale 
(CADES) which was to be financed through a special tax in order to pay back social security debt that 
was accumulated between 1995-1998 (ca. D34.15bn or around 3 per cent o f GDP). The reform also 
increased contribution rates in order to check the negative impact of the social security deficit on 
public finances (Brindisi 2000: 97; OECD Economic Surveys France 1997: 48-49). The accumulated 
social debt was to be funded by a new broad-based income tax (remboursement de la dette sociale or 
RDS), introduced in February 1996, which foresaw a 13-year amortisation period. In terms of public 
finances, in 1995 social security borrowing amounted to 0.8 per cent of GDP. The health reforms are 
estimated to have contributed 0.6 (1996) and 0.9 per cent (1997) to fiscal consolidation (p. 221), while 
the 0.7 (1996) and 0.9 per cent (1997) were raised through the RDS. These reforms made a substantial 
contribution to budgetary consolidation (Damaut 1997; OECD Economic Surveys France 1997: 48- 
49).
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The main opposition was concentrated almost exclusively in the public sector 
and in particular in a certain part of it, that is, public transport and utilities where 
unions had a high degree of disruptive power. The demonstrations also showed 
though that there was considerable support from the wider public. Due to massive 
protests, the government finally accepted to negotiate with the unions, and the plans 
for public-sector pension reform (as well as for restructuring of railway and postal 
service) were withdrawn.
At first sight, this seems to suggest that the strong French government could 
not do what the weak Italian government was able to do. It also seems to suggest that 
the institutionalist approach is inadequate. However, one needs to bear in mind that 
all three Italian pension reforms took place under radically different external 
circumstances. Unlike in Italy, without the threat of an impending fiscal crisis or 
EMU membership at stake and hence without regarding pension reform as absolutely 
necessary, the inclination to compromise on the part of French unions as well as the 
incentives for the French government to push through extremely unpopular reforms 
were less strong. It is also noteworthy that the French government was able to bring 
about ‘structural-institutional change’ in the social security area5 where changes were 
simply introduced by decree.
The French government’s failure to introduce reform in the pension area also 
shows that executive strength should not be over-estimated but needs to be analysed 
in its wider situational context. In terms of the theoretical concepts discussed above, 
the French government encountered the lock-in (or acquired rights) effect that was 
transmitted by highly mobilised groups in the public sector with a high degree of 
disruptive power.6 By contrast, the 1993 reform that only concerned the private 
sector passed without major problems. This was primarily due to the lesser union 
strength in the private sector. Nonetheless, whether due to executive strength or the 
weakness of unions in the private sector, on the whole, it is clear that the French 
government was more successful in controlling pension spending than the Italian 
one. French pension spending and its impact on public finance were relative to Italy 
at a sustainable level throughout the 1990s (Figure 7-3 above). Comparative OECD
5 In February 1996 parliament decided wide-ranging changes of the general orientations and political 
objectives of the social security system, such as administrative change in health care, changes in the 
constitution of social security boards, shift towards taxes rather than contributions (Taylor-Gooby 
1999: 8).
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studies also suggest that French policy is on a more sustainable path than the Italian 
one (Roseveare et al. 1996; Figure 7-4).7 In short, even though the French 
government failed to implement pension reform in 1995, French public pension 
policy is far more sustainable than the Italian one, thus suggesting the overall 
usefulness of the executive strength argument.
Figure 7-4 OECD Pension Expenditure Projections (baseline scenario)
(as a share of GDP)
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Private and Public Sector Wage Policy
The French industrial relations system in the private sector is characterised by a high 
degree of government involvement, mainly because of the weakness of French 
unionism (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996; Goetschy and Jobert 1998). Unions 
have traditionally been divided along ideological lines and have tended to oppose co­
operative relations with employers. Trade union weakness is reflected in terms of 
low union density, absence of access to policy-makers, limited financial resources 
and so on. Similarly, for a variety of reasons, employers have been paternalistic and 
reserved towards co-operation with the unions. Collective bargaining mainly takes 
place at the decentralised level, even though national-industry agreements -  if they 
exist at all - are automatically extended by the French government to the whole
6 The retreat of the French government in spring 2000 on the issue of the harmonisation of public and 
private pension schemes corroborates this view.
The definition of pension expenditure used by various studies differs slightly. But this does not 
affect the argument regarding pension expenditure trends, as the 1996 OECD study used identical 
definitions for standardised simulations (cf. M in is te ro  d e l  T eso ro  [2000: 28-30]).
Germany
 •  France
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sector. Overall, though, the existence of a weak, divided and declining union 
movement in the private sector was not able to create substantial wage-push 
inflation8 once the French government had decided to switch to a hard currency 
policy after 1983.
The dominance of the French government in wage policy is also evident in the 
public sector. A dominant ‘state’ with tight control over an economy-dominating 
public sector, the “collapse of union opposition” (Soskice 1990: 47; Boyer 1994) and 
the practice of extending wage hierarchy and settlements from the public to private 
sector results in a system of wage formation that is “highly institutionalized and 
centralized under the auspices of the state” (Boyer 1994: 55). Due to the weakness of 
trade unionism, the French government can moreover intervene in the private sector 
with relative ease in terms of job security legislation, unemployment benefits and 
minimum wages.
To the extent that the resurgence of Italian inflation after 1985 was the result of 
public - rather than private - sector wage policy (cf. Section 2.4), the difference in 
executive strength was a crucial factor. Contrary to the Italian government, the 
French government was able to control public wages thanks to its dominance over 
the wage-setting process. Given that public sector wage determination affects almost 
5 million people or almost a quarter of the French labour force (OECD 1997a: 52), 
public wage policy has a huge impact on economy-wide wages and inflation. The 
government unilaterally determines public sector wages within budgetary constraints. 
The national budget fixes the number of jobs per administrative department and sets 
limits to the increase of the total wage bill. And even though collective wage 
bargaining was formally introduced in the public sector in 1983 which formalised the 
right of trade unions to negotiate with the government nationally over pay, this did 
not undermine the ability of the government to set or freeze wage rates unilaterally in 
the public sector because if agreements are reached at all they are not legally binding. 
Moreover, negotiations are highly centralised for the entire public service conducted 
by the minister of public service - who is subject to the direct authority of the prime 
minister (Mosse and Tchobanian 1999). Finally, public sector strikes are strictly 
regulated and there exists an obligation to provide a minimum service and a ban on 
certain kinds of (disruptive) strikes.
8 Violent strikes are not uncommon in France and not infrequently force the government to
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The strong position of the executive in the wage determination process 
explains how the French government was able to do what the Italian government 
failed to do in terms of re-orienting macroeconomic policy towards further 
disinflation after the mid-1980s (Virard 1993; Muet and Fonteneau 1990; Onofri and 
Tomasini 1992; Walsh 1995). The importance of a strong and autonomous executive 
is further corroborated by the fact that French wage bargaining exhibited tendencies 
similar to Italy. Union density was much higher in the public than in the private 
sector; confederal unions were less and less capable of controlling occupational 
unions (so-called co-ordinations); and conflict in the private sector had been 
declining since the 1970s.
Despite these unfavourable characteristics, in terms of controlling public 
wages, the French government (in 1983) was able to index public sector wages on 
the official inflation target with no automatic clause for adjustment in case actual 
inflation overshot the forecast inflation rate.
Wages were not to be indexed to past inflation. Minimum wage increases were slowed.
Severe wage guidelines were set for the public sector and nationalized firms in order to 
initiate wage moderation to be diffused to the whole private sector. Job security 
legislation was relaxed. Welfare payments, including unemployment benefits, were 
slimmed (Boyer 1994: 59).
As regards French wage policy, after a relatively lax public wage policy in the 
early 1990s, which aimed to offset the rather tight monetary policy oriented towards 
the maintenance of a stable exchange rate with the German mark, the French 
government -  seeking to reduce the public deficit -  tightened public wage policy. 
The government decided that no negotiations would take place between 1995 and 
1998 and unilaterally decreed a nominal wage increase to maintain civil servants’ 
purchasing power (Eliot et a l 1999; Guillotin and Meurs 1999). In sum, both the 
1980s and 1990s demonstrate that the French government had sufficient institutional 
strength to control public wages effectively (Figure 7-5). Ultimately, this strength is 
grounded in the French executive’s tight control over public sector wages, its ability 
to intervene in private sector wage policy-making (Redor 1997), and its strong 
position relative to parliament and trade unions more generally.
compromise (especially farmers, truckers). These strikes rarely affect wage issues though.
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Figure 7-5 Compensation per Employee in the Business Sector, 1982-1998
(annual change in per cent)
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Source: OECD E co n o m ic  O u tlo o k  [various years]
Monetary Policy
Traditionally, monetary and exchange-rate policy-making in France was dominated 
by the executive in all relevant respects, such as the financing of government deficits, 
the control over interest rates and exchange rates, and in terms of the nomination of 
central bank decision-makers (Elgie and Thompson 1998: chapter 6; Goodman 1992: 
chapter 6; Cukierman et al. 1994).
In January 1994, a major institutional change took place when the Bank of 
France was transformed from an extremely dependent into a highly independent 
central bank. The Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) - Union pour la 
Democratic frangaise (UDF) majority proposed central bank reform in March 1993. 
This was partly a response to the commitment undertaken in the TEU concerning 
central bank independence. Partly it was due to the desire to strengthen the 
credibility of French monetary policy in the face of jittery international financial 
markets and in a context where the French government had already largely 
renounced an independent monetary policy as a result of ERM membership. 
Whatever opposition there may have been at the time (especially from the Direction 
du Tresor, political parties) the government proposal was adopted with minor but 
insubstantial amendments against the votes of the Parti communiste frangais (PCF),
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the Parti socialiste (PS) and over fifty majority MPs (Elgie and Thompson 1998:
The reform granted the Bank of France both economic and political independence 
(see Elgie and Thompson 1998: 134) and demonstrated the ease with which the 
government was able to implement reform.
What effect did the 1994 reform have subsequently on monetary policy? 
French monetary policy did not significantly change after the reform, as successive 
French governments had already been pursuing a successful low inflation policy 
(Figure 7-6).
Figure 7-6 Consumer Price Inflation, 1980-1998
Source: OECD E co n o m ic  O u tlo o k  [various years]
It is true that the Chirac government (1986-88) was less ‘anti-devaluationist’ 
than the various Socialist governments before and after (Cameron 1995, 1996). 
However, both under Beregovoy (1992-93) and Balladur (1993-95), the French 
government’s eagerness to cut interest rates more often than not prevailed over the 
concerns of the central bank. For example, after coming to power in March 1993, the 
Balladur government decided a gradual reduction in interest rates against the 
opposition of the Bank of France. The fact that this policy was reversed from August 
1993 onward reflects the government’s wish to maintain the stable exchange rate
132). Despite this opposition, the reform was never in danger of not being enacted.9
(annual change in per cent)
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9 Given that it was above all the French government that fought hardest for the creation of a politically 
dependent central bank, one might have expected greater resistance to central bank reform (see 
Mazzucelli 1997).
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with the German mark. This demonstrates that the conflict between government and 
central bank was over how to achieve the goal of preserving the exchange rate peg 
rather than the goal itself. Nonetheless, after the new central bank law had entered 
into force, a more cautious monetary policy prevailed (Aeschimann and Riche 1996).
This leads to the following conclusion: executive dominance (in terms of 
internal cohesion and insulation from outside pressure) can to a large extent serve as 
a substitute for central bank independence (similar Walsh 1994). Far from 
undermining the institutionalist argument, it actually demonstrates the importance of 
analysing different institutional variables in conjunction with one another. Hence 
central bank autonomy seems to be a more helpful instrument for weak governments 
than for strong ones in their pursuit of price stability. This can help explain why the 
Italian government ‘delegated’ monetary policy-making to the Bank of Italy in the 
early 1980s and subsequently abstained from interfering with its decisions. Had the 
Italian executive been stronger, the de facto delegation of monetary policy to the 
Bank of Italy would not have been necessary. It remains though that French central 
bank reform did have a visible effect on monetary policy, that is, it became more 
cautious.
Implications for the Institutionalist Argument
This admittedly brief and stylised history of the French politics of macroeconomic 
policy convergence corroborates the institutionalist argument overall: economic 
policy is to a high degree constrained and facilitated by domestic institutions; 
economic policy is particularly affected by executive strength (Table 7-1 below).
The French government’s institutional strength has been demonstrated after 
1982-83 as well as during the 1990s. This was why France never had to face a 
situation as dramatic as Italy in the early 1990s. If it is borne in mind that there was 
considerable opposition among public opinion, political parties and scholars to EMU 
as well as opposition to the government’s restrictive economic policies (Guyomarch 
et al. 1998: chapter 3; Fitoussi 1995), and that the economic consequences of these 
policies were partly responsible for the successive electoral defeats of various 
governments, then this indicates that French policy-makers had to face more adverse 
conditions in terms of public opinion than their Italian counterparts. This is 
illustrated by a few figures. In terms of the attitude of the electorate towards TEU, a 
majority of RPR supporters opposed Maastricht (67 per cent), which outweighed the
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pro-TEU attitudes of the UDF (58 per cent). The electorate of the left was broadly in 
favour of the TEU. The parties themselves exhibited similar attitudes towards TEU 
and hence by extension to EMU (c f Guyomarch et al. 1998: chapter 3). At the same 
time, French public opinion towards European integration and EMU was far less 
positive than the Italian one (see Figure 1-1). While the average support for EU 
membership among EU countries was on average around 50 per cent during the 
1990s, support in France decreased from a about 60 per cent in 1992 to below 50 per 
cent in 1996 and 1997. By contrast, support in Italy hovered around 70 per cent 
during the 1990s and actually increased to 75 per cent in late 1996. While support in 
France reflected the European average, Italian support for EU was consistently above 
the EU average (Commission of the European Communities 1998).
Table 7-1 Comparison of Institutional Characteristics of ‘Big Four’
EXECUTIVE BUDGET
POLICY
WAGE
POLICY
PENSION
POLICY
MONETARY
POLICY
France Executive
dominance
Executive regime Tight control of 
public wages/ 
private sector 
dominated by state 
(companies)
Influential unions 
in public sector 
only/ lock-in effect
(until 1994) 
dependent central 
bank
Italy No executive 
dominance
Parliamentary
regime
Uncertain control 
in public sector/ 
industry bargaining 
‘controlled 
decentralisation’ in 
private sector 
dominated by 
export-exposed 
metalworkers
Influential unions/ 
lock-in effect
(until 1993) partly 
dependent central 
bank
Germany Executive
dominance*
Parliamentary 
regime with strong 
executive 
prerogatives
Tight control over 
civil servants (less 
control over public 
employees); 
industry bargaining 
and ‘controlled 
decentralisation’ in 
private sector 
dominated by 
export-oriented 
industry unions
Influential unions/ 
lock-in effect
Independent, 
inflation-averse 
central bank
United
Kingdom
Executive
dominance
Executive regime De-centralised 
bargaining in 
public sector 
within budget 
limits/ de­
centralised 
bargaining in 
j>rivate sector
Executive 
dominance/ weak 
lock-in effect
(until 1997) 
dependent central 
bank
* Germany is certainly characterised by a strong executive (even if less strong than the British of French 
executives)
It is true that French policy-makers justified the franc fort policy as well as 
convergence with a strategy of so-called ‘competitive disinflation’. At least initially, 
this strategy had limited effects (Blanchard and Muet 1993; Fitoussi 1993). The
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policy was certainly not conducive to electoral success. Consecutive governments 
suffered dramatic defeats. This further corroborates the institutionalist argument. It 
was precisely its institutional capability that allowed the French government to 
pursue long-term pro-active policies, while the Italian government’s institutional 
weakness resulted in re-active and short-term policies.
It might be argued that the right’s overwhelming majority during the 1993-97 
legislative period was more important than the institutional factors underpinning 
executive dominance. But the relative continuity of monetary, public wage and 
budgetary policy under four different parliamentary majorities since 1983, including 
a minority government in 1986-88, suggests that the institutionalist approach 
provides a better explanation.
To sum up, consistent with the approach to institutions taken here, neither the 
pursuit of convergence policies nor the 1982-83 policy reversal was inevitable. This 
is also reflected in the fact that the French policy reversal of the early 1980s and the 
convergence policies of the 1990s have received widely differing explanations 
(Cameron 1995, Oatley 1997; Loriaux 1991; Aeschimann and Riche 1996; Vedrine 
1996). This is consistent with the historical-institutionalist argument defended in this 
study. As repeatedly pointed out, the ‘capability’ to act does not prejudge what kind 
of policy governments will pursue. However, if the government realises that policies 
will ran into an international constraint at some point and if it is in a position to 
prevent this, then it seems likely that the government will pursue system-conforming 
policies. Successive Italian governments -  quite apart from their willingness -  never 
had the ability to do this. The comparison of Italian policies and institutions hence 
confirms the usefulness of the institutionalist approach.
7.3 Historical Institutionalism , Institutional Convergence and
Directions fo r  Future Research
Having provided further evidence for the heuristic usefulness of the historical- 
institutionalist approach, it is necessary to discuss the implications of this case study 
for theory. The results of the case study also provide further insights into current 
academic debates concerning economic internationalisation and domestic 
convergence.
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Historical Institutionalism, Executive Strength and Macroeconomic Policy- 
Making
Historical institutionalist analysis is based on a few claims, namely,
that political processes can best be understood if they are studied over time; that 
structural constraints on individual actions, especially those emanating from government, 
are important sources of political behavior; and that the detailed investigation of carefully 
chosen, comparatively informed case studies is a powerful tool for uncovering the 
sources of political change (Pierson 1993: 596).
This is exactly what this study sought to do. The most important claims of the 
historical-institutionalist approach regarding institutional change are neatly 
summarised in the following quote:
Institutional structures do not respond in any rapid and fluid way to alteration in the 
domestic or international environment. Change is difficult. Incongruence between the 
needs and expressed demands of the state and various societal groups is the norm, not 
the exception. Institutional change is episodic and dramatic rather than continuous and 
incremental. Crises are of central importance (Krasner 1984: 234).
All of these claims have generally been confirmed by this study. First, Chapter 
2 argued at length that various domestic institutions had an independent effect on 
policy outcomes in the past. In Section 7.1 it was argued that, even though the logic 
of domestic institutions was overridden by external pressure, domestic institutions 
still had an impact on the content and nature of policy change. This shows that 
institutions are more than just simple epiphenomena, that is, they are not only the 
mere reflection of the domestic balance of power between competing groups or of 
the pressures of economic internationalisation. Second, institutions were also shown 
to be inert, that is, they were to a certain degree resistant to change despite domestic 
and international pressure. The continued executive weakness in fiscal policy­
making is only the most striking example. Third, institutional change is sporadic 
(rather than continuous), usually takes place in response to crises and -  when it does 
happen -  tends to be circumscribed by pre-existing institutions. This study of Italian 
macroeconomic reform demonstrated that increasing international pressure had to be 
supplemented with outright crisis in order to bring about the institutional reform of, 
for example, the wage bargaining and pension regimes. As argued in Chapters 4 and 
5, in both cases, pre-existing institutions limited possible institutional outcomes. The
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(failed) reform of formal-political institutions also clearly exhibited the importance 
of pre-existing institutional configurations. It seems however that the monetary 
policy area, where the central bank had gradually increased its de facto independence 
before being granted full independence, is the exception that confirms the rule with 
respect to institutional change, which usually is gradual and path-dependent. On the 
whole, though, the prediction that institutional change proceeds through ‘punctuated 
equilibria’ rather than in a gradualist fashion was confirmed (Krasner 1984: 240-44).
The study also confirmed the path-dependent character of institutional change. 
An understanding of institutional change required more than a purely actor-oriented 
or systemic-functionalist analysis.
An institutionalist perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building 
blocks of social and political life [...]. Historical developments are path dependent; once 
certain choices are made, they constrain future possibilities. The range of options 
available to policymakers at any given point in time is a function of institutional 
capabilities that were put in place in some earlier period, possibly in response to very 
different pressures (Krasner 1988: 67).
Italian macroeconomic policy during 1992-97 confirms this view. A weak 
government was not able to transform itself into a strong one; a universal pension 
system could not be transformed into a private, purely contribution-based system; the 
industrial relations regime could not be changed to a decentralised regime due to the 
existence of medium-strength trade unions. It was only in the area of monetary 
policy where institutional change was relatively easy. This was due to the already 
greater insulation of monetary policy-making as well as due to the uncertainty 
regarding distributional consequences resulting from institutional change, especially 
for interest groups (for theoretical argument see Gowa 1988) and especially in a 
context of increased economic openness.
In short, the changes in Italian macroeconomic policy and policy-making 
institutions in the 1990s are on the whole well explained by historical 
institutionalism in that the latter emphasises the importance of pre-existing domestic 
political and economic institutions (independent influence, inertia), the nature of
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change ( ‘punctualist’ change) and even the direction of change (path-dependent 
change).10
As regards the central concept of executive strength, the study provides a 
differentiated picture. A common criticism directed against the ‘state’ strength 
approach is that it does not precisely define the basis of ‘state strength’.
If statist approaches are to avoid the tautology of defining capacity in terms of the 
ability to realize objectives, they must be able to specify ex ante the state structures that 
are associated with successful reform. What are the organizational bases of state 
autonomy? (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 20).
This problem was addressed by drawing on the results of statistical and 
comparative studies that specified the institutional conditions for successful 
macroeconomic performance in the various policy areas and by analysing in a case- 
sensitive manner how and why certain Italian institutions were associated with 
unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance.
Nonetheless, the study strongly suggests a differentiated view of executive 
strength according to which a government is not strong per se but its strength is co­
determined by the specific characteristics of the policy areas (cf. Section 1.4). 
Moreover, executive strength can vary within a given policy area (for example, 
budgetary policy in 1993 as against 1995). All this suggests the need for a 
historically sensitive and differentiated approach to executive strength. Executive 
strength and autonomy are not absolute but should be regarded as structural potential 
that can however vary across areas as well as across time. As Skocpol (1985) put it: 
‘[SJtate autonomy’ is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can 
come and go. This is true not only because crises may precipitate the formulation of 
official strategies and policies by elites or administrators who otherwise might not 
mobilize their own potentials for autonomous action [...]. It is also true because the 
very structural potentials for autonomous state actions change over time [...]. Thus, 
although cross-national research can indicate in general terms whether a governmental 
system has ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ tendencies toward autonomous state action, the full 
potential of this concept can be realized only in truly historical studies that are sensitive 
to structural variations and conjunctural changes within given polities (p. 14).
10 It should be noted that on the whole strategic elites (mostly prime minister and technocrats) were 
the agents of change and that Italian macroeconomic reform was a top-down reform in that other
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By analysing ‘structural variation’ and ‘conjunctural change’, this study 
confirmed the necessity of not reifying the institutionalist basis of executive strength. 
Although institutional factors structure social life and processes and hence are 
important, they do not do so in an absolute way (Katzenstein 1977a, 1977b). The 
case study of Italian macroeconomic reform was a case in point, as it demonstrated 
how ‘state’ strength was affected by international constraints and pressure and how it 
varied across policy areas and time.
Further Implications for Institutionalist Theory
The above discussion suggests some interesting theoretical implications. 
Institutionalist theory and studies should not so much ask ‘whether institutions 
matter’, but rather ‘when and how institutions matter’ (Weaver and Rockman 1993; 
Kent 1993). This is where the issue of causal complexity and relations arises. This 
study demonstrated that the nature of institutional effects is potentially affected by 
the presence or absence of other institutional as well as the non-institutional factors. 
In other words, it demonstrated that there often is no simple one-to-one relationship 
between institutions and policies.
It is true that, statistically speaking, certain institutions have ‘on-average’ 
effects. For example, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, central bank 
independence does on average lead to lower inflation. This is en empirical fact (and a 
very plausible one too). The same is true for other institutions, such as the budgetary 
policy regime, the wage bargaining regime, and the pension regime in relation to 
respective policy outcomes. However, in a specific case, the presence of a specific 
institution does not necessarily lead to the occurrence of an ‘average’ policy effect. 
This is so because the effects of other intervening factors are not averaged out as in 
the case of large-sample statistical studies. This makes it possible that institutions 
have differential effects depending on the presence or absence of other factors. 
Hence the question ‘when and how institutions matter’ (that is, under what 
circumstances) arises. The analysis of Italian macroeconomic policy provides 
sufficient evidence in this respect.
actors (parliament, parties, public employees, trade unions) were forced to respond to the 
government’s agenda setting.
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For example, on average it is certainly true that a dependent central bank is 
more conducive to higher inflation than an independent central bank. However, the 
analysis of French monetary policy showed that a strong, autonomous government 
can act as a ‘compensating factor’ that reduces the effect central bank dependence 
would normally have. By contrast, the Italian experience suggests that a weak 
government does not ‘compensate’ for central bank dependence. In fact, it is 
plausible to assume that government weakness magnifies central bank dependence 
through the inflationary effects government weakness creates in other areas, such as 
budgetary and public wage policy. In fact, it could even be argued that -  at least 
under the relatively permissive international conditions Italy faced during the 1970s 
-  central bank dependence created a disincentive for the (weak) Italian government 
to control budgetary policy more tightly. This is due to the fact that successive Italian 
governments were aware that their control over monetary policy would eventually 
allow them to reduce government debt with the help of a loose monetary policy - 
rather than having to pursue politically difficult debt reduction. This suggests the 
existence of an ‘enhancing’ interaction effect: the presence of a weak government 
reinforces the causal impact central bank dependence has on inflation, while a strong 
government reduces this impact. In other words, the strength of one variable (central 
bank dependence) is enhanced or reduced depending on the presence of another 
factor (government strength).
Similar observations can be made with regard to the effects of wage 
bargaining institutions. The nature of the monetary regime strongly shapes the effects 
wage bargaining institutions have on wage outcomes. While ‘intermediate’ industry- 
level bargaining can be expected to lead to competition between industries (and 
possibly different groups within industries), the German -  and recently the Italian - 
experience suggest that a hard-currency regime modifies the effect wage bargaining 
institutions have on medium-term wage policy. Indeed, as indicated in Chapter 5, 
highly centralised collective bargaining arrangement may even be more inflationary 
under a hard-currency regime than co-ordinated, intermediate industry bargaining. In 
the absence of a hard currency regime, the opposite situation may occur: the 
centralised system may perform better than the industry bargaining system (see 
Iversen 1999). Again, the Italian case shows that private sector wage bargaining 
arrangements, which would not normally not be deemed to be conducive to a 
moderate wage policy as a result of the relatively high level of fragmentation, were
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very effective in producing low inflation under a hard-currency regime (as it 
emerged after the 1992-93 central bank reforms).
Finally, the presence or absence of non-institutional factors can also affect the 
kind of effect institutions have on policies. The increase of executive strength in 
various policy areas as a result of international political and economic pressure is 
only the most striking example. Similarly, the relative de facto increase in central 
bank autonomy in the 1980s was both the result of Italy’s ERM membership and a 
decreasingly permissive international economic environment. Even though from a 
purely institutional point of view the Bank of Italy was still dependent on the 
government (and the government itself was weak), the institutional effect of central 
bank dependence with respect to inflation was subdued relative to what it would have 
been in the presence of a more permissive international environment.
In short, these examples show that case-oriented institutionalist studies need to 
take into account the varying causal effects institutions can have under varying 
circumstances -  whether these circumstances result from institutional or non- 
institutional factors. A whole variety of varying causal relationships (such as 
interaction effects, spurious relations, mutually reinforcing effects, and so on) can 
exist among different individually relevant institutional (and non-institutional) 
variables. Hence, especially when the objective is to understand one specific case, it 
is imperative to check for the existence of these effects, rather than dismiss the 
importance of domestic institutions outright. This theoretical implication leads to a 
practical implications: case-oriented studies need to be sensitive to the potential 
existence of complex causal relations between institutional and non-institutional 
variables; and research -  rather than dismissing the importance of institutions when 
the actual effects of the latter seem to contradict the predictions made by statistical 
studies -  would therefore be well advised to consider likely causal complexity, and 
allow for the possibility that there does not exist a simple one-to-one relationship 
between independent (institutional) variables and dependent (policy) variables. 
Hence this study also serves as a reminder that social reality is complex, but not 
inexplicable; rather, its sometimes apparently inexplicable nature may be the result 
of our limited understanding of complex causal relationships.
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Current Academic Debates and Italian Macroeconomic Policy Convergence
Recent academic debate in International Political Economy has paid a great deal of 
attention to how economic internationalisation affects domestic politics, policies and 
institutions (Berger and Dore 1996; Keohane and Milner 1996; Garrett 1998). In 
particular, a debate has revolved around whether economic internationalisation leads 
to institutional convergence.11 On the one hand, there is the systemic-functionalist 
argument according to which similar international pressures lead to policy as well as 
institutional convergence - and the emergence of a best-practice model (Dore 2000; 
Boyer 1996; Boltho 1996; Regini 2000; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Rhodes and 
Apeldoom 1997; Berger and Dore 1996). On the other hand, the institutionalist 
approach holds that policy and institutional change will differ due to the existence of 
pre-existing domestic institutions and that institutional change is at least partly 
limited by path dependency (c f Scharpf 1991; Ikenberry 1988).
The question is then to what extent Italy experienced convergence of its 
economic policy-making regime in the 1990s. Rhodes (1997), for example, has 
argued that under pressure from the new international economic regime introduced 
with EMU (that is, no devaluation vis-a-vis main trading partners, inflation-averse 
monetary policy), EMU member countries have converged on a German-Dutch- 
Austrian model of ‘competitive corporatism’. By contrast, at least with respect to 
labour relations and pension policy, Regini (1999), though acknowledging that there 
are centripetal-functionalist forces towards greater homogeneity, argues that the 
closer a country gets to the convergence point the more indeterminate and less 
predictable future policies and institutional change become.
Prima facie the convergence thesis is eminently plausible. Empirically, it was 
primarily countries that had not been part of the German-mark zone but were eager 
to join EMU that adopted ‘national pacts’ and underwent the greatest degree of 
institutional change in the 1990s (Pochet 1998). No - or much less - reform took 
place in countries that had already been members of the German-mark zone (such as 
the Netherlands or Austria) and in Germany itself of course (Thelen 2000). Similarly, 
change in ‘opt-out’ countries (Denmark, Sweden, UK) was also limited, at least
11 As regards Italian monetary and fiscal policy, policy convergence was of course required by the 
TEU.
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during the 1990s. Theoretically,12 it makes sense to expect that the 
institutionalisation of a hard currency and hard fiscal regime (see discussion of 
Stability Pact below) will require a re-orientation of economic strategy towards an 
export-oriented policy based on ‘competitive disinflation’ as well as an adjustment of 
domestic institutions in order to cope with the new constraints.
This is of course an old argument. Katzenstein (1984, 1985), in his seminal 
work on small, open European economies, demonstrated that domestic institutions 
and policies were historically evolved responses to the pressure of the international 
economic environment and especially trade integration. Small, open economies (such 
as Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) were 
subject to much greater international constraints than larger, more closed economies 
(such as France, Italy, the UK and Germany). Therefore, the former tended to 
develop a set of domestic institutions that allowed these countries to thrive in the 
face of international constraints. However, today the large European economies are 
characterised by a degree of economic integration similar to the one of smaller 
European economies in the 1950s and 1960s. Hence it is fair to say that “[a]ll 
European economies are now subordinate to international markets in a way that has 
long been the case for the Belgians and Danes” (Crouch 1994: 194). It might even be 
argued that, as a result of financial liberalisation in the 1980s, the large European 
economies are subject to even greater constraints than the small, open economies in 
the decades before. Hence it is not surprising to expect that large, soft-currency 
countries would have to adapt to the functional pressure stemming from greater 
economic integration.
The case study of Italian macroeconomic policy and more particularly of 
domestic-institutional change in the 1990s makes it possible to make some 
observations concerning the validity of convergence theories. Budgetary policy 
reform was ‘imposed’ by both international markets and the Maastricht criteria. If the 
institutional reform of the monetary regime was stipulated by the TEU, this was not 
the case with regard to the budgetary policy regime. Undoubtedly, though, 
substantial institutional change would have been difficult to realise as a result of the 
micro-distributional character of budgetary policy and due to executive weakness. As
12 As already pointed out, a number of studies have demonstrated that - under conditions o f a hard 
currency regime - a system of industry-level bargaining that allows for co-ordination across sectors
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argued in Section 3.1, there were no substantial reforms of the budgetary policy 
regime in the 1990s in terms of modifying the crucial executive-legislature 
relationship. This means that on an institutional level Italy has certainly not 
experienced a convergence on the better performing budgetary regimes, such as the 
French, German or British ones. As pointed out, this was mainly the result of the 
path-dependent character of domestic-institutional change.
With regard to pension policy, the Italian system should have been expected to 
produce a very gradual evolution in terms of both policies and institutional change. 
Interestingly the most fundamental institutional change took place in this area with 
the switch from an eamings-related to a contribution-based system and the 
introduction of complementary pensions. Other European countries also underwent 
change in terms of the homogenisation of pension schemes for public and private 
employees, the rise in retirement age and complementary pensions (II Sole 24 Ore, 
23 October 2000). However, at a moment when other European countries were 
searching for an institutional equilibrium (like France and Germany in 2000), it is 
hard to talk of convergence as this precisely implies the notion of ‘institutional 
equilibrium’. However, the (gradual) change towards a contribution-based system in 
Italy makes the Italian pension system different from at least the other two big 
continental European economies. In short, so far institutional changes in the pension 
area point towards divergence rather than convergence.
Public and private wage policy also underwent important changes. Similar to 
other European countries (Pochet 1998), Italy has adopted a system of ‘organised 
decentralisation’ as opposed to a system of ‘disorganised decentralisation’ (Traxler 
1995).13 The institutionalisation of a national incomes policy in Italy seems 
surprising. However, to the extent that change was necessary, it was clear that private 
sector company-level and decentralised public pay bargaining was unlikely to 
emerge in Italy, given the existence of relatively strong but divided confederal unions 
in both the private and public sector. The unions would never have been prepared to 
give up the scala mobile in favour of decentralised bargaining.14 Overall, it is fair to 
say that the Italian system of ‘organised decentralisation’ of the mid-1990s -  despite 
formal differences (such as explicit inflation targeting) - largely resembles the system
leads to better inflation outcomes than centralised peak-level bargaining (Iversen 1999, 2000; 
Pontusson 2000; Soskice 2000; also Chapter 4).
13 Also described as ‘centralised decentralization’ (Visser 1997).
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of (less formally) co-ordinated industry bargaining that characterises most of the 
other hard-currency countries.15
As for public sector wage bargaining, the Italian regime evolved towards 
greater centralisation of bargaining (through the creation of ARAN) and preserved 
the centralisation of wage setting (that is, essentially the national level) and thus 
continues to represent the continental European type of public sector wage 
determination (OECD 1997a). In terms of the two models, that is, Anglo-Saxon- 
Scandinavian decentralisation versus continental-European centralisation, the latter 
has prevailed. However, there certainly has not been full convergence on the 
‘stronger’ French or German models within the group of centralised regimes (Table 
7-1). More specifically, despite the high degree of centralisation, Italy did not 
develop the same degree of formal (let alone practical) executive dominance as exists 
in France and to a lesser degree in Germany (Elliot et al. 1999; OECD 1994c). The 
existence of a weak executive largely precluded the development towards a ‘strong’ 
continental model, while the relative strength of confederal unions would have made 
it difficult to introduce an Anglo-Saxon- or Scandinavian-style decentralised system. 
Thus, despite attempts to achieve it, institutional convergence on the ‘stronger’ 
continental models was limited.
With respect to the monetary policy regime the Italian experience provides 
perhaps the most limited insights as the direction and nature of institutional reform 
was largely pre-determined by TEU. The more general tendency to grant 
independence to national central banks in an age of increasing capital mobility seems 
to have been at work in Italy even before Maastricht. Nonetheless the Italian 
experience is instructive in that (apart from the 1981 reforms) independence was not 
established through legislation until 1992-93. An already relatively high degree of de 
facto central bank independence and uncertain distributional consequences of
14 Interview with CGIL official, 18 October 2000, Rome.
15 Recent studies have talked of ‘dual convergence’ or ‘co-convergence’ in this area (Iversen and 
Pontusson 2000: 3), meaning that the wage-bargaining-monetary regimes of the advanced capitalist 
countries are presently converging on two models. While (in Soskice’s terms) ‘co-ordinated market 
economies’ converge towards a model of ‘organised decentralisation’ (Traxler 1995), the ‘liberal 
market economies’ converge towards the U.S. model of decentralised bargaining. This suggests a 
‘modified’ convergence thesis according to which there is a “trend toward convergence on the 
German model of coordinated industry-level bargaining among the coordinated market economies 
[...] and, similarly, a trend towards convergence on the dual American model of firm-level bargaining 
and a large non-union sector among the liberal market economies” (Iversen and Pontusson 2000: 7). 
The Italian experience of the 1990s certainly fits this pattern by falling into the category o f co­
ordinated market economies.
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monetary policy and hence the limited use partisan interests can make of monetary 
policy also make this policy area qualitatively different (Gowa 1988). This made 
central bank reform and institutional convergence relatively easy to achieve 
politically. Even a weak government like the Italian one was able to bring about quite 
substantial institutional change with relative ease -  at least relative to other areas 
such as pension and budgetary policy. In short, with regard to monetary policy, there 
has been both institutional and policy convergence.
What then does the case study of Italy contribute to the convergence debate? 
Italy went some way in terms of convergence towards the Germanic model16 of 
‘competitive corporatism’ in the 1990s. Convergence was most pronounced in the 
private sector wage bargaining and monetary policy regimes. There was much less 
convergence with respect to the public wage bargaining and budgetary policy 
regimes, while with regard to pension policy there was in fact divergence. 
Revealingly, where institutional convergence was achieved (monetary and private 
wage bargaining), executive strength did not matter very much, and where 
convergence was limited (budgetary and public wage bargaining), this reflected the 
relevance of path dependency and more particularly the pre-existence of a weak 
executive.
In short, this suggests that while external pressures did exercise a certain 
functional logic, a high degree of institutional convergence did not take place, largely 
as a result of the importance of pre-existing institutions (and especially a weak 
executive). The Italian case thus at best provides limited support for the convergence 
thesis.
Future Directions o f Research
In order to test the argument proposed here in terms of the relevance of domestic 
institutions and its interaction with international pressure in the context of ‘normal’ 
and ‘extraordinary’ politics, it would be interesting to conduct a study of comparative 
crisis-decision-making where two or more ‘weak states’ are compared (such as 
Greece, Italy and Belgium) -  rather than a weak with a strong one as in this study. 
This would make it possible to test to what extent the insights of this study can be
16 This model is under attack itself and is subject to change. Note also that there are of course various 
combinations of domestic institutions that are compatible with a hard-currency strategy (cfi France 
and Germany; Table 7-1).
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extended to other cases. Furthermore, it would be interesting to analyse 
systematically cases that share at least some of the features of the Italian system but 
have fared much better in terms of macroeconomic performance, such as the relative 
pluralist party systems in Denmark and the Netherlands (cfi Commission of the 
European Communities 1995; Iversen and Thygesen 1998; Visser 1997). These 
different comparative strategies - if successful - would improve the explanatory 
scope of the arguments advanced in this study.
Another interesting direction concerns the possible importance of ideas broadly 
speaking and a possible ‘marriage’ between ideas and institutions (Adler and Haas 
1992; Hall 1993, 1997; Keohane and Goldstein 1993). From Banfield’s ‘amoral 
familialism’ (1958) to Putnam’s examination of ‘civic culture’ (1993), various 
authors have argued that culture matters in Italian economic and political 
development. Indeed, some might argue that certain features of Italian politics 
exhibit continuity across time and are therefore better explained with reference to
17‘culture’. The tradition of trasformismo, which was an important characteristic of 
both the Liberal state (1860-1922) and arguably the First Republic (Clark 1996; 
Smith 1997), and the history of high public debt and inflation in periods preceding 
the First Republic (Fratianni and Spinelli 1997), could be cited as examples.
However, that ‘culture’ should be so pervasive and important a phenomenon 
sounds implausible. Moreover, on an anecdotal level, comparisons within ‘cultures’, 
such as between the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany or the 
4th Republic and the 5th Republic in France, suggest that institutions make a 
difference. Nonetheless, without a historically detailed inquiry into, for example, the 
causes of high debt and inflation under varying political regimes in Italy, the 
‘culture-matters’ hypothesis cannot be convincingly discarded. Despite the notorious 
difficulty to ‘capture’ them (Ross 1997), both culture and ideas certainly deserve 
greater scholarly attention (Jacobsen 1995; Blyth 1997; McNamara 1998).
Finally, the focus of this study has been on how institutions structure political 
conflict over both policies and institutional change. The institutionalist approach 
addresses the capacity of ‘states’ but not their motivations. Undoubtedly, even 
though policy preferences are not exclusively determined by institutions, they are
17 Trasformismo is a practice whereby the government manages to stay in office by distributing 
favours and patronage to political parties and societal groups. This practice emerged under the Liberal
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certainly influenced by them. A more detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of 
exactly how and why institutions structure and provide incentives for a certain course 
of action deserves greater theoretical attention beyond what has been proposed here 
in terms of concepts such as encompassingness, centralisation, hierarchy, strength 
and autonomy.
7.4 The Question o f Sustainability: Prospects and Challenges
After having discussed the theoretical implications of the results this study has 
generated, I will allow myself to make a few observations concerning problems and 
prospects of institutional reform and their possible implications for the future of 
Italian economic policy. If the thesis according to which Italian macroeconomic 
policy moves in cycles and is strongly determined by domestic institutions is correct, 
an analysis of Italian policy-making institutions should provide clues as to whether 
Italy is about to move towards a new macroeconomic cycle or -  this time -  is bound 
for more sustainable macroeconomic development (see Section 7.1).
There is not enough space to evaluate in detail whether current policies will 
guarantee the sustainability of Italian macroeconomic policy and EMU membership 
(see Spaventa and Chiorazzo 2000: chapter 4; Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
1998; Reviglio 1998). Hence only a brief discussion of various possible scenarios 
will be provided. Primarily, sustainability will be discussed under the aspect of the 
conduciveness of domestic institutions to sustainable macroeconomic policies in the 
context of EMU membership and economic internationalisation. Other important 
socio-economic and political factors (such as labour market reforms other than wage 
bargaining, investment and technology policies, efficiency of public administration 
and so on) that will certainly influence sustainability cannot be analysed here.
Political Institutions
This study suggests that executive strength is central for achieving sustainable, long­
term macroeconomic policies. As pointed out, in parliamentary political systems, 
electoral system, executive dominance, parliamentary strength, government 
longevity and government stability tend to be associated with each other (Lijphart
State and, despite major constitutional changes over the past 140 years, has -  arguably - not 
disappeared to this day.
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1999). In particular, executive weakness has been related to fragmentation. 
Moreover, ‘strong’ political-institutional features tend to be associated with ‘strong’ 
budgetary rules (Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999). This suggests that weakness 
reinforces weakness, while strength increases strength. This is easy to understand as 
a strong executive can change budgetary procedures with relative ease, while strong 
parliaments (and hence weak executives) tend to prevent such a strengthening of the 
executive in parliament-dominated systems.
As for Italy, moderate centre-right and moderate centre-left coalitions emerged 
after the 1993 electoral reform. However, this is unlikely to suffice as these 
coalitions are highly heterogeneous and thus make the Italian political system still 
resemble more closely an assembly government than a working government type 
(Sartori 1997 [1994]: chapter 6; cf. Chapter 2), even if the new system allows for 
alternation and greater competition. The analysis of budgetary politics and policies 
between 1992-98 suggests that the institutional capacity of the executive is unlikely 
to be sufficient to produce responsible, long-term-oriented budgetary policies. At the 
same time, it is very unlikely that Italy - in the absence of yet another crisis - will 
implement sufficient (constitutional) political-institutional change as political actors 
(mainly parties) have largely regained control of the political agenda and Italy has 
returned to ‘normal politics’ as defined in Section 7.1.
This is not the place to delve into the politics of political-institutional reform. 
However, with the reduced usefulness of referendums in bringing about 
constitutional-institutional change (Donovan 1998) and with the lack of will on the 
part of the political parties to realise reforms (failure of Bicamerale in June 1998), 
neither institutional18 nor electoral19 reform is likely to take place (Bardi and Rhodes
18 In addition to the practical problems of realising reform towards a more ‘reductive’ electoral 
system, some analysts have cautioned as to the practical relevance of electoral reform (Gambetta and 
Warner 1995). On this account, problems primarily relate to: (1) a transitional period and a lagged 
effect; (2) the claim that 50 years of party-cratic domination can be eliminated by simple institutional 
tinkering; and (3) the raising of unrealistic hopes. While it is certainly justified to caution against a 
quick ‘fix-everything’, this study suggests that electoral reform and the resulting strengthening of the 
executive not only lies at the very heart of ‘responsible’ macroeconomic policy but also that under 
present circumstances it is the only realistic way to improve the current policy-making system. This is 
especially true in that it is quite plausible that multi-partyism is incompatible with a presidential 
system in terms of producing sustainable and co-ordinated policies (cf. Sartori 1997 [1994]: chapter 6 
and section 11.2). This would preclude wider constitutional reforms as a way forward, regardless of 
the practical difficulties involved in achieving such a change.
19 Any compromise that would substantially reduce the number o f parliamentary parties would be 
unlikely. If fragmentation is crucial in determining executive strength, then the majority bonus - as 
discussed, for example, in autumn 2000 - would not result in the strengthening of the executive, as it 
is not the size o f the majority that counts but its fragmentation.
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1998; Gilbert and Pasquino 2000). The continued presence of small parties and the 
need to secure intra-coalitional compromise make the likelihood of achieving a more 
‘reductive’ electoral system remote.
What is true for the change from a proportional to a majoritarian regime also 
tends to be true for any electoral reform that directly or indirectly aims at restricting 
the number of effective parliamentary parties. Hence it is not surprising that under a 
proportional electoral system “[fundamental changes are rare and arise only in 
extraordinary historical situations” (Nohlen 1984b: 218). Only those changes that 
will not diminish the electoral fortunes of the political parties can be expected to find 
the approval of parliament. In the absence of further electoral reform, the pursuit of 
long-term, sustainable policies in areas such as budgetary, public wage and pension 
policy (that is, where a strong executive is important) seems difficult to achieve.
Budgetary Procedures
A second area of institutional reform relevant to fiscal performance concerns 
budgetary procedures (Milesi-Ferretti 1997). The implications of the theoretical and 
empirical arguments are clear. Centralisation, greater hierarchy and transparency of 
the budgetary process are all conducive to greater executive control of budgetary 
policy. There have been quite a number of proposals in this respect.20 Nonetheless, 
only little reform was achieved.
The strengthening of the executive in budgetary policy-making, especially 
through the reforms of the early 1990s (Verzichelli 1999a; Felsen 1999), has 
undoubtedly resulted in a greater rationalisation of the budgetary process at both the 
formulation and parliamentary stage. Nonetheless, the detailed historical analysis of 
budgetary policy-making in Chapter 3 suggests that it was primarily external 
pressure that strengthened executive control and power.
In May 1997 another reform took place. With law no. 94 of 1997 (introduced 
with 1998 budget) the budget was divided into a political and an administrative 
budget with the aim of re-orienting parliamentary approval towards broad functions 
and objectives of economic policy. New basic accounting rules were introduced and 
the budget preparation procedures tightened. This would leave the government and
20 See proposals by the Commissione per la Riforma dei Balanci Pubblici (1994) and by academics 
such as Alesina et al. (1998), Von Hagen and Harden (1994).
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ministries free to allocate items within limits determined by parliament. It also 
foresaw the centralisation of budget responsibility through the merging of the 
Ministero del Tesoro and the Ministero del Bilancio. This reform certainly increased 
the transparency, efficiency and autonomy of the budgetary process (Felsen 1999). 
The greater centralisation at the formulation stage and the greater transparency at the 
parliamentary stage will allow programme-based (in place of incremental) budgeting 
as well reduce opportunities for lobbying - both of which should facilitate the 
realisation of budget targets. Another recent reform introduced in 1999 similarly 
sought to alleviate some of the procedural problems regarding the budgetary process 
(cf. Degni 1999: 48; Gazetta Ufficiale, No.151, 30 June 1999). Both reforms though 
left untouched the issue of executive-legislature relations in budgetary policy 
(especially non-amendability).21
However, given the results of this study, it seems that the ‘political’ 
strengthening of the executive is crucial and prior. As discussed above, for rules to 
be effective, the strengthening of the executive relative to parliament and 
parliamentary (majority) parties is required {cf. De Ioanna 1993: chapter 16). In other 
words, rules at the parliamentary and implementation stages will only give the 
executive greater potential greater control over budgetary legislation and outcomes if 
it is strengthened politically. This is so because the ability (and willingness) to use 
procedural means will ultimately depend on the willingness of the executive to 
discipline its parliamentary majority; and this would presumably require that all 
majority parties regard their interests as being bound up with the government’s 
electoral fortunes (like in Germany or the UK). This leads back to the question of 
political-institutional reform discussed in the previous section. Once more this does 
not bode well with regard to future financial discipline. It is however possible that 
external pressure in the form of the Pact for Stability and Growth22 will permanently
21 In fact, the relatore pointed out that the reform would not only increase the initiative power of the 
executive but also the amendment power of parliament (Senato della Repubblica, Resconti 
dell’Assemblea, 19 November 1996). Also, the number of amendments to the various budget 
documents between 1997-99 was 17.751, that is, 10.254 in commission and 7.497 in aula (Degni 
1999: 64). This shows the relative weakness of the executive relative to parliament and makes the 
amendability issue extremely important.
22 The Stability Pact came into force on 1 January 1999 and is meant to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of fiscal policies under EMU. The Stability Pact foresees financial sanctions for 
countries with budget deficits larger than three per cent, unless there has been a decline in real GDP of 
more than two per cent over the preceding year. (If there has been a decline of more than 0.75 per cent 
but less than two per cent, the Council of Ministers decides on the basis of the suddenness of the 
decline in economic growth relative to earlier trends whether to impose sanctions or not.) Decisions
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compensate for executive weakness and lead to more sustainable budgetary policies 
(see below for more detailed discussion).
Pension and Welfare Policy
As regards the sustainability of the current Italian pension regime, the judgements of 
observers differ (Gronchi 1996; Pizutti 1998; Cazzola 1999; for a more upbeat 
assessment see OECD Economic Surveys Italy 2000: part HI). At the very least, 
social welfare and in particular pension expenditure will be a critical factor in 
determining Italy’s medium to long-term budgetary performance. Indeed many 
industrialised economies will face this problem. However, in the continued absence 
of political-institutional reform (and more specifically in the absence of a 
considerable strengthening of the executive), further pension reform in Italy will be 
difficult to achieve unless there is concrete international pressure. In the meantime, 
the tendency to downplay problems and the temptation of multi-party coalition 
governments to delay incisive reform is likely to prevail. Hence reform will be 
difficult to achieve and, if achieved, is likely to be gradual in its effects. Policy 
reform is hence bound to remain intermittent, gradual, piecemeal and reactive. This 
is the result of the Italian government’s lack of institutional strength necessary to 
pursue long-term, anticipatory policies and the result of the presence of relatively 
strong trade unions that act as defenders of acquired rights.
Public and Private Wage Policy-Making
As for industrial relations, a number of issues need to be addressed with regard to 
competitiveness (internal labour market issues, adoption of new technology, 
investment in employee skills and so on). However, given that in the absence of the 
exchange rate tool, wage policy is literally the only instrument to influence economy- 
wide price levels, wage policy will remain more important than ever with regard to 
inflation and international competitiveness.
will be taken with a qualified majority. If a country concerned is found to have an ‘excessive’ deficit, 
the Council can call on that country to take effective measures within four months.
The sanctions comprise an interest-free deposit of 0.2 per cent of GDP that will be payable in the first 
year; 0.1 per cent of GDP is payable every year for each percentage point above the three-per-cent 
mark. If the budget deficit is still above three-per-cent after two years, the non interest-bearing deposit 
automatically becomes a fine (cf Gros and Thygesen: 341-346).
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As regards private sector wage policy, the policy of wage restraint of the 1990s 
was quite successful in reducing inflation and preserving competitiveness in the 
wake of the 1992 devaluation. As Iversen (1999) has convincingly argued, industry 
unionism -  if dominated by manufacturing sector unions -  is the system most 
conducive to moderate wage policy in the presence of a non-accommodating 
monetary policy. The German regime of flexibly co-ordinated wages, for example, is 
characterised by the long-established wage leadership of the internationally exposed 
metalworker sector, by workplace representative bodies that are effectively 
controlled by the confederal unions and by the institutionalisation of monetarism 
through the Bundesbank (Streeck 1994; Crouch 1990).
Italy hence already possesses all the features that are likely to lead to 
responsible wage policies. In the private sector, wage bargaining is dominated by the 
(internationally exposed) metalworkers’ union, workplace representations are 
dominated by confederal unions, and the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
institutionalised monetarism permanently. Confederal division is not likely to matter 
as the international constraint imposes a limit on what unions can demand, and the 
strengthening of the confederal unions at the company-level in the private sector 
should allow avoiding excessive wage drift. Wage pressure and inflation are hence 
unlikely to emerge from the private sector. The only problem may be the transport 
sector where the continued strength of non-confederal groups may result in excessive 
wage increases. Wage policy in this area will be strongly influenced by the ability of 
the government to control wages.
As for public sector wage bargaining, all the institutional mechanisms are 
certainly in place (centralisation of bargaining, exclusion of parliament and 
administrative courts, and so on). Should it turn out that the confederal unions are 
unable to bring the cobas into line and dominate public sector wage bargaining, then 
the control of public sector wages will depend on the ability (and willingness) of the 
Italian government to keep public pay growth under control. Whether the ‘bargained’ 
system will achieve this is an open question, especially since the government is 
weak. Compared with the capacity of the French and German governments to control 
public wages (Bordogna 1992; Dustman and Van Soest 1999), the Italian system - 
despite the relatively high degree of centralisation -  appears weak. While the 
exclusion of parliament and courts from public sector wage bargaining should allow 
the executive to control wages if it is willing to resist political and societal pressure,
272
in practice it may be unlikely to do so. Given the continued fragmentation and 
weakness of the Italian executive, moderate public wage policy is hence far from 
certain.23
Overall Evaluation o f Policy Sustainability
Studies evaluating whether or not Italy’s EMU membership will be sustainable, 
given current policies, provide a mixed picture with some commentators being 
optimistic (Spaventa and Chiorazzo 2000; Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
1998) and others pessimistic (Cazzola 1999; Reviglio 1998). Based on the above 
discussion, this study suggests a differentiated view, according to which Italy is 
likely to experience more difficulties in respecting the fiscal criteria rather than 
experiencing difficulties on the monetary side.
The transfer of monetary and exchange rate policy to the European Central 
Bank (ECB) has not only removed these policies from domestic influence but they 
have also created the impossibility of competitiveness-restoring devaluations and 
thus the need for Italy to achieve average European inflation rates. Given the strong 
presence of confederal unions in the exposed manufacturing sector and given the 
recognition of the external competitiveness constraint, both private and public wage 
policy can be expected to stay broadly in line with the evolution of wages in other 
EMU countries. As just argued, this will however be contingent on whether or not 
the confederal unions are able to keep their public sector affiliates in line. Given the 
relatively strong position of confederations at the RSU level (in both the private and 
public sector), and hence the confederations’ ability to function effectively as a link 
between the public and private sectors, continued wage restraint is possible.
As regards fiscal policy, the Stability Pact imposes long-term, quantitative 
constraints. Hence, the question is whether current policies are on a sustainable 
course. An important factor with respect to budgetary sustainability is the 
composition of public debt. Although it is true that Italy was able to increase 
medium-and long-term debt as a share of total debt throughout the 1990s, Italy - 
compared to other European countries -  still has the highest percentage of short-term 
debt (OECD Economic Surveys Italy 1999: 59-60). This makes Italy more vulnerable 
to interest rate increases. If current objectives can be realised, Italy will achieve a
23 The continued debate on future reform - even after the introduction of a new law on public service
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cyclically adjusted budget balance in 2003 and a 60 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio 
sometime after 2010. This will require, however, sustained primary surpluses in the 
area of 5 per cent of GDP (OECD Economic Surveys Italy, 1999, 2000). Given the 
institutional weaknesses analysed in the previous section, whether or not these 
targets can be achieved is an open question.
In terms of long-term spending commitments, the future evolution of pension 
expenditure will also be of crucial importance with respect to fiscal sustainability. 
Provided that the most recent projections by the Ragioneria Generate are correct (see 
Section 4.4), the effect of future increases of pension spending will be moderate and 
should not cause too many problems (for more critical view see OECD 1996b; 
Cazzola 1999). However, given that these projections tend to be subject to major 
revision, especially in the face demographic changes, which are the most adverse in 
Italy among all European countries (Commission of the European Communities 
1996a), it is clear that the continued domestic-institutional weakness of the Italian 
government in conjunction with strong unions, which will continue to act as 
defenders of acquired rights, will make further pension retrenchment difficult from a 
domestic-institutional point of view.
In sum, if the arguments put forward in this study are correct, one would expect 
Italy to face considerable problems with regard to the continued respect of the 
budgetary constraints imposed by the Stability Pact. With regard to inflation and 
competitiveness in a single-currency area, Italy should be expected to do much better 
as a result of confederal unions that are more than ever before capable of 
implementing wage moderation and that are indeed interested in preserving the 
competitiveness of the Italian economy within the new framework established by 
EMU.
Final Remarks
In recent contributions Fabbrini (1999, 2000) argued that, due to the failure to bring 
about substantial institutional change of the political system, Italian politics is poised 
to revert back to ‘normal’. In a detailed analysis of core executive decision-making 
during 1992-98, the author finds that this period was indeed a transition period 
characterised by a relatively high degree of executive autonomy and a strengthening
strikes (law no. 83 of 21 April 2000) - indicates the continued relevance of the problem.
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of the position of the prime minister relative to political parties and parliament. 
Policy reform was possible thanks to increased executive autonomy and power which 
in turn was the result of external pressure rather than fundamental institutional- 
constitutional change (similar Hine and Vassallo 1999; Gilbert and Pasquino 2000). 
Hence a reverting back to the ‘normal politics’ of trasformismo, frazionismo and 
partitocrazia should be expected.
More specifically, the fall of the Prodi government in October 1998 signalled 
the re-assertion of party-parliamentary control. The circumstances surrounding the 
formation of the D’Alema II government and its fall in December 1999 further 
confirms this view. With the concomitant transfer of legitimacy from the electorate 
to parliament, the transition from a govemo govemativo to govemo partico was 
realised (Hine and Vassallo 1999; Fabbrini 1999: 147). The less central place of the 
executive in relation to parliament, less collegiality and lower collegial responsibility 
at cabinet level and the transition from a electoral mandate towards post-electoral 
legitimacy indicate this reversal.
This view is consistent with the argument advanced in this study with regard to 
macroeconomic policy. However, with regard to macroeconomic policy, two caveats 
are in order: executive strength and its importance with regard to policy outcomes 
varies across policy sectors; and executive strength is not the only feature that 
matters with regard to policy outcomes. Hence, on the basis of the detailed empirical 
analysis of policy and institutional change undertaken in the previous four chapters, 
this study suggests that the evaluation by Fabbrini - though broadly correct - has to 
be more differentiated if one is to draw conclusions concerning future 
macroeconomic performance and possible macroeconomic cycles (see previous two 
sections).
Nonetheless, executive strength - or rather its absence in the Italian case - 
remains a crucial feature of the macroeconomic policy-making regime. In budgetary, 
pension and public wage policy a strong, autonomous government is necessary to 
resist societal demands and political pressure and, if necessary, to implement 
adequate reform. While consensus may function as a functional equivalent to 
executive power, the relatively high level of conflict in Italy suggests that an 
autonomous and strong executive is central for the sustainability of future 
macroeconomic policies. As repeatedly argued, budgetary rules may increase an 
executive’s procedural power in budgetary policy-making but is unlikely to be made
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use of if there is fundamental disagreement within a heterogeneous cabinet at the 
formulation, ratification and implementation stages. Similarly, low inflation and 
international competitiveness will depend on the executive’s ability to control public 
sector wages. Finally, a sustainable pension policy would be facilitated by the 
presence of a strong homogeneous executive able to formulate and implement 
coherent, long-term-oriented pension reform.
What does this mean with regard to the question of sustainability? EMU 
membership and the Stability Pact have institutionalised macroeconomic constraints 
that Italy has to respect. However, if the argument defended in this study is correct, 
Italy should be expected to experience considerable difficulties in achieving 
sustainability (especially with regard to budgetary, pension and - to a lesser degree - 
public wage policy) and certainly much greater difficulties than countries with strong 
policy-making regimes. Nonetheless, it is possible that the political legitimacy Italian 
EMU membership enjoys among the Italian public and the Italian elite will help 
overcome those institutional biases that otherwise would tend to make medium-term 
macroeconomic policies unsustainable. To this end, Italian macroeconomic policy 
will continue to be determined by the interaction between a domestic institutional 
logic and international constraints that tend to clash. Hence a proper understanding of 
future Italian macroeconomic policies will continue to require the historically and 
institutionally informed judgement of the observer.
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ANNEXES
Annex A: Structure o f the Budgetary Process
Table 1 Structure of Government Stage
Type of Procedure
1. Strategically 
centralized
2. Decentralised guided 3. Decentralised
Event Participants
Budget targets and 
guidelines
Prime Minister (PM) or 
finance minister (MF)
Cabinet on proposal by 
MF
Cabinet
Budget bids Spending ministries
Compilation of draft MF, in bilateral 
negotiations
MF, serving as 
intermediary between 
ministers and cabinet
MF, simple collection of bids
Reconciliation PM or senior cabinet 
committee
Senior cabinet 
committee or cabinet
Cabinet
Finalization Cabinet
Source: Von Hagen and Harden (1994: 336)
Table 2 Structure of Parliamentary Stage
Type of Procedure
Restrictive Intermediate Open
Scope of amendments Amendments cannot 
increase spending or 
reduce revenues, or 
certain amendments are 
not receivable
Amendments cannot 
change overall balance
No limits on 
amendments
Relation of upper and 
lower house
Relation of 
government and 
parliament
Upper house has no 
budgetary powers
Government can call 
vote of confidence, can 
impose voting procedure 
on parliament, 
amendments require 
consent
Lower house has 
prerogatives over upper 
house
Amendments may cause 
fall government
Lower and house have 
equal rights
No special stipulations
Source: Von Hagen and Harden (1994: 338)
277
Table 3 Characteristics of the Implementation Stage
Type of Procedure
Restrictive Intermediate Open
Expenditure
Management
Disbursement approval 
required,
spending departments 
subject to
cash limits, MF can 
block
expenditure
Disbursement approval 
required, 
and-or spending 
departments 
subject to cash limits
Disbursement approval 
or full authority of 
spending departments
Transfers of 
appropriations
Within chapters only Within chapters 
unrestricted, 
between chapters upon 
approval by MF
Unrestricted
Substantive
revisions
By new law and rarely 
used
By new law, commonly 
used
By approval of MF
Source: Von Hagen and Harden (1994: 339)
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Annex B: Budgetary Policy Measures 
Table 1 Annual Budget Bills, 1992-97
FINANCIAL
BILL
GOVERN­
MENT
DATE OF 
ADOPTION
STATE 
SECTOR 
TARGET 
IN % OF 
GDP*
STATE 
SECTOR 
OUTCOME 
IN % OF 
GDP*
NEW
REVENUES 
(IN BN OF 
LIRA)
EXPENDITURE 
CUTS (IN BN 
OF LIRA)
TOTAL 
(IN BN 
OF
LIRA)
1992 Andreotti 31.12.91 8.5 10.5 36.500 25.000 61.500
1993 Amato 22.12.92 9.6 9.8 49.500 43.500 93.000
1994 Ciampi 22.12.93 8.7 9.5 3.500 28.000 31.500
1995 Berlusconi 23.12.94 8.0 7.4 21.000 29.000 50.000
1996 Dini 28.12.95 5.8 7.4 17.900 14.600 32.500
1997* Prodi 23.12.96 3.0 2.7 25.500 37.000 62.500
1998* Prodi 23.12.97 2.8 2.7 10.000 15.000 25.000
Source: Verzichelli (1999b: 53); OECD Economic Surveys Italy [various years]; Bank of Italy, 
Abridged Report [various years]
* refers to general government
Table 2 Mini-Budgets, 1992-97
BUDGET
YEAR
GOVERN­
MENT
DATE OF 
ADOPTION
NEW
REVENUES (IN 
BN OF LIRA)
EXPENDITURE 
CUTS (IN BN OF 
LIRA)
TOTAL 
(IN BN 
OF
LIRA)
1992 Amato July 21.800 8.200 30.000
1993 Ciampi May 6.800 5.600 12.400
1994 -- -- -- -- --
1995 Dini February 15.600 5.200 20,800
1996 Prodi June 5.000 11.000 16.000
1997 Prodi March 11.100 4.400 15.500
Source: OECD Economic Surveys Italy [various years]
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Annex C: Changes o f the Pension System
Table 1 Changes of the Italian Pension System between 1992 and 1998
UP TO 1992 1998 STARTING
2000-08
AFTER FULL 
IMPLEMENTATION
Requirements 
for elderly 
pension
60 years of age 
(M)
55 years of age 
(W)
63 years of age (M) 
(1)
58 years of age (W) 
(1)
starting 2000 65 
years 60 years of age 
(W)
65 (M/W) years of age 
Early retirement is allowed if 
age is not lower than 57 
years with benefits inversely 
related to retirement age 
according go an actuarial 
correction
Requirement for
seniority
pension
eligibility
- private sector
employees
35 years of 
contributions at 
any age
35 years of 
contributions and 54 
years of age or 36 
years of
contributions (3)
starting in 2002, 35 
years of
contributions and 57 
years of age or 37 
years of contribution 
(40 years starting in 
2008)
- public sector 
employees
20 years of 
contributions at 
any age
35 years of 
contributions and 53 
years of age or 36 
years of
contributions (3)
starting in 2004 
same conditions 
required for private 
sector employees
-self-employed 35 years of 
contributions at 
any age
35 years of 
contributions and 57 
years of age or 40 
years of
contributions (1)
starting in 2001: 35 
years of
contributions and 58 
years of age or 40 
years of 
contributions
Indexation consumer price 
index (two annual 
revisions) and 
real wage 
changes(one 
annual revision)
pre-determined 
benefit in
percentage points of 
reference wage per 
year of contribution
same as before same as before
Benefits 
determination 
Elderly 
employees (4)
pre-determined 
benefit in 
percentage points 
of reference wage 
per year of 
contribution
gradual extension 
career period to 
calculate reference 
wage (1)
predetermined 
benefits in 
percentage points of 
reference wage per 
year of contribution
- reference wage last 5 years wage 
(private sector) 
final wage (public 
sector) same as 
before
2 percentage points 
of reference wage 
for all categories (2)
same as before
- percentage 
points of 
reference wage
2 (or more for 
special 
categories) 
percentage points 
of reference wage
2 percentage points 
of reference wage 
for all categories (2)
same as before
Middle-aged 
employee (5)
combination 
between 
predetermined 
benefit and 
contribution-based 
system benefit
same as before
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calculation using a 
‘pro-rata’ scheme 
according to the 
number of working 
years before and 
after 1996 (3)
Young workers 
(5)
contribution base benefit: 
according to lie expectancy 
and to the overall amount of 
contributions capitalised at 
the rate of growth of 
nominal GDP
Source: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1998
Key: (1) process starting in 1993
(2) process starting in 1995
(3) process starting in 1996
(4) elderly workers: 18 or more years of contributions in 1995
(5) middle age workers; less than 18 years of contributions in 1995
(6) young workers: new workers since 1996
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